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ABSTRACT
On 1 January 1995, the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) entered into force. Since
1998, negotiations to review and reform the DSU have taken place (‘DSU
review’), without however yielding any result so far. This study proposes
to analyse the DSU review negotiations and the proposals submitted so
far.
In a first step, the foundations for the discussion are laid with a brief
account of the economic, legal and political aspects of the dispute
settlement mechanism, its evolution and its working in practice.
In a second step, the study offers an overview and analysis of the
negotiating process in its broader context. Additionally, negotiating
proposals on stage-specific and horizontal issues of the dispute
settlement mechanism are presented and analysed in depth with regard
to their background, their contents and their potential implications.
In a third step, the difficulties faced by negotiators in completing the
DSU review are explored. Policy recommendations for further
negotiations are made and the chances of a future agreement are
evaluated.
Finally, the study is also intended to offer a one-stop point of departure
for other researchers who wish to explore further specific aspects of the
DSU review. To this end, references available on the DSU review exercise
have been comprehensively documented.
JEL Classification: F02, F13, K33, K41
Keywords: WTO, Dispute Settlement, DSU Review Negotiations
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1.  INTRODUCTION
On 1 January 1995, the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (‘Dispute Settlement
Understanding; DSU’) entered into force. Since 1998, negotiations to
review and reform the DSU have taken place (‘DSU review’),  without
however yielding any result so far. This study is proposed to present
the negotiations and the individual reform proposals in their broader
context. Moreover, it is aimed at offering an analysis of the DSU review,
including the reasons for its lack of success and the prospects of an
agreement in the future. By thoroughly documenting the negotiations,
the study is also intended to provide a one-stop point of departure for
researchers who wish to explore further specific aspects of the DSU
review.
1.1 The DSU: Relevance, Evolution, Procedure and Practice
Trade agreements on the basis of reciprocity such as the WTO agreement
are instruments used by governments to achieve trade liberalisation.
Such international co-operation helps governments to overcome the
protectionist bias of trade policy which is rooted in its political economy
context. This international exchange of (domestic) political support
between governments rests on the idea of a balance of rights and
obligations. In order to protect this balance from eroding – eg by trade
restrictions in violation of the trade agreement which one government
may use to enhance its political support from import-competing interests
– trade agreements usually include dispute settlement mechanisms
based on diplomatic and/or adjudicative procedures.
The multilateral trade system contains such a dispute settlement
mechanism. Since the establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) of 1947, it has evolved from a barely-codified, largely
diplomatic mechanism into a codified procedure combining elements
of consultation and adjudication. Since the entry into force of the WTO
agreement after the Uruguay Round, the Dispute Settlement
Understanding governs the settlement of disputes between WTO
members under the agreements which are covered.
In short, its terms provide for a procedure that starts with mandatory
consultations as a negotiatory element. If the parties cannot agree to a
22
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settlement during these consultations within a certain period, the
complainant may request a panel to review the matter. Panels engage in
fact-finding and apply the relevant WTO provisions. Their findings and
recommendations are published in a report which either of the parties
or both may appeal. The Appellate Body is then to review the issues of
law and legal interpretation in the panel report. It can uphold, modify
or reverse the panel’s findings. Subsequently, the reports are adopted in
a quasi-automatic adoption procedure by the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB) where all WTO members are represented by a delegate. ‘Quasi-
automatic’ adoption means that the reports are adopted unless the parties
decide by consensus (ie including the party that has prevailed) not to
adopt the report. If it has been found that a trade measure is in violation
of WTO law, the defendant must bring this measure into compliance
with the covered agreements within a reasonable period of time,
normally not exceeding 15 months.
If the defendant refuses to comply, the complainant may ask the
defendant to enter into negotiations on compensation, or it may seek
authorisation from the DSB to suspend concessions or other obligations
(SCOO) vis-à-vis the defendant in an amount equivalent to the injury
suffered. If the adequacy of implementation is disputed, the
implementation measures are subject to further review under the DSU.
The suspension of concessions or other obligations (SCOO), if authorised,
normally takes the form of punitive tariffs on a defined value of the
complainant’s imports from the defendant.
The DSU has often been praised enthusiastically as the ‘crown jewel’ of
the Uruguay Round Agreements, particularly in its early years. Key
innovations with regard to the dispute settlement practice which had
evolved under the GATT 1947 are the introduction of an appellate review
for panel decisions, strict time-frames for each procedural step and the
abolition of the former consensus requirement for the adoption of a panel
report which had allowed defendants to block the adoption of adverse
rulings. Between 1 January 1995 and 31 December 2004, its provisions
have been applied to 324 complaints brought by a variety of members
on a wide range of topics. Many observers have interpreted the frequent
use of the system as proof of its viability and effectiveness.
1.2 The DSU Review
In 1994, even before the DSU had entered into force, a separate
‘Ministerial Decision on the Application and Review of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
23
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Disputes’ was adopted. It called upon ministers to ‘complete a full review
of dispute settlement rules and procedures’ within four years after the
entry into force of the WTO agreement, and ‘to take a decision on the
occasion of its first meeting after the completion of the review, whether
to continue, modify or terminate such dispute settlement rules and
procedures’.
This review, commonly referred to as the ‘DSU review’, should
accordingly have been completed by 1 January 1999, and a decision
whether to continue, modify or terminate the procedure should have
been taken at the Seattle Ministerial in December 1999. However,
negotiators did not complete the DSU review in time. A deadline
extension until 31 July 1999 brought no results either, and the subsequent
Seattle Ministerial Conference was equally unable to take the required
decision. Despite efforts by some delegations to move the DSU review
forward in 2000 and 2001, it essentially remained in limbo between the
Third Ministerial Conference in Seattle in December 1999 and the Fourth
Ministerial Conference in Doha in November 2001.
It was only at the Doha Ministerial that the DSU review came back on to
the agenda. The Doha Ministerial Declaration contains an agreement to
negotiate on improvements and clarifications of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding. An agreement on improvements and clarifications
should have been reached not later than May 2003. Negotiations under
the Doha mandate took place on a very broad set of issues, based on a
variety of proposals with regard to the individual steps in the dispute
settlement procedure and horizontal issues such as transparency, third
party rights and special and differential treatment of developing
countries. Once again, however, negotiators were unable to agree by
the May 2003 deadline on the so-called Balás text, a compromise proposal
that had been worked out by the chairman of the DSU negotiations,
Hungarian Ambassador Péter Balás. A subsequent deadline extension
to May 2004 brought no conclusion of the DSU review negotiations either.
Currently, the negotiations continue, however, without a new target date.
1.3 Contribution of this Study
Literature on the WTO in general, and its dispute settlement system in
particular, has virtually exploded over the last few years. Whereas
academic interest was largely limited to the legal discipline during the
first years of research in the mid 1990s, scholars from economic and
political sciences have increasingly discovered WTO dispute settlement
as a rewarding research area in recent years.
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Authors from the field of jurisprudence have focused their efforts of
analysis mainly on selected jurisprudence developed by panels and
(much more so) by the Appellate Body. They have vividly commented
on panel and Appellate Body decisions and discussed the consequences
of rulings for the WTO, its legal system, and for national policies. Given
the enthusiastic welcome which the dispute settlement system under
the DSU enjoyed, particularly in its first years, one branch of legal
literature also discusses the model character of the DSU for other
international organisations. Similarly, the new system has been a key
element in the emerging discussion about the constitutionalisation of
international (trade) law.
Political scientists and economists have shown increasing interest in the
system as well. Empirical literature offers rich insights on the patterns
of dispute settlement such as dispute initiation, dispute escalation or
dispute outcomes. The findings are increasingly derived from large data
sets which become available as usage of the system increases. Often, the
studies also include data of dispute settlement under the GATT 1947
and contrast the two systems. Theoretical literature is more interested
in exploring the concepts of political economy which underlie the WTO
in general and its dispute settlement system in particular. Often, the
methodology developed in game theory or the economic analysis of the
law is applied in the analysis of the WTO dispute settlement system.
Finally, research on the dispute settlement system has become more and
more interdisciplinary. Recent years have seen a surge in publications
that have been jointly written by authors from the legal field and authors
with a background in economics or political science.
Despite the rich literature on the DSU from various disciplinary
backgrounds, the DSU review exercise as such is a fairly new research
topic.1 This relative lack of interest in members’ proposals and
negotiations is rather surprising. This holds in particular if it is judged
in the light of the general explosion of literature on the DSU and in the
light of the vivid interest that even single adjudicating decisions have
attracted – eg the rulings in the Shrimp-Turtle or the Bananas cases, each
of which has become the subject of countless contributions. This over-
emphasis on rulings and recommendations, and the lack of interest in
the political discussions, is dangerous from both an analytical and a
practical perspective. From the analytical point of view, it creates a
general perception in which the role of the adjudicating bodies is
1 One of the first contributions is Van der Borght (1999). More recent analyses include
Petersmann (ed) (2003); Ortino and Petersmann (eds) (2003; see (in particular) the first
part of the volume); Hauser and Zimmermann (2003).
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chronically overstated and where the intergovernmental, member-driven
character of the Organisation is largely overlooked. Practically, such a
distorted assessment may lead to policy recommendations or actions
which are out of tune with political realities and which may endanger
the sustainability of the system at large and, by consequence, the stability
of the international trade order.
The DSU review exercise, although it has been unsuccessful so far, has
brought forth a variety of proposals in the last six years that are supposed
to contribute to improvements and clarifications of the mechanism. Not
only are these negotiations and proposals of interest in their own right,
but they also offer a reflection of the experience that WTO members
have gathered in nine years of dispute settlement practice. The
discussions are revealing with regard to the general degree of satisfaction
of members with the system and they can serve as an indicator for
problems or tensions in the mechanism. And finally, the discussions of
the DSU review assist us in establishing some hypotheses on the future
evolution of the dispute settlement system.
This study pursues the following research objectives:
• Overview and analysis of the negotiating process in its context
(Chapter 5);
• In-depth presentation and analysis of the negotiating proposals
and their background (Chapters 6 and 7);
• Analysis of the reasons why the negotiations have failed so far
(Chapter 8);
• Policy recommendations for future negotiations and an
assessment of the chances of a possible agreement (Chapter 9);
• Concluding remarks: Evaluation of the general importance of an
agreement on the DSU review (Chapter 10);
• Provision of a one-stop point of departure for other researchers
wishing to explore further aspects of the DSU review (References
and Chapters 11–15)
The background for the discussions – ie the political, economic, legal
and historical context of the DSU – is established in Chapters 2, 3 and 4.
26
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1.4 Research Approach and Plan of the Study
The research approach and the structure of this study have been chosen
in the light of the aforementioned purposes. Part I introduces the reader
to the concept of multilateral trade dispute settlement and provides the
foundations for the discussion of the DSU review. Specifically, Chapter
2 briefly explains the political economy rationale of trade agreements
and their enforcement. It subsequently traces the evolution of multilateral
trade dispute settlement from the early days of the Havana Charter
negotiations through the nearly five-decade-long experience under
GATT 1947 up to the entry into force of the DSU. This outline also shows
the evolution of a system that has been torn between diverging
orientations that still underlie much of the DSU review discussion today:
political realism, diplomatic traditions, negotiatory elements and power-
orientation on the one hand, and the (often idealistic) endeavour for a
rules-based trading-system and the actual role of the existing legal
provisions on the other. This historical account thus offers a basis for a
more finely-tuned evaluation of the current discussion. It provides
yardsticks that help to distinguish between erratic noise and fundamental
trends in the current debate. Chapter 2 is based largely on the study of
secondary literature.
The historical account ends with the Uruguay Round of multilateral
trade negotiations that brought forth the current Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU) which is presented in detail in Chapter 3. It starts
with a brief account of national dispute initiation procedures (eg US
Section 301). Although these procedures are, strictly speaking, not part
of the multilateral process, both are interlinked in several ways and
should be seen in context for a proper understanding. Afterwards, the
multilateral elements in the technique of WTO dispute settlement are
explained in a stage-oriented approach: consultations, panel stage,
appellate review and implementation. ‘Horizontal topics’ such as third
party rights, or special and differential treatment are also presented to
the extent necessary for the understanding of the remainder of the study.
Chapter 3 is largely based on the study of the treaty text, as well as on
pertinent secondary literature and case law.
Chapter 4 completes the first part by summarising the first 10 years of
dispute settlement practice in the WTO. Basic statistical data on the use
of WTO dispute settlement is presented. It is complemented by a brief
discussion of the reception of the dispute settlement mechanism in legal,
theoretic and empirical literature.
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Now that the stage has been set, Part II offers an in-depth discussion of
the review and reform efforts for the DSU that have been undertaken
since 1998. Chapter 5 starts by giving an overview of the different stages
of the review exercise. For each of the five negotiating periods since
1998, the course of negotiations is laid down, and the main proposals as
well as their context (chiefly consisting of high-profile cases undergoing
the dispute settlement procedure) are introduced. Due to a lack of
secondary sources on this negotiating process, Chapter 5 is based on
the study of (i) formal negotiating proposals and protocols, (ii) informal
negotiating proposals (where available) and (iii) on extensive use of
specialised news sources. Particularly with the earliest (1998–1999) and
the most recent (2003–2004) stage of the negotiations, specialised news
sources often constitute the only source of publicly available information
as negotiations during these stages were mostly informal. Chapter 5
shows how the evolving dispute settlement practice and national
experiences increasingly shaped controversial country positions that
became more and more difficult to bridge in the course of the negotiating
process. It also shows to what extent pending cases repeatedly brought
up new issues and prevented members from entering into an agreement.
Chapters 6 and 7 present the individual negotiating proposals. The focus
lies on the formal proposals that were submitted during the 2002–2003
negotiations under the Doha mandate. Specifically, Chapter 6 analyses
those proposals that are linked to a specific stage of the procedure, ie
consultations, the panel stage, appellate review and implementation.
To this end, all national submissions have been screened and their
elements have been regrouped in stage-specific and issue-specific
paragraphs. This allows readers to gain a broad picture of the differing
approaches and controversies with regard to specific problems. Chapter
7, in turn, deals with ‘horizontal’ issues that often cannot easily be
assigned to a specific stage. These issues include transparency, the
treatment of confidential information, third party rights and special and
differential treatment of developing countries. For each proposal
discussed in these two chapters, information is provided on whether it
found sufficient support among the membership to be considered in
the Balás text, which should have been the basis for an agreement at the
end of May 2003.
In exploring the DSU review proposals, Chapters 6 and 7 are not limited
to a discussion of the contents of the country submissions. Rather, both
chapters seek to explore the background of major proposals where
pertinent information has been available. Such background information
may relate to specific national experience with the use of a provision, to
a specific motivation or to domestic policy pressures. It also helps us to
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identify linkages between issues that are otherwise discussed in isolation.
Often, these driving forces behind specific proposals are not discernible
on the basis of the diplomatic negotiating documents alone. It is therefore
helpful to ‘decode’ the ‘cryptic’ official diplomatic documents in order
to evaluate and properly understand the proposals. For this purpose,
Chapters 6 and 7 also rely on related case law such as panel or Appellate
Body reports, scholarly contributions and press reports.
Part III offers conclusions and recommendations based on the preceding
analysis. The major reasons for the failure of the negotiations are the
subject of Chapter 8. First, the consensus requirement for any
amendment to the DSU sets high hurdles and underlines the
‘constitutional’ character of the DSU. Secondly, major issue-specific
divides are identified, particularly those running between the US and
the EC, and those running between developed and developing countries.
Thirdly, a more fundamental divide seems to emerge. Whereas some
proposals would further strengthen the rules-based, adjudication-
oriented approach to dispute settlement, other proposals seek to
strengthen the diplomatic, negotiatory element. Fourthly, reforming a
system in use is subject to several systemic difficulties which are also
explained in Chapter 8. Fifthly, there is a general sense of satisfaction
with the functioning of the system. Finally, the ability of members to
adapt the system in practice to changing circumstances without
modifications to the DSU text have reduced the pressure towards a fast
conclusion of the DSU review negotiations.
Chapter 9 seeks to draw some policy recommendations from the study.
Based on the difficulties and problems that have been identified in
Chapter 8, a more modest approach to the DSU review is proposed. A
focus on technical improvements appears to be the only way susceptible
of consensus. Secondly, the participation of developing countries in the
system will have to be improved if their consent to any change is to be
secured. Thirdly, and on a more general level, a new balance between
the often inefficient political decision-making processes and the relatively
efficient adjudication system will have to be found, if tensions in DSU
practice are to be reduced and chances for an agreement on the DSU
review increased. Fourthly, the insertion of generous transition periods
appears to be an essential element to overcome the systemic difficulties
in the negotiation process. In addition to these policy recommendations,
Chapter 9 also offers a brief outlook on the future course of the
discussion. Whereas a conclusion of the negotiations in the short run
seems to be unlikely, the conclusion of the DSU review negotiations as
part of the Doha final package appears to be a politically feasible option.
Chapter 10 offers some final conclusions.
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 1. Introduction
Throughout the study, much space is dedicated to thorough referencing
to further sources on the DSU review. These references are intended to
enable readers and researchers to use this study as a point of departure
for further research efforts. To this end, Chapter 11 in the Annex (Part
IV) contains a full synopsis of all the country proposals that have been
submitted during the Doha-mandated DSU review. The tabular overview
allows readers to locate proposals on any specific issue, and briefly to
review an entire country submission. In addition, Part V contains the
bibliography of scholarly literature (Chapter 12), a listing of official WTO
documents (Chapter 13), press reports (Chapter 14) and other sources
(Chapter 15) that were used in this study.
The work on Chapters 2, 3, 4.2, 5.1–5.5, 6, 7, 13 and 15 has been concluded
in January 2004. Other chapters and sections have been revised and
updated in January 2005.

PART I
WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT:
ECONOMIC RATIONALE, EVOLUTION,
PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE
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2.  ECONOMIC RATIONALE AND HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF
GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
2.1 Economic Considerations
The purpose of this section is to give a condensed overview of the
economic rationale of international trade agreements and their
enforcement. It is not intended to cover the entire body of literature on
the political economy of international trade relations but rather to embed
the discussion on the DSU and its review into the underlying political
and economic context. A survey of the reception of the DSU in legal,
theoretical and empirical literature on the DSU is included in Section
4.2.
2.1.1 The Rationale of International Trade Agreements
It has been argued that one of the few principles on which most
economists can agree is the supremacy of free trade over any other
international economic regime. Since the early days of Adam Smith and
David Ricardo,1 it is a well-established view that trade liberalisation,
even unilateral liberalisation, is to the benefit of the liberalising country.
The freedom to transact internationally promotes efficiency in factor
allocation and in the economic choices of individuals – be they
consumers, workers or investors. Although theoretically plausible
doubts have been voiced with regard to the assumptions underlying
classical trade theory and its normative interpretation in favour of free
trade, the basic recommendation of economists in favour of free trade
has not been altered fundamentally.2 Despite popular perception to the
contrary, gains from trade accrue to an economy regardless of whether
1 So-called absolute (Adam Smith) or comparative (David Ricardo) advantage; for an
introduction into the two concepts, see Dixit and Norman (1980). Extracts from the original
sources are available in Overbeek (1999).
2 Most economic objections against free trade stem from the consideration of imperfect
competition and external effects. One such argument is the infant industry argument
which goes back to List (see List (1841) for the original contribution or Kemp (1964) for a
more recent analytical approach. A seminal critique of the concept is included in Baldwin
(1964)). With regard to imperfect competition, strategic trade theory has questioned the
supremacy of the free trade argument for sectors with oligopolistic structures such as
high technology. Major contributions include Brander (1995), Brander and Spencer (1985),
Krugman (1987), Krugman (1986) and Krugman (1984). For an overview and criticism of
the concept, see Kantzenbach, Molitor and Mayer (1994).
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or not other economies liberalise their trade as well.3 Given the economic
supremacy of open trade, the question emerges why trade is then so
often restricted by tariffs and a myriad of non-tariff barriers, and why
the opening of markets only occurs on a reciprocal basis.
In the first place, the question arises why trade restrictions are permissible
at all in ‘liberal’ economic systems. As a closer analysis reveals, the
contractual freedom of citizens is relatively well-protected from
government interventions in most constitutional systems if the
transaction partner resides within the national boundaries or is a co-
national. By contrast, interventions into transactions with non-residents
and foreigners do not need to conform to the same standards. This ‘dual
standard’, which could be explained with the embedding of international
trade into the larger context of foreign relations and foreign policy, has
a long-standing tradition in most major constitutional orders, including
in the US and in the (relatively new) European Union legal system.4
The mere existence of a dual standard does, however, not yet explain
why policy-makers should engage in restricting trade. Literature from
the field of political economy offers an answer to this question. It is
based on the understanding that political actors are utility-maximising
individuals, aiming to maximise political support.5 In this line of
reasoning, interventionist trade policies are a reflection of the distributive
character of trade policy, particularly within countries. Whereas trade
liberalisation benefits consumers and importers, it harms owners of
production factors of import-competing industries, as the goods and
services which they produce are under threat of replacement by more
competitive imports. The harmful effect can consist of lower factor
remuneration or, in the case of factor price rigidity, in unemployment.
Problems arise in particular if the production factors concerned are not
sufficiently mobile for use in other, more competitive sectors (eg
unskilled labour or invested capital).6
The distributive dimension of trade policy leads the owners of
production factors in import-competing sectors to oppose any market
3 On trade theory, see Dixit and Norman (1980).
4 For a critical analysis of the dual standards in the protection of the freedom of transaction,
see also Petersmann (1992).
5 Important initial contributions to this literature have been made by James M. Buchanan,
Gordon Tullock and Geoffrey Brennan. Not surprisingly, this approach has also been
applied to international trade relations; see Krueger (1974) for an early contribution.
6 The identification of winners and losers of liberalisation goes back to the ‘specific factor
model’ of Jones (1971) and Samuelson (1971).
35
 2. Economic Rationale and Historical Evolution of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement
opening on a political level. Such lobbying is likely to unfold its intended
effects as there are few constitutional restraints on politicians with regard
to interventions into the international economic freedom of their citizens,
as has been pointed out above.7 Politicians, in turn, view trade policy as
a valuable instrument to increase political support.8
Although one might prima facie argue that protectionist interests are
balanced by the free-trade interests of consumers as well as importers,
and that trade has a positive ‘net balance’ according to welfare theory,
some drawbacks of the political market give an advantage to
protectionist interests. These include, to name only a few, the uneven
distribution of gains and losses from trade and the impact of interest
groups;9 the frequent political over-representation of protectionist
interests, often combined with ‘log rolling’;10 and the political
attractiveness of redistribution by trade policy due to its intransparency.11
Other major factors are administrative interests in protection and the
time-lag between the occurrence of gains and adjustment costs, combined
with short political cycles.12
One way of overcoming the bias of trade policy decisions in favour of
protection, despite the economic benefits of free trade, consists of
internationally agreed market access concessions that are based on
reciprocity. The producers of country A gain access to the market of
country B, whereas the producers of country B, in turn, obtain access to
the market of country A. In other words, the exporters of country A can
only gain access to the market of country B if the government of country
A opens up its own market. Such mutual liberalisation changes the
national parallelogram of forces which influence the government’s trade
policy. Whereas before only importers and the poorly organised
consumers had a preference for free trade in the absence of international
co-operation, additional lobbying for an open national trade regime
comes now from a well-organised export industry that is interested in
access to foreign markets. Trade liberalisation therefore usually occurs
based on reciprocity. By consequence, reciprocity is first of all a political
7 For analyses of trade policies from this perspective, see Bhagwati (1988) Tumlir (1983),
Tumlir (1984) and Tumlir (1985).
8 See, for instance, the contribution by Grossman and Helpman (1994).
9 This problem was first identified by Olson (1965).
10 See, for instance, Irwin and Kroszner (1996).
11 See, for instance, Tumlir (1984). See also Roessler (1986), p 472 for an example.
12 See, for instance, Thomas and Nash (1991), pp 80ff.
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concept, because it implies an international exchange of (domestic)
political support between governments.13
International negotiations with a view to mutual market access
improvements can take place bilaterally (ie between two countries),
regionally (ie between a limited number of countries only in a regional
integration area such as the EC) or globally in a multilateral framework
such as the WTO. The WTO system aims at the reduction of trade barriers
within reciprocal, mutually advantageous arrangements. It supplies a
framework for national trade policy, a forum for multilateral
negotiations, and it is in charge of administration, surveillance and
dispute resolution. Core substantive elements of the GATT/WTO
multilateral trade order are the prohibition of quantitative restrictions
(as they are particularly damaging in their economic effects) and the
principle of non-discrimination. Non-discrimination basically means that
all products should be treated equally regardless of their origin. The
non-discrimination principle can further be divided into two ‘sub
principles’: national treatment (ie equal treatment by the importing
country of national products and imported products, eg Article III GATT)
and most-favoured nation treatment (ie equal treatment by the importing
country of goods that originate in different export countries; eg Article
I GATT). Although important systemic exceptions apply,14 the basic
rationale of the WTO system is to promote freer trade on the basis of
these principles. In so doing , the system also serves a domestic policy
function by contributing to a certain restoration of the freedom of contract
that is undermined by the dual standard of protection.15
13 For an introduction into the political economy of the world trading system, see Hoekman
and Kostecki (2001). There are numerous other contributions such as Bagwell and Staiger
(2002), Bagwell, Mavroidis and Staiger (2002), Bagwell and Staiger (2000) and Bagwell
and Staiger (1997) focusing on the role of reciprocity and non-discrimination to safeguard
terms-of-trade as the key concern of international trade agreements. The role of reciprocity
in international trade relations has also been debated in Keohane (1986). On the domestic
policy function of international trade agreements, see, for instance, Hauser (1988).
14 For instance, countries may levy tariffs on imported products despite the national
treatment obligation. Further on, MFN treatment is not required for additional concessions
granted to partners in regional integration areas or to developing countries. Moreover,
the extent to which these principles materialise varies across sectors and countries. Usually,
disciplines are less tight with regard to ‘sensitive sectors’ such as agriculture or with
regard to trade in services that was only integrated into the multilateral framework in
the Uruguay Round. Finally, multilateral disciplines do not apply to the same extent for
developing countries. Senti (2001) offers a comprehensive overview of the WTO system.
15 Tumlir (1983, p 80) called international economic treaties the ‘second line of national
constitutional entrenchment’, whereas Roessler (1986) sees the principles of the GATT as
‘subsitutes for constitutional norms’. The discussion on the domestic policy function of
international trade rules was particularly vivid in the mid 1980s. For an overview, see the
special edition of Aussenwirtschaft (vol 41 (1986), nos 2 and 3) to the memory of Jan Tumlir,
including the contributions of Petersmann (1986) and Roessler (1986). See also the
contributions of Tumlir (1983), Tumlir (1984), Tumlir (1985) and Hauser (1988).
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2.1.2 The Enforcement of Obligations Under the  Multilateral
Trade Agreements
Despite the enhanced political feasibility of trade liberalisation in the
multilateral, reciprocity-based WTO environment, incentives for
support-maximising politicians to circumvent the WTO principles
continue to exist. As Roessler (1986, p 474) notes: ‘(i)t is generally
assumed that international obligations are burdens which States accept
for the sole purpose of obtaining the corresponding rights and that States
play games in which each attempts to assume a minimum of obligations
and obtain a maximum of rights.’ We can therefore expect governments
to wish to keep other markets open in order to maximise political support
from their export industry, while they will do their best to spurn WTO
disciplines where this is opportune to accommodate the interests of
politically influential import-competing sectors. Enforcement tools are
therefore required to protect what Bagwell, Mavroidis and Staiger (2000,
p 61) call governments’ ‘property rights over market access
commitments’. The need for such an enforcement device is particularly
important from the vantage point of small or medium-sized countries
that cannot enforce the obligations on larger trading partners by means
of unilateral punishment, given their limited political or economic
weight.
Such enforcement tools therefore serve different purposes:
• to provide a system of incentives to deter governments from
taking measures which are inconsistent with their
internationally agreed obligations;
• to offer governments an instrument to challenge actions
by other members that nullify or impair the benefits which
accrue to them under the negotiated trade agreements,
whether due to a violation of WTO rules or not;
• to provide for an orderly management of trade disputes by
preventing the escalation or spread of uncontrolled ‘trade
wars’ which would emerge from unilateral action or
arbitrary retaliation.
Since WTO law belongs to the realm of public international law, there
are limits on enforcement. As Bello (1996) notes, the WTO has ‘no
jailhouse, no bail bondsmen, no blue helmets, no truncheons, no tear
gas’. In other words, compliance is voluntary and depends upon the
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acceptance of the rules and sufficient political will of members. In such
a setting, several enforcement options are generally thinkable.
One alternative is the so-called diplomatic protection mechanism as laid
down in the Dispute Settlement Understanding (see Chapter 3 for a
detailed description) which is the topic of this study. An economic actor
(typically an exporter of country C) who holds that country D violates
its obligations under WTO law, needs to inform its government about
the trade barrier and convince it that action is necessary.16 The
government of the exporting country C then decides on whether or not
to avail itself of the dispute settlement mechanism provided under the
DSU.
Alternatively, WTO rules could also be anchored in national
constitutional systems and enforced domestically.17 One such mode of
enforcement would consist of granting WTO principles direct effect. It
would allow private economic actors to directly refer to WTO provisions
in national courts when challenging national trade barriers. This would
contribute to grassroots enforcement, usually by the importers in their
home country. So far, however, only a few isolated provisions, for
instance in the TRIPS agreement or in the Plurilateral Agreement on
Government Procurement, grant economic actors such a right to
domestic enforcement. The US and the EC explicitly excluded direct
effect through their domestic legislation when they implemented the
WTO agreements. Although the legal value of this exclusion is unclear,
it shows the reluctance of countries to grant direct effect.18 Since the
unilateral granting of direct effect to WTO provisions would create
political problems of reciprocity (as enforcement could be more rigid in
some countries than in others), it has been suggested that major players
in the world trade system should conclude a reciprocal agreement to
this effect.19 Even in this case, however, difficulties from a reciprocity
point of view might emerge out of differences in the application or
interpretation of the rules between the members.
Another option which is in principle based on the idea of direct effect is
thinkable. A producer, an exporter, a consumer or an importer would
be directly entitled to lodge a complaint against national trade measures
at the WTO which would then investigate the case. Compared with
complaints before national courts, this option, however, still has the
16 Theoretically, such an initiative could also emanate from an importer or consumer in
the defendant country.
17 See, for instance, Petersmann (1986) who made such calls.
18 An excellent overview of the discussion on direct effect is Cottier and Schefer (1998).
19 This idea was brought up by Tumlir (1985a).
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shortcoming that implementation would continue to depend on a
country’s good will, because national courts would not be involved.
Again, many governments have strong feelings against granting private
parties standing at the WTO.20
Finally, the WTO could pursue violations ‘ex officio’ through an official
prosecutor. Efforts by Uruguay in the 1960s to make the organisation
the prosecutor of its own law have, however, failed.21
As this overview of enforcement options shows, the DSU is currently
the only mechanism available to secure compliance with WTO
provisions. Given the role of the WTO for establishing open trade on
the one hand, and the importance of having an enforcement mechanism
to protect the market access commitments under the WTO on the other,
the DSU assumes a crucial role in the international economic system.
2.2 Historical Evolution
2.2.1 Dispute Settlement Under the Havana Charter
2.2.1.1  Dispute Settlement Provisions
The fathers of the post-war international economic architecture originally
planned to entrust the International Trade Organisation (ITO) with the
regulation of world trade. This organisation would have been established
based on the ‘Havana Charter for the International Trade Organisation’
of 1947.22 It never entered into force, mainly due to resistance from the
US Congress. Chapter VIII of the ITO Charter contained specific
provisions governing the ‘settlement of differences’. As the core concepts
discussed during ITO negotiations on dispute settlement were to impact
the coming evolution of dispute settlement under the GATT and later
under the WTO, they provide a useful background for the understanding
of dispute settlement in international trade matters and shall therefore
briefly be introduced at this stage.
Members undertake in the Havana Charter not to have recourse, in
relation to other members and to the ITO, to other procedures than those
20 This issue is discussed in Mavroidis et al (1998). On the multilateral level, standing of
private parties already exists for international investment disputes before the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) which provides individual legal
protection.
21 See Section 2.2.2.4.
22 The Havanna Charter is contained in the Appendix to Wilcox (1949), pp 227–327. Chapter
VIII on the ‘Settlement of Differences’ is available at pp 305–08.
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laid down in the Charter or to unilateral economic measures.23 Members
are called upon to ‘give sympathetic consideration’ to ‘written
representations or proposals’ by other members who consider that
benefits accruing to them are nullified or impaired, be it as a consequence
of (a) a breach of an obligation under the Charter; (b) the application of
measures not in conflict with the Charter; or (c) the existence of any
other situation. According to the Charter, members can resolve such
disputes either between themselves or through arbitration which would
only be binding on the parties to the dispute but not to other Members
or the ITO. Disputing parties shall inform the ITO of the outcome.24
In case such consultations are unsuccessful, any member may refer the
matter to the Executive Board25 of the ITO which shall investigate the
matter promptly. The executive board shall then take one of the following
steps: (a) decide that the matter does not call for any action; (b)
recommend further consultation to the Members; (c) refer the matter to
arbitration upon terms to be agreed between the executive board and
the members concerned; (d) in the case of a breach of rules, request the
Member concerned to take the necessary action to conform to the Charter;
(e) for other instances of nullification or impairment to make
recommendations that assist the members concerned and contribute to
a satisfactory adjustment. If the Executive Board considers that action
under (d) and (e) is not likely to be effective in time to prevent serious
injury, it may : ‘release the Member or Members affected from obligations
or the grant of concessions ... to the extent and upon such conditions ...
as it considers appropriate and compensatory, having regard to the
benefit which has been nullified or impaired.’
The Executive Board has the authority to bring any matter referred to it
before the Conference at any time during the consideration of the
matter.26 The Executive Board is even obliged to refer actions, decisions
or recommendations it has made to the Conference for a review if it is
requested to do so by a member. As a kind of ‘political appellate review
mechanism’, the Conference’s task is then to confirm, modify or reverse
such action, decision or recommendation. The investigations and further
actions to be carried out by the conference are the same as those available
to the Executive Board. It may also release the member concerned from
23 Article 92 Havana Charter.
24 Article 93 Havana Charter.
25 Provisions on the Executive Board are included in Articles 78–81 Havana Charter.
26 Article 94 Havana Charter; provisions on the Conference are included in Articles 74–77
Havana Charter.
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obligations or concessions to other members to an appropriate and
compensatory extent in view of the benefits that have been nullified or
impaired.27
The legal aspects of conference decisions which prejudice the interests
of any member (including those regarding the suspension of concessions
or obligations) are subject to review by the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) upon request from a member. The ITO is bound by the opinion of
the ICJ and shall modify its decision if required.28 Ultimately, a member
to whom the application of obligations or concessions has been
suspended is free to withdraw from the ITO.29
Summarising the dispute settlement provisions of the ITO, a procedure
of several steps was foreseen. Based on the obligation to abstain from
unilateral action, each member that considered its benefits nullified or
impaired would first have had to seek a solution through bilateral
consultations or bilaterally agreed arbitration. If this first step did not
yield satisfactory results, complaints would have been investigated by
the Executive Board. In a third step, such rulings could then be ‘appealed’
to the plenary Conference. As a fourth step, they could be appealed to
the ICJ as far as issues of law were concerned. Remedies included the
suspension of concessions or obligations and, ultimately, a withdrawal
from the ITO. The statute thus contains a combination of instruments,
starting with negotiatory and political elements at the beginning of the
procedure and gradually moving towards more judicial procedures,
including the review of legal issues before the ICJ.
As the negotiating history of the Havana Charter reveals, this procedure
was rather controversial, in particular with regard to the appeal before
the ICJ. First drafts favoured by powerful countries such as the US and
the United Kingdom (UK) would have allowed appeals only ‘if the
Conference consents’, whereas smaller traders such as the Netherlands,
Belgium and France objected. They feared that the legal rulings by the
Executive Board and the Conference might well be political rather than
objective. The final solution – ITO requests to the ICJ for advisory opinions
on legal questions only – was therefore a compromise between the two
positions.30
27 Article 95 Havana Charter.
28 Article 96 Havana Charter.
29Article 95.4 Havana Charter.
30 See Hudec (1990), Chapter 3.
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2.2.1.2 Core Concept: Balance of Rights and Obligations
The Havana Charter’s language on the settlement of differences makes
it clear that the core concept is the preservation of the balance of rights
(or benefits) and obligations. Commonly referred to as ‘reciprocity’, this
concept was central to US trade treaties concluded during the inter-war
period. (The importance of reciprocity from a political economy
perspective is explained in Section 2.1 above.) The rationale is that tariff
concessions, even combined with legal commitments such as a
prohibition of quantitative restrictions, cannot guarantee that commercial
opportunities are not nullified by other (for instance domestic) measures.
As it would be impossible to prohibit all potential restrictions, and as
governments would not be prepared to circumscribe their freedom in
all related policy areas, the broad notion of nullification or impairment
was established as a legitimate ground for requesting consultations. The
potential instances of nullification or impairment of benefits were defined
in a very broad manner, stretching beyond outright violations and
including also other situations (eg economic depression). Combined with
a termination clause that would allow a party to withdraw from the
agreement, this instrument was considered sufficiently protective of
reciprocity. To fit within this framework, legal obligations had to be
treated as flexible commitments, pliable enough to lead to mutually
acceptable solutions. Moreover, acceptance of these provisions was, to
a large extent, supported by confidence in the organisation and a strong
sense of community among the draftsmen.31
The dispute settlement rules contained in Chapter VIII of the Havana
Charter never became effective, as the ITO never entered into force.32
2.2.2 Dispute Settlement Under the GATT 1947
Although the ITO was never implemented, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT, now GATT 1947) was put into force by the
‘Protocol of Provisional Application’ (PPA) on 1 January 1948. It was a
temporary trade agreement that had been negotiated in parallel with
31 See Hudec (1990), pp 23ff and pp 45ff.
32 See Hudec (1990), pp 59–61. Chapters 1–6 of Hudec (1990) offer a comprehensive insight
into the background and negotiating history of the ITO as well as on the nature and
central elements of the ITO legal system. For shorter overviews on dispute settlement
provisions and the Havana Charter, see also Wilcox (1949), pp 159ff, Jackson (1990), pp
9–17, Jackson (1997), pp 35ff, Hudec (1998), pp 102–03.
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the ITO Charter as an interim agreement. The GATT contained most of
the ITO’s trade policy rules and a preliminary version of the nullification
and impairment clause. However, the GATT did not contain any
reference to arbitration or review by the ICJ. The GATT was also very
limited in terms of legal and organisational structure. Institutionally,
reference was made only to the CONTRACTING PARTIES that, if spelled
in capital letters, designated the collective group of contracting parties
when performing official decision-making functions. These features
made the GATT a mere ‘trade agreement’. Put into force by a Protocol
of Provisional Application, and along with an agreement that countries
would bind themselves only ‘to the fullest extent not inconsistent with
existing legislation’, these characteristics were meant to facilitate
respectively help evade the process of ratification in the signatory
countries.
The rudimentary dispute settlement provisions were contained in its
Articles XXII and XXIII (current version):
Article XXII
Consultation
1. Each contracting party shall accord
sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford
adequate opportunity for consultation
regarding, such representations as may be
made by another contracting party with
respect to any matter affecting the operation
of this Agreement.
2. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may, at the
request of a contracting party, consult with any
contracting party or parties in respect of any
matter for which it has not been possible to
find a satisfactory solution through
consultation under paragraph 1.
Article XXIII
Nullification or Impairment
1. If any contracting party should consider that
any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly
under this Agreement is being nullified or
impaired or that the attainment of any
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objective of the Agreement is being impeded
as the result of
(a) the failure of another contracting party
to carry out its obligations under this
Agreement, or
(b) the application by another contracting
party of any measure, whether or not it
conflicts with the provisions of this
Agreement, or
(c) the existence of any other situation,
the contracting party may, with a view to the
satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make
written representations or proposals to the
other contracting party or parties which it
considers to be concerned. Any contracting
party thus approached shall give sympathetic
consideration to the representations or
proposals made to it.
2. If no satisfactory adjustment is effected
between the contracting parties concerned
within a reasonable time, or if the difficulty is
of the type described in paragraph 1 (c) of this
Article, the matter may be referred to the
CONTRACTING PARTIES. The
CONTRACTING PARTIES shall promptly
investigate any matter so referred to them and
shall make appropriate recommendations to
the contracting parties which they consider to
be concerned, or give a ruling on the matter,
as appropriate. The CONTRACTING
PARTIES may consult with contracting parties,
with the Economic and Social Council of the
United Nations and with any appropriate
inter-governmental organization in cases
where they consider such consultation
necessary. If the CONTRACTING PARTIES
consider that the circumstances are serious
enough to justify such action, they may
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authorize a contracting party or parties to
suspend the application to any other
contracting party or parties of such
concessions or other obligations under this
Agreement as they determine to be
appropriate in the circumstances. If the
application to any contracting party of any
concession or other obligation is in fact
suspended, that contracting party shall then
be free, not later than sixty days after such
action is taken, to give written notice to the
Executive Secretary3 to the CONTRACTING
PARTIES of its intention to withdraw from this
Agreement and such withdrawal shall take
effect upon the sixtieth day following the day
on which such notice is received by him.
3 By the decision of 23 March 1965, the Contracting Parties
changed the title of the head of the GATT secretariat from
‘Executive Secretary’ to ‘Director General’.
Similarly to the provisions contained in the ITO Charter, the rules
provided for a combination of a general system of negotiation and
dispute settlement. Again, the core concept was the ‘nullification or
impairment’ of benefits, as the headline of Article XXIII confirms. We
now turn to how these provisions worked and developed in practice.33
2.2.2.1 Chairman Rulings in 1948
Dispute settlement activity began early and on a relatively tentative and
provisional basis. When the first dispute arose over a Benelux complaint
against Cuban consular taxes, and consultations yielded no results, the
Dutch delegation requested a ruling from the chair on whether the Most
Favoured Nation (MFN) obligation laid down in Article I GATT applied
to consular taxes. The chairman ruled ‘yes’ without any further
discussion, and Cuba later reported that it had removed the
discriminatory tax. The chairman’s personal prestige had served as a
source of collective authority. Yet, the practice of chairmen’s rulings was
33 On the basic design of Articles XXII and XXIII, their position in the GATT architecture,
and the Protocol of Provisional Application, see also Jackson (2001), pp 181ff, Jackson
(1997), pp 35–41, Petersmann (1997), pp 70ff, Jackson (1990), pp 9–17 and, more specifically
on dispute settlement, pp 59ff, as well as Hudec (1990), pp 49–58.
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short-lived. From the second session on, which was also held in 1948,
legal complaints were referred to subsidiary Working Groups.34
2.2.2.2  Use of Working Parties Between 1949 and 1951
Working groups (or working parties) are negotiating bodies that are
appointed to do work which cannot be done efficiently in the formal
setting of a plenary meeting. They offer the advantage of a limited
number of participants, sufficient time to consider an issue in depth,
and informal face-to-face bargaining where possibilities can be explored
without formal commitments to a position. This model was now also
used in dispute settlement.
Initially, working parties were composed of the complainant, the
defendant and neutral members. In a first case on Brazilian taxes,
disagreement on some issues was resolved, whereas it persisted on
others. On these, the report simply catalogued the opposing arguments.
A later case involving working parties had already a stronger orientation
towards adjudication. In a Chilean complaint about an Australian
subsidy, the working party was formed of the main parties and three
neutral members. The neutral members concluded that Chile’s complaint
was valid and the secretariat prepared a draft report in the name of the
Working Party which stated and explained the majority’s conclusions.
Australia later filed a separate memorandum stating its own position,
whereas the report of the three neutral members contained a decision
on a legal issue. Whereas the Australian delegation began to lobby among
the Contracting Parties for the rejection of the report, others started a
counter-lobby stressing the importance of not subjecting such decisions
to political review. The report was subsequently approved. This
procedure constituted some middle ground. It was factually third party
adjudication but the formal structure was still a working party with full
membership of the principal parties.35
2.2.2.3  Use of Panels After 1952
Dispute settlement activity continued to increase. In 1952, the chairman
of the Contracting Parties suggested dealing with several disputes within
a “single working group”. A few days later, the term ‘panel’ appeared
for the first time to designate this working group. Two characteristics in
particular differentiated it from prior working groups. First, none of
34 See Hudec (1998), pp 104–05 and, in more detail, Hudec (1990), pp 75ff for a summary
of the earliest dispute experience in the GATT.
35 See Hudec (1990), pp 78ff.
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the parties to the various disputes were panel members, and none of the
major powers (whose presence was usually required to assure political
acceptance of the outcome) sat on the panel. Secondly, the use of the
term ‘panel’ in GATT parlance was reminiscent of the term ‘panel of
experts’ which usually designated impartial and non-political decisions
by individuals acting in their own capacity. Whereas the panel chair
was named individually, the remaining panel members were named by
country. Along with this change went a modification of the working
procedures. Disputing parties would be heard by the panel, but the panel
would draft its report in their absence. The draft report would be
discussed with the parties and a final report would be prepared for
submission to the Contracting Parties. The decision-making process lay
clearly with the panels. As the new procedures were established, the
secretariat influence in the process increased.36
The practice remained largely the same in 1953 and 1954, except that all
panel members were now named as individuals (and not as
representatives of their countries), ie acting in their own capacity. The
success of the panel system motivated the Danish delegation in 1955 to
request the extension of the panel procedure to other areas such as
balance-of-payments restrictions. Most members, however, opposed
such extension. As Hudec (1990, p 92) states: ‘The rejection of the Danish
proposal ... proved ... that the panel procedure itself could never really
escape the basic political constraints which had dictated GATT’s limited
legal design in the first place. Now that the panel procedure had proved
itself effective, its own range of operations would have to be controlled
in turn.’
From 1948 to 1959, GATT dealt with 53 legal complaints. Hudec (1990,
p 200) identified the larger lines in the first 10 years of GATT dispute
settlement as the result of a general desire to create more effective
international regulation of national trade policies on the one hand and
the absence of effective political support for meaningful international
regulation on the other. As a consequence, the system relied mainly on
the force of organised normative pressures and the use of law as a
diplomatic instrument. The fact that the GATT had remained a fairly
small and cohesive organisation contributed to this success. Members
shared the same basic trade policy goals of lowering trade barriers and
were often represented by the same ‘veterans’ who had negotiated the
Agreement, making the GATT of this decade resemble a ‘club’.37
36 See Hudec (1998), pp 107ff and, in more detail, Hudec (1990), pp 85–90. This initial
period of GATT dispute settlement is also briefly discussed in Jackson (1990), p 61, and
Jackson (1997), p 115. See also Stewart (1993), p 2676 (with further references) on the
establishment of the panel practice.
37 See Hudec (1993), p 11.
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2.2.2.4 Breakdown of Dispute Settlement Activity
in the 1960s
Other amendments to the dispute settlement provisions included the
permission of third party participation in 1958,38 and the adoption of
differential procedures for disputes involving developing countries in
1966, the so-called ‘1966 Procedures’.39 Despite these procedural changes,
the use of GATT dispute settlement plummeted shortly after the panel
procedure had established itself in practice as a successful instrument
for the management of trade disputes. Not a single formal legal
complaint was filed from mid-1963 until 1969.
This drop in popularity has been explained with an increased use of
sophisticated non-tariff trade barriers difficult to tackle under the GATT,
the unequal bargaining position of developing as opposed to developed
countries and the increasing recourse to unilateral retaliation –
particularly in transatlantic trade disputes – which highlighted both
material and procedural shortcomings of the mechanism.40 The decline
in dispute activity went along with a change in the attitude of
governments. Basically, they challenged the fairness of the procedure,
arguing that there was no longer reciprocity of legal obligation. In this
climate, complaints were regarded as unfriendly confrontations
poisoning the atmosphere. Of the six disputes between the Dillon Round
(1960–1962) and the Kennedy Round (1963–1967), two became larger
confrontations: a US complaint against the EC (known as the ‘Chicken
War’) where the US was finally authorised to retaliate against the EC,
and a Uruguayan complaint against 15 developed countries.41
The Uruguayan complaint consisted of 15 separate complaints that listed
almost all of the defendants’ non-tariff barriers against Uruguayan
exports without distinguishing between illegal and legal measures (in
total, 562 restrictions). The legal basis was an assertion of non-violation
nullification and impairment with Uruguay presumably getting less than
it was giving. With this dispute that was not specifically targeted at a
particular measure, Uruguay wished to highlight the problems of
developing countries’ eroding trade position. Uruguay prosecuted it very
passively, and its broad scope (being directed against 15 countries)
avoided a confrontation with any specific developed country. Overall
38 See Stewart (1993), pp 2676–77, with further references.
39 GATT, Procedures Under Article XXIII, Decision of 5 April 1996, reprinted in GATT,
BISD, 14th Supplement; for details, see Stewart (1993), pp 2678-79.
40 See Stewart (1993), pp 2679–80, with further references.
41 See Hudec (1990), pp 235ff.
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three decisions were issued in a case which was intended to make GATT
become the prosecutor of its own law: In the first, the panel declined to
entertain any theory of non-violation nullification and impairment, as
Uruguay did not support its claim with precise information and
arguments. However, the panel issued recommendations with regard
to those claims that the defendants conceded were illegal. Although there
was some compliance, Uruguay asked the panel to meet again and study
whether retaliation should be authorised in particular cases and, if so,
how much. Again, the panel refused and argued that it was up to
Uruguay to decide whether it was satisfied, and to propose specific
retaliation if it was not. Uruguay declined, and the second panel only
reviewed the progress made. In 1964, Uruguay returned again and asked
the panel to press for compliance. It asked for legal rulings on all items
(even those not covered in the recommendations of the first panel) and
tabled a new list of restrictions which should have been treated as well.
Again, the panel declined to follow the request and merely reviewed,
once more, the progress to date. The effort to make GATT assume the
prosecutor’s role had failed.42 Yet, the Uruguayan Recourse made a
significant contribution to GATT dispute settlement. It established the
practice of regarding breaches of obligations (ie violations) as prima facie
instances of nullification or impairment, unless the defendant can prove
the opposite.43
After the case had been concluded, Uruguay and Brazil submitted
proposals for a renegotiation of Article XXIII. They sought three major
reforms: 1) improved technical assistance by the Secretariat; 2) third-
party prosecution of developing country complaints; 3) improved
remedies for cases of non-compliance (financial compensation, collective
retaliation). The only outcome of this effort was a 1966 decision of the
Contracting Parties setting out new mediation procedures and other
minor modifications and clarifications.44 As Hudec (1990, p 243) argues,
both the Uruguayan complaints and the efforts to renegotiate Article
XXIII: ‘tended to identify the disputes procedure with radical developing
country demands, and with a level of vigorous prosecution and
enforcement that was simply out of keeping with traditional “flexibility”
of GATT law. The dangers of this rampant legalism brought forth an
equally excessive counterreaction from the developed country leadership
in the form of a concerted effort to defend and rationalise a policy of
avoiding GATT’s legal machinery.’
42 See Hudec (1990), pp 240–42.
43 Uruguayan Recourse to Article. XXIII; BISD 11S/95. See also Jackson (2001), pp 182ff
and Jackson (1998c), p 67.
44 BISD, 14th Supplement (1966), p 18.
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The ‘Chicken war’ and the Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII are also
symptomatic for two more fundamental developments that had changed
the GATT during the decade and were responsible to a large extent for
the climate change which had occurred. One development was the
consolidation of the European Community which took over the GATT
chairs of its six smaller and generally law-abiding nation states and which
claimed the right to major deviations from the multilateral trade order
in the area of agriculture and trade preferences with former colonies,
preferring a more negotiated, diplomatic approach to dispute settlement
while pushing GATT law into the background. The second development
was a more than three-fold increase in the number of developing country
members which completely shifted the balance between developed and
developing countries. Developing countries sought an increase in legal
obligations of GATT’s developed Members by making enforcement
stricter while at the same time intensifying their demands for greater
freedom from GATT obligations for themselves. With support from the
US for the EC position, ‘anti-legalism’ was on the rise in the GATT and
the system relied largely on negotiations.45
2.2.2.5 Re-establishment of the GATT Legal System in the 1970s
At the beginning of the 1970s, the United States left its anti-legalist
approach and sought a stronger enforcement of its rights under the trade
agreements. As the ‘club’ atmosphere with shared objectives such as a
general propensity towards free trade was gone, new legal rules had
become necessary for trade relations between over 80 contentious
Members.
The major element in this rebuilding effort was the conclusion of the
Tokyo-Round ‘NTM Codes’ dealing with non-tariff measures. The
perceived need for reform also included dispute settlement. The
discussions, however, proved to be difficult: While Japan and the EC
were strongly opposed to any substantive change, the US advocated
reforms, supported by Switzerland and the Nordic countries. Some of
these reforms already foreshadowed later discussions. For instance, the
US called for an automatic right to a panel, while other countries warned
that: ’if panel rulings declaring violations became routinely available,
regardless of the nature of the violation, there would be a large number
of instances in which governments would not comply with panel rulings.’
Other issues discussed were, inter alia, notification requirements for trade
measures, a codification of the ‘customary practice’ of dispute settlement,
45 On GATT dispute settlement in the 1960s, see Hudec (1998), pp 109ff, Hudec (1993), pp
12ff and, in more detail, Hudec (1990), pp 235–50.
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the role of the Director-General, the submission of the descriptive part
of panel reports to disputing parties with a view of furthering mutually
acceptable solutions, and surveillance issues.46
As a result of these negotiations, the ‘Understanding Regarding
Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance’ was
adopted on 28 November 1979.47 It also included an annex with the
‘Agreed Description of the Customary Practice of the GATT in the Field
of Dispute Settlement (Article XXIII:2)’. This new understanding
primarily aimed at the codification of prior practices and at
improvements of the panel process, setting forth procedures for panel
composition and timetables. In addition to the understanding, further
provisions on dispute settlement were laid down in the so-called ‘Non-
Tariff Measure Codes’ (NTM Codes) that the Tokyo Round brought
about.48 The Tokyo Round result received a mixed welcome.49 Whereas
the legal basis for settlements had been strengthened, the system would
continue to rely very heavily on the ability of Contracting Parties to
reach political solutions. Developing countries were also disappointed
as their concerns had not been taken fully into account. Generally, the
improvements were regarded as steps towards the still unfinished
business of legal reform. Yet, dispute settlement activities awoke again.50
2.2.2.6 Increased Dispute Activity in the 1980s
As dispute settlement activity increased, the GATT secretariat created a
legal office in order to give more attention to legal issues in dispute
settlement.51 Given the success of the system, more legally difficult and
politically sensitive lawsuits were brought to Geneva, establishing a basis
for the development of a GATT case law. The increasing number of
sensitive disputes also led to an increasing number of ‘legal failures’. In
sensitive issues, governments made use of their powers to veto the
establishment of panels, the adoption of reports. and the authorisation
of countermeasures. Later, implementation in several high-profile cases
was held hostage to the outcome of the Uruguay Round negotiations.
46 See Stewart (ed) (1993), pp 2687–95, with further references.
47 GATT Document no L/4907, reprinted in GATT, BISD, 26th Supplement (1979), pp 210ff.
48 For an overview, see Stewart (ed) (1993), pp 2699–703, with further references.
49 On the Tokyo Round and its results in general, see Winham (1986) or Jackson, Louis
and Matsushita (1984).
50 For a brief summary on dispute settlement activity in the 1970s, see Hudec (1998), pp
110–13, Hudec (1993), p 13 and Hudec (1999), pp 6ff and pp 29–57. On the political and
economic background, see pp 19–28. See also Stewart (1993), p 2706, with further
references.
51 Hudec (1999), p 7.
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The emerging enforcement problems led the US (which suffered from a
massive trade deficit) to seek unilateral solutions, leading to a
reinforcement of Section 301 of its trade legislation. Given the success
that these unilateral policies brought for the US, complaints about the
inadequacy of GATT law muted, and fears were mounting that the US
who used to support the GATT legal system would reverse its policy
and oppose reform.52
2.2.2.7 Uruguay Round Negotiations (I): The 1989 Improvements
Deepening economic problems towards the beginning of the 1980s such
as the debt crisis, a worsening recession and a high US trade deficit put
the GATT system under considerable stress, with protectionist pressures
on the rise.53 In order to overcome the paralysis of the GATT system,
Secretary General Arthur Dunkel asked a group of non-governmental
experts – the so-called ‘Leutwiler Group’ named after its chairman – ‘to
identify the fundamental causes of the problems afflicting the
international trading system and to consider how these may be overcome
during the remainder of the 1980s’.54 The report also dealt with dispute
settlement. The members of the group were particularly concerned about
delays in the procedure, the lack of legal expertise in the system, the
lack of third party intervention against bilateral ‘cartel-like’ schemes
and the weak implementation. Its proposition no 12 on dispute
settlement stated:55
In support of improved and strengthened
rules, GATT’s dispute settlement procedures
should be reinforced by building up a
permanent roster of non-governmental experts
to examine disputes, and by improving the
implementation of panel recommendations.
Third parties should use their rights to
complain when bilateral agreements break the
rules.
52 For a brief summary on dispute settlement activity in the 1980s, see Hudec (1993), pp
14ff. A more detailed account is available on pp 129–77 (1980–1985) and on pp 199–269
(1985–1989). The political and economic background is set out on pp 103–16.
53 For details, see Croome (1999), pp 1–14.
54 The report was published under the title ‘Trade Policies for a Better Future’ (Dunkel
(1987)).
55 See Dunkel (1987), pp 14ff. (Recommendation no 12 of the Leutwiler Group).
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Dispute settlement accordingly also became a topic in the run-up for
the Punta del Este Ministerial Meeting. The relevant passage of the
Ministerial Declaration reads as follows:56
Dispute Settlement
In order to ensure prompt and effective
resolution of disputes to the benefit of all
contracting parties, negotiations shall aim to
improve and strengthen the rules and the
procedures of the dispute settlement process,
while recognizing the contribution that would
be made by more effective and enforceable
GATT rules and disciplines. Negotiations shall
include the development of adequate
arrangements for overseeing and monitoring
of the procedures that would facilitate
compliance with adopted recommendations.
The Ministerial Declaration thus recognised two avenues of
improvement. One was the improvement of the dispute settlement
process as such. The second avenue, which was much wider in scope,
was the elaboration of clearer rules in the substantive agreements.
The first meeting of the Negotiation Group on Dispute Settlement on 6
April 198757 made it clear that there were conflicting views between
groups of countries regarding the nature of the dispute settlement
system. Some countries such as the EC and Japan emphasised that GATT
did not provide for judicial settlements of international trade disputes.
They perceived the dispute settlement process as being primarily of a
conciliatory nature, calling for negotiated settlements and compromises.
However, a second group of countries pointed to the: ‘contractual nature
of GATT law, to the ambiguous meaning of many general GATT
provisions, and to the law-creating element in any interpretative choice
of one among other possible interpretations of GATT rules by a
competent GATT dispute settlement body.’ These countries did not view
a rule-oriented approach enabling legally binding interpretations as a
hindrance to conciliatory settlements. This point of view was promoted
mainly by the US, but support also came from Canada and some other
countries. An intermediate position was taken by a third group of
56 Ministerial Declaration of 20 September 1986, Part I, Section D, Subsection entitled
‘Dispute Settlement’; Document MIN(86)/6 of 20 September 1986.
57 See Document MTN.GNG/NG13/1 of 10 April 1987, no 9.
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countries which favoured a ‘sequential approach’ that would make use
of various techniques including consultations, mediation, conciliation
and arbitration, which were not mutually exclusive.58
When the Trade Negotiations Committee convened in Montreal for the
Mid-Term Review of the Uruguay Round (UR) of multilateral trade
negotiations (MTN) in December 1988, the negotiations group had
progressed well enough that trade ministers recommended approval of
the proposed procedural reforms. These included a notification
requirement for mutually agreed solutions, time-lines for consultations,
alternative dispute settlement procedures (good offices, conciliation,
mediation, arbitration), panel and working party procedures (including
establishment of a panel, terms of references, panel composition, multiple
complaints, third party rights, time-lines for panel work), adoption of
panel reports, technical assistance and surveillance of implementation.
The text was later adopted and implemented on a trial basis from 1 May
1989.59
This relatively fast progress may be attributed to two factors. First,
divergences of opinion on procedural issues were relatively limited.
Secondly, and probably more importantly, the negotiations were likely
spurred by parallel developments in the United States where Congress
had enacted the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 which
included significant amendments to Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.
Through the introduction of ‘Special 301’ and ‘Super 301’, the protection
of US intellectual property rights and market access for US exports
respectively were considerably enhanced . The move was widely
criticised as a US departure away from multilateralism towards
aggressive unilateralism. Consequently, ‘Section 301’ and its relationship
with multilateral dispute settlement also became a discussion topic in
the multilateral forum and in academic literature.60 The EC, however,
did not manage to insert a provision into the 1989 Improvements
according to which domestic legislation and actions to settle disputes
should be in full conformity with GATT and the dispute settlement
procedures. Furthermore, the adoption of panel reports remained subject
to consensus.61
58 See Document MTN.GNG/NG13/1 of 10 April 1987, no 6. See also the comments by
Stewart (1993), pp 2727ff and Croome (1999), p 125.
59 See Stewart (ed) (1993), pp 2754–59.
60 See, for instance, Shaffer (2001), Blázquez Navarro (2000), Chang (2000), Hudec (2000),
Bhala and Kennedy (1998), Lash (1998), Schaefer (1998), O’Neal Taylor (1997), Puckett
and Reynolds (1996), Schede (1996), Bayard and Elliott (1994), Mavroidis (1993), Sykes
(1992), as well as Bhagwati and Patrick (1990).
61 See Stewart (ed) (1993), pp 2760ff and 2777ff; see also Croome (1999), pp 127ff and pp
224ff.
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2.2.2.8 Uruguay Round Negotiations (II): The DSU
In the subsequent negotiations from 1989 to 1990, discussions focused
on the following topics: the adoption and implementation of panel
reports, the introduction of an interim review stage during panel
procedures and an appellate review mechanism, provisions for
compensation and retaliation in case of non-compliance, treatment of
non-violation complaints, arbitration, involvement of least-developed
countries in disputes, third party rights, the selection of panellists and
negotiations on dispute settlement provisions in other negotiating
groups.62 Of these issues, the blockage of panel reports (due to the
consensus requirement) was the most important issue, with the US
favouring automatic adoption and the EC wishing to maintain the
consensus rule. Of similar importance was the EC’s insistence (backed
by many other countries) that parties bring their trade legislation into
line with multilateral obligations, and that they refrain from unilateral
measures incompatible with the multilateral approach to dispute
settlement. These voices were directed at the US ‘Section 301’ legislation.63
While negotiations went on, new problems arose due to the non-
implementation of five adopted panel reports by the members of the so-
called ‘Quad’. These governments had linked implementation of the
reports with the results of the Round.64 Whereas only one panel had
been active in late 1990, there were 11 active panels in November 1991.
Still, the commitment to refrain from unilateral actions and the
automaticity of the procedure were among the most important issues,
being linked to one another. Agreement was ultimately reached on 19
December 1991 by the negotiations group. The consensus rule was turned
upside down for consensus was now required not to establish a panel
and not to adopt a report. This went hand in hand with the provision
sought by the EC and many others which obliged countries to refrain
from unilateral action. However, in order to secure the agreement of the
US, the requirement that domestic legislation be brought into line with
the proposed new rules was left out. Members also agreed on the
establishment of a single ‘Dispute Settlement Body’. 65
62 See Stewart (ed) (1993), pp 2764ff and Croome (1999), p 126 and pp 225ff.
63 See Croome (1999), p 227.
64 These are the EC (oilseeds (US); anti-dumping duties on products assembled in the EC
from imported parts and components (Japan)), the US (Section 337 of US Tariff Act (EC)),
Japan (agricultural imports (US)) and Canada (ice cream and yoghurt (US)). See Stewart
(ed) (1993), pp 2788ff, and in particular footnote 878.
65 See Croome (1999), pp 277ff and Stewart (1993), pp 2788ff.
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2.3 Summary: The Evolution of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement
Summarising the evolution of multilateral trade dispute settlement
between the earliest days of the GATT and ITO drafts on the one hand
and the new DSU procedure under the WTO on the other, one finds a
gradual and very cautious evolution of the dispute settlement system
from a rather diplomacy-oriented towards a more adjudication-oriented
mechanism. That evolution, however, has not been free of setbacks.
Initially, the failure of the ambitious ITO with its ultimately legal
procedures highlighted an unwillingness of governments fully to
subordinate their trade policies to an international organisation in
general and to third party adjudication in particular as both remained
outside their control. Sovereignty concerns and power considerations
stood in the way of the establishment of a powerful organisation with
strong and explicit adjudicating powers. Consequently, parties chose a
cautious, pragmatic and rather gradual evolution from political
negotiations towards third party adjudication. The strong prevalence
of negotiatory and diplomatic instruments with characteristic vagueness
and rather implicit than explicit statements in earlier stages needs,
however, not be interpreted as a sign of weakness. At least initially, the
early GATT was more like a ‘club’ of like-minded nations and country
representatives that basically followed common goals of freer trade. The
system lived from normative pressures and strong political will.
Moreover, one may assume that all parties were aware of the crucial
role that safeguarding reciprocity in trade relations would have for the
stability of the system and that, therefore, negotiated outcomes might
be closer to the objective of safeguarding a ‘balance of rights and
obligations’ than the outcome of pure adjudication.
The foundations of the system were shaken with the consolidation of
the EC that was anxious to build a politically coherent block and a
counterweight to the so-far dominant US, as well as with the entry of
many developing countries in the 1960s. The latter believed more in
political interventionism and import-substitution policies than in the
benefits of free trade. As the objectives of the multilateral trading system
had become less obvious, an erosion of GATT discipline took place which
also affected dispute settlement activity that consequently broke down.
It was only restored by the addition of new treaty text, first (albeit
incompletely and on a fragmented basis) in the Tokyo Round and later
(in a consolidated, single-package approach) in the Uruguay Round.
Throughout this evolution, one constant feature seems to be that WTO
dispute settlement evolved positively whenever there was political
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convergence between members on the substance of the multilateral trade
provisions and their mutually beneficial nature. It was blocked, however,
whenever members pursued strongly diverging views on what the world
trade order should look like, or when important countries or country
groups were dissatisfied with the outcome achieved by the mechanism.
This finding is in line with the basic rationale of reciprocity that underlies
the logic of international trade agreements and (through the nullification
and impairment clause) dispute settlement practice.
A second common denominator seems to be a certain pendulous
movement. Periods of law-abidance and legal enthusiasm alternated
with periods of resignation and a dominance of political power-play.
Efforts to reform or further develop the mechanism were the answer of
members to the latter, sometimes with certain delays. Strong rules on
dispute settlement in the ITO had raised fears of sovereignty loss in the
US and contributed to the demise of the ITO. Later on, the rapid and
positive evolution of the dispute settlement system in the 1950s caused
an anti-legalist backlash in the 1960s with governments growing tired
of having their hands tied by a too rigid system as they wished to adapt
to new political realities. However, whenever the system threatened to
degenerate into insignificance, members reunited their efforts to bring
it back on track. Yet, more radical efforts to strengthen the system (such
as those undertaken by Denmark in the 1950s or that by Uruguay in the
1960s) never materialised. Clearly, governments always wished to keep
their hands on the system.
In sum, the evolution reflects the concerns of a membership that is torn
between its desire for an effective, rules-based dispute settlement system
and its desire for trade policy flexibility. We will see that many of these
elements are still present today in the DSU review discussions.
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3. THE TECHNIQUE OF WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
UNDER THE DSU
According to Article III.3 WTO agreement, dispute settlement is one of
the key functions of the WTO.1 The rules are laid down in the Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU).2 In this chapter, the various stages in
the technique of WTO Dispute Settlement will be presented to the extent
that is necessary to allow readers to understand the nature and scope of
the reform proposals discussed in Part II. As a detailed discussion of the
procedure and its reception in literature is beyond the scope of this study,
readers are invited to consult the rich body of literature on this topic.3
Certain aspects will also be considered more deeply in the context of
the proposals on the DSU review in Chapters 6 and 7.
3.1 The (National) Dispute Initiation Stage
The initiation stage of WTO dispute settlement is governed by national
law. Although it is not part of the DSU, the question of dispute initiation
is useful for the overall positioning and understanding of the procedure
in a larger trade policy context.
One feature of WTO dispute settlement is that only governments have
access to WTO dispute settlement in terms of dispute initiation. Private
1 The legal texts which resulted from the Uruguay Round are available at http://
www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm and in WTO (ed) (1999). For general
presentations of and comments on the Uruguay Round and its results, see, for instance,
Senti (2001), Senti (2000), Senti and Conlan (1998), Trebilcock and Howse (1999), Krueger
(ed) (1998), McDonald (1998), Thürer and Kux (1996), Cottier (ed) (1995), Hauser and
Schanz (1995), Schott (1994) and Senti (1994).
2 Annex 2 to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation (‘WTO
agreement’).
3 The text of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (as laid down in Annex 2 to the
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation) is available via the
internet (http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu.pdf) as well as in WTO (ed)
(2002b) and WTO (ed) (1999). For an introduction and a discussion of the system, see, for
instance, Pescatore, Stewart, Dwyer and Prado (looseleaf), Gallagher (2002) (for a detailed
guide to the procedure), Jackson (2001) (for an introduction), Davey (2002b), Goh and
Witbreuk (2001), Feliciano and van den Bossche (2001), Hoekman and Kostecki (2001)
(Chapter 3), Palmeter and Mavroidis (1999), Trachtman (1999), Trebilcock and Howse
(1999) (Chapter 3 for an introductory overview), Cameron and Campbell (1998), Jackson
(1998a), Jackson (1997), Chapter 4 (pp 107–37), Petersmann (1997) and Petersmann (1997a).
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economic actors such as exporters, importers and consumers do not have
the right to bring complaints. More generally, private parties do not have
standing at the WTO as has been pointed out above.4 Although this is a
common feature of intergovernmental organisations, it is nevertheless
worth noting, because these private actors are those mostly affected by
trade measures. The initiation of a dispute under the DSU therefore still
requires a government decision.5
Probably the best-known national trade policy instrument is Section 301
of the Trade Act of 1974 in the United States which does also include the
initiation procedure for US complainants. It has been the topic of much
research.6 The EC established its own procedure with the so-called New
Commercial Policy Instrument (NCPI)7 in 1984 which was replaced by
the Trade Barriers Regulation (TBR) in 1994 and which co-exists with
other procedures for government-initiated disputes.8 These national
initiation instruments differ in many aspects, including the type of
contestable foreign actions, admitted categories of complainants, the
effects of foreign trade barriers required to make action necessary,
allocation of the authority for decision on whether to lodge a complaint
and the availability of judicial review.
Given the importance of this stage in the mechanism, it comes as a
surprise, at least at first sight, that only a few countries have published
procedures that allow companies or industries to request their
governments to initiate a dispute settlement procedure. Many countries
do not have publicly known rules, and the question on whether to initiate
4 On the role and position of private parties in the WTO system in general and in its
dispute settlement mechanism in particular, see, for instance, Charnovitz (2001) (focusing
on the individual rights perspective), Esty (1998) (with a focus on NGOs), Schleyer (1998)
(on allowing private parties to raise claims before the WTO), Charnovitz (1996), Shell
(1996), Lukas (1995) and Abbott (1992).
5 For a brief introduction into the concept of national dispute initiation, see, for instance,
Jackson (1998), pp 127ff.
6 On Section 301 and its relationship to the WTO system, see Shaffer (2001) (including
reference to the EC’s TBR), Blázquez Navarro (2000), Chang (2000) (focusing on the panel
decision on US  Section 301), Hudec (1999), Bhala and Kennedy (1998) (Chapter 10), Lash
(1998), Jackson (1997), pp 127–133 (briefly), Schaefer (1998), O’Neal Taylor (1997), Puckett
and Reynolds (1996), Schede (1996) (focusing on the relationship with Article 23 DSU
concerning the priority of the multilateral dispute settlement procedure), Bayard and
Elliott (1994), Mavroidis (1993), Sykes (1992), as well as Bhagwati and Patrick (1990).
7 Council Regulation no 2641/84; OJ L252 of 20 September 1984. For an analysis of the
NCPI, see Mavroidis (1993).
8 OJ  L349 of 31 December 1994, last modified by Council Regulation no 356/95; OJ  L41 of
23 February 1995. The Trade Barriers Regulation and its operation have been analysed in
Shaffer (2001) (including reference to US Section 301), Bronckers and McNelis (2001),
Sundberg and Vermulst (2001), MacLean (1999), McNelis (1999), Van Eeckhaute (1999),
Mavroidis and Zdouc (1998), Shaffer (1998), McNelis (1998) and Bronckers (1997).
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a dispute rests primarily in the hands of the government which has
considerable discretion to decide. At a second glance, however, this fact
may be interpreted as a clear sign that governments are unwilling to
have their trade policy flexibility reduced by laying their trade policy
agenda into the hands of the private sector. Moreover, it may underline
the foreign policy context in which trade policy takes place.
3.2 The Consultation Stage
Once the government of the complainant country ‘C’ has decided to
bring a trade dispute to the WTO, the provisions of the Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU; Annex 2 to the WTO Agreement)
govern the proceedings.
The first stage of any dispute settlement procedure consists of mandatory
consultations between the complainant (C) and the defendant (D). C
who alleges that D has violated WTO provisions, thereby nullifying or
impairing C’s benefits under the agreements, has the right to ask D to
enter into consultations in order to find a mutually acceptable solution
to the problem.9 Such consultation requests shall be made in writing.
They shall contain the reasons for the request, and identify the measures
and the legal basis for the complaint.10 Consultation requests shall be
notified to the Dispute Settlement Body.11
D is normally obliged to answer within 10 days after receipt of the
consultation requests, and it shall enter into such consultations within
30 days.12 The consultations are confidential.13 However, a third party
which considers that it has a ‘substantial trade interest’ in the
consultations may notify the consulting Members and the DSB of its
interest. It shall be joined in the consultations if the other parties agree
to the claim of substantial interest. If the third party is not allowed to
join the consultations, it may request its own consultations.14
9 For the area of trade in goods, see Article XXII GATT. The other annexes to the WTO
agreement contain similar provisions regarding consultation requests.
10 Article 4.4 DSU.
11 In principle, the Dispute Settlement Body is identical with the General Council; Article
IV.3 of the WTO agreement: ‘The General Council shall convene as appropriate to
discharge the responsibilities of the Dispute Settlement Body provided for in the Dispute
Settlement Understanding. The Dispute Settlement Body may have its own chairman
and shall establish such rules of procedure as it deems necessary for the fulfilment of
those responsibilities.’
12 Article 4.3 DSU. Shorter time-frames apply in the case of perishable goods; see Article
4.8 and Article 4.9 DSU.
13 Article 3.6 DSU.
14 Article 4.11 DSU.
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If a mutually acceptable solution for the dispute has been found, it shall
be notified to the DSB.15 The DSU has a clear preference for mutually
acceptable solutions over the solution of disputes through panel
procedures.16 It prescribes, however, that such mutually agreed solutions
shall be consistent with the multilateral trade agreements, and that they
shall not nullify or impair the benefits accruing to any member under
these agreements.17
If D refuses to enter into consultations, or if no mutually acceptable
solution can be found within 60 days, C has the right to ask the DSB to
establish a panel.18
3.3 The Panel Stage
Panel requests must be formulated in writing. They must contain details
on whether consultations have been held, which measures are the subject
of the complaint and which rules of the multilateral trade regime are
concerned.19 Following a request a panel is usually established at the
second meeting of the DSB where the panel request appears on the DSB’s
agenda, unless the DSB decides by consensus not to establish the panel.20
In other words, the time between the first and the second DSB meeting
with the request on the agenda may be used for further consultations.
By the time of the second meeting, agenda control shifts to the
complainant as the latter would have to consent not to establish a panel.
The reverse consensus rule for the establishment of panels is a new
feature of dispute settlement in the WTO, as has been pointed out in the
preceding chapter.21
Panels typically consist of three panellists, unless the parties agree to a
panel composed of five panellists.22 Panellists are usually governmental
or non-governmental trade experts, including officials, diplomats or
15 Article 3.6 DSU.
16 ‘ ... The aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a
dispute. A solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with
the covered agreements is clearly to be preferred. ...’ (Article 3.7 DSU).
17 Article 3.5 DSU.
18 Article 4.3 and 4.7 DSU. Exceptionally, longer time-frames may apply in cases involving
developing country defendants; see Article 12.10 DSU.
19 Article 6.2 DSU.
20 Article 6.1 DSU.
21 The reversed consensus is one of the main innovations of the new Dispute Settlement
Regime compared to its predecessor. Under the old GATT, panels were established only
by consensus, ie if the member which was the subject of the complaint agreed to the
establishment of a panel.
22 Article 8.5 DSU.
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academics. They are appointed ad hoc, although the WTO maintains a
roster from which panellists can be chosen.23 Citizens of members whose
governments are involved in a specific dispute shall not serve on that
panel.24 The secretariat shall propose nominations for the panel which
shall be accepted by the parties. Such nominations shall not be opposed
by Members, except for ‘compelling reasons’. If the parties cannot agree
on the panellists, the Director General of the WTO is called upon to
determine the composition of the panel.25 When acting on a panel,
panellists shall serve in their individual capacities and independent from
instructions of their governments.26 Further rules for observance by
panellists are contained in specific rules of conduct.27 In disputes
involving developing countries, at least one panellist from a developing
country shall be included if the developing country members so request.28
The panel’s task is to assist the DSB in making rulings and
recommendations under the covered agreements. In practice, this usually
means the establishment of a report on whether or not a trade measure
constitutes a violation of multilateral trade rules.29 To this purpose, a
panel shall make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including
an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of
and conformity with the relevant covered agreements.
Panel procedures include written submissions30 of the parties to the
disputes and panel hearings. Two so-called ‘substantive meetings’
normally take place before the interim report (see below) is issued, and
another meeting takes place after the interim report is issued. If necessary,
more meetings can be arranged.31 The panel enjoys a right to seek
23 Article 8.4 DSU.
24 Article 8.2 DSU. For details on the composition of panels, see Article 8 DSU and Leier
(1999), p 205 and p 208, with further references. As far as the panellists are concerned,
additional rules are laid down in the ‘Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes’ of 11 December 1996; WT/DSB/
RC/1.
25 Article 8.7 DSU.
26 Article 8.9 DSU.
27 Annex II (Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes) to the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, most recent
version of 1 May 2003; WT/AB/WP/7.
28 Article 8.10 DSU.
29 Article 7 DSU on the ‘terms of reference’ of the panel reads as follows: ‘Panels shall
have the following terms of reference unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise
within 20 days from the establishment of the panel: “To examine, in the light of the relevant
provisions in (name of the covered agreement(s) cited by the parties to the dispute), the
matter referred to the DSB by (name of party) in document ... and to make such findings
as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided
for in that/those agreement(s).”’
30 Article 12.6 DSU.
64
Negotiating the Review of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding
information and technical advice from anyone it deems appropriate.32
Panels may also request advisory reports from expert review groups.33
Parties’ submissions to the panel shall be treated as confidential but shall
be made available to the parties to the dispute. Disputing parties have a
right to disclose statements of their own to the public. Members may
also ask disputing parties to provide a non-confidential summary of
the information contained in written submissions which may be
disclosed to the public. However, there is no time frame for the fulfilment
of this obligation.34
Even during the panel stage, both parties are encouraged to continue
their search for a mutually acceptable solution. To this end, panels should
also consult regularly with the parties to the dispute and give them
adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution.35
Moreover, the panel has the authority to suspend its procedures for a
maximum of 12 months upon the complainant’s request in order to allow
for further bilateral negotiations. If the work of a panel has been
suspended for more than 12 months, its authority lapses.36
As during consultations, third parties enjoy specific rights during the
panel stage. Having notified their substantial interest in a matter to the
DSB, they shall be heard by panel and their submissions shall be reflected
in the panel report. They also receive the submissions of the disputing
parties to the first meeting of the panel and they may request their own
panel under the DSU.37 Specific rules apply for cases involving multiple
complainants.38
If no mutually acceptable solution can be agreed upon during the panel
stage, the panel shall issue its final report within six or, under exceptional
circumstances, within nine months.39 The deliberations of the panel are
confidential, and the reports are drafted without the presence of the
parties. Opinions expressed by individual panellists in the report are
anonymous.40 Before the final report, the panel issues an interim report
which is circulated to the parties to the dispute.41 If this interim report is
31 See Article 12 DSU and the Working Procedures laid down in Appendix 3 of the DSU
for an overview of the panel procedure.
32 Article 13.1 DSU.
33 Article 13.2 DSU and Appendix 4 of the DSU.
34 Article 18.2 DSU.
35 Article 11 DSU.
36 Article 12.12 DSU.
37 Article 10 DSU.
38 Article 9 DSU.
39 Articles 12.7 –12.9 DSU.
40 Article 14 DSU.
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not commented by the parties, it constitutes at the same time the final
report to the DSB.
Where the panel has found a trade measure to be in violation of WTO
law, it recommends that the party concerned bring its trade regime into
conformity with its WTO obligations. The panel may also suggest
possible ways of implementation. This, however, is rarely done. Panel
findings and recommendations may not add to the rights and obligations
of members.42 Where no party notifies its intention to appeal findings of
the panel report, the DSB adopts the panel report, unless it decides by
consensus – ie with the vote of the prevailing party – not to adopt the
report (reversed consensus).43
3.4 The Appellate Review Stage
Both the complainant and the defendant have the right to appeal a panel
report. Third parties do not have the right to appeal a report but they
may make written submissions to and be heard by the Appellate Body
in the course of an appeal if they had previously notified the DSB of
their substantial interest during the panel stage.44
The responsibility for the appeal lies with a permanent organ, the
Appellate Body. It consists of seven persons, three of whom (ie a
division45) work on any case.46 Appellate Body members shall have
demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and the subject matter
of the multilateral trade agreements. They are appointed for a four-year
term which is renewable once.47 They shall be unaffiliated with any
government.48 In contrast to the panel stage, there is nothing in the DSU
which would prevent an Appellate Body member from serving on a
case involving his home country. Further rules for observance by
Appellate Body members are contained in the rules of conduct.49
41 Article 15 DSU.
42. Article 19 DSU.
43 Article 16.4 DSU. Again, the reversed consensus rule constitutes a major change from
the old GATT, where the losing party had to agree to the panel’s judgment before it could
become legally binding.
44 Article 17.4 DSU. See also Rules 24 and 27 of the Working Procedures for Appellate
Review (Document WT/AB/WP/7) for further provisions on third party participation.
45 Rules 6 and 7 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, Document WT/AB/
WP/7.
46 Article 17.1 DSU.
47 Article 17.2 DSU.
48 Article 17.3 DSU.
49 Annex II (Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes) to the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, most recent
version of 1 May 2003, Document WT/AB/WP/7.
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An appeal is limited to issues of law and legal interpretations in the
panel report.50 This stage of dispute settlement does not include another
fact-finding process, nor does the DSU currently grant the Appellate
Body the authority to remand an issue to the panel for further fact-
finding. In order to appeal a panel report, a country notifies its intention
to appeal to the DSB before adoption of the panel report51 and submits a
notice of appeal. It shall include, inter alia, a brief statement on the nature
of the appeal including the alleged errors in the issues of law covered in
the panel report and the legal interpretations adopted by the panel.52
Within 10 days after filing the notice of appeal, the appellant has to file
its appellant’s submission with more specific information.53 Within 25
days after the notice of appeal has been filed, the appellee may present
its submission.54 Thirty days after the filing of the notice of appeal, an
oral hearing shall take place.55 Parties’ submissions to the Appellate Body
shall be treated as confidential but shall be made available to the parties
to the dispute. Disputing parties have a right to disclose statements of
their own to the public. Members may also ask a disputing party to
provide a non-confidential summary of the information contained in its
written submission which may be disclosed to the public. However, there
is no time-frame for the fulfilment of this obligation.56 Further rules for
appellate review are included in the Working Procedures for Appellate
Review.57
The Appellate Body has 60 days (following the appellant’s notification
of its decision to appeal a panel report) to finish its report for the DSB.58
In its report, the Appellate Body can uphold, modify or reverse the panel’s
findings.59 As is the case with panel reports, the deliberations of the
Appellate Body shall be confidential and the reports shall be drafted
without the presence of the parties.60 Opinions expressed in the Appellate
50 Article 17.6 DSU.
51 Article 17.4 DSU.
52 Rule 20 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, Document WT/AB/WP/7.
53 Rule 21 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, Document WT/AB/WP/7.
54 Rule 22 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, Document WT/AB/WP/7.
55 Rule 27 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, Document WT/AB/WP/7.
56 Article 18.2 DSU.
57 Most recent version of 1 May 2003, Document WT/AB/WP/7.
58 Under exceptional circumstances, the Appellate Body has 90 days to finish its report.
In cases involving perishable goods, it should aim at accelerating the proceedings; see
Article 17.5 DSU in connection with Article 4.9 DSU; see also Annex I to the Working
Procedures for Appellate Review, Document WT/AB/WP/7.
59 Article 17.13 DSU.
60 Article 17.10 DSU.
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Body report shall be anonymous.61 Appellate Body decisions shall be
taken by consensus wherever possible; otherwise, decisions shall be
made by majority votes.62 Collegiality plays a vital role in the work of
the Appellate Body.63
Once the report has been finished and circulated to the members, it shall
be adopted by the DSB and unconditionally accepted by the parties
within 30 days from the date of circulation unless the DSB decides by
consensus (ie with the agreement of the prevailing party) not to adopt
it.64 Like panel reports, Appellate Body reports may not add to or
diminish the rights and obligations of members.65
Overall, the total duration from the date of the establishment of the panel
until the date when the Appellate Body report is considered for adoption
shall not exceed nine months in cases where no appeal is made, or 12
months in cases with appeal.66
3.5 The Implementation Stage
Where a panel and/or the Appellate Body have reached the conclusion
that a trade measure of a country is not compatible with its obligations
under any of the multilateral trade agreements, it recommends that the
member state shall bring its measure into conformity with the WTO
agreement. Although the panel or Appellate Body are free to make
suggestions on how this conformity can be reached,67 they have used
this authority only rarely as they obviously do not wish to interfere in
member governments’ policies.68
The member whose trade measure has been found to be in violation of
WTO obligations shall communicate to the DSB how it plans to
61 Article 17.11 DSU.
62 Rule  3 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, Document WT/AB/WP/7.
63 Rule  4 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, Document WT/AB/WP/7.
64 Article 17.14 DSU.
65 Article 19.2 DSU.
66 Article 20 DSU.
67 Article 19 DSU.
68 A noteworthy exception is the compliance panel report (on compliance panels, see
below) in the Bananas case (WT/DS27). It had found that the EC did not sufficiently
implement the DSB recommendations from the first panel and Appellate Body reports.
In this report, the panel made use of its right to make suggestions on how a banana
import regime in compliance with WTO rules could look ‘... after one implementation
attempt has proven to be at least partly unsuccessful ... ’; see WT/DS27/RW/ECU at para
6.154.
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implement the DSB recommendations. As a general rule, the
recommendations and rulings should be implemented immediately, or
within a ‘reasonable period of time’ (RPT). If the parties to the dispute
cannot agree on a RPT, it will be determined by binding arbitration within
90 days after the adoption of the recommendations and rulings. It should
not exceed 15 months, but it can be adjusted upwards or downwards in
exceptional circumstances.69 The DSU requires that the DSB keeps the
implementation of adopted recommendations under surveillance and
that the implementation of rulings is placed on the DSB agenda after six
months following the determination of the reasonable period of time,
unless the DSB decides otherwise. The dispute remains on the agenda
until it is resolved. During this time, the defendant party is required to
submit written status reports to the DSB 10 days prior to each meeting
with information on the progress in the implementation of the
recommendations and rulings.70
If a dispute arises between the parties on whether implementation has
been sufficient, or whether it has taken place at all, ‘such dispute shall
be decided through recourse to these dispute settlement procedures,
including wherever possible resort to the original panel’. In the practice
of this ‘Recourse to Article 21.5 DSU’, the so-called ‘sequencing problem’
has emerged, as the rules of the DSU on the implementation stage are
not perfectly clear, giving rise to different interpretations: Whereas the
‘compliance panel’ provided for in Article 21.5 DSU shall have 90 days
to issue a decision on the existence or consistency of the measures taken
by the defendant to comply with a ruling, Article 22.2 DSU gives the
complainant a right to request an authorisation from the DSB to suspend
the application to the defendant of concessions or other obligations
(SCOO). The DSB shall grant this authorisation within 30 days of the
expiry of the RPT or decide by consensus to reject this request according
to Article 22.6 DSU. The incompatibility between the time-frames in
Article 21.5 and Article 22.2/22.6 DSU has led to disagreements on
whether a compliance panel procedure is needed at all, and on whether
the complainant foregoes its right to SCOO if he awaits a panel ruling
(which will likely be available only after the 30-day time-frame in Article
22.6 has expired). This issue will be subject to further discussion in
Section 6.4.3 on the DSU Review.
Where no implementation occurs, the DSU provides for compensation
or for the suspension of concessions or other obligations (SCOO) as
vehicles of temporary relief in case of non-compliance. However, neither
69 Article 21.3 DSU.
70 Article 21.6 DSU.
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compensation nor the SCOO is preferred to full implementation.71 Upon
request from the complainant(s), the defendant shall enter into
negotiations with a view to developing mutually acceptable
compensation. Where no satisfactory compensation has been agreed
within twenty days after the date of expiry of the RPT, the complainant(s)
may request authorisation from the DSB to SCOO vis-à-vis the
defendant.72
According to the rules on ‘cross-retaliation’ as laid down in Article 22.3
DSU, the general principle is that such suspension should occur in the
same sector(s) as that where the violation has occurred. If this is not
deemed practicable or effective by the complainant, the complainant
may seek redress in other sectors of the same agreement, or even under
other agreements, provided that the circumstances are serious enough.73
The level of the SCOO shall be equivalent to the level of nullification or
impairment suffered by the complainant.74 If the defendant objects to
the level of suspension proposed, or if it claims that the rules on cross-
retaliation have not been followed, the matter shall be referred to binding
arbitration. This arbitration shall be completed within 60 days after the
RPT has lapsed. Where available, the original panel shall act as arbitrator.
Concessions may not be suspended while the arbitration is in course.75
Once the SCOO is in place, it shall be applied only until the defendant
has removed the WTO-inconsistent measures or until a mutually
satisfactory solution is reached.
Findings of non-compliance with regard to implementation cannot be
made unilaterally by the complainant. They must be made using the
multilateral rules and procedures, as Article 23 DSU stresses. The
objective of this provision is to avoid unilateral determinations of non-
compliance (such as those under US Section 301) which lead to unilateral
trade measures by individual member countries and which would
seriously undermine the credibility of the multilateral trade regime and
its ‘monopoly of power’ with regard to determinations of compliance
and non-compliance under the covered agreements.
71 Article 22.1 DSU.
72 Article 22.2 DSU.
73 Article 22.3 DSU.
74 Article 22.4 DSU.
75 Articles 22.6 and 22.7 DSU.
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Table 3.1 graphically summarises the main elements of the dispute
settlement procedure.
Table 3.1: Simplified Overview of the Dispute Settlement Procedure under the
DSU
3.6 Alternative Ways of Dispute Settlement
Besides the procedures laid down in Section 3.3, the DSU provides rules
for alternative means of dispute settlement. These are good offices,
conciliation and mediation (Article 5 DSU), or arbitration (Article 25
DSU). As they have neither been frequently used in DSU practice nor
been among the central topics of the DSU review, we will abstain from
offering a detailed account on these procedures.
3.7 Summarising the DSU Procedure: A ‘Middle Ground’ Between
Negotiation and Adjudication
Having reviewed the dispute settlement procedure as it is laid down in
the Dispute Settlement Understanding (and the preceding national
initialisation procedures), it becomes clear that the dispute settlement
rules of today combine both political and legal elements and that they
constitute something of a ‘middle ground’ between political/diplomatic
negotiations and third party adjudication. The DSU thus combines both
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the rule-oriented and the diplomatic, negotiation-oriented traditions of
its evolution.
The political, negotiation-oriented elements include, inter alia,
government filters in dispute initiation, the lack of any multilateral ex -
officio prosecution, mandatory confidential consultations, negotiating
elements during the panel stage (establishment of panels at second
meeting, suspension of panel procedures, interim review), and the
subordination of the entire procedure to the DSB as a ‘political’ body
(although the reverse consensus rules greatly reduce possibilities of
political influence as regards the acceptance of reports). Moreover, the
scope of panel and Appellate Body recommendations has been clearly
limited as they may not add to or diminish the rights and obligations of
Members. Finally, the nature of countermeasures in the case of non-
implementation of recommendations (SCOO) is exclusively based on
the political concept of reciprocity. The SCOO can hardly be seen as
serving legal security in international economic relations (see discussion
in Section 6.4.5).
Rule-oriented elements include the conformity and notification
requirements with regard to mutually agreed solutions, the prohibition
of unilateral action, the panel and (in particular) the Appellate Body
stage where reports are established on the basis of the relevant provisions
in WTO law. Other features of the system such as third party rights
support rule-orientation as well.
Both the political and the legal perspective are also reflected in the
‘General Provisions’ laid down in Article 3 DSU. Article 3.2 includes
much rule-oriented language, affirming that dispute settlement is ‘a
central element in providing security and predictability to the
multilateral trading system’ and that ‘it serves to preserve the rights
and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify
the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with
customary rules of interpretation of public international law’. Moreover,
‘(a)ll solutions to matters formally raised under the consultation and
dispute settlement provisions ... shall be consistent with those
agreements...’, as Article 3.5 stipulates. Article 3.8 DSU equally
establishes a clear link between the (political) concept of reciprocity and
legal aspects of the multilateral trading system: ‘In cases where there is
an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement,
the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or
impairment.’
Yet, the general provisions do not release Members from their duty to
exercise political judgment and to seek negotiated solutions. Article 3.7
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holds that: ‘(b)efore bringing a case, a Member shall exercise its judgment
as to whether action under these procedures would be fruitful. The aim
of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a
dispute. A solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and
consistent with the covered agreements is clearly to be preferred.’ The
prominent role of a negotiated solution is even more highlighted in the
context of the next sentence of Article 3.7: ‘In the absence of a mutually
agreed solution, the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is
usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned if these are
found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered
agreements’ (emphases added). Article 3.2 also limits the powers of the
panel and the Appellate Body by holding that: ‘(r)ecommendations and
rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations
provided in the covered agreements.’ Clearly, the right to seek an
authoritative interpretation of provisions of a covered agreement rests
with members.76
In sum, whereas the method of dispute resolution is partly legal (ie
during the panel and the Appellate Body stage), the core underlying
concept remains a political one, namely the maintenance of the balance
of rights and obligations, ie reciprocity.
76 Article 3.9 DSU. Yet, although the rulings are only relevant for the cases at hand and
although they cannot add to the rights and obligations of members (Article 3.2 DSU and
Article 19.2 DSU), there is a long tradition of building case law and of establishing
interpretations which are used in future cases as well; see, for instance, Bhala (2001),
Bhala (1999) and Bhala (1999a).
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4. EXPERIENCE WITH THE DSU
To conclude Part I and to complete the foundation for a discussion of
the DSU review, some basic information on the use of the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism in its first 10 years and on its reception in literature
is offered in Chapter 4.
4.1 Basic Data on the Use of the System
The DSU entered into force on 1 January 1995. Until the end of 2004, a
total of 324 consultation requests were notified to the WTO.1 This number
shows that the new system is more widely used than the dispute
settlement mechanism under the old GATT (less than 300 cases in 47
years). However, such comparisons are not necessarily adequate. The
old GATT had less members than the WTO, and it covered far fewer
agreements and sectors of economic activity than the WTO.
Graph 4.1: Use of the Dispute Settlement System (1995–2004)
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Graph by the author; based on data from worldtradelaw.net (downloaded on 15 January 2005)
Notes: (i) Numbers refer to standard DSU complaints. (ii) Some of the panel reports circulated
in 2004 may still become the subject of an appeal in 2005. The low ratio of panel reports appealed
in 2004 should therefore be interpreted cautiously.
1 See WTO Document WT/DS/OV/22, and internet: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm.
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Graph 4.1 shows the intensity in the use of the dispute settlement
mechanism in its first 10 years for which complete data is available,
ie until 31 December 2004. The number of complaints increased
sharply in the first three years after the mechanism had come into
force, and it peaked in 1997 with 50 new consultation requests in one
single year. Thereafter, the number of consultation requests dropped
to an annual average of roughly 28 in the period from 2000 to 2004,
with the lowest figure (19 consultation requests) recorded in 2004.
The evolution of the number of circulated panel reports displays a
similar pattern, yet with a certain time lag and a peak in 2000. This
time lag is obvious, given the time required between the notification
of a consultation request and the circulation of a panel report. Overall,
the number of panel reports is much lower than the number of
consultation requests. This difference is due to the settlement of a
considerable number of disputes in the stages preceding the
circulation of the panel report (consultation or panel stage; see also
Section 4.2.3.2). Moreover, several separate consultation requests were
in some cases dealt with subsequently by one single panel.
The number of Appellate Body reports peaked in 1999. While every
panel report circulated in 1996 and 1997 had been subject to an appeal,
this ratio dropped to an average of 62 per cent for panel reports
circulated between 2000 and 2003. Overall, there have been relatively
few complaints under Article 21.5 regarding alleged non-compliance
of defendants with panel rulings. The fairly small number is in stark
contrast to the public perception of these ‘trade wars’ as they concern
‘high profile’ cases, including Bananas, Hormone Beef and Foreign Sales
Corporations.
In terms of usage, we find that both the United States and the EC are
among the DSU’s most frequent users. Together, they account for
nearly half the cases brought before the WTO (see Graph 4.2).
Moreover, a substantial number of cases concern bilateral trade
disputes directly between these two parties. Among developing
countries, Brazil and India are the most important users of the system.
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Graph 4.2: Main Users of the WTO Dispute Settlement System (1995-2004)
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Note: The figure for cases with the EC as a respondent neither includes DS numbers of complaints
against individual EC Member States (15 DS numbers) nor DS numbers of complaints brought against
Central and Eastern European countries prior to their entry into the European Union (8 DS numbers).
Developing countries’ participation in dispute settlement is generally
increasing, but is still on a fairly modest level, given the high number
of developing countries in the WTO. After high-income countries had
dominated dispute settlement practice as complainants in initial
years, upper middle income countries have more recently become
more active (exception: 2004). High income countries are also actively
participating as respondents in trade disputes (see Graphs 4.3 and
4.4). The weak participation of LDCs in dispute settlement activities
is another salient feature. The first LDC to initiate a DSU proceeding
was Bangladesh in 2004, more than nine years after the DSU has come
into force.
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Graph 4.3: Income classification of Complainants in WTO Dispute
Settlement
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in which a complaint is being brought. Only standard DSU complaints are counted (DS numbers;
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Graph 4.4: Income Classification of Respondents in WTO Dispute Settlement
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With regard to the provisions subject to disputes, we find that by far the
most disputes concern provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT; see Graph 4.5).
Graph 4.5: Agreements Whose Provisions Were Subject to Litigation (1995–
2004)
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Graph by the author; based on data from worldtradelaw.net (downloaded on 15 January 2005)
Notes: GATT = General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; SCM = Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures; AD = Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 (Anti-
dumping); TBT = Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade; SPS = Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures; TRIPS = Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights; TRIMS = Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures; ATC = Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing; GATS = General Agreement on Trade in Services; GPA = Agreement on
Government Procurement.
This dominance of goods trade in WTO dispute settlement becomes even
more apparent if the complaints relating to the special agreements in
the goods sector (such as the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, the Agreement on Anti-dumping, or the Agreement on
Agriculture) are taken into account. By comparison to this traditional
realm of GATT law, the ‘new topics’, trade in services and trade-related
intellectual property rights, have not yet been frequent subjects of WTO
disputes, and their importance in dispute settlement seems to decrease
even further. A modest 25 complaints have been brought under the
TRIPS, only five of which have been brought in the five-year period
78
Negotiating the Review of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding
2000–2004. Nevertheless, it should be noted that one particularly ‘high-
profiled’ case – a dispute between the US and the EC on the one hand
and India on the other regarding patent protection for pharmaceutical
and agricultural chemical products – ranges among the TRIPS disputes.2
Similarly, there have not been frequent disputes under the GATS: of the
14 complaints that have been brought under this agreement, only five
were lodged in the five-year period 2000–2004.3 Here as well, however,
politically and economically important cases are included such as Mexico
– Telecommunications4 and United States – Gambling Services.5
4.2 General Reception in Literature6
4.2.1 Legal Literature
The Dispute Settlement Understanding received a very warm, if not
enthusiastic, welcome in scholarly literature. According to Bhala (1999a),
a sizeable portion of this literature is ‘characterised by a near irrational
exuberance ... about the new adjudicatory system’. It was called a ‘crown
jewel’ and a ‘core linchpin’ of the multilateral trading system.7 Hudec
(1998) wrote that trading nations granted an ‘unprecedented degree of
power to a legal tribunal’ to enforce the obligations under the WTO
agreement. The DSU has also been hailed as a model for other
international organisations, and it has brought forth a debate on the
‘constitutionalisation’ of international trade law.8 The increased academic
interest in the WTO dispute settlement system has also been reflected
by a myriad of scholarly publications on the system from a variety of
disciplines and on a variety of aspects.9 Both established and new
periodical publications which emerged over the last few years (such as
the Journal of International Economic Law and the World Trade Review)
devote considerable space to articles on WTO dispute settlement.
2 On dispute settlement activities related to the TRIPS, see, for instance, Samahon (2000).
3 On dispute settlement activities related to the GATS, see, for instance, Geuze and Wager
(1999).
4 Mexico – Measures affecting telecommunications services (complaint brought by the US;
WT/DS204).
5 United States – Measures affecting the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services
(complaint brought by Antigua and Barbuda; WT/DS285).
6 In this section, only a global overview on the massive DSU literature can be given. Some
aspects will be discussed in more detail in further chapters of this book.
7 See Bhala (1999a), pp 856ff for quotations.
8 See, for instance, the many contributions by Petersmann, including Petersmann (1999),
Petersmann (1998), Petersmann (1998a) and Petersmann (1997). For an overview of the
debate, see Duvigneau (2001).
9 See Part V.
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Specifically, the quasi-automaticity in the establishment of panels as well
as in the adoption of panel and Appellate Body reports was among the
most-lauded elements. This quasi-automaticity removed blockage
possibilities for losing defendants that had existed in dispute settlement
under the old GATT. The introduction of precise time-limits was equally
seen as a highly positive step. From a legal point of view, the introduction
of an appellate review mechanism and the institution of a permanent
Appellate Body composed of highly-qualified lawyers were greeted as
particularly important contributions towards improved legal quality of
decisions and as a further step towards the rule of law in trade matters.10
More generally, this appellate review system was greeted as a model
for other areas of international public law. Many authors are closely
observing the evolving jurisprudence and are writing countless
comments on panel and (much more so) Appellate Body reports.
Hudec (1999, pp 4 and 9) has warned, however, not to overstate the
differences of the new DSU compared with the older procedures. With
regard to the removal of the blocking possibilities, Hudec holds that
blockage did not play too prominent a role in actual GATT practice either,
as there was a community consensus that every member should have a
right to have its claims heard by an impartial third-party decision-maker.
Moreover, GATT dispute settlement had already become a more judicial
instrument in the late 1970s and 1980s, where the cornerstones were
laid for the later evolution towards the DSU (see Sections 2.2.2.5 – 2.2.2.7).
As Hudec (1999, p 11) states with regard to the success of dispute
settlement in the 1980s, an international legal system does not require
rigorously binding procedures to be generally effective but that requisite
political will can achieve a great deal. Even more, stringent procedures
by themselves are not likely to make a legal system effective unless there
is sufficient political will behind them. He cautioned, therefore, that even
the new system would not lead to 100 per cent compliance. As under
the GATT, countries would be unable or unwilling to comply in specific
cases in the WTO as well. The system would accordingly have to learn
to live with legal failure: ‘Just as GATT did, [the new WTO legal system]
will have to learn how to get up off the floor, brush off its soiled authority,
and move on to the next piece of business with the same high
expectations of achieving compliance.’
Indeed, legal literature began to take these problems into account
towards the end of the 1990s as implementation problems surged in a
number of high profile cases, including, inter alia, EC – Bananas, EC –
10 See, for instance, the many contributions by Jackson or Petersmann.
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Hormones and US – Foreign Sales Corporations. In these cases, the refusal
of defendants to implement the DSB recommendations triggered the
suspension of concessions or other obligations (SCOO) by the
complainant government under authorisation from the Dispute
Settlement Body. More commonly known under terms like ‘retaliation’
or ‘sanctions’, the SCOO itself has become the focus of much criticism:
By suspending concessions or other obligations, the complainant
government usually harms its own economy as well as ‘innocent’
individual economic actors in both countries who are not responsible
for the defendant government’s failure to implement the DSB
recommendations properly. Similar to any other import restriction, the
SCOO weakens the competitiveness of the complainant’s domestic
industries by shutting out competitive raw materials or intermediate
products. It may also promote rent-seeking behaviour in the
complainant’s newly-protected industries and undermine their long-
term competitiveness. On a general level, the SCOO reduces the
predictability of trade conditions. Moreover, developing and small
countries have difficulties in using the SCOO as they usually lack the
market size to make a credible retaliatory threat. Retaliation may also
have a negative impact on third countries, for instance, if their industries
supply inputs to industries in the defendant country. Finally, the SCOO
has a problematic psychological connotation as it creates the erroneous
impression that trade restrictions would make a country better off.11 In
addition to implementation problems in cases that were subject to an
Article 21.5 compliance dispute, the actual degree of market opening as
a consequence of ‘implemented’ DSB rulings has been questioned as
well.12
Other problems identified with the new procedure include the often
poor respect of the deadlines laid down in the DSU, the lack of a remand
procedure which would allow the Appellate Body to remand certain
issues back to the panels for further factual clarification, and the
problems of developing countries wishing to participate more actively
in the system.
More recently, some quite strong criticism has been spelt out on the
jurisprudence of the Appellate Body in trade remedy cases. The gist of
this criticism is that the adjudicating bodies are exceeding their authority
and are legislating instead of adjudicating, that they are not showing
sufficient deference to members’ trade policy decisions, and that the
11 For a discussion of the SCOO, see, inter alia, Charnovitz (2003), Anderson (2002),
Charnovitz (2001), Hudec (2000) and Mavroidis (2000). A critical view of the current
focus on retaliation from an industry perspective is included in UNICE (2001).
12 See Zimmermann (2001) for a discussion of implementation measures in WT/DS31: Canada
– Measures Prohibiting or Restricting Importation of Certain Periodicals (brought by the US).
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system is biased towards trade liberalisation.13 That criticism has been
particularly strong in the US. However, for the time being, strong
criticism may be considered a minority view in literature. And, as some
observers hold: ‘it is not always clear that some of the harshest critics of
WTO jurisprudence, many of whom have advocacy roles related to a
variety of special interests, have the best interests of the overall WTO
system in mind.’14
Yet, there is a real concern about what some commentators perceive to
be an imbalance between relatively effective legal decision-making by
the adjudicating bodies and ineffective political decision-making by the
political bodies of the WTO.15 Unlike the lengthy search for compromise
at the negotiating table, the quasi-automatic architecture of the DSU
allows complainants to exact decisions on politically highly sensitive
issues from the dispute settlement system. It is therefore hardly
surprising that the DSU is the forum of choice for governments that
perceive their position to be in accordance with WTO rules. The danger
associated with such a trend is that member governments that see their
interests insufficiently safeguarded might be driven out of the system.
This would be particularly problematic if large members with ‘systemic
weight’ were to retreat from the system. There are currently two strands
in DSU literature that seek to strike a balance between the relative success
and well-functioning of the dispute settlement system with its
adjudicative bodies on the one hand, and the weakness of the consensus-
based political decision-making at the WTO on the other. One school of
thought – probably the minority point of view – seeks to re-strengthen
political control of WTO dispute settlement and to weaken its
adjudication character,16 whereas, by contrast, other authors vehemently
oppose any effort to weaken the adjudicating system and argue in favour
of focusing reform efforts on improved political decision-making.17
4.2.2 Theoretical Literature in Economics and Political Science
Besides legal scholars, economists and political scientists have discovered
the WTO dispute settlement system as an interesting topic for theoretical
research.18
13 See, for instance, Greenwald (2003), Magnus, Joneja and Yocis (2003), Ragosta, Joneja
and Zeldovich (2003), Wilson and Starchuk (2003), as well as Ragosta, Joneja and Zeldovich
(no year specified).
14 See Consultative Board (ed) (2004), p 55.
15 See, for instance, Ehlermann (2002a).
16 See Barfield (2002) and Barfield (2001). An earlier contribution to the discussion from a
critical perspective is Hippler Bello (1996).
17 See Ehlermann (2003, 2002, 2002a), Jackson (2002), Steger (2002a), as well as Cottier
and Takenoshita (2003); see also Section 9.1.3 of this study.
18 Analyses have already been established for dispute settlement under the GATT; see,
for example, Hungerford (1991).
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Although there is no comprehensive political or economic theory of
GATT/WTO dispute settlement so far, research progresses on several
avenues. In the emerging literature, methods such as those developed
for the economic analysis of the courts (law and economics)19 and game-
theory are being applied to explain how the WTO dispute settlement
system affects members’ behaviour. These methodological approaches
are adapted to the political economy considerations underlying the
architecture of the multilateral trading system. For instance, payoffs in
trade litigation are not monetary but they are modelled as gains (or
losses) in political support that governments can draw from action before
the WTO and/or from dispute settlement outcomes. Furthermore,
litigation in the domestic context is often motivated by uncertainty with
regard to the outcome of cases20 which is not necessarily the case in
international trade disputes. And finally, such studies take the relatively
weaker enforcement of international economic law (compared with
domestic law) into account.
Hauser and Bütler (2000) studied the incentives of members in the
litigation process.21 In their game-theoretic analysis, they explain that
new trade restrictions occur despite the existence of a dispute settlement
system with the political benefits which stem from such restrictions and
which continue to accrue to the defendant while the litigation procedure
lasts. Dealing with the role of early settlements, the authors predict that
such settlements are more likely in the early stages of the procedure
and that the settlement will be oriented towards the expected outcome
of litigation. The high rate of appeals is similarly explained with the
delay (during which the measure can be upheld) and with the desire of
litigants to prove their determination to domestic constituents. Given
the agenda control of the complainant, they argue that trade restrictions
are, however, less attractive under the new system. Nevertheless, the
authors hold that the implementation procedure as such is insufficient
to induce compliance.
In further developing this line of thought, Hauser (2001) argues that
incentives for compliance lie mainly outside the dispute settlement
system and that they can be captured as reputation costs of non-
compliance. Such reputation costs could take the form of reduced
credibility in future negotiations or the form of the decline of the whole
19 An excellent overview of this tradition is offered by Kaplow and Shavell (2002).
20 Such asymmetry can be the result of asymmetric information (tradition established by
Bebchuk (1984)) or of divergent expectations (tradition established by Priest and Klein
(1984)).
21 The ideas set out in the formal paper of Hauser and Bütler (2000) were developed in an
earlier contribution by Hauser and Martel (1997).
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system. Such reputation mechanisms also play a central role according
to Maggi (1999) who sees the main functions of dispute settlement in
the verification of violations and the dissemination of pertinent
information, whereby he underlines the multilateral character of the
GATT. These findings are in line with earlier research on the GATT
system (which was characterised by a legally speaking even ‘weaker’
dispute settlement system) that stressed the role of ‘normative pressures’
and countries’ sense of international obligations22 for compliance with
multilateral trade rules (see Sections 2.2 and 2.3).
Guzman (2003) analyses the patterns of settlement and litigation. He
argues that unlike in a domestic context where asymmetric information
is bringing actors into court, it is the asymmetry of payoffs that
determines the pattern of settlement and/or litigation in the WTO. This
asymmetry is due to the ‘political’ nature of payoffs in trade litigation.
Based on this understanding, the author builds a theory which predicts
that cases where the complainant is likely to win at the panel stage will
fail to settle if the political payoffs from empanelment received by
complainants are systematically larger than those received by the
defendant. If the payoffs to defendants are larger than those to
complainants, cases where the complainant is likely to win settle more
easily than cases where the defendant is likely to win. This theory is
corroborated by the fact that in 90 per cent of the 82 panel rulings that
were issued until July 2002 and that were examined by Guzman, the
defendant was found in violation of WTO law in at least one respect.
Since litigation before the WTO is no zero-sum game according to
Guzman, both the complainant and the defendant can be better off by
litigating a case to the end.
Rosendorff (2001) argues that the dispute settlement procedure allows
governments in times of political stress to respond to domestic political
pressures by introducing a trade barrier, pay compensation or accept
retaliation and nevertheless remain part of the community of co-
operating nations. From a systemic perspective, that mechanism yields
stability to an international trade agreement and provides an insurance
mechanism against random political fluctuations.23 The reflections in
22 See Kovenock and Thursby (1992) who gave countries’ sense of obligation a
supplementary role (with regard to dispute settlement under the old GATT) in addition
to the threat of retaliatory deterrence. Mitchell (1997) argued that this sense of obligation
was even necessary for compliance, given the weaknesses of retaliation. Kovenock and
Thursby (1997) replied by defending their thesis, arguing that unilateral retaliation outside
the GATT system is an important factor of deterrence.
23 See Rosendorff (2001). The role of such escape clauses is discussed in more general
terms in Rosendorff and Milner (2001).
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Ethier (2001) follow a similar thrust, starting from the idea that trade
agreements are incomplete contracts as trade can be affected by all sorts
of policies that countries cannot foresee or are not willing to negotiate.
Trade agreements therefore contain an implicit agreement to allow
countries to violate commitments as long as reciprocity is safeguarded
through commensurate ‘punishments’.24 This theoretic approach is
particularly intriguing as it corresponds closely to the core legal concept
of the balance of rights and obligations that is a central element in the
WTO architecture (see Section 2.2.1.2).
Other contributions perceive WTO dispute settlement as a re-negotiation
mechanism,25 or as a mechanism for the gathering and exchange of
information.26 Still others analyse the impact that the presence of a
dispute settlement system has on international trade co-operation in
general.27 Some contributions focus on the role of trade policy flexibility
and the limits of enforcement.28
4.2.3 Empirical Literature
Finally, a number of empirical contributions have enriched our
understanding of WTO dispute settlement.
Some of the more basic analyses, such as those published regularly by
the Journal of International Economic Law, give an account of basic figures
on the trend in the use of the dispute settlement mechanism. While these
descriptive statistics help us to identify trends in the application of the
system, they do not attempt to identify the ‘driving forces’ behind the
trends that are depicted.29
Another line of empirical research with a more qualitative orientation
was established early by Hudec (1993) who offers descriptions and
statistical analyses of the 207 GATT legal complaints that were brought
under the GATT between 1948 and 1989. He analysed the cases under
24 See Ethier (2001). The author goes on to explain specific behavioural patterns in the
negotiation of agreements and abidance by the rules.
25 See Bagwell and Staiger (1999).
26 See Maggi (1999).
27 See Ludema (2001) and Furusawa (2003).
28 On the role of flexibility and the limits of enforcement, see for instance Rosendorff and
Milner (2001) and Koremenos (2001).
29 See, for instance, Leitner and Lester (2003), Park and Panizzon (2002), Park and Umbricht
(2001) and Park and Eggers (2000). Recent data is also available on WorldTradeLaw.Net’s
Dispute Settlement Commentary, a subscription-based information service available at
http://www.worldtradelaw.net.
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criteria such as procedural outcome (rulings, settlements without rulings,
withdrawn/abandoned cases) and substantive outcome (result unknown,
full satisfaction, partial satisfaction, negative outcome). The author also
examined dispute settlement activities by member, type of measure, and
sector concerned. Continuing this approach, Hudec (1999) examined
the first three years of the new WTO dispute settlement system along
similar lines, too. Based on his dataset, he found that: ‘there is a strong
case for saying that substantially all the increase in WTO litigation can
be traced to the new or intensified obligations of the Uruguay Round.’
He did not find a significant change in the identity of complainants (as
a consequence of the new procedures) either. However, he found a
significant increase in cases brought against developing countries. This
increase, in turn, was largely explained with the significant increase in
legal discipline against developing countries which came with the entry-
into-force of the Uruguay Round agreements.30
Hudec also examined whether empanelment of disputes increased as a
consequence of the greater automaticity in the proceedings, as intuition
might suggest. His findings, however, reveal no significant increase in
the panelling of disputes. The proportion of early settlement remained
largely the same under the new DSU as under the old GATT. Moreover,
experience in the first three years even suggested that the proportion of
complaints leading to a ruling is even lower in the WTO than it was
under the GATT. Two hypotheses could explain this pattern. One is that
the binding quality of the new procedure persuades more governments
to remove illegal practices voluntarily. A second hypothesis is that legal
complaints are increasingly used as negotiating instruments, ie as
devices to increase pressure without intending to carry the litigation
further. However, testing these hypotheses would require an analysis
of cases settled early which is a tremendous task.31
Hudec’S line of research has recently been taken up by other researchers.
Busch and Reinhardt, along with a few other authors, have conducted
massive empirical research on the WTO dispute settlement system and
its predecessor under the GATT.32 The results of this research are briefly
summarised in the following sections.
30 See Hudec (1999), pp 24ff.
31 See Hudec (1999), pp 25–27.
32 See Guzman and Simmons (2002), Busch (2000), Busch and Reinhardt (2003a), Busch
and Reinhardt (2003), Busch and Reinhardt (2000), Reinhardt (2001), Reinhardt (2001a),
Reinhardt (2000), Reinhardt (2000a), Sevilla (1998) and Sevilla (1997). An excellent
overview is Busch and Reinhardt (2002), also embarking upon the methodological
problems that researchers face when dealing empirically with the DSU.
86
Negotiating the Review of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding
4.2.3.1 Dispute Initiation
Dispute settlement reforms did not significantly raise the likelihood of
disputes among developed states, at least not up to the end of 1998.
Although the DSU is usually viewed as a much more substantial reform
than the 1989 Improvements, Reinhardt (2000) finds in his statistical
analysis that the coming-into-force of the new DSU has not increased
the probability of dispute initiation between developed countries,
whereas he finds that the mid-term improvements made in 1989 during
the Uruguay Round increased the probability of dispute initiation
between developed countries by a factor of 3.3. As the institution’s
fundamental lack of enforcement was not altered, Busch and Reinhardt
(2002, p 464) concur with Hudec that writers have tended to overstate
the difference between dispute settlement under the GATT and under
the WTO. Rather, the often-quoted increase in disputes can be regarded
as tracking the evolution of GATT/WTO membership.
With regard to dispute initiation, ‘positive feedback’ and ‘bandwagon
effects’ are identified as other features of the dispute settlement system.
Positive feedback means that defendants often file counter-complaints.
The average complaint increases the probability of a counter-complaint
within a year by 55 times.33 Bandwagon effects occur as other Members
are also more likely to target the policy of a defendant as soon as one
member has filed a complaint. It has also been found that members of
preferential trade agreements are seven times less likely to file disputes
against each other than are other states. Reinhardt (2000) also rebuts
conventional wisdom that past successes in resolving complaints cause
greater reliance on the system. Pointing to the Bananas case where the
EC’s failure to implement the rulings caused further sets of complaints,
it is argued that disputes are just as likely to be responses to the failure
rather than success of the adjudication system.
The position of developing countries in WTO dispute initiation has also
been studied. Horn, Mavroidis and Nordström (1999) found that the
pattern of bringing complaints largely reflects the diversity of a country’s
exports over products and partners, and that litigation costs also explain
the greater restraint from developing countries. Whereas the availability
of legal capacity matters to some extent, the authors found that power
measures do not. Interestingly, the proportion of complaints brought
by developing countries has even decreased under the WTO vis-à-vis
33 See Busch and Reinhardt (2002), p 464.
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the GATT. Despite the increasing number of developing WTO Members,
they constituted 31per cent of the GATT complainants, compared with
29 per cent of the complainants under the WTO. Reinhardt (2000, p 19)
found that Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are one-third less likely
to file complaints against developed states under the WTO than under
the GATT, whereas they are five times more likely to be subject of a
complaint under the WTO than under the 1989 Improvements. Busch
and Reinhardt (2002, p 467) therefore conclude that: ‘the evidence
strongly supports the claims of many developing country advocates that
the WTO dispute settlement system is not working as effectively for
LDCs. Several reasons have been offered in literature, such as ballooning
treaty text, ever-increasing loads of case law, new stages and the
judicialisation which put a premium on sophisticated legal
argumentation.’
4.2.3.2 Dispute Escalation
Looking at dispute escalation, there are some interesting findings with
regard to the effect of the 1989 Improvements which removed the
blocking of panel requests. Busch (2000) found that cases filed for
consultations were no more likely to go to a panel after the 1989
Improvements than before. This would contradict the views of many
commentators that the increased ‘legalism’ would be preferred over the
‘power politics’ of consultations. This finding should, however, not be
interpreted so as to portray the modifications as inconsequential. As
Busch and Reinhardt (2000, p 170) note, this experience could point to
the fact that ‘the real action is still likely to be found in pre-trial
negotiations’. The mere possibility of a panel leads to bargaining in the
shadow of the law and may therefore enhance early settlement.
Reasons inducing such early settlement – even in the absence of strong
enforcement – are the delivery by adjudicating bodies of a timely and
coherent normative statement, which could empower groups in the
defendant country opposing a protectionist measure, or which could
enable the defendant’s executive branch of government to ‘tie hands’
and to make commitments more acceptable by citing the need to be a
‘good citizen’. Reinhardt (2001) offers an alternative explanation for early
settlement in the GATT. Accordingly, the complainant has greater resolve
prior to a ruling, believing that the defendant will be compelled to
concede to an adverse judgment. Even if this belief is erroneous, this
resolve induces early settlement and generous concessions from the
defendant.
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4.2.3.3 Dispute Outcomes
Busch and Reinhardt (2002, p 471) have found that the chances the
defendant will concede are greater prior to a ruling than they are after a
ruling against the defendant.34 The probability of full concessions by
the defendant jumps an average of 27 per cent after a panel is established,
but it drops 18 per cent if the panel rules in favour of the complainant
and 55 per cent if it rules in favour of the defendant. Several explanations
are offered for this trend, which is puzzling at first sight, as defendants
could always ‘spurn rulings with impunity’, due to the low likeliness of
retaliation. One explanation is that countries are wary of bringing down
the GATT system. That explanation is, however, insufficient, as the larger
members (EC, US) in particular account for much of the non-compliance,
whereas precisely these countries should show responsibility for the
system. Another explanation offered is the normative power of a GATT
ruling and the pressure to observe it. Yet, it does not explain the high
use of early settlement. Of course, a simple explanation (subject to further
verification) could be that cases which are settled early do not involve
high political stakes, and have clear legal merits. In other terms, the
‘political cost’ to the defendant of losing the case will be inferior to the
‘political cost’ of removing a measure without further litigation (pp
471ff). This finding would also be in line with another finding on
compliance. Busch and Reinhardt (2002, p 473) found that only two-
fifths of rulings for the complainants result in full compliance, counting
also those rulings which were not adopted. Their conclusion which, at
first sight, may be surprising is: ‘whatever positive effect [the institution]
has on a defendant’s willingness to liberalise occurs prior to rulings, in
the form of early settlement.’ This finding also holds for problematic
transatlantic trade-disputes. Busch and Reinhardt (2003) find that: ‘(i)f
Washington and Brussels fail to resolve their trade tensions prior to a
panel ruling, the likelihood of concession drops precipitously. Indeed,
concessions offered in the transatlantic relationship are typically had in
advance of a ruling, or not at all’ (footnote omitted).35
With regard to settlements, Busch (2000) found that pairs of highly
democratic countries are up to 21 per cent more likely to settle disputes
in the pre-panel stage than pairs with one or more states that are not
fully democratic. The confidential nature of the pre-panel stage seems
to make it easier for those governments to come to a settlement. Increased
34 Based on Reinhardt (2001).
35 See Busch and Reinhardt (2003), pp 161ff for an overview, and Busch and Reinhardt
(2003a) for an in-depth analysis of transatlantic trade disputes. On transatlantic trade
disputes, see also Hauser and Roitinger (2003).
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transparency at this stage could make it more difficult to settle early. It
has also been found that open economies are up to 31 per cent less likely
to make concessions during consultations, and up to 13 per cent less
likely to make concessions during the panel stage. An explanation offered
is that these countries have less ‘slack’ for further liberalisation.
With regard to compliance with adverse rulings, Reinhardt (2000, pp 19
and 33) finds that democratic states are less likely to comply.36 The reason
could be that they find it more difficult to give in as they are more
sensitive to public opinion. Besides, defendant countries which are
economically smaller than the complainant country or which depend
on the complainant’s export market are more likely to comply. LDCs are
more likely to comply than comparably sized, more developed countries.
As to the overall impact of adjudication, Busch and Reinhardt (2002, p
474) find that ‘evidence is accumulating that the regime indeed makes a
difference’. Invoking adjudication increases the level of liberalisation of
disputed measures by about 10 per cent. Moreover, liberalisation is four
times as likely after a ruling for the complainant than for the defendant,
thereby showing that the system affects the bargaining between the
litigants. Finally, they have found for cases involving actions under
Section 301 that the defendant is more likely to comply if action under
Section 301 is accompanied by a GATT/WTO complaint.37 Bown (2003)
found in an empirical study of GATT/WTO disputes between 1973 and
1998 that it is the potential cost of retaliation that allows governments
to commit to liberalisation.
4.2.4 Summary: General Reception of the DSU in Literature
The prevailing mood in WTO dispute settlement practice and literature
is that the mechanism has worked generally well in its first 10 years of
existence. Although problems are emerging, its continued high use
suggests that it is still an attractive forum for the discussion of trade
issues.
The undertone of the literature on the system is generally positive. Yet,
most legal contributions, particularly the early ones, appear to overstate
the differences between dispute settlement under the old GATT and the
new WTO. This conclusion is based on the findings of empirical research
carried out by economists, political scientists and also by legal scholars
such as Hudec. The larger lines of the theoretical and empirical literature
seem to lead back to the concept of reciprocity. Dispute settlement has
36 Quoted in Busch and Reinhardt (2002), p 473.
37 Based on Busch (2000a).
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to safeguard the negotiated balance of rights and obligations as well as
to prevent (and remedy, if necessary) the nullification or impairment of
benefits accruing under these agreements. It is the balance of political
support which governments have exchanged that needs to be protected
if the system is to work.
Since the Uruguayan Recourse (see Section 2.2.2.4), violations of WTO
law have been considered prima facie instances of nullification or
impairment. This approach to dispute settlement clearly has its legal
merits and it may be the best proxy available for restoring the political
balance, given the difficulties of measuring political support and thus
reciprocity. However, this approach does not necessarily secure
reciprocity over time. Agreements remain constant whereas trade
patterns evolve with economic development and technological progress,
as may the structure of political support for governments. This holds
particularly if normal negotiations are blocked due to weak political
decision-making (see Section 9.1.3 for a more detailed discussion). Given
the role of political will behind GATT/WTO dispute settlement that has
been stressed in literature, one could argue that adjudicating bodies
should not lose sight of the reciprocity concept when they draft their
decisions. In this line of thought, the dispute settlement in general, and
the combination of diplomatic and legal ingredients in particular, are
most of all instruments to secure the maintenance of reciprocity in trade
relations and thus the political support behind the WTO system and its
principles.
PART II
THE DSU REVIEW: NEGOTIATIONS AND PROPOSALS
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5. EVOLVING DSU REVIEW NEGOTIATIONS AND THEIR CONTEXT
As we are not aware of any treatise on the DSU review negotiations at
the time of writing, this chapter gives an overview of the different stages
of the negotiations. It shows how the negotiations evolved amidst
emerging issues of on-going dispute settlement practice. We start with
the first review effort under the 1994 Ministerial Declaration that took
place in 1997 and 1998 (Section 5.1) and under the 1999 extension in the
run-up to Seattle (Section 5.2). After the failure of the Seattle Ministerial,
the discussion remained in an inconclusive limbo (Section 5.3) until the
Doha Ministerial Conference, where a new negotiating mandate
regarding the DSU was included in the Ministerial Declaration. The
negotiations under this mandate between early 2002 and the May 2003
deadline are discussed in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 outlines the negotiations
up to the May 2004 deadline whereas Section 5.6 recapitulates
developments until the end of 2004. Finally, Section 5.7 offers some
conclusions that are based on the preceding account of the negotiations
process.
5.1 Getting Started Amidst Emerging Issues (1997–1998)
Initially, the DSU review had been mandated by the Ministerial Decision
on the ‘Application and Review of the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes’. This decision, which
had been adopted on 14 April 1994, called upon ministers to ‘complete
a full review of dispute settlement rules and procedures’ within four
years after the entry into force of the WTO agreement and ‘to take a
decision on the occasion of its first meeting after the completion of the
review, whether to continue, modify or terminate such dispute settlement
rules and procedures’.
The DSU review appeared as an item on the agenda of the Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) for the first time on 18 November 1997.1 At this
meeting, the chairman asked members for their views on procedural
aspects of the DSU review. Consultations on these issues were held
informally, and the chairman issued a report on the results in February
1998.2 In this report, the chairman stated that no delegation favoured
1 See Document WT/DSB/M/39, 12.
2 See Document WT/DSB/W/74 of 26 February 1998.
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the option of terminating the DSU and that the DSU was generally
considered to be working effectively. Accordingly, a ‘careful approach
to the review was warranted’. The review was to be conducted by the
DSB which would then report to the General Council, and ultimately to
the Ministerial Conference. The review was timed to be conducted
mainly after the 1998 Geneva Ministerial in order to allow delegations
to dedicate more time to the latter. The DSB took note of this report as a
basis for future discussions.3 To sum it up, the start of the DSU Review
was slow and characterised by a general satisfaction with the system as
well as by a lack of experience with ‘hard cases’.4
In the following months, mostly informal discussions and consultations
on procedural aspects of the DSU review were held.5 Members were to
submit informal suggestions preferably before the end of July 1998, and
substantive discussions were to start in late September or early October
1998. Discussions were to be supported by a compilation of suggestions
from members and statistical data on dispute settlement provided by
the secretariat.6 Although input from the Appellate Body or academics
on an informal basis was judged to be a useful complement to the
discussions, it was explicitly held that: ‘the DSU review is an exercise to
be conducted by Members exclusively on the basis of their suggestions.’7
The informal documents prepared by the secretariat included a
compilation of informal comments submitted for the review of the DSU8
and statistical data on the operation of the DSU.9 They were circulated
in late summer.10 This input was discussed in an informal meeting of
the DSU on 1 October 1998. Members also made their submissions.
3 See Document WT/DSB/M/42, 6. For contributions in the academic discussion during
the early stage of the DSU review, see, for instance, Jackson (1998), Shoyer (1998), Steger
and Hainsworth (1998).
4 On issues that were dealt with as ‘candidates’ for the review in these early stages, see
‘Major Changes to WTO Dispute Settlement Unlikely During 1998 Review’, in Inside US
Trade, 26 December 1997.
5 DSB meetings of 25 March 1998 (see WT/DSB/M/44, no 8; see also ‘WTO Members Asked
to Submit Suggestions on Dispute Settlement’, in International Trade Reporter, vol 15, no
13, 1 April 1998), 22 April 1998 (see WT/DSB/M/45, no 10), and informal DSB meetings
and consultations, including on 29 April 1998, 10 June 1998 (see also ‘WTO Off to Slow
Start on Review of Dispute Settlement Mechanism’, in Inside US Trade, 12 June 1998).
6 See WT/DSB/M/46, 11.
7 See WT/DSB/M/47, 10; see also ‘World Trade Organisation Begins Review To Reform
Procedures for Settling Disputes’, in International Trade Reporter, vol 15, no 29, 29 July
1998; and ‘US Blocks First EU Request For WTO Panel on FSC Tax Provision’, in Inside
US Trade, 24 July 1998.
8 Job no 4762.
9 Job no 4750.
10 See WT/DSB/M/48, no 9.
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However, the response to the invitation to submit informal suggestions
was relatively weak. By the beginning of October 1998, no inputs had
been received from the two major players, the US and the EC, which
caused a delay in the negotiations.11
In retrospect, one likely reason for the hesitant approach to the review
may be found in the context of the dispute settlement practice. The review
negotiations started right at a time when politically difficult cases were
beginning to cause stress in WTO dispute settlement and when crucial
developments were taking place that countries were eager to observe.
First, the US became increasingly worried about implementation. The
EC showed reluctance with regard to the implementation of the adverse
rulings in the politically delicate disputes on Hormones12 and Bananas,13
whereas Canada planned a law which would ban advertising in foreign
periodicals and thereby circumvent the market opening obligations
which the US had expected from the rulings in the Magazines14 case.
Whereas Canada should have already implemented the ruling by the
end of October 1998, implementation periods were also nearing their
end in Bananas (1 January 1999) and Hormones (13 May 1999). Deceived
by its trade partners’ unwillingness towards compliance, and under
pressure from Congress, the US administration was proceeding with
plans for retaliatory measures as concerns were growing that the DSU
could turn out to be insufficient when it came to implementation.15
Secondly, there were growing concerns in the US after the ruling in the
so-called Fuji-Kodak case16 that the system would be insufficient to open
foreign markets if more subtle protectionist measures were at stake. Some
observers therefore suggested that the US should return to a more
aggressive use of its unilateral Section 301 policies.17
11 See ‘Talks on WTO Dispute Settlement Review Delayed Until Later in October’, in
International Trade Reporter, vol 15, no 39, 7 October 1998.
12 European Communities – Measures Affecting Livestock and Meat (Hormones) (WT/DS48).
On this case, see, for instance, Hughes (1998), Quick and Bluthner (1999).
13 European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (WT/
DS27). On this case, see, for instance, Palmer (2002), Salas and Jackson (2001), Bishop
(2001), Jackson and Grané (2001), Slotboom (1999) and Bessko (1996).
14 Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals (WT/DS31). On this case, see
Zimmermann (2001).
15 See ‘US, EU Banana Dispute May Become Test Case for WTO Rules’, in Inside US Trade,
14 August 1998; ‘Administration Withstands Gingrich, Lott Pressure on EU Retaliation’,
in Inside US Trade, 9 October 1998; ‘US, EU Clash Over Planned Retaliation for EU Banana
Policy’, in Inside US Trade, 23 October 1998; and ‘WTO Begins Contentious Talks on Reform
of Dispute Resolution Rules, Delays Expected’, in International Trade Reporter, vol 15, no
42, 28 October 1998.
16 Japan –Measures Affecting Photographic Film and Paper (WT/DS44). On this case, see, for
instance, Linarelli (2000), Furse (1999), Goldman (1999) and Fujii (1997).
17 See, for instance, Wolff and Magnus (1998).
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Thirdly, the US came under increasing pressure from internal interest
groups such as environmentalist NGOs to press for more transparency
in WTO dispute settlement.18 WTO dispute settlement was fiercely
criticised when the Appellate Body confirmed a prior panel ruling on
12 October 1998 according to which a US ban on imported shrimp from
countries without adequate conservation policies for sea-turtles was
WTO-inconsistent.19 Similar criticism had already mounted after the
Appellate Body, in its first-ever ruling, had found policies used by the
US under its Clean Air Act to be WTO-inconsistent (Gasoline case20). This
situation had a direct impact on the negotiations. With crucial decisions
and developments ahead, delegations apparently chose a ‘wait and see’
attitude.
The first of the two major trade powers to finally come out with a
proposal was the EC.21 It outlined its ideas on 19 October 1998. The EC
suggested the establishment of a standing body of professional
panellists.22 The EC also suggested that all arguments put forward to
panels and the Appellate Body should be made available to the public.
In addition, the WTO should either allow the public to attend hearings
before the panels and the Appellate Body, or allow interested parties to
express their views to the panel. Moreover, the time available for the
Appellate Body to hand down rulings should increase from the current
60/90 day time-frame to a period of three to six months which would
allow the Appellate Body to remand issues back to panels.23 Further
issues covered by the EC proposal include the distinction between
mandatory and discretionary law, a refusal to extend the special standard
of review under the Anti-dumping agreement to other agreements and
cases involving several complainants or defendants. Finally, the EC
proposal sought to strengthen the consultative element, including in
18 On US private party comments regarding WTO dispute settlement, see ‘Comments on
WTO DSU Review Seek Transparency, Private Party Role’, in Inside US Trade, 3 July 1998.
For an earlier contribution, see also ‘ACTPN Urges Greater Transparency in WTO Dispute
Settlement’, in Inside US Trade, 28 April 1995. The issue of transparency is discussed in
more detail in Section 7.1.
19 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (WT/DS58); see
‘WTO Appeals Body Faults Implementation of Shrimp-Turtle Law’, in International Trade
Reporter, vol 15, no 40, 14 October 1998; see also ‘WTO Ruling in Shrimp-Turtle Dispute
Will Not Halt Protection Efforts, USTR Says’, in International Trade Reporter, vol 15, no 14,
8 April 1998.
20 United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (WT/DS2 and WT/
DS4). On this case, see Nogueira (1996), Scott (1996), Shenk (1996) and Waincymer (1996).
21 Review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding – Discussion Paper from the European
Communities; Job no 5602; DSU/7.
22 For a discussion of this idea, see Section 6.2.1.
23 For a discussion of remand authority, see Section 6.3.5.
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implementation issues. This proposal has to be seen in the light of a
letter from the White House to Congress where retaliatory measures
against the EC for failure to implement the Bananas and Hormones rulings
were outlined. Where as the EC wanted to engage in consultations with
the US on implementation, the US sought immediately to reconvene the
original panel for a dispute on implementation.24
With regard to its own position, the US submitted an informal paper on
3 November 1998.25 It included calls for faster compliance, arguing that:
‘(i)t is clear that these rules have functioned fairly well with respect to
the panel and appellate process, but that significant problems remain in
ensuring good faith implementation.’ The US also suggested a review
of the procedures for the selection of panel members, a review of the
time-frames allocated to the various stages of dispute settlement,
including the rule that panels are established only at the second meeting
where the issue appears on the agenda. In order to increase confidence
in the system, the US called both for the opening to the public of dispute
hearings and for giving outside parties the opportunity to present ‘friend
of the court’ (amicus curiae) briefs.26 These are unsolicited reports which
a private person or entity submits to the court with a view of informing
and influencing its decision (see Section 7.3 for details). This latter
proposal was likely spurred by the rulings in the Shrimp-Turtle case27
already mentioned which dealt with a US import prohibition of shrimp
that is not caught ‘turtle-friendly’. While the import ban was found to
be inconsistent under WTO law, the Appellate Body found in favour of
the US on the amicus curiae issue and reversed a previous panel finding
by concluding that panels do have the authority to accept amicus curiae
briefs, and by upholding another finding according to which parties
had the right to attach such briefs to their own submissions.28 Already
prior to its proposal under the DSU review, the US had been pressing
24 See ‘EU Outlines Its Proposal For Reforming Dispute System’, in International Trade
Reporter, vol 15, no 41, 21 October 1998, and ‘EU Outlines Proposals for Changes to WTO
Dispute Settlement System’, in Inside US Trade, 30 October 1998.
25 Preliminary Views of the United States Regarding Review of the DSU, document dated
29 October 1998.
26 See ‘US Recommends Prompt Compliance, Transparency to Reform WTO Process’, in
International Trade Reporter, vol 15, no 44, 11 November 1998; and ‘US Calls on WTO
Members to Open Dispute Mechanism to Public’, in Inside US Trade, 6 November 1998.
27 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (WT/DS58/AB/
R). On the case, see also Ahn (1999), Appleton (1999), Bree (1999), Cadeddu (1998), Chang
(2000), Howse (2002), Mavroidis (2000a), Puls (1999), Qureshi (1999), Richard and McCrory
(2000), Simmons (1999) and Warnken (1998).
28 See WT/DS58/AB/R, para 110.
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hard for strengthened transparency,29 although it made its proposals
outside the DSU review to the General Council in July and October 1998.30
India called in its submission31 for a clarification of the DSU provisions
on special and differential treatment (S&D) of developing countries. It
urged developed countries to make less aggressive use of the dispute
settlement system against developing countries ‘to prove their
aggression to domestic constituencies’, arguing that dispute settlement
proceedings should not be initiated where the trade effect on developed
countries was only marginal. India also argued in favour of giving
developing countries extra time for the preparation of submissions and
rebuttals, and a longer reasonable period of time (RPT) for
implementation which should be 30 months in the case of developing
country defendants.32 At that time, India was struggling in two major
disputes with trading partners. In India – QRs, it sought to shelter its
quantitative restrictions (QR) which played a major role in Indian trade
policy from challenges under the WTO.33 In addition, India had been
defeated in the politically highly sensitive Patents case by the US and
the EC, where it now had to implement the rulings.34
Pakistan, Singapore and Thailand sought in their proposal changes that
would reverse the Appellate Body’s conclusion that non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) be allowed to submit unsolicited friends-of-the-
court briefs to dispute panels, motivated by the findings in the Shrimp-
Turtle case on that issue.35
29 See ‘ACTPN Urges Greater Transparency in WTO Dispute Settlement’, in Inside US
Trade, 28 April 1995; ‘US Seeks More Transparency in WTO Dispute Settlement Process,
Lang Says’, in International Trade Reporter, vol 13, no 14, 3 April 1996; and ‘US Will Seek
More Transparency in WTO Dispute Settlement Process’, in International Trade Reporter,
vol 15, no 15, 15 April 1998.
30 See ‘US Proposal Calls on WTO to Release Dispute Panel Papers’, in International Trade
Reporter, vol 15, no 28, 15 July 1998; and ‘US Submits Revised Proposal on WTO “Timely”
Transparency’, in International Trade Reporter, vol 15,  no 41, 21 October 1998. On the General
Council discussions, see also ‘WTO Chief Outlines Plans for Increased Transparency’, in
International Trade Reporter, Vol 15, no 29, 22 July 1998; and ‘Ruggiero Places Onus for
Additional Transparency on WTO Members’, in Inside US Trade, 24 July 1998.
31 Review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding – Discussion Paper by India (undated).
32 See ‘US Recommends Prompt Compliance, Transparency to Reform WTO Process’; in
International Trade Reporter, vol 15,  no 44, 11 November 1998.
33 India – Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products
(WT/DS90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96).
34 India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products (WT/DS50
and WT/DS79).
35 See ‘Four Nations Submit Proposals to Reform WTO Dispute Settlement Process’, in
International Trade Reporter, vol 15, no 47, 2 December 1998; and, with regard to the report,
‘Complainants in WTO Shrimp Case Slam Appellate Body at DSB’, in Inside US Trade, 13
November 1998.
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Other countries that made proposals for the DSU review at this stage
included Hong Kong, Hungary,36 Japan,37 South Korea,38 Venezuela,39
Argentina,40 Guatemala41 and Australia.42
Despite discussions held in some 10 informal meetings, the original
deadline to complete the review in 1998 could not be met. It had become
clear already at the time when the ‘substantive discussions’ started in
mid-October 1998 that the deadline would probably be missed.43 In the
light of the slow progress the DSU review made, the DSB finally agreed
in its meeting on 8 December 1998 to ask the General Council for an
extension of the deadline until the end of July 1999.44 This extension
was granted at the General Council Meeting of December 1998.45
5.2 The Extension in the Run-Up to Seattle (1999)
Informal meetings continued in 1999. Meanwhile, the DSU review
changed – as Canada’s deputy permanent representative in Geneva put
it – from a ‘once-over-lightly’ tune-up of the DSU to dealing with serious
concerns over compliance with panel rulings. At this time, the Bananas
case was the prime motivator in raising the level of the review.46 The
reasonable period of time (RPT) for the implementation of the rulings
in the Bananas case had expired on 1 January 1999 and a row was
developing over whether the EC had complied.
36 Comments on the Review of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism, Non-Paper by Hungary,
18 September 1998.
37 The Review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding – Informal suggestions with
respect to the issues to be considered for evaluation and review by the Government of
Japan, 29 May 1998, 3150 DSU/2.
38 Issues Relevant to the DSU Review – Informal Suggestions by Korea, Job no 3224 DSU/
3.
39 Comments on the Review of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism, Non-Paper by
Venezuela, 24 February 1998.
40 Review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, Non-Paper Argentina, 27 October
1998.
41 Proposal by Guatemala Regarding the Review of the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 26 October 1998.
42 Not publicly available.
43 See ‘WTO Begins Contentious Talks on Reform of Dispute Resolution Rules, Delays
Expected’, in International Trade Reporter, vol 15, no 42, 28 October 1998.
44 See WT/DSB/M/52.
45 See WT/GC/M/32 15; see also ‘Dispute Settlement Review Will Continue into Next
Year’, in International Trade Reporter, vol 15, no 48, 9 December 1998; and ‘Members of the
WTO Vote to Delay Review of the DSU Until Next Year’, in Inside US Trade, 18 December
1998.
46 See ‘Next WTO Negotiating Round Must Clarify Dispute Settlement, Canadian Official
Says’, in International Trade Reporter, vol 16, no 14, 7 April 1999.
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On 10 February 1999, Canada presented its submission. It was the first
proposal to address the so-called ‘sequencing issue’ that had arisen
between the US and the EC on account of procedural gaps or even
contradictions in the DSU. Whereas the US held that it could (and even
had to) proceed with an Article 22 request for retaliation 30 days after
the expiry of the RPT, the EC argued that the US would first have to
request an Article 21.5 panel to review the implementation process. In a
parallel development, the EC sought an authoritative interpretation
pursuant to Art. IX.2 of the WTO agreement from the General Council
in order to clarify the problem.47 Canada (which faced similar problems
as the EU in the Magazines case48 with the US as complainant) proposed
a sequential approach, making the successful challenge of an
implementation measure under Article 21.5 a prerequisite for the
complainant’s request for authorisation to suspend concessions vis-à-
vis the defendant.49 Furthermore, Canada’s proposal also called for more
transparency by making country submissions to panels and the
Appellate Body publicly available on a timely basis, and by requiring
members to release public versions of their submissions. The proposal
also mentioned the possible establishment of an advisory centre on WTO
law to help developing countries better participate in the system.50 This
submission was followed by a further textual submission on 19 May
which proposed the text for a new Article 21bis to eliminate the
sequencing problem.51 From press reports quoting trade officials, it
appears that the US was the only member to oppose such sequencing in
the negotiations.52
The US reluctance to agree on a sequencing approach at this time is
likely related to two new complaints brought forward by the EC in
November 1998 and March 1999. They were closely related to the
disagreement on the ‘sequencing issue’. In US – Section 301,53 the EC
complained about allegedly WTO-inconsistent time-frames in the US
47 For the discussion in the General Council on 15 and 16 February 1999, see WT/GC/M/
35. See also the texts submitted by the EC (WT/GC/W/133 and WT/GC/W/143) and by the
United States (WT/GC/W/144). On the discussion, see ‘WTO General Council Passes On
Clarifying WTO Dispute Rules’, in Inside US Trade, 19 February 1999.
48 Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals (WT/DS31).
49 For details on sequencing, see Section 6.4.3.
50 See ‘Canada Urges WTO to Adopt “Refinements” to Dispute Rules’, in International
Trade Reporter, vol 16, no 7, 17 February 1999. See also Section 7.5.4 of this study.
51 See ‘Canada Proposes Change for Dispute Rules in Draft Submitted to WTO Settlement
Body’, in International Trade Reporter, vol 16, no 21, 26 May 1999; and ‘Canada Floats
Language to Clarify WTO Dispute Settlement Provisions’, in Inside US Trade, 28 May
1999.
52 See ‘US Isolated on Sequencing Issues at WTO Dispute Reform Negotiations’, in
International Trade Reporter, vol 16, no 28, 14 July 1999.
53 United States – Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (WT/DS152).
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trade legislation which would mandate the USTR to make
determinations in a time frame shorter than that included in the DSU
procedures. Whereas this complaint was more general in nature, the EC
complained in US – EC Products54 against specific retaliatory measures
which the US had taken to counter the EC’s failure to implement the
Bananas ruling. The EC held that the US measures were not consistent
with WTO rules as the US had not exhausted the Article 21.5 procedure.
Obviously, the US did not want to prejudice its own position in the
negotiations by agreeing to any sequencing procedure as long as it was
not mandated to do so by the panels or the Appellate Body.
The US followed up on its first proposal on 21 April 1999 with a new
proposal, suggesting a reduction of the time frame for consultations
prior to the panel request from 60 to 30 days, and the elimination of the
interim panel stage. Final panel rulings should be issued to the parties,
other WTO members and the public simultaneously. The proposal would
shorten the entire procedure by 20–27 weeks.55
As the final stage of the pre-Seattle negotiations began, there were some
signs that the US was beginning to accept the idea of sequencing. That
acceptance may have been fostered by an adverse panel ruling in the
high-profile Foreign Sales Corporations (FSC) case56 which was circulated
on 8 October 1998 and which pushed the US for the first time into a
defensive position in dispute settlement practice under the DSU on an
important issue. However, another issue was already emerging as a new
transatlantic stumbling block on the way to an agreement: President
Clinton had signed a provision into law which would have mandated
periodic changes to the list of products subject to the suspension of
concessions, thereby maximising the negative impact of retaliation on
exporters in the defendant country.57 The move towards this ‘carousel
retaliation’ had been motivated by the non-compliance of the EC in the
Hormones and Bananas cases. In order to avoid any such ‘carousel
retaliation’, the EC now proposed the addition of a footnote to Article
22.7 DSU on the arbitration procedure on the level of suspension of
concessions or other obligations which would have effectively banned
the rotation of product lists. By contrast, the US sought a footnote
explicitly allowing such retaliation. As in the case of sequencing, the EC
54 United States – Import Measures on Certain Products from the European Communities (WT/
DS165).
55 See ‘Canada Proposes Change for Dispute Rules in Draft Submitted to WTO Settlement
Body’, in International Trade Reporter, vol 16, no 21, 26 May 1999 (Section on the US Paper).
56 United States – Tax Treatment for ‘Foreign Sales Corporations’ (WT/DS108).
57 See Section 6.4.6 on carousel retaliation.
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position reportedly enjoyed much wider support among the membership
than the US position.58
Informal meetings continued through the July 1999 deadline. However,
they did not bring about the completion of the review, and a draft report
circulated at the end of July 1999 did not find sufficient support among
members. Countries such as India, Malaysia or Mexico opposed any
continuation of the review after the 1999 summer break.59 At an informal
meeting held on 30 July 1999, delegations had concluded that the DSU
review had not been terminated in time, and that any further work would
have to be approved retroactively by the General Council. The DSB
chairman therefore proposed to start informal consultations at the
beginning of September with a view to finalising a report on the DSU
review at the DSB meeting of 22 September 1999.60 However, no
agreement was reached, not even on whether to extend the 31 July 1999
deadline once more. The DSB therefore decided to adjourn the meeting
until further notice.61
In the subsequent meeting of the General Council on 6 October 1999,
the chairman of the DSB requested the General Council to consider how
to proceed with the DSU Review. Strong resistance against continuing
the DSU Review came from Mexico, Malaysia, the Philippines and Egypt.
In particular, these countries had no interest in a modification of the
DSU that would increase transparency and would legitimise the
admission of amicus curiae briefs. By contrast, many other members, such
as the EC, Japan, Canada, Thailand, Hungary, Hong Kong, Brazil, New
Zealand, Venezuela, Ecuador, Australia, Uruguay, Singapore,
Guatemala, Switzerland, Korea, Costa Rica and Bulgaria favoured
continuation of the discussions. The United States in particular argued
strongly in favour of continuing the review, holding that even the
continuation of the DSU required a consensus decision to be taken in
Seattle. Other countries such as India or Indonesia factually took
58 See ‘Revised Dispute Reform Text Presented to WTO Members, Differences Remain’,
in International Trade Reporter, vol 16, no 46, 24 November 1999; ‘Trade Officials Say Accord
is Near on WTO Dispute Settlement Reform’, in International Trade Reporter, vol 16, no 47,
1 December 1999; and ‘EU May Challenge United States in WTO on Carousel Approach
to Trade Sanctions’, in International Trade Reporter, vol 17, no 19, 11 May 2000.
59 See ‘WTO Fails to Meet Deadline for Completing DSU Review’, in International Trade
Reporter, vol 16, no 31, 4 August 1999; and ‘WTO Members Deadlocked on DSU Review
After Missing July Deadline’, in Inside US Trade, 6 August 1999.
60 See WT/DSB/M/67; no 3.
61 See WT/DSB/M/68; no 9. See also ‘Review of Dispute System in Limbo as Members Fail
to Extend Mandate’, in International Trade Reporter, vol 16, no 38, 29 September 1999.
103
5. Evolving DSU Review Negotiations and their Context
intermediate positions with regard to this issue. The discussion ended
inconclusively with the General Council agreeing to revert to the matter
at its next session.62
Before the next meeting of the General Council, the DSU review was
subject to a final debate in the Dispute Settlement Body which met on
27 October and 3 November 1999. At this meeting, the Chairman Kåre
Bryn invited Mr Suzuki of the Japanese delegation to report in his
personal capacity on informal consultations that he had chaired. These
informal consultations had taken place after the lapse of the 31 July 1999
deadline between a large group of WTO members that were interested
in the continuation of the DSU review beyond the deadline.63 Suzuki
subsequently presented the text dated 15 October on his personal
capacity, without prejudice to the position of any participating member.
It included many proposals on the sequencing issue and the
implementation stage, on time-frames, third party rights and other
aspects.64
As negotiators became aware that no consensus on the Suzuki text would
emerge, the discussion then turned to how to proceed with the DSU
review exercise. It became increasingly clear that many members refused
to consider an extension of the DSU Review beyond Seattle, and that
the general feeling was that in the absence of a decision by Ministers,
the DSU would continue without modifications. However, the US in
particular did not share this view of automaticity, reiterating as on prior
occasions that: ‘... it should not be assumed that the United States would
agree to the continuation of the DSU or to any modifications which
would not be acceptable to it.’65 When the meeting was reconvened a
62 See WT/GC/M/48, no 7; see also ‘Proponents, Opponents of DSU Review Fail to Break
Stalemate in WTO’, in Inside US Trade, 8 October 1999; and ‘North-South Stalemate
Continues in Talks on Reform of WTO Dispute Process Rules’, in International Trade
Reporter, vol 16, no 40, 13 October 1999.
63 These open discussions, where all members had an option to participate, had started in
early July and continued until the middle of September 1999. The first result was a paper
entitled ‘Elements of Possible Agreement’ dated 21 September 1999, which subsequently
served as the basis for a first draft of a legal text. A series of discussions on the legal draft
was held until 15 October which was the informal deadline that had been set in light of
the constraints imposed by preparations for the Seattle Ministerial Conference. Based on
the outcome, Suzuki had produced a proposal entitled ‘Proposed Amendment of the
DSU’, dated 15 October, that – like prior versions – was circulated to all WTO members.
The venues for the meetings had been provided by Hong Kong and Canada.
64 See ‘Official Says WTO Members Still Disagree on Reform of Dispute Resolution
Procedure’, in International Trade Reporter, vol 16, no 43, 3 November 1999. On the US
position, see also ‘DSU Review Draft Falls Short of US Demands for Transparency’, in
Inside US Trade, 22 October 1999.
65 See WT/DSB/M/70, p 27.
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few days later, on 3 November 1999, the discussion resumed on the basis
of a statement summarising the state of the discussions, which the
chairman proposed to make at the General Council in his own
responsibility, in the absence of agreement on a report of the DSB.
In the statement, DSB chairman Kåre Bryn reported that it had not been
possible to reach agreement on a report by the DSB on the DSU review
and that he could therefore only make a statement in his capacity as
chairman on his own responsibility, which should be read in conjunction
with individual statements by members on their national positions.
Referring to the former chairman’s prior oral report to the General
Council, he held in carefully balanced diplomatic language that the 31
July deadline for the review process had lapsed, that informal
consultations among some interested parties had continued beyond that
deadline, that in his view there was a consensus on the effectiveness of
WTO dispute settlement and that it could be further improved. He
proposed to the General Council to take note of all the discussions that
had taken place during the review, and that some proposals to amend
the DSU could still emerge in time for a decision at the Seattle Ministerial.
The report by the DSB chairman – along with the proposals and
statements by delegations – was forwarded to ministers, meeting in
Seattle, without any particular recommendation.66
In a final attempt to move the DSU review, Japan also submitted the
Suzuki text for the Seattle Ministerial in December 1999. This submission
entitled ‘Proposed Amendment of the DSU’ was co-sponsored by
Canada, Costa Rica, the Czech Republic, Ecuador, the European
Communities and its Member States, Hungary, Japan, Korea, New
Zealand, Norway, Peru, Slovenia, Switzerland, Thailand and
Venezuela.67 It was largely based on Suzuki’s informal consultations and
it already left out some of the more contentious issues in order to make
the text palatable to delegations. The issues that had not been considered
included the proposed establishment of a standing panel body,
modalities for civil society to provide inputs to panel proceedings (amicus
curiae briefs), public observance of dispute settlement proceedings
(transparency), co-defendants, collective retaliation and certain aspects
of strengthening third party rights. Certain disputed aspects regarding
Article 21.3 DSU on the reasonable period of time for implementation
were also left open. It included, however, a footnote with restrictions on
carousel retaliation in two different versions.
66 See WT/GC/M/50, no 5.
67 See WT/MIN(99)/8.
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Ministers were not able to take a decision in Seattle with regard to the
DSU and in accordance with the 1994 Ministerial Decision.68 From a
review of press reports, it appears that US opposition to the provision
banning carousel retaliation on which the EC insisted was the main
stumbling block, whereas the provision was acceptable to other WTO
members.69
After the Seattle Ministerial, the DSU review disappeared from the
agenda of the Dispute Settlement Body.70
5.3 The Limbo Between Seattle and Doha (2000–2001)
After the failure of the Seattle Ministerial, the DSU review remained in
limbo for some time. It only came back on the WTO agenda later in
2000. Negotiations did not move, however, as long as the controversial
footnote banning carousel-style retaliation was still included in drafts.
On 20 May 2000, President Clinton had signed the carousel provisions
into law and the US prepared its application for the first time.71 On 31
May, USTR published the proposed changes to the list of sanctioned
products in a Federal Register notice, seeking public comments on the
proposed modifications.72 Arguing that it needed time to review the
‘hundreds of comments’ it had received on the proposed modifications,
the US administration dragged its feet and delayed the rotation of the
product list to the disliking of Congress.73 The administration had voiced
68 See also WT/DSB/M/72, no 4.
69 On the discussions immediately before Seattle, see ‘North-South Stalemate Continues
in Talks on Reform of WTO Dispute Process Rules’, in International Trade Reporter, vol 16,
no 40, 13 October 1999; ‘Official Says WTO Members Still Disagree Reform of Dispute
Resolution Procedure’, in International Trade Reporter, vol 16, no 43, 3 November 1999;
‘Draft DSU Text Languishes as Countries Oppose Formal Consideration’, in Inside US
Trade, 5 November 1999; ‘EU Demands on Retaliation Delay Progress on DSU Draft Review
in WTO’, in Inside US Trade, 12 November 1999; ‘Revised Dispute Reform Text Presented
to WTO Members, Differences Remain’, in International Trade Reporter, vol 16, no 46, 24
November 1999; ‘US, WTO Members Split Over How to Change DSU at Seattle’, in Inside
US Trade, 26 November 1999; ‘Trade Officials Say Accord is Near on WTO Dispute
Settlement Reform’, in International Trade Reporter, vol 16, no 47, 1 December 1999; and
‘Negotiators Try to Hammer out Agreement on DSU Review’, in Inside US Trade, 3
December 1999.
70 For an overview of the state of the discussions immediately after Seattle, see ‘DSU
Review Faces Substantive, Procedural Challenges After Seattle’, in Inside US Trade, 24
December 1999.
71 See ‘USTR Puts Public Comments on “Carousel” Sanctions in Hundreds’, in WTO
Reporter, 21 June 2000 and ‘Text’s Footnotes on Carousel Retaliation Seen Likely to Sink
Dispute Settlement’, in WTO Reporter, 21 July 2000.
72 See FR vol 65, no 105, of 31 May 2000, pp 34786ff.
73 See ‘USTR Puts Public Comments on “Carousel” Sanctions in Hundreds’, in WTO
Reporter, 21 June 2000.
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its opposition against the carousel approach previously, arguing that it
already had the discretionary authority to alter its retaliation lists if
necessary.74
Even before the measure had been signed into law, the EC had already
signalled that it might decide to challenge the new provisions in the
WTO, also hinting that the carousel approach could be used one day
against the US in the FSC case.75 Additionally, the EC requested
consultations under the DSU on the carousel provision in summer 2000.76
However, the EC signalled that it would only request a panel once the
carousel provision was effectively applied.77
While the row over the carousel issue went on, EC efforts to impose its
view of the sequencing problem through rulings by the adjudicative
bodies received a blow: Although the final panel report of 17 July 2000
in US – Certain EC Products78 had found that the US acted inconsistently
when it made a unilateral determination of the WTO-compliance of the
implementing measures taken in EC – Bananas, it had also stated that
the WTO-consistency of implementation measures could be determined
both through recourse to an Article 21.5 panel and through an arbitration
under Article 22.6/22.7.79 The EC appealed against this finding as it ran
counter to its sequencing approach. The Appellate Body found in its
December 2000 report that the panel’s determination with regard to the
sequencing issue was outside its terms of reference. Moreover, it also
held that: ‘(d)etermining what the rules and procedures of the DSU ought
to be is not our responsibility nor the responsibility of panels; it is clearly
the responsibility solely of the Members of the WTO.’ 80 By thus exercising
judicial restraint, the Appellate Body elegantly evaded the problem, and
the ball was back in the court of members.
Regarding material disputes, new developments in the FSC case
occurred. After it had become obvious that the US replacement legislation
74 See ‘EU May Challenge United States in WTO on Carousel Approach to Trade Sanctions’,
in International Trade Reporter, vol 17, no 19, 11 May 2000.
75 See ‘EU May Challenge United States in WTO on Carousel Approach to Trade Sanctions’,
in International Trade Reporter, vol 17, no 19, 11 May 2000. See also Sek (2002).
76 United States – Section 306 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Amendments Thereto (WT/DS200).
77 See ‘EU-US Trade Disputes: negotiation and compensation rather than sanctions’, in
EU/US News – A review of Transatlantic Relations, vol II, no 6, December 2000, p 11.
78 United States – Import Measures on Certain Products from the European Communities (WT/
DS165).
79 See WT/DS165/R, para 6.126; see also ‘Ruling May Revive “Sequencing” Issue in Dispute
Rules for Settlement Reform’, in WTO Reporter, 11 September 2000, and ‘EU to Appeal
WTO Panel Finding on Dispute Settlement Sequencing’, in WTO Reporter, 14 September
2000.
80 See WT/DS165/AB/R, para 92.
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(Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act; ETI) would not be in compliance
with the DSB recommendations, the US and the EC negotiated in
September 2000 a bilateral agreement on how to proceed in the FSC
case.81 According to the agreement, a sequencing approach was adopted
under which a panel (subject to appeal) would review the WTO
consistency of the replacement legislation, and arbitration over the
appropriate level of sanctions would only be conducted if the
replacement legislation was found WTO-inconsistent.82 Not only did
the EC grant the US another 30 days to enact the replacement legislation,
but the US itself had now become a beneficiary of the sequencing
approach (even with the possibility of subsequent appeal) which it had
opposed before.83 It is believed that the US had to back down, in exchange
for the agreement, on carousel retaliation although no such deal had
been explicitly made part of the procedural agreement.84 Whereas the
EC requested, on 17 November 2000, an authorisation from the DSB to
impose sanctions against the US worth more than 4 bn USD, the US
official said one day later that the US would not publish a revised list of
sanctions under the carousel approach, as long as progress was being
made toward settling the dispute.85 The sanctions requested by the EC
were several times higher than the US Sanctions in EC – Bananas and EC
– Hormones combined. Indeed, the arbitrators later confirmed that the
suspension of concessions in the form of 100 per cent ad valorem duties
on imports worth 4.043 bn USD constituted ‘appropriate
countermeasures’.86 As the annual CEO-level conference under the Trans-
Atlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) noted in November 2000, the
transatlantic disputes had now placed ‘enormous economic and political
strain’ on the overall US-European Union relationship.87
81 United States – Tax Treatment for ‘Foreign Sales Corporations’ (EC) (WT/DS108); see also
Hauser (2000).
82 See ‘US-EU Reach Agreement on FSC Procedures’, USTR Press Release, 00–65, 30
September 2000.
83 Already previously, it had insisted that consultations be held prior to the establishment
of a compliance panel on its implementation in United States – Anti-dumping Duty on
Dynamic Random Access Memory Semi-conductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from
Korea (Korea) (WT/DS99); see ‘US Blocks WTO Compliance Review With Reversal on
DSU Rules’, in Inside Trade, 24 March 2000.
84 See ‘US-EU Trade Tensions De-Escalate in FSC Case’, in BRIDGES Weekly Trade News
Digest, vol 4, no 37, 4 October 2000; also see a remark in ‘WTO Appellate Body Affirms
Legality of Dispute Settlement “sequencing”’, in WTO Reporter, 12 December 2000.
85 See ‘Corporate Leaders Say US-EU Disputes Harming Business, Urge Quick Resolution’,
in International Trade Reporter, vol 17, no 46, 23 November 2000.
86 See WT/DS108/ARB, circulated on 30 August 2002. The EC was authorised to suspend
concessions on 7 May 2003.
87 See Hauser and Zimmermann (2000) as well as ‘Corporate Leaders Say US-EU Disputes
Harming Business, Urge Quick Resolution’, in International Trade Reporter, vol 17, no 46,
23 November 2000.
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The FSC case was by far not the only reason that had forcefully driven
the US from an initially offensive approach into a defensive position in
WTO dispute settlement during the year 2000. More and more cases
against US trade remedy laws were being brought to the WTO.88
Observers argued that these cases included disputes that could have
been settled in Seattle, had there been negotiations, and that had now to
be clarified under the DSU.89 With the US finding itself more and more
often on the bench, criticism of WTO dispute settlement was mounting
in the US. Almost inevitably, a plan for a US WTO dispute settlement
review commission that had originally been presented by Dole was
revived. Under the plan, WTO rulings adverse to the US would be
reviewed under four criteria: (i) did the panels exceed their authority?;
(ii) did they add to the obligations or diminish the rights of the United
States under the WTO agreements?; (iii) did they act arbitrarily, engage
in misconduct, or depart from established procedures?; (iv) did they
deviate from the applicable standard of review, including in anti-
dumping cases?90
Not only issues such as sequencing or carousel retaliation and the
transatlantic trade disputes in general made any progress on the DSU
review in the year 2000 difficult. Decisions that came about in late 2000
highlighted the importantce of the amicus curiae issue and the question
of third party rights as well as the close linkages between these two
issues. On the one hand, some rulings increased or at least confirmed
the possibilities of NGOs to submit amicus curiae briefs (British Steel,91
Australia – Salmon,92 Music Licensing93). On the other hand, the US refused
to grant third party rights to Japan and Australia and others in the
carousel consultations. This refusal was viewed by adversaries of amicus
briefs as amounting to a preferential treatment of NGOs vis-à-vis
members. It became clear that the DSU review would now also have to
88 For a list of such cases under review in August 2000, see ‘WTO Action Proceeding on
Key Disputes, Many Affecting United States Trade’, in WTO Reporter, 31 August 2000.
See also GAO (2003) for a more recent analysis.
89 See ‘Sen Baucus Warns of Attacks on US Trade Laws in WTO Proceedings’, in WTO
Reporter, 21 July 2000.
90 See ‘Rep Cardin Revives Dole Plan to Create Panel to Review WTO Rulings Against
US’, in WTO Reporter, 23 June 2000. For a discussion of the Dispute Settlement Review
Commission proposal, see Herman (1996) and Horlick (1995).
91 United States – Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-rolled Lead and Bismuth
Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom (European Communities) (WT/
DS138); See, for instance, ‘Key WTO Members Score Appellate Body For Decision to
Accept Amicus Briefs’, in WTO Reporter, 8 June 2000; and ‘WTO Members Fight Appellate
Body on British Steel Over NGO Briefs’, in Inside US Trade, 9 June 2000.
92 Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon (Canada) (WT/DS18).
93 United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act (EC) (WT/DS160).
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bring improved third party rights.94 With regard to amicus briefs, the
publication of an ‘additional procedure’ by the Appellate Body for the
submission of such briefs in the EC – Asbestos case95 fuelled additional
outrage among many members against the Appellate Body in late 2000.96
This generally tense atmosphere at the WTO was barely conducive to
the DSU review efforts. Nevertheless, Japan basically resubmitted on
29 September 2000 the Suzuki text of 1999 to the General Council for an
amendment of the DSU pursuant to Article X WTO agreement.97 Beside
some minor modifications, the new proposal changed only in one aspect
more substantially from its predecessor. The controversial footnote to
Article 22.7 guiding arbitration proceedings on carousel retaliation was
not included any more. The dropping of the footnote presumably
prompted the European Union (and EC membership candidates Czech
Republic,98 Hungary99 and Slovenia) as well as Thailand100 not to co-
sponsor the proposal any longer.101 The proposal was still co-sponsored
by many delegations already sponsoring the Suzuki draft (ie Canada,
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Switzerland
and Venezuela). Colombia, Chile,102 Bolivia103 and Uruguay104 joined the
sponsors as well.
In the subsequent General Council discussion of 10 October 2000, the
EC made it clear that it was not acceptable that the proposal was silent
on ‘carousel’ retaliation. The United States did not view the proposal as
a basis for consensus either. Most other delegations took a reserved stance
as well. The discussion also revealed old divides between developing
94 See ‘WTO Members Make Unfriendly Noises on ‘Friends of the Court’ Dispute Briefs’,
in WTO Reporter, 9 August 2000.
95 European Communities – Measures Affecting the Prohibition of Asbestos and Asbestos Products
(Canada) (WT/DS135); see also Zonnekeyn (2001) and Cone III (2001).
96 See ‘WTO Appellate Body Sets Out Procedures for Amicus Briefs in Asbestos Case’, in
WTO Reporter, 13 November 2000 and ‘WTO Appellate Body Under Fire for Move to
Accept Amicus Curiae Briefs from NGOs’, in WTO Reporter, 27 November 2000. For details
on the amicus issue, see Section 7.3 of this study.
97 Proposal contained in WT/GC/W/410.
98 The Czech Republic stated that it suggested a more comprehensive approach and a
cautious approach in invoking the procedures laid down in Article X WTO agreement as
this was a novum; see discussion in WT/GC/M/58, no 5.
99 Hungary stated that it would have preferred a more comprehensive approach; see WT/
GC/M/58, no 5.
100 Thailand, as some other countries, stated that it favoured a more comprehensive
approach; see WT/GC/M/58, no 5.
101 See also ‘Supporters of DSU Changes Highlight Problems in Hope of Momentum’, in
Inside US Trade, 9 February 2001.
102 See WT/GC/W/410/Add 1.
103 See WT/GC/W/410/Add 2.
104 See WT/GC/W/410/Add 3.
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and industrial countries (particularly the US) on issues such as
transparency and amicus curiae briefs. It was agreed, at the end of the
discussion, that the chairman would hold consultations on how to move
forward, and to revert to the issue at the December 2000 General Council
meeting.105 However, neither that meeting nor several subsequent
meetings and open consultations held in 2001 brought any result.106
On 26 October 2001, Japan and the co-sponsors submitted a revised
version of their proposal.107 Most of the proposal remained unchanged,
apart from some technical modifications and a few important
amendments regarding compliance panels and transitory provisions.
The new proposal introduced a right to appeal a compliance panel report
before the Appellate Body.108 Transitory provisions established that the
new rules governing the implementation stage and resolving the
sequencing issue would apply only to those disputes where the DSB
adopted recommendations and rulings after the effective date of the
amendment. Most likely, these transitional provisions were not only
meant to provide legal clarity with regard to the application of the
amendment for those cases currently under consideration by the DSB,
but they were also drafted to help negotiators to agree on the new rules
without being concerned that the amendments might weaken their
position in any concrete case currently before the DSB.109
The proposal was submitted to the Doha Ministerial Conference for
decision.110 Another submission to the Ministerial Conference regarding
dispute settlement was made by Thailand calling for an increase in the
number of members serving on the Appellate Body.111 This proposal was
likely motivated by Thailand’s experience with the appellate review in
the case Thailand –Anti-dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of
Iron or Non-Alloy Steel H-Beams from Poland112 where it took the Appellate
Body 140 days to circulate its report as opposed to the maximum ninety
105 See WT/GC/M/58, no 5; see also ‘US, EU Reject Compromise Proposal by Japan on
Reform of WTO Dispute Rules’, in WTO Reporter, 11 October 2000.
106 See WT/GC/M/63, no 7; WT/GC/M/65, no 12; WT/GC/M/66, no 12; and WT/GC/M/69,
no 8. See also ‘WTO Chair Cites “Wide Gaps” in Member Positions on Launch of New
Trade Round’, in WTO Reporter, 26 July 2001; ‘Agreement on Dispute Settlement Changes
Unlikely Before Doha’, in Inside US Trade, 3 August 2001.
107 See WT/GC/W/410/Rev 1.
108 See WT/GC/W/410/Rev 1, no 4 (Proposed Articles 21bis 7 and 21bis 7bis).
109 See ‘WTO Members Circulate Proposed Changes to Dispute System; Carousel Issues
Left Out’, in WTO Reporter, 8 November 2001; and ‘Japan to Press for Dispute Settlement
Changes in Qatar’, in Inside US Trade, 9 November 2001.
110 See WT/MIN(01)/W/6.
111 See WT/MIN(01)/W/2.
112 WT/DS122.
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day time limit laid down in the DSU. A further proposal was submitted
jointly by Thailand and the Philippines, calling for a modification of
Article 22.7 of the DSU by introducing clear rules on the determination
of the level of nullification and impairment by the arbitrator, and by
regulating carousel retaliation. The proposed text closely followed one
version of the controversial footnote to Article 22.7 that had been
included in the 1999 Suzuki text (which, at the time, was still co-
sponsored by Thailand), and which had later been dropped.113
Both the revised text and the new submissions by Thailand and the
Philippines were discussed at the General Council meeting on 31 October
2001.114 This was the last time the proposals for the DSU review had
been the topic of formal discussions in the General Council prior to the
Doha Ministerial Conference which took place from 9 to 14 November
2001. By that time, it had become clear that there was no sufficient
consensus for the proposals to be adopted. However, a new mandate
for negotiations on the DSU was now included in the Doha Ministerial
Declaration.
5.4 The Structured Discussion Under the Doha Mandate (2002–
2003)
Paragraph 30 of the Ministerial Declaration which was adopted at the
end of the Doha Ministerial on 14 November 2001 contains an agreement
to negotiations on improvements and clarifications of the Dispute
Settlement Understanding. The negotiations were to be based on the
work already done and additional proposals by members, and they were
to have brought an agreement on improvements and clarifications not
later than May 2003. The results should have entered into force as soon
as possible thereafter without awaiting the conclusion of the entire
Round.115
Formal discussions were held predominantly during 13 meetings of the
Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body,116 chaired by Péter Balás
113 See WT/MIN(01)/W/3 and WT/MIN(01)/W/4. On the resumption of the DSU Review
in general, see also ‘WTO Members Gear up for Talks on Dispute Settlement Rules Reform’,
in WTO Reporter, 11 October 2001.
114 See WT/GC/M/71, no 5.
115 See also para 47 of the Ministerial Declaration, adopted on 14 November 2001 (WT/
MIN(01)/DEC/1).
116 As mandated by the Trade Negotiations Committee (see TN/C/M/1) which in turn was
mandated to operate under the authority of the General Council by the Ministerial meeting
in Doha; see para 46 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1). Minutes
of the formal discussions are available in TN/DS/M/1, TN/DS/M/2, TN/DS/M/3, TN/DS/
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of Hungary. In addition, informal sessions took place. The first formal
meeting took place on 16 April 2002. Work progressed from a general
exchange of views to a discussion of conceptual proposals put forward
by Members. In total, 42 specific proposals had been submitted by the
deadline of the negotiations at the end of May 2003. In the second half
of 2002, discussions took place issue-by-issue, based on the conceptual
proposals submitted by members. Textual proposals submitted by
Members were subject to initial review until the end of March 2003,
after which the discussion focused on various draft legal texts. The
review exercise progressed much more slowly than the chairman of the
negotiations had originally planned, a situation which some observers
attributed to the fact that the US did not make its position on the
negotiations known early enough.117 The relatively short deadline for
the negotiations was viewed critically from the beginning. Australia
suggested, for instance, that members should focus on reaching a
‘consolidation of agreed DSU practices’ by May 2003 with formal
amendments being dealt with later.118
The first submission after Doha was handed in by the EC in March 2002,
dealing with long-standing issues such as the sequencing problem
(which, however, had lost its acrimony due to bilateral procedural
agreements), a prohibition on carousel retaliation, the establishment of
a permanent panel body, arbitration on the level of nullification or
impairment prior to the request for an authorisation to retaliate in order
to make compensation a more realistic alternative, conditions for the
acceptance of amicus curiae briefs, rules for the formal withdrawal of
consultation and panel requests, monitoring for mutually agreed
solutions, and the introduction of remand authority for the Appellate
Body.119
However, even before the first meeting of the Special (Negotiating)
Session of the Dispute Settlement Body on reforming the DSU under
the Doha agenda had taken place, more high-politics cases were brought
M/4, TN/DS/M/5, TN/DS/M/6, TN/DS/M/7, TN/DS/M/8, TN/DS/M/9 and TN/DS/M/10
(see Section 13.1 of this study for details, and the last column of the table in Chapter 11
on issues covered). Reports of the chairman of the negotiations to the Trade Negotiations
Committee (TNC) are available in TN/DS/1, TN/DS/2, TN/DS/3, TN/DS/4, TN/DS/5, TN/
DS/6, TN/DS/7, TN/DS/8 and TN/DS/9.
117 See ‘US Still Long Way off from Offering Plan in WTO to Fix Dispute Settlement
Regime’, in WTO Reporter, 4 October 2002.
118 See ‘WTO Members Highlight Sequencing Issue as Main Focus of Dispute Settlement
Talks’, in WTO Reporter, 15 March 2002.
119 See ‘EU Lays Out Proposed Changes to Dispute Settlement Rules’, in Inside US Trade,
15 March 2002; ‘EU Offers Proposal for WTO Dispute Rules With Ban on US-Style
“Carousel Retaliation”’, in WTO Reporter, 5 March 2002; and ‘WTO Members Discuss
DSU Changes Based on EU Proposal’, in Inside US Trade, 19 April 2002.
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to the WTO. Still in March 2002, eight WTO members, headed by the
EC, requested consultations with the US on its steel safeguards120 for
violating several provisions of the Agreement on Safeguards and the
GATT. Also in March, Canada requested urgent consultations with the
US regarding a provisional anti-dumping investigation on softwood
lumber imports from Canada.121 At the same time, members disagreed
fundamentally on whether to pursue a broad review of the DSU
negotiations (an approach favoured by the EC) or whether negotiations
should focus on a narrow, well-prepared set of issues such as the
sequencing problem.122
The DSU review continued nevertheless. In the following months, a
submission of Thailand and a joint submission of Thailand and the
Philippines (both had already been submitted to the Doha Ministerial)
followed, as did submissions from Australia, Ecuador, Korea and Costa
Rica, the latter with a focus on third party rights.123 The first US proposal
came only in August 2002, focusing on improved transparency.124
Developing countries submitted comprehensive proposals either as
groups (African Group, LDC Group, joint submissions by Cuba,
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka,
Tanzania and Zimbabwe) or individually (Paraguay, Jamaica) with a
focus mainly on the specific concerns of developing and least developed
countries.125 At the end of October 2002, Japan submitted its proposal,
mainly consisting of a re submission of the core proposals on sequencing
that had been around in discussions since 1999, and a few other issues.
Mexico submitted what has been regarded a ‘radical’ proposal that called
for retroactivity to strengthen the impact of retaliatory measures and
for other incentives towards earlier compliance. Other countries that
submitted proposals include Taiwan and China.
While discussions on the many conceptual proposals were held during
much of 2002, criticism of the DSU in the US was still mounting. In
120 United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products (WT/
DS248 (EC), WT/DS249 (Japan), WT/DS251 (Korea), WT/DS252 (China), WT/DS253
(Switzerland), WT/DS254 (Norway), WT/DS258 (New Zealand), and WT/DS259 (Brazil)).
121 United States – Provisional Anti-Dumping Measure on Imports of Certain Softwood Lumber
from Canada (WT/DS247).
122 See ‘WTO Members Split on Scope of Dispute Rules Review for Next Year’, in Inside
US Trade, 22 March 2002.
123 See also ‘DSU Review Fields New Proposals, as Informal Talks Fail to Close Gaps’, in
Inside US Trade, 20 September 2002.
124 See also ‘US Proposal to Open WTO Dispute Process Recycles Controversial Ideas’, in
Inside US Trade, 16 August 2002
125 For an overview of the main proposals received until August 2002, see also ‘DSU Talks
Face Shortest Deadline Outside Overall Doha Package’, in Inside US Trade, 30 August
2002.
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April 2002, Senator Max Baucus, Chairman of the influential Senate
Finance Committee, called on the Bush administration to make reforming
dispute settlement the ‘single most important’ objective of the US, and
not to treat it ‘as a technical issue isolated from larger issues at stake in
the new round of WTO negotiations’. He particularly referred to several
adverse panel or Appellate Body decisions on trade remedies regarding
trade measures that did allegedly not have demonstrable adverse impact
on trade. As had happened in several instances before, the panels and
the Appellate Body were accused of exceeding their scope of
responsibility and of legislating instead of interpreting, thus creating
new legal obligations. They were accused of ignoring the negotiated
standard of review by leaving too little deference to US agencies making
determinations under US trade remedy laws.126
The situation got more and more critical during the summer of 2002, at
a time when the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) Bill was under way
in Congress and the US had still not made any proposals on the DSU
Review.127 TPA, traditionally known as ‘fast track’, gives the President
the authority to negotiate trade agreements that can only be accepted or
rejected by Congress but that are shielded from changes. On 25 July
2002, the panel in the Steel case was composed. Also in July, an
unfavourable interim ruling was handed down in the US – Byrd
Amendment case,128 and Canada requested the establishment of a panel
regarding countervailing duties on softwood lumber imports, followed
by another consultation request in September regarding a final dumping
determination on softwood lumber imports under the urgency
procedures of the DSU.129 Additionally, the Article 22.6 arbitration report
in the FSC case was circulated on 30 August 2003, concluding that the
126 See ‘Sen Baucus Calls Dispute Resolution Reform “most Important” US Objective in
WTO Talks’, in WTO Reporter, 16 April 2002, ‘Baucus Lays out Demands For Changes to
WTO Dispute Settlement’, in Inside US Trade, 19 April 2002. The letter by Senator Baucus
to USTR Zoellick was reprinted in Inside US Trade on 19 April 2002. An early contribution
on the standard of review issue in WTO dispute settlement was made by Croley and
Jackson (1996). On the US criticism and the discussion on the standards of review, see,
for instance, Ehlermann (2002), pp 619–21. From early on, US anti-dumping interests
have followed critically the evolution of the jurisprudence on anti-dumping, including
the standard of review; see ‘Steel Companies Call for Reinforcement of WTO Dumping
Review Rules’, in Inside US Trade, 10 July 1998. See also Section 7.7 for more details.
127 See also ‘US Officials See Proposals on WTO Rules, Dispute Settlement’, in Inside US
Trade, 14 June 2002.
128 United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (WT/DS217) (Australia,
Brazil, Chile, EC, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea and Thailand); (WT/DS234) (Canada,
Mexico).
129 United States – Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada (WT/DS264)
and United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with respect to Certain Softwood
Lumber from Canada (WT/DS257).
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EC was entitled to impose 100 per cent ad valorem duties as SCOO on
imports worth 4,043 bn USD.
All these events caused strong reactions in the US. It was argued that
decisions like that on the Byrd Amendment would further increase efforts
in Congress such as the Dayton-Craig amendment to restrict negotiations
on US trade laws. Under that amendment, a majority of the Senate can
shield changes to US trade remedy laws from TPA procedures.130 Senator
Baucus called again upon the US not to leave the agenda on the DSU
discussions to other countries, as the US had only submitted a proposal
on transparency by that time and it remained unclear what other
proposals the US would make.131 Senator Baucus, from lumber-
producing Montana, likened WTO dispute settlement to a ‘kangaroo
court’ determined to destroy US trade laws, a trend that had to be
stopped. Senator Baucus therefore brought up again the idea of a US
dispute settlement review commission.132
In December 2002, the US finally submitted its long-awaited proposal
(jointly with Chile) to strengthen flexibility and member control in
dispute settlement. The proposal would have shifted influence from the
adjudicative bodies to the parties to disputes, as it would have allowed,
inter alia, the deletion of portions of a panel or Appellate Body report by
agreement of the parties to a dispute. Moreover, it called for ‘some form
of additional guidance’ to WTO adjudicative bodies. The proposal was
130 See ‘US Criticizes WTO in Wake of Decision Upholding Complaints Over Byrd
Amendment’, in WTO Reporter, 19 July 2002.
131 See the letter by Max Baucus to Secretary Donald Evans and Ambassador Robert B.
Zoellick on DSU negotiations, dated 4 September 2002, reprinted in Inside US Trade, 6
September 2002. See also ‘Baucus Urges Administration to Design Proposal for WTO
Dispute Settlement Reform’, in WTO Reporter, 6 September 2002; ‘Baucus Pressures USTR
to Step Up Efforts to Change WTO Dispute Rules’, in Inside US Trade, 6 September 2002.
On previous efforts of the same Senator, see, for instance ‘Baucus Lays Out Demands for
Changes to WTO Dispute Settlement’, in Inside US Trade, 19 April 2002, and the letter by
Senator Baucus reprinted in Inside US Trade on 19 April 2002.
132 See ‘Sen Baucus Calls WTO “Kangaroo Court” With Strong Bias Against the United
States’, in WTO Reporter, 27 September 2002; ‘US Still Long Way off from Offering Plan in
WTO to Fix Dispute Settlement Regime’, in WTO Reporter, 4 October 2002; and Sen Baucus
Introduces Bill Creating Commission to Review WTO Decisions’, in WTO Reporter, 21
March 2003. In addition to US criticism over WTO dispute settlement, there equally seems
to be discontent with regard to NAFTA Dispute Settlement; see ‘Baucus Urged to Back
Proposal Calling for NAFTA Chapter 19 Reform’, in International Trade Reporter, vol 20,
no 12, 20 March 2003. On NAFTA dispute settlement in general, see Folsom, Gordon and
Spanogle (2003) or Trakman (1997). For comments of US  interest groups on WTO dispute
settlement, see, for instance, ‘AG Coalition Presses To Change WTO DSU, Seek Permanent
Panelists’, in Inside US Trade, 17 May 2002, including the AgTrade Coalition Policy Paper
on Dispute Settlement Understanding Reform, reprinted in Inside US Trade, 17 May 2002.
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greeted with scepticism, with members arguing that deleting parts of
interim reports could weaken the WTO panels and the Appellate Body.
A diplomat who commented on the proposal said that the US wanted
panels and the Appellate Body to issue rulings without making the
payment of allowing these bodies to establish jurisprudence to guide
future panellists.133 Moreover, the move would contradict earlier
proposals on improving transparency as parties could ‘bury’ more
controversial or groundbreaking decisions by the adjudicating bodies
before the rulings were made public. The proposal was deemed to attend
the complaints from Congress that the WTO adjudicating bodies were
legislating.134 Switzerland said in reaction to the proposal that providing
‘additional guidance’ to panels or the Appellate Body would mean
limiting their independence. Ironically, support for the US proposal came
mainly from Malaysia, Hong Kong and Singapore, citing the Appellate
Body’s decisions on amicus curiae briefs as examples of why the proposal
merited attention.135
By December 2002, Balás was quoted as saying that a ‘critical mass’ of
proposals had been received, but that the overall situation was
‘confusing’, and that he did not believe there was a single issue so far
where a consensus could be reached at that stage.136 Towards the
beginning of 2003, proposals changed in character from conceptual
towards more textual, containing specific legal draft texts that should
be integrated into the DSU. Most of these textual proposals that were
now handed in were based on the ideas expressed in the conceptual
proposals that had been submitted before. Only few new submissions
from additional members (Canada, Jordan and Brazil) were received at
that time. In the spring of 2003, and until the end of May deadline,
negotiations took place on the textual proposals and subsequently on
133 Although the DSU holds that panels and the Appellate Body cannot add to or diminish
the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements, such reports factually
establish precedents and provide guidance to the adjudicative bodies in future
proceedings. The precedent effect is also recognised by members when it serves their
interests. For instance, Petersmann (2002a) cites the example of an EC complaint against
US customs user fees in 1988. Although the US had lost the case, it immediately used the
legal interpretation of the panel report to enforce the newly-established interpretation
against all other GATT members. See also Bhala (2001), Bhala (1999) and Bhala (1999a).
134 See ‘US, Chile Unveil Proposal for Increasing ”Member Control” of WTO Dispute
Procedures’, in WTO Reporter, 17 December 2002.
135 See ‘US Proposal on Dispute Settlement Reform Gets Mixed Reaction from WTO
Delegations’, in WTO Reporter, 20 December 2002. With regard to discussions on this
proposal, see also ‘US-Chile Text For DSU Changes Leaves Out Standard of Review’, in
Inside US Trade, 14 March 2003.
136 See ‘Supachai Cites “Mixed” Results, Expresses Concern for Cancun Meeting’, in WTO
Reporter, 5 December 2002.
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draft legal texts compiled by Ambassador Balás.137 As the deadline drew
closer, the chairman of the negotiations was increasingly exposed to
criticism for lacking leadership and not weeding out enough on the many
proposals received. Whereas several smaller and medium-sized trading
nations such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay,
Ecuador, Hong Kong, Israel, Malaysia and New Zealand wished a
concentration in negotiations on core issues such as sequencing, third
party rights, the remand procedure, housekeeping and time-saving
proposals, other members such as Canada, the US and the EC rather
sought an ‘ambitious, balanced package’. In order still to meet the
deadline, the EC had also proposed to agree on a small package by May
if members agreed that negotiations on a broader deal would take place
subsequently. However, this proposal did not enjoy sufficient support.138
The deadline for the completion of talks that had been set for the end of
May 2003 was finally missed. While many smaller trading nations would
have favoured coming to a conclusion on a limited package of issues,
both the EC and the US obviously preferred negotiations to go on, and
to address those (of their) concerns that had been left out in the Balás
text.139 These include the establishment of a permanent panel body (for
the EC) and the partial adoption procedure as well as the deletion of
portions of reports (for the US). According to press reports, another
problem that stood in the way of an agreement was that total time-lines
under the new DSU text (with sequencing and an interim review at the
appellate stage) would have extended beyond the timelines in the US
Section 301 legislation. This could have led, in the future, to further
findings of inconsistency if the US were to take retaliatory measures
before the multilateral procedures were completed. Moreover, the US
had reportedly linked an agreement on sequencing to progress in the
137 See ‘DSU Chair to Move to Draft Text by Early May, Precursor Paper in April’, in Inside
US Trade, 21 March 2003.
138 On the EC proposal, see ‘Lamy Proposes Small DSU Package by May, as WTO
Negotiations Lag’, in Inside US Trade, 21 February 2003. On negotiations during the last
months before the expiry of the May 2003 deadline, see ‘WTO Chair Issues “Framework”
Text for Reform of Dispute Settlement Rules’, in WTO Reporter, 8 April 2003; ‘DSB Reform
Talks Stall as Deadline Looms; Pressure to Limit Negotiations to Core Issues’, in WTO
Reporter, 14 April 2003; ‘WTO Members Still Stalled on DSU Changes One Month Before
Deadline’, in Inside US Trade, 25 April 2003; ‘Countries Clash Over DSU Chairman’s
Proposal for Small Deal’, in Inside US Trade, 23 May 2003; ‘DSU Chairman to Table Draft
Showing Possible Areas of Consensus’, in Inside US Trade, 16 May 2003; and ‘Chairman
Offers Compromise Text for WTO Dispute Settlement Review’, in WTO Reporter, 19 May
2003.
139 See ‘WTO Dispute Reform Talks Miss Deadline; Parties Plan to Keep Trying, but Set
No Date’, in WTO Reporter, 29 May 2003.
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area of transparency. The EC allegedly linked its agreement on
sequencing to a prohibition of carousel retaliation.140
Despite some initial disagreement on whether the mandate allowed the
continuation of discussions (which is familiar from past missed
deadlines) and how broad the scope of such negotiations should be,
Members agreed at an informal meeting on 10 July 2003 to extend the
deadline for the review until the end of May 2004. The decision was
formally adopted by the General Council at its 24–25 July meeting.141
5.5 Negotiations Under the Deadline Extension
(May 2003 – May 2004)
No new developments from negotiations were reported during summer
and autumn 2003. The failure of the Fifth Ministerial Conference held
in Cancún, Mexico, in mid-September 2003 caused a further setback to
overall negotiations under the Doha mandate, which also affected DSU
review negotiations.
While the momentum behind the negotiations was slow, transatlantic
disputes took on new fervour again. Already in May 2003, the United
States, along with Canada and Argentina, requested consultations with
the EC on its moratorium on genetically modified agricultural and food
products.142 In addition to this high-profile dispute, a number of other
disputes began to escalate: In the FSC dispute,143 the EC announced on 5
November 2003 that it was set to impose a gradually phased-in scheme
of retaliatory tariffs, beginning in March 2004 unless the US repealed its
inconsistent legislation. Also, the US and Canada refuted EC calls for
an end to the SCOO in the Hormones case on 7 November 2003.144 They
dismissed the EC’s argument that it had presented new scientific
evidence to justify the EC ban on hormone beef.145 Finally, in November
140 See ‘WTO Members Fail on DSU Deal, Further Negotiations After Cancun’, in Inside
US Trade, 30 May 2003.
141 See ‘WTO Members Fail on DSU Deal, Further Negotiations After Cancun’, in Inside
US Trade, 30 May 2003; ‘DSU Consultations Focus on Extending Time, Sidestepping
Mandate’, in Inside US Trade, 11 July 2003; ‘New Deadline Set For DSU Negotiations’, in
BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, vol 7, no 27, 28 July 2003; and ‘General Council
Endorses New Deadline for Changing DSU Rules’, in Inside US Trade, 1 August 2003.
142 European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products
(WT/DS291 (United States), WT/DS292 (Canada), WT/DS293 (Argentina)).
143 United States – Tax Treatment for ‘Foreign Sales Corporations’ (WT/DS108).
144 European Communities – Measures Affecting Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) (WT/
DS26 (United States), WT/DS48 (Canada)).
145 See ‘DSB: EC-US Disputes Top Agenda’, in BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, vol 7,
no 38, 13 November 2003.
119
5. Evolving DSU Review Negotiations and their Context
2003, the Appellate Body confirmed a prior panel ruling that found the
safeguard measures imposed by the United States on steel imports
illegal.146 The US withdrew the tariffs at the beginning of December 2003.
The renewed increase in transatlantic trade tensions and the gloomy
post-Cancún perspective for the Doha negotiations were barely
conducive to a fast conclusion of the DSU review. Reportedly, the
members, meeting on 16 October 2003 for a special (negotiating) session
of the DSB, which was then converted into an informal (and therefore
undocumented) meeting were on the whole reluctant to engage in
substantive discussions.147 On 13 and 14 November 2003, a further
negotiating session took place. It mainly dealt with a study undertaken
by Mexico, which held that the May 2003 deadline was missed mostly
because of a lack of focus. Mexico therefore proposed ‘diagnosis-based
work’ as an alternative approach, offering statistical data on eight and a
half years of WTO dispute settlement practice in order to help identify
problems in dispute settlement practice.148 Mexico concluded from this
analysis that the most important problem of the dispute settlement
mechanism was non-compliance. The Mexican study was reportedly
welcomed by developing countries whereas some other delegations held
that it did little to move the discussions.149
A final meeting in 2003 took place shortly before Christmas. It did,
however, not bring any significant progress either. During the meeting,
the chair proposed a list of questions to guide an issue-by-issue
discussion on consultations, panel proceedings, appellate review, and
the implementation stage. Questions included an earlier establishment
of panels, and the automatic appointment of developing country
panellists in cases where developing country members are parties to
the dispute. Although most members gave their reactions, there were
no converging views on the issues, even among developing countries.
146 United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products; WT/
DS248 (European Communities), WT/DS249 (Japan), WT/DS251 (Korea), WT/DS252
(China), WT/DS253 (Switzerland), WT/DS254 (Norway), WT/DS258 (New Zealand), WT/
DS259 (Brazil). On the introduction of the steel tariffs, see Wolff (1998).
147 See ‘Members Unprepared to Engage in DSU Review’, in BRIDGES Weekly Trade News
Digest, vol 7, no 35, 23 October 2003; and ‘Formal DSU Talks Stall, WTO Considers US
Appellate Body Appointees’, in Inside US Trade, 24 October 2003.
148 See ‘Diagnosis of the Problems Affecting the Dispute Settlement Mechanism; Some
Ideas by Mexico’, undated file (November 2003).
149 See ‘DSU Review: Members React to Mexican Study’, in BRIDGES Weekly Trade News
Digest, vol 7, no 40, 26 November 2003; ‘Mexican Study Cites Non-compliance as Top
Problem in WTO Dispute System’, in WTO Reporter, 14 November 2003; and ‘Mexican
Analysis Does Little to Dislodge Impasse in WTO on DSU Talks’, in Inside US Trade, 28
November 2003.
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Only few new formal proposals were submitted in this stage of the DSU
review. Indonesia and Thailand circulated a communication outlining
a number of questions and issues.150 Malaysia reportedly announced
that it would submit a proposal on provisional measures that could be
applied if an industry is irreversibly hurt while an issue is under
examination by a panel. However, the idea reportedly left delegates with
more questions than answers.151
On 11 February 2004, the General Council appointed a new chair for the
DSU negotiations, Ambassador David Spencer of Australia.152 Even
under the new chair, however, negotiations did not gain any additional
momentum. Meetings of the negotiating session at the end of January
and February that had originally been scheduled for two days lasted
only little more than one hour as delegations did not put forward any
new proposals and seemed unwilling to bridge the gaps between the
respective positions. As members continued to disagree with regard to
the scope of the negotiations – ie whether a limited number of technical
issues should be discussed or whether the negotiations should focus on
a broad package including more ambitious components – it became clear
already at the end of February that the May 2004 deadline would likely
be missed again.153
A call of the chairman upon members to negotiate among themselves
did not produce any result either. Whereas a group that was led by
Canada and included Argentina, Brazil, India, New Zealand and Norway
reportedly tried to achieve some progress on a limited number of
technical issues during spring 2004, several other delegations such as
the United States, the EU, and some developing countries were not
prepared to consider a conclusion of the negotiations without an
implementation of their more ambitious proposals. The group worked
on the sequencing issue, third party rights, the remand procedure, ways
to improve compliance, developing country issues, rules for the removal
of existing sanctions, and transparency. The idea was to develop a ‘non-
paper’ and a legal text on these issues which could serve as an alternative
150 See TN/DS/W/61 (Indonesia, Thailand); see also ‘Dispute Settlement: Lumber, Byrd
Amendment and DSU Review’, in BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, vol 8, no 1, 14
January 2004; and ‘WTO DSU Chair Lays out New Timetable for Meeting May deadline’,
in Inside US Trade, 2 January 2004.
151 See ‘DSU Review Off to Slow Start’, in BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, vol 8, no 3,
28 January 2004.
152 See ‘WTO Chairpersons for 2004’, WTO Press Release, no 371, http://www.wto.org/
english/news_e/pres04_e/pr371_e.htm; see also ‘WTO Agrees to New Chairs for Doha
Round, Puts Off Decision on Ministerial’, in Inside US Trade, 13 February 2004.
153 See ‘DSU Review: May 2004 Deadlines Slipping Out of Reach’, in BRIDGES Weekly
Trade News Digest, vol 28, no 8, 4 March 2004.
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to the Balás text. On the basis of the support that this paper would receive
from the EU, the US and developing countries, it could be formally
inroduced into the negotiations.154
The meeting on 30 April 2004 focused on the forthcoming package of
the group led by Canada. Developing countries and the African Group
reportedly argued that developing country interests were not sufficiently
taken into consideration. The support that the US and the EU would
give to the work of the group once it would be presented was unclear as
well.155 On 10 May 2004, when the group was expected to present their
work, Norway only reported on the progress achieved so far. At that
stage, the six countries had agreed on three issues under consideration:
sequencing, remand and the procedures for the lifting of retaliatory
measures. The group, however, was still working on transparency, third
party rights, compliance and developing country issues.156 The proposal
was finally presented to members as a ‘non-paper’ in the 24 May DSU
negotiations session – not to be discussed as a proposal but rather with
the intention of informing members on the work done.
The DSU Special Negotiating Session met for the last time prior to the
lapse of the deadline on 28 May. At that meeting, Members considered,
inter alia, the non-paper by the group around Canada, as well as proposed
changes to the Working Procedures of the Appellate Body which were
drawn up by the latter.157 The proposal included a move to increase the
clarity of the notice of appeal – an issue, which also surged in the DSU
review negotiations.
The meeting was, however, unable to conclude the DSU review before
the expiry of the May 2004 deadline as required by the mandate.
members supported a statement by the chairman to extend the deadline
for the DSU review negotiations, yet without setting a new target date.
Some Members questioned whether sufficient momentum could be
generated for these negotiations if they were to go on without a clear
deadline. The relationship between the DSU review negotiations on the
154 See ‘Chairman’s Call for Informal DSU Talks Produces Little Action’, in Inside Trade, 9
April 2004.
155 See ‘Package Deal to Salvage DSU Negotiations?’, in BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest,
vol 8, no 16, 4 May 2004; and ‘“Magnificent Seven” Offer Compromise as Clock Ticks
Down to Deadline in May’, in WTO Reporter, 4 May 2004.
156 See ‘Deliberations on Package Deal for DSU Review Ongoing’, in BRIDGES Weekly
Trade News Digest, vol 8, no 17, 13 May 2004. See also ‘Proponents Unveil Proposal for
Limited Reform of WTO Dispute Settlement Rules’, in International Trade Reporter, vol 21,
no 22, 27 May 2004.
157 See WT/AB/WP/8.
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one hand and the overall Doha negotiations was also a topic of
discussions. Whereas some delegations were anxious not to establish
any links (in order to avoid that countries would have to pay for changes
to the DSU in other areas), others argued that the negotiations would
remain stalled until the overall Doha negotiations would gain additional
momentum.158
The chairman then established a brief report on his own responsibility
to the Trade Negotiations Committee. It held that additional progress
had been made since the General Council meeting of 24 July 2003,
building on the work done thus far, including the proposals put forward
by members as well as the Balás text of May 2003. He also reported that
there was agreement among Members that more time was needed for
the completion of the work, that all existing proposals would remain
under consideration, and that the negotiations were outside the single
undertaking. He therefore suggested that action be taken by the Trade
Negotiations Committee or the General Council for the continuation of
the work. Whereas he noted that some members would prefer to establish
a new specific target-date, he did not propose to recommend any such
date at that time.159
5.6 Negotiations from May 2004 Onwards
In the decision adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004 on the
Doha Work Programme – the so-called ‘July Package’ – the General
Council accordingly took note of the above-mentioned report and it
reaffirmed members’ commitment to progress in this area of negotiations
in line with the Doha Mandate. The work should continue on the basis
set out by the chairman of that body in his report.160 No new deadline
was set.
The Special Negotiating Session of the DSB met two more times in
October and November 2004, yet without achieving any significant
progress.161 Negotiations will continue in 2005 with six dates being
reserved for further meetings before the summer break.
158 See ‘Chair to Propose Indefinite Continuation of Dispute Reform’, in WTO Reporter, 25
May 2004; ‘Chairman Seeks Third Extension of WTO DSU Talks, but no Deadline’, in
Inside Trade, 28 May 2004; and ‘DSU Update: DSU Review Deadline Extended; Appellate
Body Developments’, in BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, vol 8, no 19, 2 June 2004.
159 See TN/DS/10.
160 See WT/L/579.
161 See ‘DSU Review: Members Discuss May Proposal, Dispute Settlement Data’, in
BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, vol  8, no 36, 27 October 2004; and ‘Dispute Settlement
Review Focuses on “Package Deal”’, in BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, vol 8, no 41,
1 December 2004.
123
5. Evolving DSU Review Negotiations and their Context
5.7 Summary: The DSU Review Negotiating Process (1997-2004)
As the previous account has shown, the DSU review negotiations are
closely linked to emerging dispute settlement practice.
The negotiations started in 1997/1998 at a time when a general feeling
of satisfaction with the mechanism prevailed. Shortly thereafter,
however, the negotiations became increasingly captured by the
emergence of two divides. One was essentially transatlantic. The US
was concerned with the implementation of rulings and wished to secure
immediate compliance whereas the EC struggled from a defensive
position to cope with adverse rulings in Bananas and Hormones. The
different approaches on sequencing were symptomatic of these different
positions. The second divide ran between industrialised countries (with
the US at the forefront) and developing countries regarding both
transparency and the amicus issue.
After Seattle, the context of the DSU review changed. While the US was
initially still in an offensive position which was highlighted by its stance
on the carousel issue, negotiating positions changed fundamentally in
the course of the year 2000. The defeat in the FSC case as well as
numerous complaints against US trade remedy measures increasingly
pressured the US into a defensive stance (see Graphs 5.1 and 5.2). In
tune with these new circumstances, the carousel provision was never
applied despite initial pressures from Congress. During this time of
change without a clear negotiating mandate, the review exercise
essentially remained in a limbo.
The post-Doha negotiations took place under a specific Ministerial
mandate again. The divides between country positions were, however,
less clear-cut compared with previous negotiations as a multitude of
proposals on all stages and horizontal issues of the DSU had come in.
These covered virtually all provisions of the understanding. They will
be subject to more detailed analysis in Chapters 6 and 7.
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Graph 5.1 The US in WTO Dispute Settlement as Complainant and Defendant
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Graph 5.2: DSU Cases Brought Against the US: Trade Remedy and Other
Cases
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After the May 2003 deadline, the negotiations lost their momentum.
Sessions ended early and only few additional proposals were submitted
in this stage, not even as formal proposals but only as non-papers.
Members such as the EU and the US did not participate actively any
more in the process, but they left the negotiations to others like the group
led by Canada. However, even this small group of six countries was
unable to agree on seven rather technical issues.
As most issues on the table have been discussed for a long time, it is
hardly conceivable how a compromise should emerge in the near future.
This holds in particular as long as the DSU review remains separated
from the overall Doha Round negotiations, as this separation stands in
the way of a political package deal that would emerge from bargaining
across different negotiating areas. The absence of a clear deadline for
the new negotiations will not add much credibility or momentum to
these negotiations either. As countries will likely have to concentrate
their resources in other areas such as agriculture and as delegations are
unwilling to appear as ‘demandeurs’ in the DSU review process, the
outlook for a successful conclusion of the review in the near future is
rather dim (see also Part III of this study).
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6. THE DOHA ROUND PROPOSALS (I): STAGE-SPECIFIC ISSUES
In Chapters 6 and 7, the proposals which were made under the Doha
mandate in negotiations up to the (missed) May 2003 deadline are
discussed. Whereas Chapter 7 covers horizontal issues that concern
several or all stages of the procedure (such as transparency or special
and differential treatment of developing countries), this chapter
considers the stage-specific proposals. For each stage of the multilateral
dispute settlement procedure, the proposals are presented and
commented, including where possible reference to the relevant
discussion in academic literature. Information is also contained on
whether the issues were taken up in the Balás text. As a separation
between stage-specific and horizontal proposals is not always neatly
possible, readers are encouraged to check both chapters for issues that
could fall into either category. The tabular overview in Chapter 11 may
be helpful in locating specific proposals.
6.1 The Consultation Stage
Consultations are among the negotiatory elements of the DSU. They
have a long tradition in dispute settlement as it gradually evolved under
the GATT. Even today, a high proportion of disputes are settled during
consultations.1
The rules on consultations have been crafted to facilitate pre-panel
resolutions. Consultations are confidential and there is no record which
might figure into later proceedings and thereby prejudice any member’s
position. As Davey and Porges (1998) indicate, consultations typically
last ‘no longer than two or three hours’, are ‘generally conducted in
English with no interpreters, no transcript, and no taping’ and are closed
to the public and other WTO members. Despite this informal design,
Roessler (2003) argues that consultations under the DSU are no longer
conducted in the same meaningful way as they were under the
conciliatory mechanism of the GATT. Today, they are often regarded as
merely formal prerequisites for the panel process. Incentives are such
that there is no real co-operation from the respondents to engage in
meaningful discussions. From this perspective, successful settlements
during the consultation stage are explained with the respondent’s fear
1 See Part I for details and references.
128
Negotiating the Review of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding
of a formal adverse ruling, but not with the respondent’s obligation to
engage in consultations.2 Finally, another problem with consultations is
that there is no multilateral instrument to keep the implementation of
mutually agreed solutions under surveillance.3 Many proposals have
been made on consultations, ranging from rather programmatic calls
for strengthening the consultative process to suggestions for specific
modifications.
6.1.1 Consultation Requests
The European Communities and Jordan proposed procedures that would
allow the withdrawal of consultation requests, or an automatic lapse of
a consultation request, if no panel request follows within a certain period
of time.4 These proposals would help in ‘house-keeping’ by avoiding
the accumulation of a large number of dormant cases, as has happened
in the past.5
The proposals were integrated into the Balás text. The proposed rules
would establish that a request for consultations may no longer serve as
the basis for the establishment of a panel if the complaining party has
not submitted a panel request within 18 months after the date of
circulation of the request for consultations. As an exception to the rule,
the complainant could notify both the defendant and the DSB of its
objection to the lapse in which case the request for consultations may
continue to serve as a basis for a panel request for another 18 months.
Even further extensions would be possible.6
The new rule would beyond any doubt contribute to house-keeping as
the long list of ‘pending consultations’ would be cleaned up at regular
intervals. The regularly published overview of the state of play of
disputes7 contains many disputes that were initiated several years ago
and where neither any outcome nor progress has ever been reported.
For instance, the October 2004 version of this overview still lists an April
2 Similar views are expressed by Wethington (2000). The consultations stage has, so far,
received relatively little attention in literature. The few contributions include Parlin (2000),
Horlick and Butterton (2000), Horlick (1998) and Davey and Porges (1998).
3 See Shoyer (1998a).
4 See TN/DS/W/1 (EC), Attachment, no 4; TN/DS/W/43, no III (Jordan) and TN/DS/W/53
(Jordan).
5 See Davey (2002), pp 38–39.
6 See the proposed Article 4.12, as contained in TN/DS/9.
7 This is the ‘WT/DS/OV/’ document series. For an overview on the current status of
disputes, see WT/DS/OV/18 (Update of WTO Dispute Settlement Cases) of 23 December
2003.
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1995 complaint by the United States regarding Korean testing and
inspection requirements for agricultural products under the heading
‘pending consultations’.8
Beyond house-keeping, there would also be further important, although
more subtle effects. The proposed rules would allow disputes to dissipate
from public attention without the outcome ever being known. From the
point of view of both internal and external transparency, such a
development could be problematic. Through the back-door, it would
allow members to avoid the notification requirement of mutually agreed
solutions regardless of the strengthening of the notification discipline
which has been suggested elsewhere (see below in Section 6.1.3). Parties
that have de facto agreed on a solution could simply let the consultations
request lapse and the issue would dissipate. It would in many instances
be difficult to tell whether a consultations request lapses because a
solution has been found or because the complainant has stopped
pursuing the issue for other reasons (pressure from the defendant in
other trade or non-trade areas, lack of interest etc). The automatic lapse
could therefore also undermine third party rights. On the positive side,
however, both the possibility to withdraw consultation requests and
their automatic lapse would increase the attractiveness of consultation
requests as a bilateral ‘negotiation tool’.
6.1.2 The Process of Consultations
In a general effort to strengthen the consultative element, and with
reference to Article 3.7 DSU which establishes that the aim of the dispute
settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute,
Jamaica suggests that consultations as well as good offices, conciliation
and mediation (Article 5 DSU) should be made more attractive. This
would particularly benefit developing countries, as ordinary panel
procedures can be costly and time-consuming.9 The proposal, however,
was not considered in the Balás text.
Both the EC10 and Japan11 suggested a reduction of the time-frame for
consultations from 60 to 30 days, thus resubmitting an idea they had
already put forward in the Suzuki text. China made a similar proposal.12
8 Korea – Measures Concerning the Testing and Inspection of Agricultural Products; WT/DS3;
see WT/DS/OV/22, no I.108.
9 See TN/DS/W/21, no 1, first three paragraphs (Jamaica).
10 See TN/DS/W/1, Attachment, no 1 (EC).
11 See TN/DS/W/22, Attachment, no 9 (Japan), and TN/DS/W/32, Attachment, no 10 (Japan).
12 See TN/DS/W/51 (China).
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Whereas the Japanese proposal also contains the possibility of extending
this time frame in cases involving developing countries, that S&D
provision has a more mandatory character in the Chinese proposal. The
Balás text did not incorporate the proposal for a shortened time frame
for consultations.
Costa Rica and Taiwan sought to strengthen third party rights during
the consultation stage (see also Section 7.4 on third party rights.).13 The
LDC Group made a case for special and differential treatment during
consultations by holding consultations which involve developing
countries in the capitals of these countries.14 Furthermore, some other
developing countries proposed to make Article 4.10 mandatory by
replacing the word ‘should’ with ‘shall’. This paragraph calls upon
Members to give special attention to developing country members’
problems and interests during consultations.15 Both proposals have been
integrated into the Balás text (for more details on special and differential
treatment, see Section 7.5).16
6.1.3 Notification of Mutually Agreed Solutions
The issue of the notification of mutually agreed solutions (MAS) is closely
related to consultations.17 Article 3.6 DSU provides that: ‘(m)utually
agreed solutions to matters formally raised under the consultation and
dispute settlement provisions of the covered agreements shall be notified
to the DSB and the relevant Councils and Committees, where any
Member may raise any point relating thereto.’ The unwillingness of
disputing parties to notify such solutions, however, is notorious and
arose as a problem very early in dispute settlement practice.18
Accordingly, proposals to remedy this situation had already been
contained in the original Suzuki text of the pre-Seattle review.
The notification requirement should be read in context with Article 3.5
DSU establishing that ‘(a)ll solutions to matters formally raised under
13 See TN/DS/W/12 and TN/DS/W/12/Rev 1 (Costa Rica), TN/DS/W/36 (Taiwan).
14 See TN/DS/W/17 (LDC Group).
15 See TN/DS/W/19, no III (Cuba, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri
Lanka, Tanzania and Zimbabwe).
16 See new Article 4.10, as contained in TN/DS/9. The language in the Balás text would
require for complaints against least developed countries that ‘the possibility of holding
consultations in the capital of that Member shall always be considered’.
17 See, for instance, Davey (2002), p 37 or Petersmann (2002b), p 131, UNICE (1999)
favouring improved notification of bilateral settlements.
18 See, for instance, the discussions in the Dispute Settlement Body on 24 April 1996 (WT/
DSB/M/15, no 4) and the statement made by the chairman of the DSB on 19 July 1995
(WT/DSB/M/6, no 6).
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the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the covered
agreements, including arbitration awards, shall be consistent with those
agreements and shall not nullify or impair benefits accruing to any
Member under those agreements...’. Without proper notification, it
cannot be excluded that a solution is inconsistent with the material
provisions of the covered agreements, and it cannot be excluded either,
that the settlement comes at the expense of countries not participating
in the dispute.
To strengthen the notification of MAS, Japan19 and some developing
countries20 called for a more precise wording of the notification
requirement in Article 3.6 DSU that would oblige parties to a dispute
explicitly to notify such solutions to the DSB. Jamaica made a similar
proposal, which could be understood as going even further than the
other proposals. It suggested that the party requesting consultations
should submit a factual and concise written report from the consultations
to the DSB that would indicate whether a mutually agreed solution had
been found.21 In other terms, not only mutually agreed solutions (as
under the proposals by Japan and some developing countries) would
have to be notified but all matters subject to consultations under the
DSU would, sooner or later, be concluded with a report. Implemented
properly, the Jamaican proposal would shed light on the result of many
consultation requests whose outcome remained in the dark, to the
detriment of both internal and external transparency. Yet, these effects
could be offset by new provisions on the automatic lapse of consultation
requests (see Section 6.1.1 above).
The Balás text would require each party to a mutually agreed solution
to notify the terms of that solution within 60 days to the DSB and to the
relevant councils and committees. Such notification shall contain
sufficient information relevant to the covered agreements to enable other
members to understand the mutually agreed solution.22
From the viewpoint of transparency and third party rights, improved
notification requirements for bilateral solutions are highly welcome. On
the other side, however, improved public scrutiny of the outcome of
consultations would significantly decrease the flexibility of governments
19 See TN/DS/W/22, Attachment, no 15 (Japan), and TN/DS/W/32, Attachment, no 16
(Japan).
20 See TN/DS/W/18 (Cuba, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka,
Tanzania and Zimbabwe) and TN/DS/W/47 (India, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt,
Honduras, Jamaica and Malaysia).
21 See, for instance, TN/DS/W/21 (Jamaica).
22 See Article 3.6 as contained in TN/DS/9.
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to settle on compromise solutions. It would alter one fundamental aspect
of the consultations process which is confidentiality. Confidentiality
plays an important role in these negotiatory stages of the process, as it
allows negotiators to explore compromise solutions by shielding them
from pressures exerted by their constituents. Strengthened notification
requirements and the emerging paper trail could therefore make early
settlements during consultations more difficult and less probable than
they are today.
6.1.4 Implementation of Mutually Agreed Solutions
The EC made an additional proposal on mutually agreed solutions
which, however, was not considered in the Balás text. It proposed the
creation of a new Article 22bis on the examination of mutually agreed
solutions which would subject a notified MAS to a compliance review.
In case it were found that the defendant did not comply with the
mutually agreed solution as notified, the complainant would be entitled
to request an authorisation from the DSB to suspend concessions or other
obligations.23 Petersmann has argued that such a compliance review
would set both an incentive for dispute prevention through more
mutually agreed solutions, and for their more precise notification as
procedures would not have to restart from scratch.24
Again, however, the word of caution that has been mentioned on the
improved notification of MAS has to be repeated. Compliance reviews
of the implementation of mutually agreed solutions necessarily require
a high degree of transparency and formal documentation with regard
to the solution. The high degree of precision of the solution which is a
prerequisite to legal review under a compliance panel procedure could
have a chilling effect on negotiators’ ability to explore avenues of
compromise. Moreover, the shadow of strict enforcement could preclude
a MAS from the start. Finally, the higher visibility which would result
at least ex post from a compliance review of a MAS could create problems.
Even if the mutually agreed solution were identical in content to the
expected outcome of a panel procedure, the defendant could be blamed
by domestic interests for having foregone the extra time during which
the inconsistent measure could have been upheld if the full panel and
appellate review procedures had been utilised and during which rents
from protection would have continued to accrue. Complainants, in turn,
could be prevented from entering into a compromise because any
‘softening’ on the issue could ex post become visible and thus entail
political costs. To sum it up, improved enforcement and the requisite
higher visibility of MAS could make early settlements more difficult
23 See TN/DS/W/1, Attachment, no 29.
24 See Petersmann (2002b), p 131.
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and could drive governments into a more aggressive use of the panel
mechanism. The empirical literature discussed in Chapter 4 offers some
support for this view.
6.2 The Panel Stage
6.2.1 The Composition of Panels
With regard to the panel stage,25 one of the most far-reaching proposals
is the EC call for a permanent panel body (PPB).26 This proposal had
already been made in 1998, and it has also led to a lively discussion in
academic literature. It is aimed at assuring the supply of qualified
panellists at times when the use of the dispute settlement mechanism
increases, and to overcome the mounting problems in the selection of
panellists for individual cases, as parties find it increasingly difficult to
agree on panellists in the current ad hoc appointment system. It has been
argued that delays and increasingly frequent recourse to the Director
General for the composition of the panel are a reflection of the problem.
Given the higher complexity of cases, the EC expects that a system of
permanent panellists would also result in a professionalisation of the
panel process with fewer reversals of cases and altogether shorter time-
frames for the procedure. According to the EC, it would also enhance
the legitimacy and credibility of the panel process through an elimination
of conflicts of interest. Finally, it could lead to an increased presence of
developing countries on panels as the composition of the permanent
panel body would be broadly representative of WTO membership.
The proposal has also been interpreted as being intended to bring into
panels more citizens of those states that are the most frequent users (eg
the EC, US, Japan and some developing countries) and whose nationals
cannot serve on cases involving their countries under the current rules.27
While it is true that nationals of a number of small and mid-sized trading
nations have occupied a high number of panel positions (such as
25 For references to specific issues within the panel process, see the references given below
and the overview (as of 2000) by Stewart and Karpel (2000).
26 See TN/DS/W/1, no I (EC), and Attachment, no  7.
27 Argument presented by Cartland (2003). For the discussion on a permanent panel body
in general, see for instance Petersmann (2002a), pp 14–15 and Steger (2002), pp 63–64.
Support for a permanent panel body is expressed, to varying degrees, by Bourgeois (2003),
Bourgeois (2001), Chang (2003), Cottier (2002), Davey (2003), Davey (2002a), Davey (2000),
Davey (2000a), Ehlermann (2002), pp 627–828, Kingery (2000), Roessler (2003), Rosas
(2001), p 144, UNICE (2001) and UNICE (1999). For more cautious or rather critical
comments on the idea of a permanent panel body, see Cartland (2003), Hecht (2000) and
Shoyer (2003). Wasescha (2003) makes the case for a mixed system of professional and
non-professional panellists) and some accompanying measures to overcome current
problems. On the organisational ‘culture’ of the panel system, see the highly interesting
contribution by Weiler (2001).
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Switzerland, Australia and New Zealand – each of which has had far
more panellist positions than, for instance, the US) the EU-15 is leading
in this ranking (see Graph 6.1). It is therefore questionable whether the
EU that is the main proponent of a PPB, would really gain many
additional panel positions.
Graph 6.1: WTO Panellist Positions by Country (1995-2004)
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Graph by the author; Data: http://www.worldtradelaw.net (downloaded on 15 January 2005).
Opponents of the idea of a permanent panel body fear that a PPB could
be more ‘ideological’ than ad hoc panels and that it could engage in
judicial activism or law-making. The current system of appointing panel
members by agreement or with the help of the Director General has also
been seen as giving Members certain flexibility and to be therefore in
line with the ‘member-driven’ approach of the WTO.28 As Cottier (2003)
argues, there are also constitutional implications, as the move towards
a permanent panel body would de-link law-making and adjudication
and further alienate trade diplomacy, giving rise to complaints about
an extensive judicialisation of trade policy and governments’ increased
loss of control.
Canada’s proposal, although being more limited, goes into a similar
direction as that of the EC. Canada suggests replacing the current
indicative list of panellists by a new panel roster where each WTO
member would be invited to nominate one individual for inclusion. Panel
28 See Shoyer (2003).
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members would mostly be selected from the roster although off-roster
candidates could also be proposed. The Director General would continue
to be in charge of panel composition absent agreement of the disputing
parties. In addition, Canada suggests an increase in the per diem of
panellists which is very low compared to other international tribunals.29
Thailand sought to build a bridge between the EC proposal and what it
had perceived to be the views expressed by members. In addition to
existing practices for the composition of panels, Thailand suggests the
establishment of a roster of panel chairs, from which individuals would
be appointed as chair by lot. The selection of the remaining panel
members could be based on nominations proposed by the secretariat or
they could be appointed by the Director General.30 None of these
proposals is reflected in the Balás text. Obviously, the moves in the
direction of a permanent panel body did not enjoy sufficient support.
Other proposals that deal with the composition of panels were submitted
by the African Group, calling for a better representation of Africa on
panels,31 as well as from the LDC Group and Jordan which demanded a
better representation of developing countries and LDCs in panels that
deal with cases involving them.32 Their proposals are partly reflected in
the Balás text. Whereas the current Article 8.10 DSU provides for the
presence of a panellist from a developing country on a panel only upon
request from the developing country party, this ‘default setting’ would
now be reversed. In disputes between a developing and a developed
Member, panels would include a panellist from a developing country
unless the developing member agreed otherwise. Additionally, a similar
provision on cases with LDC defendants would ensure the inclusion of
a panellist from an LDC unless the LDC party agrees otherwise.33
The qualification of panellists is an issue in the joint proposal made by
the United States and Chile. Both countries sought to ensure ‘that the
members of panels have appropriate expertise to appreciate the issues
29 See TN/DS/W/41, no 2 (Canada).
30 See TN/DS/W/31 (Thailand). Similar concepts are discussed by Cottier (2003), but
criticised by Chang (2003) as rather aggravating existing problems, and by Roessler (2003)
as not resolving the particular problems of the ad hoc selection procedures. Hudec (1999),
pp 34ff proposes transition to a system with one professional jurist per panel. At the time
of writing (the 1998 DSU review), he states, however, that: ‘(a)t the moment, most observers
are predicting that governments will not be ready to consider a professional-jurist proposal
(...).’  After the lapse of the May 2003 deadline, Thailand submitted jointly with Indonesia
a further communication with comments and questions on the panel appointment system;
see TN/DS/W/61 (Thailand and Indonesia).
31 See TN/DS/W/15 (African Group).
32 See TN/DS/W/17 (LDC Group), TN/DS/W/43 (Jordan) and TN/DS/W/53 (Jordan).
33 See the modified Article 8.10, as contained in TN/DS/9.
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presented in a dispute’ by adding such an explicit requirement into the
DSU.34 Obviously, the proposal also implied a fair amount of criticism
of the work of the panels. No suggestions were made, however, with
regard to how such a requirement could be made operational, eg on
whether proposed panellists would need to give proof of work
experience in the related field or whether they would have to prove
their qualifications in another way. The request was not incorporated
into the Balás text.
6.2.2 Time-Frames
Besides the composition of panels, time-frames for the panel procedure
have also been a topic in the negotiations. Australia,35 the EC,36 Japan37
and China38 separately called for the abolition of the rule according to
which panels are established only at the second meeting at which the
panel request appears on the agenda of the DSB. These countries suggest
that panels should be established already at the first meeting, a proposal
that had already been made in the Suzuki text. Additional time savings
should be achieved through an obligation for members to provide their
first written submissions along with the panel request.39 These concerns
have partly been taken up in the Balás text. According to the modified
Article 6.1 DSU, panels would be established at the first meeting where
the item appears on the agenda, unless the DSB decides by consensus
not to establish the panel. As an S&D measure, however, panels would
continue to be established only at the second meeting in cases involving
developing countries as defendants.40
This modification is more than merely a technical change. Under the
current rule, the panel request constitutes an additional negotiatory
instrument. Complainants do not yet have a right to the establishment
of a panel at the first meeting. They can, however, demonstrate their
resolve to proceed with a complaint. This leaves some room for
additional negotiations, particularly for the defendant. Under the
modified rule, that negotiating instrument would be available only to
34 See TN/DS/W/28, no 6(e) (US, Chile) and TN/DS/W/52, lit (e) (US, Chile).
35 See TN/DS/W/8 (Australia), and TN/DS/W/34, lit (d) (Australia).
36 See TN/DS/W/1, Attachment, no 5 (EC) and TN/DS/W/38 (EC).
37 See TN/DS/W/22, Attachment, no 10 (Japan) and TN/DS/W/32, Attachment, no 11
(Japan).
38 See TN/DS/W/51 and TN/DS/W/51/Rev 1 (China).
39 See TN/DS/W/8, lit (d) (Australia), TN/DS/W/34, lit (d) (Australia), and TN/DS/W/49
(Australia).
40 See Article 6.1, as contained in TN/DS/9.
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the complainant as he would have full control over whether the panel is
established at the first meeting or not.41
6.2.3 Withdrawal of Panel Requests and Suspension of Panel
Procedures
Currently, there is no procedure for the withdrawal of panel requests.
Regarding the suspension of panel procedures, the ultimate decision
on whether to suspend the proceedings lies with the panels and is
therefore outside full control of the disputing parties.
The EC proposed the introduction of a provision that would allow a
complainant to withdraw a panel request.42 In reaction to concerns that
such a provision could be abused for the withdrawal of panel requests
just after the issuance of the interim report (ie when a complainant would
already be informed of a potentially adverse decision), the suggestion
was modified in the EC’s second proposal which would allow the
complainant to withdraw a panel request only prior to the issuance of
the interim panel report. After the interim review, the panel proceeding
could be terminated only at the joint request of the parties.43 Another
proposal on the withdrawal of panel requests was submitted by Jordan.
It first called for a provision allowing countries to withdraw panel
requests prior to the second written submission,44 but later modified its
suggestion to limit such a withdrawal to the time prior to the composition
of the panel.45 A joint US-Chilean proposal would also give parties a
right to suspend panel procedures by mutual agreement.46
The Balás text took these proposals into consideration by both
incorporating a modification to Article 12.12 and by including a new
Article 12.13. Currently, Article 12.12 states that ‘(t)he panel may suspend
its work any time at the request of the complaining party for a period
not to exceed 12 months’ (emphasis added). According to one version of
the new proposed wording, the panel would be obliged to suspend its
work at the request of the complainant. In the second version, it would
still be up to the panel to decide. However, the complainant’s right to
request the suspension of the panel procedure under Article 12.12 would
41 See Davey (2002), p 38.
42 See TN/DS/W/1, no V and Attachment, no 6.
43 See TN/DS/W/1, no V, 2nd bullet point (EC), and TN/DS/W/38 (II.C) (EC).
44 See TN/DS/W/43, no IV (Jordan).
45 See TN/DS/W/53 (Jordan).
46 See TN/DS/W/28, no 6(d) (US, Chile) and TN/DS/W/52, lit (d), proposing changes to
Article 12.12 and Article 17.5 DSU (US, Chile).
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now be limited to the time before the issuance of the interim report.
Thereafter, such suspension would be possible only upon agreement of
the parties.
The Balás text would also add some precision to the provision on the
lapse of the panel’s authority, detailing that a lapse would occur only if
the panel’s work was suspended for 12 consecutive months.47 A new
Article 12.13 would contain provisions on the termination of panel
procedures. The text, however, is bracketed. It would give the
complainant a right to terminate the panel process any time prior to the
issuance of the interim report. In case of termination after the panel has
been composed, a complainant could only request a new panel on the
same matter after going through new consultations. In case of mutual
agreement of the parties to terminate panel procedures, the panel
procedure could be terminated at any time before issuance of the final
report, ie including after the interim review. Should the panel already
be composed when the termination of the procedure occurs, the panel’s
report would be confined to a brief description of the case and to
reporting that the panel process had been terminated.48
The suggested amendment would introduce much greater flexibility for
members in WTO dispute settlement. It would strengthen disputing
parties vis-à-vis the adjudicating bodies, and it would probably also
fortify parties with strong negotiating powers. A complainant could stop
the procedure at any time prior to the interim review. Even thereafter,
in case the interim report contained language which the complainant
would not want to be adopted (for whatever reason), the complainant
could negotiate with the defendant a termination of the procedure. As a
result, the proposed provisions would expand the possibilities of using
panel requests and panel proceedings for negotiating purposes.
6.2.4 Interim Review
The EC and Japan resubmitted a proposal to simplify the procedures
for the interim review which had already been contained in the Suzuki
text. It would remove the requirement for an additional meeting of the
panel with the parties on the issues identified in the comments to the
interim report.49 The Balás text considered this request. However, the
changes are less far-reaching than those requested by the EC. Under the
new rules of the Balás text, a further meeting of the panel with the parties
47 See modified Article 10.12, as contained in TN/DS/9.
48 See new Article 10.13, as contained in TN/DS/9.
49 See TN/DS/W/1, Attachment, nos 11 and 12 (EC); TN/DS/W/22, Attachment, no 12
(Japan).
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would only take place if requested by both parties, whereas today, a
request from one party is sufficient. If no such meeting is requested, the
Balás text would introduce a new opportunity to comment in writing
on the written comments previously submitted by other parties.50
6.2.5 Adoption of Panel Reports
As part of their ‘flexibility proposal’, the US and Chile propose to provide
for the partial adoption of panel reports. The co-sponsors hold that: ‘(t)he
WTO dispute settlement system is almost unique in that adoption of
panel and Appellate Body reports is quasi-automatic under the reverse
consensus rule.’ As ‘the reasoning and findings of reports may at times
go beyond what the parties consider to be necessary to resolve the
dispute, or, in some circumstances, may even be counterproductive to
resolution of the dispute’, the US and Chile suggest that: ‘there should
be mechanisms that would enhance the parties’ flexibility to resolve the
dispute and Members’ control over the adoption process.’51
This objective is translated into two concrete proposals:
• insertion of a provision according to which a panel shall
not include in the final report any finding, or basic rationale
behind a finding, that the parties have agreed is not to be
included;52
• insertion of a provision that would allow the DSB to decide,
by consensus, not to adopt a finding in the report or the
basic rationale behind a finding.53
Critics have argued, inter alia, that the provision allowing the deletion
of findings by mutual agreement of the parties could lead to ‘arm-
twisting’ to the detriment of the weaker party. It could also negatively
affect the interests of third parties.54 Neither suggestion has been
integrated in the Balás text.
50 See modified Article 15.2, as contained in TN/DS/9.
51 See TN/DS/W/28, para 3.
52 See TN/DS/W/28, no 6(b) (US, Chile) and TN/DS/W/52, lit (b), first proposal (US, Chile).
53 See TN/DS/W/28, no 6(c) (US, Chile) and TN/DS/W/52, lit (c), amendment to Article
16.4 (US, Chile).
54 See ‘US Proposes Changing Dispute Settlement Rules to Encourage Deals’, in Inside US
Trade, 20 December 2002.
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6.2.6 Other Issues
In order to facilitate the resolution of disputes with multiple
complainants and in order to avoid delays, the EC suggests that any
member having participated as a third party in consultations should be
able to join in any request to establish a panel without having to request
its own consultations. Similarly, a member should be entitled to become
a party to a panel proceeding regarding the same matter even if it has
not held consultations for 60 days at that point in time.55 This proposal
is likely motivated by the EC’s complaint against India’s patent regime.
It had participated as a third party in a proceeding which had been
begun by the United States and it later requested a panel on its own
behalf. The EC request not only met with resistance from India, but the
EC also had to go through the entire consultations procedure.56 The Balás
text did not consider the proposal and it left the procedures for multiple
complainants unchanged.
The EC also proposed the inclusion of an additional paragraph into the
working procedures governing the contents of the panel report.
Accordingly, the descriptive part of the panel report would have to
include a brief summary of the facts and the procedural history of a
case.57 It was not incorporated into the Balás text either.
Brazil called for the introduction of a fast track panel procedure. It could
be invoked by a complainant if it could demonstrate that the measure at
issue was the same as one that had already been the subject of a panel or
appellate proceeding. The panel would then have 10 to 15 days to
announce its decision on whether it was the same measure or not. If it
were the same, the fast track panel would have to continue its work up
to a maximum period of 90 days, and appellate review would be limited
to 45 days. Otherwise, regular procedures would apply.58 The proposal
did not find entry into the Balás text.
The EC and Jordan suggested the establishment of standard panel
working procedures.59 This proposal has been cautiously supported by
Davey (2002). He suggests, however, that if a permanent panel body
55 See TN/DS/W/38, no II.B (EC).
56 India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products (EC) (WT/
DS79). The US complaint on the same issue was dealt with in WT/DS50.
57 See TN/DS/W/1, Attachment, no 35 (EC).
58 See TN/DS/W/45 (Brazil) and TN/DS/W/45/Rev 1 (Brazil).
59 See TN/DS/W/1, no V, last bullet point (EC); see also TN/DS/W/43, no VI (Jordan). For
a discussion, see Davey (2002), pp 27–28. An early comment on procedural issues is
available in Steger and Van den Bossche (1998).
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were established (which he actively supports in other writings60) this
body should be given the power to codify its own procedures, subject to
DSB approval. Secondly, such codification should occur only after a few
years of experience. Thirdly, not too many resources should be spent on
the codification process in case it became controversial.61 The issue was
left out of the Balás text.
Finally, the African Group called for a provision that would oblige panel
members to state their separate written opinion in panel reports and to
hand down majority decisions. According to the LDC Group, dissenting
opinions should be allowed in panel reports.62 This proposal was not
accounted for in the Balás text. It could undermine both the independence
of panels and the collegiality of panelists.
6.3 The Appellate Review Stage
6.3.1 Composition and Terms of Appointment of the Appellate
Body
In the discussions on the appellate review stage, a point raised by various
delegations was the composition and the terms of appointment of the
Appellate Body. The EC proposed converting the Appellate Body
mandate into full-time appointment.63 Moreover, the EC proposal would
give the General Council the authority to modify the number of Appellate
Body members from time to time.64 Thailand suggested increasing the
number of Appellate Body members by two to four persons.65 With
similar intentions, a Japanese proposal would change Article 17.1 DSU
by providing that the number of Appellate Body members could be
modified, as required, by the DSB or the General Council.66 The proposals
came closer together with Thailand’s second proposal on this issue which
was to increase the number of Appellate Body members to nine while
60 See Section 6.2.1.
61 See Davey (2002), pp 27ff.
62 See TN/DS/W/17 (LDC Group) and TN/DS/W/42, no VI (African Group). For a critical
discussion, see McCall Smith (2003), pp 80ff. Currently, Article 14.3 DSU provides:
‘Opinions expressed in the panel report by individual panellists shall be anonymous.’
63 See TN/DS/W/1, no V (EC). Ehlermann (2002), p 609 views such a shift as unavoidable.
64 See TN/DS/W/1, Attachment, no 13 (EC).
65 See TN/DS/W/2 (Thailand). Ehlermann (2002), p 610, does not share the view that a
greater number of Appellate Body members is the best reaction to the heavier workload.
He argues that the small number has had a beneficial effect on the intimacy and collegiality
of deliberations.
66 See TN/DS/W/22, no 2(c) (Japan) and TN/DS/W/32, no 2(c) (Japan), as well as the related
proposal for an amendment in the Attachment to TN/DS/W/32, no 20 (Japan).
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allowing the DSB to modify this number if circumstances so warranted.67
The EC also supports giving competence to the DSB for modifications
to the number of Appellate Body members.68 In the Balás text, this issue
was taken into account and it is suggested that the Appellate Body shall
be composed of at least seven persons, and that ‘(t)he total number of
Appellate Body members may be modified by the DSB, after consultation
of the General Council on any potential budgetary implications...’.69
This debate has also been the subject of scholarly discussion.70 Recently,
Appellate Body veterans such as Lacarte-Muro71 and Steger72 have voiced
concerns about calls for an enlargement of the Appellate Body. One
argument is that the Appellate Body has so far come to terms with its
workload quite well and in a timely manner and that therefore no
increase is warranted. Furthermore, the authors fear that the collegiality
of the Appellate Body and its members could be put at risk and that it
may be difficult to achieve consensus in a larger group. It is also feared
that coalitions could emerge in a larger group, or that ‘regional seats’
could develop in an enlarged Appellate Body.
Regarding the terms of appointment, a group of developing countries
suggested changing the terms of appointment for Appellate Body
members into non-renewable six-year terms,73 a proposal also brought
by the EC.74 With regard to the composition of the Appellate Body, the
African Group argued in favour of a better representation of Africa, as
it already did for panels.75 The Balás text, however, remains silent on
this issue.
As the LDC group already suggested for panels, it also made a proposal
according to which dissenting opinions should be allowed in Appellate
67 See TN/DS/W/30 (Thailand). A third proposal with a view to increasing the number of
Appellate Body members has been brought by Thailand after the May 2003 deadline, on
8 December 2003 (TN/DS/W/60).
68 See TN/DS/W/38, no VA (EC).
69 See modified Article 17.1, as contained in TN/DS/9.
70 On this issue, see, for instance, Shoyer and Solovy (2000).
71 As quoted in Petersmann (2002a), pp 15–16.
72 See Steger (2002), pp 53–66. Steger headed the secretariat of the Appellate Body.
73 See TN/DS/W/18 and TN/DS/W/18/Add 1, no IV (Cuba, Honduras, India, Jamaica,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania Zimbabwe), and TN/DS/W/47 (India, Cuba,
Dominican Republic, Egypt, Honduras, Jamaica and Malaysia).
74 See TN/DS/W/38, no VA (EC). Steger (2002), while being in favour of a non-renewable
term, argues that its length should be somewhere between 8 and 10 years in order to
guarantee independence and in order to allow for a ‘learning curve’.
75 See TN/DS/W/15 (African Group).
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Body reports.76 The African Group went one step further by suggesting
that Appellate Body members should be required to give their separate
written opinion and to take majority decisions.77 Neither of these issues
was taken into consideration in the Balás text. Obviously, such proposals
could also undermine the principle of collegiality which is held high by
the Appellate Body.
6.3.2 Notice of Appeal
Some developing countries suggested the establishment of additional
guidelines on the nature of the notice of appeal in order to make sure
that such notices are sufficiently clear.78 Three of these countries, namely
India, Pakistan and Malaysia had previously complained that the United
States’ notice of appeal in US – Shrimp-Turtle had been too ‘vague and
cursory’.79 This concern was taken up in the Balás text which stipulates
that: ‘(a) notification of appeal ... shall identify the relevant issues of law
covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the
panel in sufficient detail to present the issues under appeal clearly.’80
The concerns of members regarding sufficient clarity of the notice of
appeal have in the meantime been considered by the Appellate Body
itself. New Working Procedures for Appellate Review entered into force
on 1 January 2005. The modified rules require, inter alia, more detail on
the nature of the appeal. Appellants are now requested to include a list
of the legal provision(s) of the covered agreements that the panel is
alleged to have erred in interpreting or applying, and to provide an
indicative list of the paragraphs of the panel report containing the alleged
errors.81
6.3.3 Suspension of Appellate Review
As part of their ‘flexibility proposal’, the US and Chile also suggested
introducing the possibility of suspending the appellate review by mutual
76 See TN/DS/W/17 (LDC Group). For a critical discussion, see McCall Smith (2003), pp
80ff.
77 See TN/DS/W/42, no VI (African Group). Currently, Article 17.11 DSU states: ‘Opinions
expressed in the Appellate Body report by individuals serving on the Appellate Body
shall be anonymous.’ This proposal is similar to the African Group proposal on the panel
stage; see Section 6.2.6.
78 See TN/DS/W/18 and TN/DS/W/18 Add 1, no VI (Cuba, Honduras, India, Jamaica,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Zimbabwe).
79 See WT/DS58/AB/R, para 92.
80 See Article 17.5(a), as contained in TN/DS/9.
81 See the modified Rule 20(2), as contained in WT/AB/WP/5.
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agreement of the parties82 (as they did for the panel procedure, see Section
6.2.3). The time-frames for appellate review (and for the overall dispute
settlement procedure) would be expanded by the amount of time that
the work was suspended. The proposed provision does not include a
time frame for the resumption of the work of the Appellate Body. As the
proposal stands today, it could, if implemented, result in more cases
ending in a similar kind of inconclusive limbo that is familiar from those
cases ending in the consultation stage.
The Balás text would oblige the Appellate Body to suspend its work ‘at
the request of the parties’ for a period of time determined by the parties.83
It remains open how long such a period of time may be. There is nothing
in the proposed text which would prevent proceedings from being
suspended indefinitely. However, there is no provision on the lapse of
the Appellate Body’s authority (similar to that in the rules on the
suspension of panel procedures) either. Also, without a provision to the
contrary, a request for a suspension of appellate review procedures could
presumably be made at any time during the appellate review, including
the time after the issuance of the proposed interim report (which the
Balás text would also introduce; see Sction 6.3.5). In other words, the
parties could still suspend the proceeding when they already knew the
essence of the ruling. If the parties agreed on a settlement of the dispute,
possible at any time, the report would be confined to a brief description
of the case and to reporting that a solution had been reached.84
6.3.4 Introduction of an Interim Review Stage
In their “flexibility proposal”, the United States and Chile also proposed
the introduction of an interim review stage (similar to the one known
from the panel procedure). By consequence, they also suggested that
the general time frame for appellate review would rise from currently
sixty days to ninety days, and it could even be increased to 120 days in
cases where the Appellate Body considered that it was unable to issue
the report in the time suggested.85 (One will note that this increase in
time-frames is quite at odds with the US stated objective of keeping
time-frames under the DSU as short as possible, inter alia in order to
avoid interference with strict time-frames for the national Section 301
procedures.86)
82 See TN/DS/W/28, no 6(d) (US, Chile), and TN/DS/W/52, lit (d), proposed amendment
to Article 17.5 DSU (US, Chile).
83 See Article 17.5(d), as contained in TN/DS/9.
84 See Article 17.5(e), as contained in TN/DS/9.
85 See TN/DS/W/28, no 6(a) (US, Chile) and TN/DS/W/52, lit (a) (US, Chile).
86 See also ‘US-Chile Text For DSU Changes Leaves Out Standard of Review’, in Inside US
Trade, 14 March 2003; and ‘WTO Members Fail on DSU Deal, Further Negotiations After
Cancun’, in Inside US Trade, 30 May 2003.
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The purpose of such an interim review at the appellate stage has been
questioned. First, it has been argued that the interim review during the
panel stage has deceived hopes that parties would use this phase to
settle their differences.87 Moreover, it is held that the reviews did not
lead to changes in panel decisions.88
The Balás text took the proposal for an interim review into consideration;
however, the proposed provisions are bracketed. They provide for the
issuance of an interim report to the parties which would include the
descriptive sections as well as the findings and conclusions. Parties may
submit written requests for the Appellate Body to review aspects of the
interim report prior to the circulation of the final report. Only if requested
jointly, a further meeting would be held with the parties on the issues
identified in the written comments. If no comments are received, the
interim report shall be considered the final report. The report shall
include a discussion of the arguments made at the interim review stage.89
According to the text, the ordinary time frame for appellate review would
be extended from 60 to 90 days, or from 90 to 120 days if the Appellate
Body could not provide its report within the ordinary time-frame.90
6.3.5 Introduction of Remand Authority
There are instances where the Appellate Body had to leave certain claims
unresolved because of insufficient factual findings in panel reports.91
As the Appellate Body’s mandate consists of reviewing ‘issues of law
covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the
panel’ according to Article 17.6 DSU, it is argued that the authority to
remand certain issues back to the panels for further fact-finding would
save time and resources.92
87 Hudec (1999), p 41, questions the usefulness of the interim review stage.
88 According to this argument, voicing concerns on a report during the interim review
would only contribute to making the panel report better and thus make the objectionable
findings less vulnerable to appeal. Parties that did not agree with a report would therefore
rather keep quiet during the interim review and spend their time and effort on the
preparation of an appeal. See also ‘US Proposes Changing Dispute Settlement Rules to
Encourage Deals’, in Inside US Trade, 20 December 2002.
89 See Article 17.5(c), as contained in TN/DS/9.
90 See Article 17.5(b), as contained in TN/DS/9.
91 One such example is Canada – Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation
of Dairy Products (WT/DS103 (US), WT/DS113 (New Zealand)); see also ‘Canada Dairy
Fight Raises Questions on Agriculture, Dispute Rules’, in Inside US Trade, 4 January 2002.
92 See, for instance, Steger (2002), pp 62–63 and, for an early discussion, Palmeter (1998).
See also Shoyer and Solovy (2000) and Cottier (1998).
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The EC has been proposing the introduction of ‘remand authority’ for
the Appellate Body since 1998.93 If the Appellate Body were unable to
resolve an issue as a result of insufficient factual findings in a panel
report or insufficient undisputed facts on the record of the panel
proceedings, the Appellate Body would explain the specific
insufficiencies, and any party to the dispute could then request a remand
of the matter to the original panel. The remand panel would then have
to issue its report which, in turn, could be appealed. The introduction of
a remand procedure is also explicitly supported by Jordan.94
This remand procedure is included in the Balás text. Its purpose is
twofold. First, if the Appellate Body is unable to fully address an
appealed issue due to insufficient factual findings in the panel report or
insufficient undisputed facts on the panel record, it shall indicate this in
its report and explain in detail the specific insufficiencies. This procedure
would apply to ‘ordinary’ panel reports as well as to compliance panel
reports and remand panel reports (see below). Within 30 days from the
adoption of the panel report, the complainant may request the DSB to
remand that issue to the original panel, pursuant to the provisions of
the proposed Article 17bis. Secondly, the modified paragraph would also
provide rules for situations where the Appellate Body is unable to
establish whether a measure in respect of which an issue was raised on
appeal is inconsistent. In such cases, the Appellate Body shall indicate
this in its report and, according to bracketed wording, it shall refrain
from making recommendations that the measure concerned be brought
into conformity. The remand procedure would be without prejudice to
the adoption of those recommendations and rulings that relate to
findings which were not appealed and which the Appellate Body was
able to address fully.95
Details for the remand procedure are laid down in Article 17bis of the
Balás text. The entire text of this Article is bracketed. According to the
procedure, the DSB shall establish a remand panel at the first meeting
where the request appears on the DSB’s agenda. The remand panel shall
consist of the original panellists. Its terms of reference mandate an
examination of the matter referred to the DSB under the Article 17.12
procedure in accordance with the indications given by the Appellate
Body. The remand panel would normally circulate its report within 90
days from the request, and in no case later than within six months. The
remand panel report would be adopted by the DSB within 10 days unless
93 See TN/DS/W/1, no V (EC) and Attachment, nos 15 and 16.
94 See TN/DS/W/43, no X (Jordan) and TN/DS/W/56 (Jordan).
95 See modified Article 17.12, as contained in TN/DS/9.
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a party to the remand panel proceeding formally notified the DSB of its
decision to appeal.96
The establishment of the remand procedure would be one of the key
improvements to the DSU. While it is true that this procedural device
may lengthen proceedings, it could help to enhance the acceptance of
adverse findings as the legal quality of reports could benefit from
remand. Observers, however, also argue that the introduction of a
remand authority could deter suitable persons from serving on panels
due to the extra workload in case of a remand. Obviously, that problem
would be less significant if a permanent body of full-time panellists were
established.
6.3.6 Adoption of Appellate Body Reports
Similar to their proposal on the partial adoption of panel reports (see
Section 6.2.5), the US and Chile also suggested the introduction of a
provision that would allow for the partial adoption of Appellate Body
reports. Again, the proposal consists of two elements:
• insertion of a provision which would require the Appellate
Body to set out the applicability of relevant provisions and
the basic rationale behind any findings and
recommendations that it made. In its final report, however,
the Appellate Body would be prevented from including any
finding, or basic rationale behind a finding, that the parties
had agreed is not to be included;97
• insertion of a provision that would allow the DSB to decide,
by consensus, not to adopt a finding in the report or the
basic rationale behind a finding. Moreover, a party to the
dispute would not need to accept any finding or basic
rationale that the DSB did not adopt.98
The proposed text would deliver a device to increase the hurdles for the
Appellate Body (as the highest adjudicating body) to hand down rulings
which a party with strong negotiating powers opposes. The new
provision would particularly suit negotiators from powerful countries.
The provision on the deletion of findings by mutual agreement of the
96 See Article 17bis, as contained in TN/DS/9.
97 See TN/DS/W/28, no 6(b) (US, Chile) and TN/DS/W/52, lit (b), second proposal seeking
an amendment to Article 17.13 DSU (US, Chile).
98 See TN/DS/W/28, no 6(c) (US, Chile) and TN/DS/W/52, lit (c), second proposal seeking
an amendment to Article 17.14 (US, Chile).
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parties could also interfere unduly with the rights of third parties.
Clearly, this proposal ranks among those which display the strongest
tendency away from the adjudication-oriented approach towards more
member control and more diplomatic dispute settlement.99 The partial
adoption procedure did not find its way into the Balás text.
6.4 The Implementation Stage
A major part of the discussion on the DSU, both in practice and in
academic literature,100 is related to the implementation stage,
corresponding to a more general perception that this is both a very
problematic and crucial stage in the procedure. Several issues have been
dealt with regarding implementation.
6.4.1 Determination of the Reasonable Period of Time for
Implementation
In the light of the proposed introduction of an appellate stage into the
compliance panel procedure (see Section 6.4.3.1 below) and the
subsequent delays in the process, Korea suggests that the time frame
for the determination of the reasonable period of time (RPT) for
implementation should be shortened. Officially, that time frame is now
90 days from the adoption of the reports. Factually, however, Korea offers
statistics which show that the average time it took to issue the award in
the proceedings was 137 days for all proceedings, or 157 days in the
proceedings that have taken place since 2000. This corresponds to an
average delay of 47 or 67 days respectively.
Korea therefore seeks to reduce the time frame for bilateral negotiations
on the RPT (or the appointment of an arbitrator for such determination)
from 45 to 30 days. At the DSB meeting taking place after the lapse of
this deadline, the complainant should be entitled to ask the Director
99 For an initial discussion of the proposal, see ‘US Proposes Changing Dispute Settlement
Rules to Encourage Deals’, in Inside US Trade, 20 December 2002.
100 See, for instance, Petersmann (2002a), pp 16–20. With regard to the use of arbitration
(including under Article 21.3 on the reasonable period of time), see Hughes (2002), pp
107–18. With regard to the sequencing issue, see Mavroidis (2002), Rhodes (2000), Valles
and McGivern (2000). Beyond sequencing, several aspects of Article  21.5/22 procedures
are discussed in Pauwelyn (2002). The general experience with Article  21.5 procedures is
discussed in Kearns and Charnovitz (2002). A critical perspective on the current state of
implementation procedures is given by Gleason and Walther (2000). For an EC perspective,
see Rosas (2001).
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General to appoint an arbitrator within 10 days. Arbitration would then
have to be carried out within 45 days. This should ensure that arbitration
proceedings can be finished within the ninety day time frame foreseen
in the DSU. In this context, Korea also suggests that Members make
better use of the time between the circulation and the adoption of panel
and Appellate Body reports (which ranges from 20 to 60 days) to study
ways of implementation.101
A similar proposal on the RPT was made by the EC. In its first submission,
the EC suggested that the time frame for the completion of the arbitration
should start from a ‘more logical date than the date of the adoption of
the report, for example by providing a 45-day period from the date of
the appointment of the arbitrator’.102 The EC’s second proposal tries to
bridge the gaps between the EC and the Korean idea by suggesting that
each party may request arbitration on the RPT within 30 days from the
adoption of the report. Parties would then have another 10 days to agree
on an arbitrator who, without such agreement, would be drawn from
the roster of panellists that the EC proposes. The arbitrator should then
issue the award within 45 days.103
The Balás text took the proposals into account with slight modifications.
As proposed, it would grant any party a right to refer the matter to
arbitration within 30 days from the date of the adoption of the reports.
If there were no agreement on the arbitrator within 10 days, the Director
General would appoint one within seven days (bracketed provision).
The arbitrator should then issue its award within 50 days.104 As a result,
the scope for delay tactics in the implementation stage would be slightly
reduced.
6.4.2 Length of the Reasonable Period of Time for
Implementation
The length of the RPT has been discussed as well.105 Some developing
countries called for a longer RPT in cases involving developing country
defendants. While the Balás draft added a programmatic provision on
S&D treatment, it does not propose any concrete changes to the numbers
(see Section 7.5.3 for details).
101 See TN/DS/W/11, no III.A (Korea).
102 See TN/DS/W/1, no V and Attachment, no 19 (EC).
103 See TN/DS/W/38, nos  22 and 23 (EC).
104 See the modified Article 21.3(c), as contained in TN/DS/9.
105 See Petersmann (2002a), pp 19–20; Monnier (2001).
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The EC106 and Japan107 also resubmitted a proposal with regard to the
RPT that is well-known from prior stages in the DSU review. It suggests
inclusion of a footnote to Article 21.3, establishing that the RPT shall
include the time period specified under Article 4.7 of the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) for the withdrawal of a
subsidy. The Balás text integrated this proposal.108
6.4.3 Sequencing During the Implementation Stage
Especially at the beginning of the review exercise, the so-called
‘sequencing issue’ was much debated.109 This problem arose from gaps
or – as some would argue – contradictions in the DSU regarding the
application of Articles 21.5 and 22 DSU, thereby giving rise to different
interpretations. It first surfaced in the Bananas case,110 where a dispute
arose on the WTO-consistency of the EC implementation measures. The
main question is whether a ‘compliance panel’ must first review the
implementation measures undertaken by a defendant before a
complainant may seek authorisation to retaliate on grounds of the
defendant’s alleged non-compliance. Whereas the US initially opposed
any idea of sequencing and favoured immediate retaliation, the EC and
many other  members argued in favour of the completion of a compliance
panel procedure as a prerequisite to seeking an authorisation to retaliate.
Over time, however, this debate lost some of its acrimony after the US
had been defeated in the FSC case,111 finding itself unable to implement
the rulings in a timely and WTO-consistent manner. The EC and the US
then agreed bilaterally on a case-specific sequencing procedure which
filled the gaps of the DSU.
During the Doha Round negotiations on the DSU review, the problem
was debated again. However, it was viewed as clearly less acute in the
light of the practice to conclude bilateral agreements which has
developed. Such bilateral agreements regularly provide that an Article
21.5 ‘compliance panel’ first review an implementation measure before
the complainant may seek authorisation to suspend concessions or other
obligations pursuant to Article 22.2. In some instances, such
106 See TN/DS/W/1, Attachment, no 20 (EC).
107 See TN/DS/W/22, Attachment, no 1 (Japan) and TN/DS/W/32, no 1 (Japan).
108 See the note marked with an asterisk below the modified Article 21.3(c), as contained
in TN/DS/9.
109 See, for instance, Petersmann (2002a), pp 16–17, Mavroidis (2002), Rhodes (2000), Valles
and McGivern (2000). Beyond sequencing, several aspects of Article 21.5/22 procedures
are discussed in Pauwelyn (2002).
110 European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (WT/
DS27).
111 United States – Tax Treatment for ‘Foreign Sales Corporations’ (WT/DS108).
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arrangements provide for the possibility to appeal the compliance panel
report. Some arrangements also include the timing for an arbitration
procedure on the equivalence of the level of the suspension of
concessions or other obligations with the level of nullification or
impairment pursuant to Article 22.6.
6.4.3.1 Compliance Panel Procedure
The most comprehensive proposals in this regard were made by the EC
and Japan, based on former proposals brought in by these countries
and other members back in 1999 and thereafter.112 Those portions of the
Balás text dealing with sequencing draw mainly on these two proposals
and the co-ordination efforts between them. Therefore, the Balás text
and its contents are briefly outlined here directly, without embarking
on the specifics of the original proposals.
According to the Balás text, a defendant must start to report on the status
of implementation from the mid-point of the RPT or six months after
the adoption of the DSB recommendations, whichever is earlier. This
reporting requirement would last until the parties to the dispute have
mutually agreed that the issue is resolved. The draft would further clarify
the reporting requirement by holding that status reports must be
‘detailed’ and ‘written’.113 Once the defendant considers that it has
complied, it shall submit to the DSB a written notification of the measures
it has taken. Such notification would have to include a detailed
description as well as the text of any relevant measures.114
112 See TN/DS/W/1 (EC), with an attachment (particularly nos 22–26) largely based on
WT/MIN(99)/8 and TN/DS/W/38 (EC); see TN/DS/W/22 and TN/DS/W/23 (Japan), both
with an attachment (particularly nos 3–7) largely based on WT/MIN(01)/W/6. Other
countries making proposals on sequencing include Australia (see TN/DS/W/8 lit (e), TN/
DS/W/34 lit (e), and TN/DS/W/49), Jordan (see TN/DS/W/43, no VIII), China (see TN/DS/
W/51 and TN/DS/W/51/Rev 1, no 5), as well as Cuba, Honduras, India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Zimbabwe (see TN/DS/W/19, proposal
relating to Article 21.2, lit (b)ii and (c)). The proposal of these developing countries calls
for mandatory consultations and additional time-frames in cases involving developing
countries as defendants. They were, however, not considered in the Balás text.
113 However, brackets indicate that there is disagreement as to whether specific measures
taken since the last report should be included. Given the poor information provided in
many such status reports so far, this disagreement is another reflection of members’
reluctance to disclose substantial information on implementation during the RPT.
Interestingly, the draft would also introduce a new obligation on the Director General to
issue public reports on the status of implementation of DSB rulings at regular intervals;
see Article 21.6(b) as contained in TN/DS/9.
114 See Article  21.6(c)(i) and Article 21.6(c) last sentence, as contained in TN/DS/9. While
this requirement would trigger a notification only if the defendant did consider that it
was in compliance, brackets indicate disagreement as to whether a defendant should be
generally obliged to submit written notifications on measures taken to comply at a certain
point in time; see bracketed Article 21.6(c)(ii) and Article 21.6(c)(iii), as contained in TN/
DS/9.
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In case of disagreement between the complainant and the defendant as
to the existence or WTO-consistency of implementing measures, a
compliance panel procedure would be available. The text offers two
versions both of which are bracketed. According to version A,
consultations should be held prior to the request for a compliance panel
in order to discuss possible mutually acceptable solutions for the
implementation of DSB recommendations and rulings. According to
version B, the establishment of a compliance panel could be requested
directly.115 Such a request could be made either once the defendant has
indicated that it does not need a RPT for implementation, or once it has
submitted a notification of compliance, or once the RPT has expired,
whichever is earlier.116 The compliance panel would be composed of the
members of the original panel.117 Unless the parties agreed on special
terms of reference, the compliance panel would operate under standard
terms of reference.118 It would be established at the DSB meeting where
the request appeared first as an item on the DSB agenda, unless the DSB
decided by consensus not to establish the compliance panel.119 It would
circulate its report within 90 days after its establishment.120 The
compliance panel report would be adopted by the DSB at the request of
any party unless it were appealed.121 In case of appeal, the normal
procedures for Appellate Review as included in Article 17 would apply.122
If it were found that the defendant had not complied with the rulings, it
would not be entitled to any further period of time for implementation.123
If the defendant did not inform the DSB that it intended to implement
the recommendations, if it did not submit a notification of compliance,
115 See new Article 21.5 (bracketed) and Article 21bis.2 (bracketed) as contained in TN/
DS/9. Japan had originally intended to make such consultations voluntary (see Article
21.3bis in TN/DS/W/22, Attachment, no 2 (Japan) and TN/DS/W/32, Attachment, no 2
(Japan)) while the EC insisted that they should be mandatory before a compliance panel
could be requested (see no  21 of the attachment to TN/DS/W/1). In a co-ordination effort,
and to counter fears that such mandatory consultations could delay the process, the EC
proposed that these consultations, while being mandatory, could begin as early as 30
days prior to the expiry of the RPT in order to avoid delays in comparison with the
Japanese proposal (see TN/DS/W/38, no 27 (EC)).
116 See Article 21bis.2, as contained in TN/DS/9. Brackets indicate that in alternative A,
consultations could be requested already 20 days prior to the expiry of the RPT. In this
case, the defendant would have to reply to the request within 10 days and it should enter
into consultations within 20 days. Twenty days after the circulation of the request for
consultations, the complainant would have the right to request the establishment of a
compliance panel; see Article 21bis.3, as contained in TN/DS/9.
117 See Article 21bis.3, as contained in TN/DS/9.
118 See Article 21bis.4, as contained in TN/DS/9.
119 See Article 21bis.5, as contained in TN/DS/9.
120 See Article 21bis.6, as contained in TN/DS/9.
121 The adoption procedure is bracketed; see Article 21bis.7, as contained in TN/DS/9.
122 See Article 21bis.8, as contained in TN/DS/9.
123 See Article 21bis.9, as contained in TN/DS/9.
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or if the result of the compliance panel procedure was that the defendant
had failed to bring its trade measures into conformity, the complainant
could either request the defendant to enter into consultations with a
view of agreeing on a mutually acceptable trade or other compensation,
or the complainant could request an authorisation from the DSB to
suspend concessions or other obligations (SCOO) vis-à-vis the
defendant.124 The DSB should meet 15 days after the request to authorise
the SCOO. In the case of disagreement on the level of suspension or
whether the principles for the determination of the sectors subject to the
SCOO (Article 22.3) had been followed, the matter could be referred to
arbitration. The arbitrator should decide within 60 days from the referral
of the matter, or within 30 days if an arbitration on the level of
nullification or impairment had taken place before.125 After this
arbitration, the complaining party could submit a request to the DSB
for an authorisation to SCOO, which the DSB should grant as long as it
were consistent with the arbitrator’s determinations.126 A new obligation
would be imposed on the complainant who would have to notify the
DSB of any retaliatory measures taken.127
6.4.3.2 Determination of the Level of Nullification or Impairment
Several proposals discuss the timing of the determination of (or
arbitration on) the level of nullification or impairment and its equivalence
with the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations.
The most far-reaching proposal comes from Mexico. The Mexican paper
suggests incorporating the determination of the level of nullification
and impairment into the original panel process. Such determination
could already be requested after the interim panel report has been issued.
Subsequent findings in this regard would form part of the final panel
124 See new Article 22.2, as contained in TN/DS/9. This paragraph contains a bracketed
subparagraph (c) which would block recourse to Article 22 before the completion of a
compliance panel procedure in case of disagreement on whether implementing measures
exist or are WTO-consistent. With regard to the SCOO, further bracketed language
indicates disagreement on whether the complainant would have to submit, along with
its request, an indicative list of the concessions or other obligations to be suspended; see
Article 22.2ter(a), as contained in TN/DS/9.
125 See Article 22.2ter(b) and Article 22.6, as contained in TN/DS/9.
126 See Article 22.7, as contained in TN/DS/9. Again, this paragraph contains bracketed
language as to whether the complainant should submit an indicative list of those
concessions and other obligations that the complainant proposed to suspend.
127 See Article 22.8, as contained in TN/DS/9. Also with regard to compliance review
procedures, both Japan (TN/DS/W/22, Attachment, no 16) and the EC (TN/DS/W/1,
Attachment, no 30) proposed extending such compliance reviews to arbitration awards
under Article 25. This issue, which had already been brought up in earlier stages of the
DSU review, was not considered in the Balás text.
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report and could be subject to appeal. The Mexican proposal could lead
to important time-savings, particularly if it were implemented jointly
with other proposals contained in the Mexican submission (see Section
6.4.11 on increased incentives for compliance).128
Ecuador submits a draft proposal which is also aimed at making such
determination occur earlier. According to the new paragraphs 3bis and
3ter which Ecuador suggests for inclusion into Article 21, a complainant
could seek arbitration on the level of nullification and impairment as
soon as it becomes clear that the defendant has not complied immediately
with the DSB recommendations and rulings. The arbitrator in charge of
determining the RPT could also determine the level of nullification or
impairment. The entire procedure could be completed before the
complainant would seek authorisation to retaliate from the DSB.129
Korea proposes to have compliance panels determine the level of
nullification or impairment, holding that both the compliance panel and
the arbitration panel are composed of the members of the original panel.
Not only would such ‘front-loading’ provide stronger incentives for
compliance (as members would have a clear picture of the consequences
of non-compliance up-front), but it would facilitate negotiations on
compensation and it might make recourse to the arbitration procedures
under Article 22.6 (on whether the level of suspension was equivalent
to the level of nullification, and on whether the rules on cross-retaliation
had been followed) less frequent.130
The EC is equally in favour of an earlier determination of the level of
nullification or impairment. However, according to the EC proposal, it
should only occur towards the end of the reasonable period of time (when
the non-complying party indicates that it will not be able to comply
with the DSB recommendations), or after the end of the reasonable period
of time if both parties agree that there has not been implementation, or
if a compliance panel has found that the measures are insufficient.131
This idea was later also integrated into a Japanese proposal.132
128 See TN/DS/W/40 (Mexico) for the textual proposal, and TN/DS/W/23 (Mexico) no II(a)
for the conceptual background.
129 See TN/DS/W/26 (Ecuador) and TN/DS/W/33 (Ecuador).
130 See TN/DS/W/11, no III.B (Korea) and TN/DS/W/35, no III.B (Korea). Pauwelyn (2002)
is in favour of this proposal, as it would eliminate recourse to Article 25 arbitration as in
United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act (WT/DS160).
131 See TN/DS/W/1, at II.B, and no 24 (attachment) (EC); see also TN/DS/W/38, at VI.C
(EC).
132 See TN/DS/W/32, no 1a, and para 5 of the attachment (Japan).
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Some of these differing views are accounted for in the Balás text which
proposes different versions. According to one version, arbitration could
be requested at any point of time after the DSB has adopted the
recommendations of the original panel and Appellate Body reports.
According to the second (bracketed) version, such arbitration could be
requested only after completion of the compliance panel procedure. The
arbitration should be carried out by the original panel, and the award of
the arbitrator should be circulated to members within 45 days after the
date of the request.133
One may regret that the Balás text did not embark upon any of the more
ambitious proposals such as those put forward by Ecuador or Mexico.
From the viewpoint of ‘prompt settlement’ as called for in Article 3.3
DSU, the Mexican proposal is beyond doubt the most intriguing one A
determination of the level of nullification or impairment occurring as
early as in the original panel stage could shorten the entire compliance
proceeding considerably because no additional arbitration procedure
would have to be completed. Moreover, negotiations on compensation
to restore reciprocity would be facilitated if parties had information on
the level of nullification or impairment up-front. This might even lead
to less cases of SCOO (see also Section 6.4.5). Additionally, the proposal
could bring efficiency gains as panels would deal directly with the level
of nullification or impairment while they are profoundly investigating
the issue instead of having to reconvene much later for the arbitration.
Finally, one could argue that the legal protection of members was
enhanced because the determination made by the panel would be subject
to appeal.
6.4.4 Level of Nullification or Impairment
The level of nullification and impairment is a crucial element in the
application of retaliatory measures. Article 22.4 stipulates that the level
of suspension of concessions or other obligations shall be equivalent to
the level of nullification or impairment.134 This idea is directly linked to
the core concept of reciprocity (see Part I).
Japan wishes to account for the chilling effects of ‘mandatory’ laws in
the level of nullification or impairment. Mandatory laws are laws which
mandate the application of WTO-inconsistent measures, and thus are
found to be WTO-inconsistent as such (eg anti-dumping laws). Japan
asserts that not all trade-distorting effects that such laws generate are
133 See Article 22.1bis, as contained in TN/DS/9.
134 For a critical discussion of this concept, see Anderson (2002), pp 127ff.
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currently being taken into account, because only the effects of existing
measures (eg a specific anti-dumping order) and not those of similar
measures which may be taken in the future are considered. According
to Japan, this leads to an underestimation of the level of nullification
and impairment, resulting in a lack of encouragement for the member
concerned to bring such laws into compliance with WTO obligations.
Japan therefore proposes to take into account trade effects of similar
subsequent measures that may be taken under the same legislation.135
The proposal could be seen as directed towards the United States which
has often been the defendant in disputes (particularly on trade remedies)
where the mandatory versus discretionary debate arose. Obviously, the
proposal is not only politically delicate, but it would be very difficult to
implement in practice. As might be expected, it was not integrated into
the Balás text.
For cases between developing country complainants and developed
country defendants, Ecuador suggests that the arbitrator in charge of
determining the level of nullification or impairment may also make an
estimate of the impact of the WTO-inconsistent measures on the
complainant’s economy. This impact should then be taken into account
in proceeding with compensation or retaliation.136 Again, it remains
unclear how this impact should be calculated. This proposal is not
reflected in the Balás text either.
6.4.5 Compensation Versus Suspension of Concessions
In the last few years, both practitioners and scholars have increasingly
questioned the suitability of the suspension of concessions or other
obligations (SCOO) as a response to non-compliance. In general, this
literature is critical, as authors point to many disadvantages that are
associated with the SCOO. While a full discussion of the many adverse
effects of the SCOO would be outside the scope of this study, a few
arguments shall be noted here. By suspending concessions or other
obligations, the complainant government usually harms its own
economy (as it curbs previous trade which, presumably, was in the
economic interest of both parties). More specifically, harm is done to
individual economic actors who are not responsible for the defendant
government’s failure to implement. Similar to any other import
restriction, the SCOO weakens the competitiveness of the complainant’s
135 See TN/DS/W/22, no 2(a) (Japan) and TN/DS/W/32, Attachment, no 21 (Japan). For a
general overview of the discussion on mandatory versus discretionary laws, see Bhuiyan
(2002) and Sim (2003).
136 See TN/DS/W/33, modification in Article 21.3bis (Ecuador); see also Section 7.5.3.
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domestic industries because it shuts out competitive raw materials or
intermediate products. It may also promote rent-seeking behaviour in
the complainant’s newly-protected industries and may undermine their
long-term competitiveness. On a general level, the SCOO reduces the
predictability of trade conditions which the WTO is normally set to
preserve, as every concession and trade rule can be revoked as part of a
SCOO.
Moreover, the SCOO is not an equally powerful instrument for all
countries. Developing and small countries will have difficulties in using
the SCOO as they usually lack the market size to make a credible
retaliatory threat. The difficulties faced by developing countries were
illustrated in Ecuador’s struggle against the EC non-compliance in the
Bananas case. Retaliation may also have a negative impact on third
countries, for instance if their industries supply inputs to industries in
the defendant country.137 Finally, it has a problematic psychological
connotation as it creates the erroneous impression that trade restrictions
would make a country better off. Given the many negative aspects of
the SCOO, other options of enforcement would be desirable.
Some proposals were submitted during the DSU review with a view to
making trade-enhancing compensation more attractive vis-à-vis the
trade-restricting SCOO. As past practice has shown, parties prefer the
SCOO to compensation as a remedy against non-compliance. According
to the EC, this is due to the structure of the DSU. Article 22.2 establishes
that members have only 20 days after the end of the reasonable period
of time (RPT) for implementation to conclude negotiations on
compensation. Further on, it is only the request for the authorisation to
SCOO that triggers the Article 22.6 arbitration which enables parties to
ascertain the level of nullification and impairment. This information
could otherwise play an important role in any negotiations on
compensation. As a measure to enhance the attractiveness of
compensation, it has therefore been suggested to ‘front-load’ the
determination of the level of nullification or impairment.138 That same
idea has also been brought forth by Ecuador (see Section 6.4.3.2 for
details).
137 See Charnovitz (2003), Anderson (2002), Charnovitz (2001), Hudec (2000)  and Mavroidis
(2000) for a discussion. A critical view of the current focus on retaliation from an industry
perspective is included in UNICE (2001).
138 See TN/DS/W/1, no II.B and the subsequent legal text (EC). See also Rosas (2001), p
144.
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Some countries have suggested the introduction of monetary
compensation, including Ecuador,139 China,140 the LDC Group and the
African Group. The latter suggests introducing (mandatory) monetary
compensation which should continually be paid pending the withdrawal
of the measures.141 The LDC Group even argues that monetary
compensation is to be preferred, as any form of enhanced market access
would prejudice other members. It should be equal to the loss or injury
suffered, and it should be calculated from the date that the offending
measure was adopted.142
The Balás text considered the preference of many (particular developing)
members for strengthened compensation. It suggests that the
complainant could choose whether to proceed with a request for an
authorisation to retaliate, or whether it preferred negotiations with the
defendant on compensation. In the latter case, the defendant would enter
into consultations with the complainant ‘with a view to agreeing on a
mutually acceptable trade or other compensation’. While negotiations
would be underway, the complainant could not request authorisation
from the DSB to suspend concessions. The defendant should then submit
a proposal for mutually acceptable trade or other compensation to the
complainant (bracketed language indicates disagreement as to whether
the submission of such a proposal would be mandatory or not).143 With
regard to compensation affecting cases with a developing country
complainant, the Balás text calls upon the defendant in programmatic
language to ‘take into account all relevant circumstances and
considerations relating to the application of the measure and its impact
on the trade of that developing country’, whereby ‘the suitable form of
compensation should also be an important consideration’. Special
attention would be given to the specific constraints of LDCs which find
it particularly difficult to suspend concessions or obligations.144
The language used in the Balás text makes it clear that more profound
changes regarding the compensation versus. retaliation issue did not
command consensus among members. Complainants would retain
control over whether negotiations on compensation would take place
or whether they would proceed directly to seeking authorisation from
139 See TN/DS/W/33 (Ecuador).
140 See TN/DS/W/29, no 2 (China).
141 See TN/DS/W/15, no 5 (African Group) and also TN/DS/W/42, no VIII (African Group).
142 See TN/DS/W/17, no 13 (LDC Group). This suggestion was not included in the second
submission of the LDC Group, circulated as TN/DS/W/37; see also Section 7.5.3.
143 This should happen within 30 days (bracketed version A) or 20 days (bracketed version
B). See new Article 22.2bis(b), as contained in TN/DS/9.
144 See the new Article 22.2bis(c), as contained in TN/DS/9.
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the DSB to SCOO. Moreover, the provisions aiming at putting developing
country complainants in a better position are of a rather programmatic
nature. In light of the Ecuadorian experience in the Bananas case and the
magnitude of the difficulties encountered, substantial improvements
under the proposed rules are hard to identify.
With regard to compensation agreements, Australia further voiced
concerns that bilateral compensation deals could impair the rights of
third parties and constitute waivers of their obligations. This issue, which
is discussed in detail in Section 7.4 below, was taken into consideration
by Balás. His draft would require parties to a dispute that reached an
agreement on mutually acceptable trade or other compensation to notify
the text of such agreement to the DSB. Further on, the defendant would
have an obligation to notify to the DSB the measures it had taken in
application of the compensation agreement.145
6.4.6 Carousel Retaliation
The term ‘carousel retaliation’ refers to periodic modifications of the list
of products that are subject to the suspension of concessions. The issue
surfaced for the first time on 22 September 1999 when the ‘Carousel
Retaliation Act of 1999’ was introduced into Congress. The purpose of
the bill, which was supported by farm and cattle groups as well as the
Hawaii Banana Industry Association, was to induce the EC towards
compliance with the WTO rulings in the Hormones and Bananas cases.
To this purpose, increased pressure on the EC Commission and European
governments should be exerted through the channel of EC exporters
affected. Under the bill, the USTR is required to periodically ‘carousel’,
ie rotate, the list of products subject to retaliation in order to maximise
the effect of the sanctions. The measure was signed into law in May
2000 but has so far never been applied.146
In the light of these developments, the EC had already sought a
prohibition of carousel retaliation in the DSU review of 1998/1999, by
adding a footnote to Article 22.7 DSU on the arbitration procedure on
the level of the SCOO. By contrast, the US had sought a footnote explicitly
allowing such retaliation.147 In a parallel development, the EC had
145 See the new Article 22.2bis(d), as contained in TN/DS/9.
146 See Sek (2002).
147 See ‘Revised Dispute Reform Text Presented to WTO Members; Differences Remain’,
in International Trade Reporter, vol 16, no 46, 24 November 1999; ‘Trade Officials Say Accord
Is Near On WTO Dispute Settlement Reform’, in International Trade Reporter, vol. 16, no
47, 1 December 1999 and ‘EU May Challenge United States in WTO on Carousel Approach
to Trade Sanctions’, in International Trade Reporter, vol 17, no 19, 11 May 2000.
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requested consultations under the DSU on the carousel provision in
summer 2000, however without proceeding to the panel stage.148
Although carousel retaliation has so far never been applied, the EC is
still among the staunchest opponents of this type of sanctions. In its
conceptual proposal, the EC insisted once more that a specific provision
had to be integrated into the DSU, making it clear that a country did not
have the ability to unilaterally modify the list of concessions or other
obligations for which a DSB authorisation had been granted.149 A similar
direction was pursued in a joint proposal by Thailand and the
Philippines. To ensure the equivalence of the level of the SCOO with the
level of the nullification or impairment, their text would require the
complainant to submit to the arbitrator a detailed proposal containing a
list of the concessions or other obligations it intended to suspend. Once
the arbitrator approved this list as equivalent, the complainant could
only suspend obligations and concessions contained in its own list.
Modifications of the list would be possible only by mutual agreement,
or for technical purposes.150 In its determinations, the arbitrator would
also be required: ‘to take due account of any time-period necessary for
trade in the affected sectors to adjust itself prior to and during the
suspension of concessions or other obligations, and to regain its normal
course thereafter.’151
Australia also submitted a proposal which would oblige complainants
not to vary the list of suspended concessions or other obligations – except
to correct technical errors or in unforeseen circumstances. In case of such
corrections, the defendant would have the right to seek new arbitration
under Article 22.6 DSU.152
Given the differences in the approach by the US on the one hand and
many other members on the other, the Balás text does not contain any
provision on carousel retaliation. The only timid step it does take in this
148 United States – Section 306 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Amendments Thereto (WT/DS200).
149 See TN/DS/W/1, no II.D and subsequent legal text (EC).
150 In this case, the complainant would have to request authorisation from the arbitrator
for the adjustment. If the arbitrator agreed that the equivalence between the level of
suspension and the level of nullification or impairment remained intact, the DSB would
grant the authorisation to adjust the list unless it decided by consensus not to do so.
151 See TN/DS/W/3 (Thailand, Philippines). In this context, Mavroidis (2002) raises the
question of how precisely to calculate nullification and impairment. The EC later expressed
support for the proposal by Thailand and the Philippines; see TN/DS/W/38, no VI.C (EC).
152 See TN/DS/W/8, lit (c) (Australia), TN/DS/W/34, lit (c) (Australia) and the proposed
change to Article 22.7 DSU, as contained in TN/DS/W/49 (Australia).
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direction is a bracketed provision in the new Article 22.2ter(a) which
would require the complainant to submit an indicative list of the
concessions or other obligations it proposed to suspend. Even this list,
albeit only indicative, would be ‘without prejudice to the determination
by that Member of the specific concessions or other obligations that it
may ultimately suspend’.153
6.4.7 Collective Retaliation
Arguing that individual developing countries can hardly use the
suspension of concessions as an enforcement device against developed
countries, the African Group suggests that all WTO members shall be
authorised to collectively suspend concessions to a developed member
that adopts measures in breach of WTO obligations against a developing
country, notwithstanding the requirement that the suspension of
concessions is to be based on an equivalent level of nullification and
impairment.154 The LDC Group basically echoes this call, arguing that
under a ‘principle of collective responsibility’, all WTO members would
collectively have the right and the responsibility to enforce
recommendations of the DSB. Collective retaliation should therefore be
available automatically where a developing country or a LDC has been
a successful complainant, as a matter of S&D. In determining whether
to authorise collective retaliation, the DSB should not be constrained by
quantification on the basis of the rule on nullification and impairment.155
Although collective retaliation has been a long-standing concern of
developing countries, particularly after the Ecuadorian experience in
the Bananas case, this concept did not find its way into the Balás draft.
6.4.8 Freedom of Cross-Retaliation for Developing Countries
A group of developing countries (India, Cuba, Dominican Republic,
Egypt, Honduras, Jamaica and Malaysia) suggests that developing
countries should have the right to suspend concessions in sectors of
their choice in their disputes with developed countries.156
153 See the last sentence of the new Article 22.2ter(a) and footnote 22, both bracketed, as
contained in TN/DS/9.
154 See TN/DS/W/15, no 6 (African Group), and see TN/DS/W/42, no IX (African Group).
Collective retaliation is also discussed in Pauwelyn (2000) who supports the introduction
of collective countermeasures, albeit incrementally.
155 See TN/DS/W/17, no 15 (LDC Group).
156 See the proposal for a new Article 22.3bis in TN/DS/W/47 (India, Cuba, Dominican
Republic, Egypt, Honduras, Jamaica and Malaysia).
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This proposal was likely motivated by an arbitration in the Bananas case
where the EC accused Ecuador of not having properly followed the rules
on cross-retaliation as laid down in Article 22.3 DSU.157 The general
principle laid down in this provision is that the SCOO should first take
place in the same sector as that where the violation has occurred. Yet, a
SCOO in other sectors under the same agreement is admissible if a SCOO
in the same sector is ‘not practicable or effective’. The SCOO may even
occur under other agreements if ‘the circumstances are serious enough’.
Although the arbitration proceedings had held that Ecuador followed
Article 22.3 as an overall matter, it had criticised the Ecuadorian approach
in one instance,158 and it allocated the burden of proof for the necessity
of the SCOO in another sector or under another agreement on the party
wishing to cross-retaliate.159
The proposal which would have greatly enhanced the freedom of
developing countries to cross-retaliate (by lowering the prerequisites
for cross-retaliation) was not considered in the Balás text. One may regret
that the proposal has not been considered. If one is willing to accept the
SCOO concept at all (despite its flaws), one should indeed allow
complainants to SCOO in those sectors where they can minimise the
economic and political costs to themselves and where they can maximise
the political cost to the defendant government in order to incite
compliance. Moreover, limitations on cross-retaliation have a particularly
restrictive impact on developing countries because their trade with
developed countries is usually inter-industry trade. This makes an
effective SCOO in the same sector more difficult than in the usual intra-
industry trade relationships between developed countries.
6.4.9 Exemption for Goods En Route
The EC suggested the exemption of ‘goods en route’ from the SCOO.160
In its second proposal, Japan also incorporated this element.161 It was,
however, not considered in the Balás text.
157 Ecuador had, inter alia, requested authorisation to SCOO under the TRIPS.
158 See the Article 22.6 Arbitration Decision in European Communities – Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas; Recourse to Arbitration by the European
Communities (WT/DS27/ARB/ECU), paras 100 and 101.
159 See WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, paras 59–60 and 75.
160 See TN/DS/W/1, no II.C and Attachment, no 27 (EC). This proposal was later included
in the second Japanese proposal (TN/DS/W/32, Attachment, no 8 (Japan)) as well.
161 See TN/DS/W/32, no 1(b), and para 8 of the attachment (Japan).
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6.4.10 Termination of the Suspension of Concessions
A final stage in the implementation procedure that was discussed during
the DSU review is the lifting of the SCOO, or the recomputation of the
level of nullification or impairment respectively. It concerns the
procedure that should apply if the defendant asserts that he has since
complied with a WTO ruling after the complainant had already been
granted the authorisation to suspend concessions or obligations. So far,
the DSU did not include any detailed provision in this respect. The EC162
and Japan163 suggest a compliance panel procedure to decide in such
cases. In case of partial implementation, the EC additionally suggests a
specific arbitration procedure for the recomputation of the level of
nullification or impairment.164
The Balás text contains such a procedure for the termination of
suspension of concessions or other obligations. The proposed procedure
would allow the defendant to request the withdrawal of the authorisation
to SCOO on the grounds of its implementation of the DSB
recommendations. The defendant should submit with its request a
written notice with a detailed description of the measures taken,
including the text of the relevant measures. The DSB would then
withdraw the authorisation to SCOO, unless the complainant requested
the establishment of another compliance panel which found that the
measures were still inconsistent. The provisions of the newly created
Article 21bis (also see Section 6.4.3 on the sequencing issue) would apply
to this compliance panel, too. That means that any compliance report
issued under this article would also be subject to appeal. If the measures
were still found to be inconsistent, each party could seek a new
arbitration on the level of nullification or impairment. If that level
differed from the level of suspension of concessions previously
authorised by the DSB, the DSB would have to modify the
authorisation.165
The addition of a provision on the termination of the SCOO has gained
some relevance: The US and Canada reportedly refuted EC calls for an
end to the SCOO in the Hormones case in a DSB meeting on 7 November
162 See TN/DS/W/1, no II.E and Attachment no 28 (EC).
163 See TN/DS/W/22, Attachment, no 8 (Japan) and TN/DS/W/32, Attachment, no 9 (Japan).
164 See TN/DS/W/22, Attachment, no 28, proposed Article 22.9(d) (Japan).
165 See the newly-introduced Article 22.9, lit (a) – (d) as contained in TN/DS/9. A bracketed
subparagraph (e) is also included. It would provide for a possibility to redetermine the
level of nullification or impairment by ways of arbitration according to Article 22.7 if the
defendant had taken measures to comply whose WTO-consistency was not disputed
among the parties.
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2003.166 They dismissed the EC’s argument that it had presented new
scientific evidence to justify the EC ban on ‘hormone beef’.167 The
question of which procedures should be followed in order to end trade
sanctions has triggered new discussions in the DSB.
6.4.11 Increased Incentives for Implementation
Some members proposed increased incentives for implementation.
Mexico noted in its proposal that: ‘the fundamental problem of the WTO
dispute settlement system lies in the period of time during which a WTO-
inconsistent measure can be in place without the slightest consequence.’
Mexico argued that: ‘(e)very time an illegal measure is unilaterally
introduced, or as long as it is maintained in force, ... the delicate balance
of concessions or other obligations achieved in the Uruguay Round is
upset.’ It complained that: ‘(i)llegal measures may be in place for more
than three years before a complaining party can obtain compensation
or suspend concessions or other obligations.’
Based on these considerations, Mexico came up with a whole package
of measures designed to enhance mechanisms that foster early
implementation.168 The first proposal aimed at an early determination
and application of nullification and impairment (see also Section
6.4.3.2).169 Mexico’s second suggestion called for the retroactive
determination and application of nullification or impairment. Mexico
considered the fact that an illegal measure could be maintained ‘for free’
throughout the dispute settlement proceedings as a ‘de facto waiver’ that
should be eradicated. To this purpose, and with reference to a general
incorporation of the concept of retroactivity into public international
law, Mexico suggested that nullification or impairment should be
calculated retroactively, eg from the date of imposition of an illegal trade
measure. Alternatively, the date of the request for consultations or the
date of the establishment of the panel could be used as starting points
for the calculations. The amount calculated could also include lawyer’s
fees and litigation expenses.170
166 European Communities – Measures Affecting Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) WT/DS26
(United States), WT/DS48 (Canada).
167 See ‘DSB: EC-US Disputes Top Agenda’, in BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, vol 7,
no 38, 13 November 2003.
168 See TN/DS/W/23, no I (Mexico).
169 See TN/DS/W/23, no II(a) (Mexico) and the proposed new Article 15.4 in TN/DS/W/40
(Mexico).
170 See TN/DS/W/23, no II(b) (Mexico). For the textual proposal, see the modified Article
22.7, as included in TN/DS/W/40, where the inclusion of litigation costs has been dropped
(Mexico). Canada reportedly criticised this proposal, as the concept of retroactivity had
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In order to prevent damage which is difficult to repair, Mexico called in
its third suggestion for the introduction of preventive measures into the
DSU. A complainant should have the right to ask the panel to request
the defending member to suspend the application of a challenged
measure for a certain period. If the defendant refused to suspend the
application of the measure, the panel could authorise the complainant
to take preventive measures for the duration of the proceedings.171
Finally, Mexico wanted to make the suspension of concessions a
negotiable instrument. Member A that is unable to suspend concessions
towards member C without adversely affecting its own interests should
be allowed to transfer the right to suspend concessions towards member
B. In exchange, A could obtain from B a mutually agreed benefit which
could even take the form of cash.172 Seen from a different perspective,
the Mexican proposal would allow country B to buy protection from
country A against imports from country C.
Ecuador equally proposed a radical remedy if countries refused to
comply with rulings on a continued basis. It suggested that the right of
such members to invoke the dispute settlement mechanism as
complainants should be suspended.173 Additionally, Ecuador also wanted
to make the SCOO better usable by developing countries. To this purpose,
the impact on the developing country economy should also be
considered in the calculation of the level of the admissible level of
retaliatory measures.174
None of these proposals found their way into the Balás text. This might
be regretted in the light of the delay tactics often used to protract timely
implementation of rulings. However, WTO members are obviously not
ready really to tighten the disciplines on implementation in such a
‘radical’ way.
been widely condemned by the membership when it was applied in the US-Australian
dispute over Australian automotive leather subsidies (Australia – Subsidies Provided to
Producers and Exporters of Automotive Leather (US) (WT/DS126). See also ‘DSB Adopts Report
on Leather Subsidies Despite Australia Protest’, in Inside US Trade, 18 February 2000; and
‘Mexico Presents “Radical” Proposal For WTO Dispute Resolution Reform’, in International
Trade Reporter, vol 19, no 46, 21 November 2002. Mavroidis (2002), pp 97–98, voices support
for retroactivity. For a discussion on retroactive remedies in international law and in the
WTO tradition, see also Goh and Ziegler (2003), Grané (2001) and Rosas (2001), pp 140ff.
171 See TN/DS/W/23, no II(c) (Mexico) and, for a textual proposal, the newly introduced
Article 12.6bis and 12.6ter in TN/DS/W/40 (Mexico).
172 See TN/DS/W/23, no II(d) (Mexico) and, for a textual proposal, the newly-introduced
Article 22.7bis in TN/DS/W/40 (Mexico).
173 See TN/DS/W/9 (Ecuador). This idea is also supported by Mavroidis (2002), p 98.
174 See TN/DS/W/33 (Ecuador). According to Ecuador’s first submission (TN/DS/W/9), that
could be done by multiplying the level of nullification or impairment by the factor two.
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7. THE DOHA ROUND PROPOSALS (II):
HORIZONTAL AND OTHER ISSUES
Many proposals do not focus on one particular stage of the dispute
settlement process but are ‘horizontal’ as they concern issues that pertain
to several or all stages of the procedure. These proposals are presented
in this chapter, grouped by topics. As has already been noted at the
beginning of Chapter 6, this separation between stage-specific and
horizontal proposals is not always neatly possible, and readers may
therefore want to check both Chapters 6 and 7 for issues that could fit
into both categories. Again, the overview in Chapter 11 may be helpful
in locating specific proposals.
7.1 Transparency
The issue of transparency surged early in dispute settlement practice,1
and it has been among the most difficult topics of DSU review
discussions.2
Advocates of more transparency argue that the confidentiality
requirements for the panel and appellate review process3 run counter
to the traditions of most members. They erode legitimacy and make it
easy to criticise unwelcome rulings, thereby undermining efforts of
governments to comply with panel rulings.4 A further argument against
the confidentiality of panel proceedings is that arguments will become
1 At first, the issue surfaced due to the early ‘leakage’ of information in panel reports. It
then rapidly developed into a more general debate. See ‘Ruggiero Calls on Members Not
to Talk About Cases Undergoing Dispute Settlement’, in International Trade Reporter, vol
15, no 8, 25 February 1998; ‘WTO Chief Floats Solutions to Problem of Leaked Reports’,
in International Trade Reporter, vol 15, no 17, 29 April 1998; see also Discussion in WT/
DSB/M/45, no 9, and ‘WTO Members Asked to Submit Suggestions on Dispute Settlement’,
in International Trade Reporter, vol 15, no 13, 1 April 1998. Further proposals were brought
by the US on 14 July 1998 (Transparency in WTO Work – Procedures for the Circulation
and Derestriction of WTO Documents – Proposal by the United States; WT/GC/W/88),
and jointly with Canada (Transparency in WTO Work – Procedures for the Circulation
and Derestriction of WTO Documents – Revised Proposals by the United States and
Canada, WT/GC/W/106).
2 Waincymer (2000) offers a usefully structured discussion on the different concepts of
transparency.
3 Article 14 DSU on panel deliberations, Article 17.10 DSU on the proceedings of the
Appellate Body and Article 18.2 on written submissions of the parties.
4 See Roessler (2003), pp 232ff.
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public at the end of the procedure in any way, due to the publication of
the reports.5 It is held that the lack of transparency in WTO dispute
settlement emanates from the ‘old’ diplomatic model of dispute
settlement where compromise was encouraged and confidentiality
played an important role. In the litigation setting of a more judicial
dispute settlement system, withholding litigation documents would no
longer be appropriate.6
By contrast, opponents to more transparency argue that the government-
to-government nature of the WTO should be preserved. Enhanced
transparency would only lead to increased public pressure on negotiators
and thereby preclude mutually agreed settlements.7 Hudec, in balancing
the arguments in favour of and against increased transparency, argues
that public access to documents and hearings ‘would help to deflect
serious attacks on the legitimacy of WTO panel rulings’ and that: ‘WTO
governments should accept the inevitability of less co-operative legal
practice.’8
Even before the DSU review started, the United States has continuously
been the most vociferous advocate of enhanced transparency in the sense
of more openness.9 Initially, the early leakage of interim rulings was
one of the problems to be addressed through enhanced transparency
and faster derestriction of reports. Politically, however, it was much more
important to address increasing criticism from domestic constituents
5 See Davey (2000a), p 17; Shoyer (1998a), pp 77ff.
6 See Ragosta (2000), who also argues that private parties as the ‘real complainants’ should
be given improved access to the judicial dispute settlement system. See also UNICE (2001)
and UNICE (1999).
7 For a discussion of transparency, see also Davey (2002), pp 28–31. See also Busch and
Reinhardt (2002) who argue, based on empirical studies by Busch (2000), that transparency
should not be increased in the consultation and panel operation stage as ‘highly democratic
pairs of countries are especially likely to settle early in consultations, suggesting that
they find it easier to compromise in a setting that is relatively less transparent, when the
terms of any arrangement, in sharp contrast to what occurs after panel rulings, are not
subject to 21.5 or “compliance” reviews’ (pp 477ff). See also Busch and Reinhardt (2000).
8 See Hudec (1999), p 46.
9 See USTR: ‘1998 Trade Policy Agenda and 1997 Annual Report of the President of the
United States on the Trade Agreements Program’, http://www.ustr.gov; see also ‘US Seeks
More Transparency in WTO Dispute Settlement Process, Lang Says’, in International Trade
Reporter, vol 13, no 14, 3 April 1996; ‘US Will Seek More Transparency in WTO Dispute
Settlement Process’, in International Trade Reporter, vol 15, no 15, 15 April 1998; ‘Ruggiero
Urges Greater Public Access to WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings’, in International
Trade Reporter, vol 15, no 16, 22 April 1998; ‘US Has “Very Active” Trade Agenda, Official
Asserts’, in International Trade Reporter, vol 15, no 20, 20 May 1998. See also a
communication from the US with regard to transparency and derestriction (WT/GC/W/
77) of 9 February 1998, and the protocols of subsequent General Council meetings on 19
February 1998 (WT/GC/M/26, no 7) and 24 April 1998 (WT/GC/M/28, no 9).
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that the WTO was an undemocratic and intransparent organisation,
eroding national sovereignty on key issues such as environmental
protection.10 Such criticism was particularly strong in the light of rulings
such as US – Gasoline or US – Shrimp/Turtle, further deepening the
mistrust that politically influential NGOs had against the WTO since
the controversial Tuna rulings under the old GATT. While one leg of
transparency was the openness of panel or Appellate Body proceedings
and the public accessibility of submissions, the other leg was more
participation from ‘civil society’ in the WTO, particularly in dispute
settlement (see Section 7.3 on amicus curiae briefs below).11
In the current negotiations under the Doha mandate, the US proposed
opening panel, Appellate Body and arbitration meetings to public
observers, except for those portions where confidential information is
dealt with. In its proposal, the US also pleads in favour of making
submissions public.12 Canada, another long-standing supporter of more
transparency,13 similarly suggests making submissions public at the time
of filing, except for confidential information. The latter should, however,
be made public in a redacted non-confidential version. Canada is also
in favour of making panel and Appellate Body meetings public, again
except for those portions dealing with confidential information.14
The EC has also supported more transparency.15 Its approach to the
negotiations under the Doha mandate is, however, more cautious than
that of the United States, reflecting different approaches between EC
Member States. According to the EC, the DSU should provide flexibility
to parties and third parties with regard to whether certain parts of the
10 Sovereignty issues traditionally play a crucial role in the US approach to dispute
settlement. See, for instance, the contributions by Jackson (1997a) and Jackson (1998b).
11 For an overview of early debate, see the discussions held in the General Council on 15
July 1998 (WT/GC/M/29, no 6), and on 14 October 1998 (WT/GC/M/31, no 7). Members’
proposals have been reproduced by the Secretariat in WT/GC/W/117/Rev 1 (Review of
Procedures for the Circulation and Derestriction of WTO Documents – Note by the
Secretariat on Proposals made by delegations).
12 See TN/DS/W/13 (United States) and TN/DS/W/46 (United States); see also ‘US Proposal
on Dispute Transparency Gets Cool Reception From WTO Members’, in WTO Reporter,
11 September 2002; and ‘US Official Backs WTO Amicus Briefs As Promoting
Transparency, Legitimacy’, in WTO Reporter, 13 September 2002.
13 See, for instance, the submission made by Canada (Transparency and Derestriction –
Communication by Canada, WT/GC/W/98 of 22 September 1998); joint submission by
Canada and the US (Transparency in WTO Work – Procedures for the Circulation and
Derestriction of WTO Documents – Revised Proposals by the United States and Canada,
WT/GC/W/106 of 13 October 1998).
14 See TN/DS/W/41, no 3 (Canada).
15 See, for instance, the submission made by the EC (Improving the Transparency of WTO
Operations – Communication from the European Communities, WT/GC/W/92 of 14 July
1998).
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panel and appellate proceedings should be public or not. Specifically,
the EC proposed amending the working procedures so as to allow parties
to agree within 10 days of the establishment of a panel that the panel
hearing should be open to the public, wholly or in part.16 The first
substantive hearing could further be divided into a first part that is open
to the public and a second part that is closed to the public. Third parties
would have to decide whether they wanted to present their views in the
first or in the second part of the meeting.17 Similar procedures would
apply for appellate review.18 Panels and the Appellate Body should be
in a position to impose restrictions on such opening, especially when
dealing with confidential information.19 Japan also called for public
access to submissions of parties and third parties within two weeks from
the date of each meeting.20
Support for the transparency-related proposals was far from universal.
Major developing countries including Mexico, Malaysia, Egypt and India
have staunchly opposed any opening of the dispute settlement process
from early on, as they have also refused calls for more transparency in
the WTO in general.21 Taiwan voiced concerns about ‘taking the dispute
process into the public domain’ as this ‘could lead to complications that
get in the way of an efficient settlement’. Although it supported the US
proposal for a timely circulation of final reports, Taiwan cautioned that
one ‘should not lose sight of the fact that the dispute settlement
mechanism was originally designed as a ‘government-to-government’
process’, and that ‘it was never conceived as a public process’.22 More
outspoken resistance came from many developing countries: The African
Group did not wish to accord priority treatment to the transparency
issue, and it did not consider it appropriate to open the dispute settlement
mechanism to the public at this time.23
16 See TN/DS/W/1, Attachment, no 32 (EC).
17 See TN/DS/W/1, Attachment, no 34 (EC).
18 See TN/DS/W/1, Attachment, no 14 (EC).
19 See TN/DS/W/1, no III (EC). See also Section 7.2 on the treatment of confidential
information.
20 See TN/DS/W/22 (Japan). With regard to confidential information, non-confidential
summaries that could be disclosed to the public should be provided upon request from a
Member; see TN/DS/22, Attachment, no 14 (Japan) and TN/DS/W/32, no 2(d), as well as
Attachment, nos 15, 18 and 19 (Japan). This proposal, which was also brought by the EC
(see TN/DS/W/1, Attachment, nos 17 and 33 (EC)), had already been included in the Suzuki
text (WT/MIN(99)/8).
21 For instance, the discussion in the General Council on the derestriction of WTO
documents had dragged on for more than four years before new procedures, watered-
down from an earlier draft, were finally adopted on 14 May 2002 (see WT/GC/M/74, no
5). The new procedures are contained in WT/L/452 (Procedures for the Circulation and
Derestriction of WTO Documents).
22 See TN/DS/W/25, no I.1 (Taiwan).
23 See TN/DS/W/15 (African Group).
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Given the controversial character of the transparency issue throughout
the deliberations, it is not surprising that the consensus-oriented Balás
text does not suggest any substantial modifications with regard to the
transparency issue. The sparse provisions contributing to more
transparency regard the release of non-confidential summaries of
confidential information, which is discussed in the next section.
7.2 Treatment of Confidential Information
A topic related to transparency is the treatment of confidential
information. It arises as a particular problem in cases on subsidies or
trade remedies, where sensitive business information may have to be
provided by the parties to the panel.24 However, there are only
rudimentary provisions in the DSU with regard to the protection of
confidential information.25 The problem of confidential information has
been recognised as ‘one of the most urgent, but also one of the most
difficult problems to be resolved’.26
Canada proposes the inclusion of a new Appendix to the DSU which
would allow parties to designate information as ‘Business Confidential
Information’ (BCI). Such BCI would then be limited in its circulation to
certain groups of persons having signed a declaration of non-disclosure.
Panel reports would not disclose BCI but would only state conclusions
drawn from BCI. Finally, BCI would have to be destroyed or returned
after the end of the proceedings.27 This submission was likely motivated
by Canada’s early experience under the DSU in its dispute with Brazil
on aircraft subsidies, where the WTO panel’s finding against two
Canadian measures was seen as a direct result of the Canadian
government’s decision not to submit information requested by Brazil.28
Panels may draw negative inferences if members violate their duties
under Article. 13 DSU to provide the information requested.29
24 See, for instance, Davey (2002), p 34.
25 Article 18.2 DSU according to which ‘members shall treat as confidential information
submitted by another Member to the panel or the Appellate Body which that Member
has designated as confidential. A party to a dispute shall also, upon request of a Member,
provide a non-confidential summary of the information contained in its written
submissions that could be disclosed to the public.’
26 See Ehlermann (2002), pp 625ff.
27 See TN/DS/W/41, no 3 (Canada).
28 Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft (WT/DS70). See ‘Next WTO
Negotiating Round Must Clarify Dispute Settlement, Canadian Official Says’, in
International Trade Reporter, vol 16, no 14, 7 April 1999, and ‘Trade Lawyer Links More
Negotiation to More Effective WTO Dispute Resolution’, in WTO Reporter, 3 April 2000.
See also Behboodi (2000).
29 See Ehlermann (2002), pp 624ff.
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The Balás text would add some provisions on the handling of confidential
information to the DSU. The major modification would be to Article 18
DSU. It would require the DSB to establish procedures for the treatment
of information which is designated as ‘privileged’ (this term is bracketed).
Moreover, the text would add precision to the provisions requiring each
party or third party – upon request by any member – to provide a non-
confidential version of the written submission which would be disclosed
to the public. Access to these non-confidential versions of written
submissions would be administered in a dispute settlement registry at
the WTO, which would operate according to rules and procedures
established by the DSB. The coverage of Article 18 which has so far
applied explicitly to panels and the Appellate Body only would be
extended to arbitrators.30
7.3 Amicus Curiae Briefs
Transparency has also been discussed in the sense of public participation
in dispute settlement, namely through so-called amicus curiae (or ‘friend
of the court’) briefs.31 It is an issue to which even ‘constitutional
significance’ has been attributed.32 Amicus curiae briefs can be defined
as unsolicited reports which a private person or entity without direct
stake or interest in the dispute at hand submits to the court. In these
reports, the person or entity articulates its own views on legal questions
and informs the court about factual circumstances in order to facilitate
the court’s ability to decide the case. Whereas the concept of the impartial
amicus goes back to Roman times when oral history was the principal
way to submit information and such briefs were crucial for informed
decision-making, this idealised concept has changed over time. Today,
most amici are guided by their own interests and try to influence judges
accordingly.33
In the WTO, the issue surfaced for the first time in 1998 when the
Appellate Body decided in US – Shrimp-Turtle that the panel had the
authority to accept unsolicited amicus curiae briefs under its right to seek
information pursuant to Article 13 DSU, and that the Appellate Body
had the right to consider such briefs if submitted as attachments by the
30 See the modified Article 18.2, as contained in TN/DS/9.
31 On the amicus issue, see, for instance, Hollis (2002), Davey (2002), pp 32–33, Umbricht
(2001), Mavroidis (2001), Marceau and Stilwell (2001), Zonnekeyn (2001), Padideh (2000),
Ragosta (2000) and Marceau and Pedersen (1999). See also Charnovitz (2001), Charnovitz
(2000), Nichols (1996), Shell (1996) and Charnovitz (1996) on the relationship between
non-governmental entities and the WTO in general.
32 See Umbricht (2001), pp 773ff.
33 See Umbricht (2001), p 778.
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parties to the dispute.34 The Appellate Body then expanded this right in
United States – Lead Bars when it found that it had the authority under
the DSU to accept and consider amicus submissions even when they
were not submitted by the parties.35 In EC – Asbestos, the Appellate Body
published – in anticipation of receiving amicus briefs – an ‘additional
procedure’ for filing such briefs.36 Although the Appellate Body had
rejected all the briefs filed, the way it had dealt with the briefs had
provoked outrage by an overwhelming number of WTO members,
particularly developing countries. A special meeting of the General
Council was convened, at the end of which the chairman of the General
Council announced that he would recommend the Appellate Body to
‘exercise extreme caution’ on these matters in the future.37
Amicus curiae briefs had been an important topic throughout the DSU
review discussions since 1998. During the negotiations under the Doha
mandate, the EC suggested in its first proposal to ‘define better the
framework and the conditions for allowing such amicus curiae briefs in
potentially all cases’. According to the EC, this should be based on the
two-stage approach (first application for leave, then effective submission)
already developed by the Appellate Body.38 A similar move was made
by the United States, which – in its first submission – calls upon members
to consider the proposition of a guideline procedure for handling amicus
curiae briefs.39 In its second submission, however, the US stated that it
did “not believe that an amendment to the Dispute Settlement
34 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (India, Malaysia,
Pakistan and Thailand) (WT/DS58). On this issue, see in particular WT/DS58/AB/R, para
89 (attachment of amicus briefs to submissions in the appellate stage) and para 110
(acceptance of amicus curiae briefs by the panel). Apparently, however, the question of
providing for the possibility of amicus curiae submissions in the dispute settlement system
had already been discussed in the Informal Group on Institutional Issues back in 1993
when the Uruguay Round Agreements were negotiated, where ‘one delegation put forth
an informal negotiating proposal to the effect that the panels may invite interested persons
(other than parties or third parties to the dispute) to present their views in writing. As
there was overwhelming opposition to the proposal, the proposal was not incorporated
in the DSU’ (TN/DS/W/18 (Cuba, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka,
Tanzania and Zimbabwe)).
35 United States – Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth
Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom (EC) (WT/DS138). On this issue,
see WT/DS138/AB/R, para 42.
36 European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products
(Canada) (WT/DS135); on this issue, see in particular documents WT/DS135/9 and WT/
DS135/AB/R, paras 51–57.
37 Special meeting of the General Council held on 22 November 2000; the minutes are
contained in document WT/GC/M/60.
38 See TN/DS/W/1, no IV and Attachment, no 10 (EC).
39 See TN/DS/W/13, no V (United States); see also ‘US Proposal on Dispute Transparency
Gets Cool Reception from WTO Members’, in WTO Reporter, 11 September 2002.
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Understanding was necessary (...)’.40 Similarly, amicus briefs no longer
appeared as an issue in the EC’s second proposal (although the proposal
formally held that ‘(t)hose EC proposals that were included in Document
TN/DS/W/1, and do not appear in the present document, remain
unaltered’).41
In contrast to those members favouring acceptance of amicus
submissions, major developing countries have from early on opposed
any such opening of the process.42 In the current discussion under the
Doha mandate, the African Group raised its voice against any
interpretation of the ‘right to seek information’ that would include
acceptance of unsolicited amicus curiae briefs by the panel or the Appellate
Body. According to the Group, new rules should be adopted stating that
unrequested information should be directed only to the parties and not
to the panels. Moreover, the Group holds that the right to seek
information under Article 13 only applies to panels but not to the
Appellate Body which, according to the group, has the exclusive function
of examining issues of law and legal interpretations raised on appeal.
Panels, in turn, should consult the parties and their legal advisers in
deciding whether to seek information.43 The second proposal by the
African Group, however, was less far-reaching. This proposal only calls
for the inclusion of a paragraph according to which the right to seek
information should not be construed as a requirement to receive
unsolicited information or technical advice.44 Another group of
developing countries equally opposed the acceptance of amicus briefs.
Drawing on the negotiating history of the Uruguay Round and the
ordinary meaning of the term ‘seek’ which is ‘ask for, request, demand’,
they call for the inclusion of a footnote to Article 13. According to this
footnote, ‘“(s)eek” shall mean any information that is sought or asked
for, or demanded or requested by the panels. Unsolicited information
shall not be taken into consideration by the panels’. A similar footnote
would also apply to the Appellate Body.45
40 See TN/DS/W/46, no 4 (United States).
41 See TN/DS/W/38, no 1 (EC).
42 See the intense discussion in the Dispute Settlement Body on 6 November 1998 when
both the Appellate Body report and the panel report as modified by the Appellate Body
report were adopted (WT/DSB/M/50, no 1); see also ‘WTO Appeals Body Faults
Implementation of Shrimp-Turtle Law’, in International Trade Reporter, vol 15, no 40, 14
October 1998.
43 See TN/DS/W/15 (African Group).
44 See TN/DS/W/42, no V (African Group).
45 See TN/DS/W/18, no III (Cuba, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka,
Tanzania and Zimbabwe), and TN/DS/W/47 (India, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt,
Honduras, Jamaica and Malaysia).
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Taiwan holds, with reference to the EC proposal, that allowing
unsolicited amicus curiae submissions and even systematising this in a
new Article would create a situation where members that do not have
the social resources such as think tanks, academic institutions and NGOs
would be put at a disadvantage. With reference to the US proposal for
the establishment of guidelines, Taiwan points out that the handling of
amicus curiae submissions was already covered by precedents from past
cases which the panels and the Appellate Body could follow.46 Jordan
finally made a proposal with regard to amicus submissions that would
seek to remedy the differences in members’ capabilities to deal with
amicus briefs. It proposes a fund that would be established by industrial
countries with the aim of remitting costs or expenses that may be
incurred by developing countries or LDCs in reviewing, analysing or
responding to amicus briefs.47
As one would expect in the light of the seemingly irreconcilable positions
on the issue, the consensus-oriented Balás draft does not make any
suggestions with regard to the amicus issue or Article. 13 DSU which
includes the controversially debated ‘right to seek information’.
Nevertheless, a review of the proposals made under the Doha mandate
suggests that the debate has lost some of its acrimony, compared with
the discussion in 1998/1999. Parties seem to become aware of the fact
that the Appellate Body has already developed a practice on this issue.48
On the one hand, this practice leaves the door open to public participation
in principle and thereby satisfies those countries interested in more
transparency and more participation to some extent. On the other hand,
the Appellate Body does not appear to have attached decisive weight to
amicus briefs in those cases where they have so far been submitted,
thereby reassuring the opponents of amicus briefs to some extent of the
limited role that such briefs do factually play. Finally, no one could
prevent interested governments from co-operating with NGOs in the
preparation of submissions and from incorporating the arguments put
forward by NGOs into their own submissions.
In short, parties’ insistence on a modification of the DSU in either
direction seems to weaken, a trend which is also reflected in the wording
of more recent proposals. The issue increasingly appears as some kind
of bargaining chip which could be traded for concessions on more
substantive issues.
To conclude, and with a view of the next section, it should also be noted
that the amicus issue is closely related to the issue of third party rights in
46 See TN/DS/W/25, no I.2 (Taiwan).
47 See TN/DS/W/43, no XI (Jordan) and TN/DS/W/53 (Jordan).
48 See also TN/DS/W/5 (EC), Answers to Questions 28–39 (EC).
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dispute settlement. Many members have argued that admitting amicus
briefs, particularly at the appellate stage, would put members at a
disadvantage compared to non-members such as NGOs, which would
normally not enjoy standing at the WTO. The reason is that a member
which is not directly involved in a case as either complainant or
defendant, is subject to specific provisions on third party participation.
These rules establish that in order to participate as a third party in an
appellate review, a member must have previously participated as a third
party in the prior panel proceedings. In the Sardines case,49 this led to a
situation where Morocco – a member which had not participated as a
third party in the panel proceeding – filed an amicus brief. Although
Morocco was accused by other Members of circumventing the provisions
on third party participation, the Appellate Body decided, that it was
‘entitled to accept the amicus curiae brief submitted by Morocco, and to
consider it’.50 At the same time, Colombia had been prevented from
presenting its views as a third party due to the restrictive provisions on
third party participation.51 Members subsequently criticised the
Appellate Body for the move because both the amicus curiae issue and
third party rights were part of the ongoing DSU review which could be
prejudiced.52 To sum up, the rules and practice in place for both third
party rights and amicus curiae briefs should be seen in close context, and
a ‘package deal’ could bring about a solution for both issues.
7.4 Third Party Rights
In accordance with the multilateral nature of the WTO system, a
minimum of ‘internal transparency’ in handling bilateral disputes must
be safeguarded. Besides the requirement to notify mutually agreed
solutions (see Section 6.1.3), specific procedural rights of third parties
constitute another safeguard to prevent that bilateral disputes are settled
at the expense of uninvolved parties. Furthermore, the topics under
review in bilateral disputes are often of interest to parties other than the
complainant and the defendant, as these parties may have a stake in the
outcome of the case (eg ACP countries in the Bananas case). The DSU
therefore contains specific provisions for third party participation in
disputes. As a ‘multilateral element’ in the dispute settlement procedure,
these rules are of particular interest to small and medium-sized trading
49 European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines (Peru) (WT/DS231).
50 See WT/DS231/AB/R, paras 160–68 and para 314.
51 See ‘WTO Appellate Body Braces for Criticism for Easing Rules on Third Party
Participation’, in WTO Reporter, 10 October 2002; and ‘WTO Appellate Body Chair Offers
to Discuss Appellate Review Rules’, in WTO Reporter, 23 October 2002.
52 See ‘WTO Appellate Body Under Fire Again for Amicus Rulings in Dispute Proceedings’,
in WTO Reporter, 25 October 2002; ‘Appellate Body Procedural Moves Stir Controversy at
WTO’, in Inside US Trade, 25 October 2002.
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nations that are anxious about safeguarding the spirit of the most
favoured nation principle in the handling of disputes. On the negative
side, however, the involvement of third parties may also complicate
political negotiations on bilateral settlements, as the freedom of
negotiating parties is limited to some extent.53
Key rules on third party participation are laid down in Article 4.11 DSU
(regarding participation in consultations), Appendix 3 to the DSU
(Working Procedures), and foremost in Article 10 DSU. The latter gives
third parties, which have notified their substantial interest in a matter,
an opportunity to be heard by the panel and to make written submissions
to the panel. Moreover, third parties have a right to receive the
submissions of the disputing parties to the first meeting of the panel.
Finally, the panel granted so-called ‘enhanced’ third party rights in the
Bananas case in the light of the importance of the EC Bananas regime for
the third parties and in the light of prior practice. These enhanced rights
consisted of the permission to observe the second substantive meeting
of the panel with the parties, and to make a brief statement during this
meeting. The panel, however, declined to grant further third party rights
such as participation in the interim review.54 Third party rights also
surfaced as an issue in some other disputes, including the Hormones
case, and in US – Anti-dumping Act of 1916.
Given the systemic importance of third party rights, and their
relationship to other topics such as amicus briefs (see preceding Section),
several proposals have been dedicated to this issue. Costa Rica
underlined the importance which it attaches to the issue by focussing
its proposal entirely on third party rights.55 Costa Rica seeks the
expansion of third party rights in each stage of the procedure from
consultations to implementation.56 It proposes to ease the ‘substantial
trade interest’ requirement for third party participation in consultations
(Article 4), especially by eliminating the need for approval from the party
to which the request is addressed.57 With regard to the panel stage, Costa
53 Interestingly, not much research has been dedicated to third party rights so far. The
contributions include Davey (2002, pp 31–32) and Covelli (1999). Enhanced third party
rights against the background of the case United States – 1916 Anti-Dumping Act (WT/
DS136, 162) are discussed in Antoniadis (2002).
54 See WT/DS27/R, paras 7.5–7.9.
55 See TN/DS/W/12 and TN/DS/W/12/Rev 1 (Costa Rica).
56 For a comment on ‘multilateralising’ consultations, see Petersmann (2002b), p 129.
57 A similar proposal has also been made by Jamaica; see TN/DS/W/44, nos 2, 4 and 5
(Jamaica). The proposals are obviously motivated by these members’ experiences in the
Bananas case where they participated as third parties and where disagreement arose on
the extent to which third parties should be able to participate in the proceeding; see the
panel report in European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas; (WT/DS/27/R), paras 7.4–7.9.
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Rica proposes the inclusion of a 10-day time frame for the notification
of third party interest to the DSB (as do the EC and Jordan58). Third
parties would get access to all the submissions (except those containing
confidential information) and to all the stages of the proceeding.59 Panels
would henceforth have to address the arguments of third parties in the
findings of the report, too (Article 10). The interim report (Article 15)
would have to be issued to the third parties as well, and they would
obtain a right to make comments.
Concerning appellate review, Costa Rica proposes that third parties
should be able to notify their interest in a case and participate in appellate
proceedings even if they did not participate in the previous panel
proceedings, as is currently required (Article 17).60 The strengthening
of third party rights during the appellate stage is also supported by a
group of other developing countries.61 With regard to the implementation
stage, the Costa Rican proposal would require disputing parties to afford
third parties an adequate opportunity to express their views in
consultations on the implementation of rulings (Article 21.5 DSU).
The African Group equally proposed improving third party rights from
a developing country perspective. Developing countries shall have a
right to all the documents and information, and to full participation in
all the proceedings. To this purpose, the ‘substantial trade interest’
requirement should be interpreted very extensively in the case of
developing and least developed third parties, and third party rights
would be strengthened during the appellate stage. The African Group
holds that improved third party rights for developing countries would
allow them to gain better insight into procedural, substantive and
systemic issues in the multilateral trade order, and that such rights could
thus be regarded as a ‘concrete contribution towards capacity building’.62
58 See TN/DS/1, Attachment, no 8 (EC) and TN/DS/W/43, no VII (Jordan). In a later
submission, however, Jordan proposes that such notification should be made only within
ten days after the establishment of a panel; see TN/DS/W/53 (Jordan).The time frame for
notification of third party interest surged, for instance, in the compliance panel in the
case Canada – Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products;
(WT/DS103) (United States) and (WT/DS113) (New Zealand); see also ‘Canada Dairy Panel
Gives Rise To Larger Policy Debate in WTO’, in Inside US Trade, 9 March 2001.
59 Proposal also made by the EC (see TN/DS/W/1, Attachment, no 9). Costa Rica also
seeks amendments to Article 12 and the Working Procedures governing the panel stage
so as to afford more weight to the role and interests of third parties. A proposal to this
effect has also been submitted by Jordan; see TN/DS/W/43, no VI (Jordan).
60 See TN/DS/W/12 and TN/DS/W/12/Rev 1 (Costa Rica).
61 See TN/DS/W/18 and TN/DS/W/18/Rev 1 (Cuba, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Malaysia,
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Zimbabwe) and also TN/DS/W/47 (India, Cuba,
Dominican Republic, Egypt, Honduras, Jamaica and Malaysia).
62 See TN/DS/W/15 (African Group) and TN/DS/W/42, no IV (African Group).
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In this same line of reasoning, Lacarté-Muro and Gappah (2000) hold
that: ‘(d)eveloping countries that have been third parties have no doubt
found that their knowledge of the functioning of the dispute settlement
system has been considerably enhanced by such participation.’63
Japan and the EC equally submitted proposals for improved third party
access that are familiar from the early stages of the review. They establish
that third parties shall receive copies of documents or information
submitted prior to the interim review, and that they should be able to
observe any of the substantive meetings.64 Again, both proposals are
likely motivated by the experience of the two parties, this time in their
respective complaints in US – Anti-dumping Act of 1916.65 Both the EC
and Japan had made separate complaints, and each party had requested
to be granted ‘enhanced’ third party rights in the other complainant’s
case. Whereas each complainant accepted the other complainant’s
request, the US as defendant opposed it. The panel refused to grant
either the EC or Japan enhanced third party rights in each other’s cases,66
a decision that was upheld by the Appellate Body.67
Whereas the EC supports most of the Costa Rican suggestions on third
party rights, it is not supportive of an automatic right to join
consultations, and it does not wish to involve third parties at the interim
review stage.68 Taiwan, while being supportive of a general strengthening
of third party rights, raises some reservations with regard to
modifications to the substantial trade interest provision, to the
requirements that third party arguments be reflected in the panel and
Appellate Body reports, and to the right for third parties to comment on
the descriptive part and the interim report. Taiwan asserts that these
proposals would increase the complexity of the dispute process and that
they would not be in line with judicial economy considerations.69
An Australian proposal called for strengthened non-party rights in
bilateral compensation agreements. It would call upon parties fully to
63 See Lacarté-Muro (2000), p 397.
64 See TN/DS/W/22, Attachment, no 13 (Japan); TN/DS/W/32, Attachment, no 14 (Japan)
and TN/DS/W/1, Attachment, no 9 (EC).
65 United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (WT/DS136) (Complaint by the European
Communities) and United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (WT/DS162) (Complaint by
Japan).
66 WT/DS136/R, paras 6.33–6.36 and WT/DS162/R, paras 6.29–6.35.
67 WT/DS136/AB/R and WT/DS162/AB/R, paras 139-150.
68 See TN/DS/W/38, no III (EC).
69 See TN/DS/W/25, no II (Taiwan). The textual proposal is contained in TN/DS/W/36
(Taiwan).
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observe the requirement of Article 3.7 DSU (according to which
compensation is temporary) and the requirement of Article 22.1 DSU
(according to which compensation must be consistent with the covered
agreements). Compensation should further be granted on an erga omnes
basis. In this submission, Australia stated that it was: ‘concerned by a
recent trend toward bilateral compensation deals agreed between parties
which have no timetable for implementation and which are not offered
to other members whose rights and obligations have also been nullified
and impaired.’ If members were forced to initiate their own complaints
to acquire compensation rights, this would place enormous pressure on
WTO dispute settlement and would lead to a waste of resources.70 In its
third proposal, Australia suggests amending Article 22.2 on
compensation with a view of obliging defendants to enter within 10
days into negotiations with any party that has invoked the dispute
settlement mechanism. If compensation were not available to third
parties, defendants would have to agree to expedited arbitration under
Article 25 DSU to determine the right of third parties to compensation.
The Australian proposal has likely been motivated by the country’s
experience in the US Copyright case where a panel had to rule on an EC
complaint against the US ‘Fairness in Music Licensing Acticle’.71 This
Act exempted small establishments from paying royalties on music
broadcast in their establishment. The panel found the rule to be in
contravention of the TRIPS agreement. The US subsequently agreed to
offer compensation to EC artists. However, such compensation was
denied to artists from countries such as Australia who had also been
harmed by the US legislation.72
The Balás text integrated some of the demands for increased third party
participation. However, the ‘substantial trade interest’ requirement
would still continue to apply. Under the draft, a third party with an
interest in participating in consultations would have to indicate the
reasons for its claim of substantial trade interest. In addition, the new
text would impose a requirement on the party to which the request to
be joined in the consultations is addressed, to inform the DSB within 10
days on whether it agrees with the claim of substantial trade interest or
not.73
The Balás text would set a 10-day time limit after the establishment of a
panel for the notification of third party interest at the panel stage. Third
70 See TN/DS/W/8, lit (b) and TN/DS/W/34, lit (b) (Australia).
71 United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act (EC), (WT/DS160).
72 See ‘Australia, South Korea Outline Proposals for Revamping of WTO Dispute
Settlement’, in WTO Reporter, 19 July 2002.
73 See new Article 4.11, as contained in TN/DS/9.
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parties would be granted the right to be present at all meetings of the
panels with the parties prior to the issuance of the interim report, in
addition to the right to be heard, which they already enjoy now.74
Moreover, they would get access to all submissions of the parties prior
to the interim review, except those including ‘privileged’ information.
Until now, they have access only to the first submission.75
The Balás text would also strengthen third party rights in the panel
procedures. The new Article 12.1 calls upon panels in a rather
programmatic style to ‘bear in mind’ the ‘interest of third parties’ when
modifying the standard working procedures as laid down in Appendix
3.76 Panels should set deadlines for written submissions not only by
parties (as is now the case) but also for submissions by third parties.77
Furthermore, the Balás text suggests modifications to the Working
Procedures in Appendix 3. In addition to the right to attend the first
substantive meeting and to present their views on this occasion, third
parties would have to be invited by panels to make a written
submission.78 More importantly, they would also be invited to be present
at the second substantive meeting of the panel where rebuttals to the
first submissions are made.79 If additional substantive meetings were
held prior to the issuance of the interim report, third parties would also
be invited to be present at these meetings.80 A right for the panel would
be included to put questions to third parties and to ask them for
explanations at any time prior to the issuance of the interim report.81
Third party rights would also be strengthened at the interim review
stage. The panel would be required to issue to each third party that
portion of the descriptive section of its draft report which reflects that
third party’s argument, and the third parties would get an opportunity
to submit their comments in writing.82
Beyond the panel stage, the Balás text would strengthen third party rights
during appellate review, although the modification is bracketed.83
74 See modified Article 10.2, as contained in TN/DS/9.
75 See Article 10.3 DSU, as contained in TN/DS/9. The term ‘privileged’ is bracketed.
76 See modified Article 12.1, as contained in TN/DS/9.
77 See modified Article 12.5, as contained in TN/DS/9.
78 See modified Paragraph 6 of the Working Procedures in Appendix 3, as contained in
TN/DS/9.
79 See modified Paragraph 7 of the Working Procedures in Appendix 3, as contained in
TN/DS/9.
80 See modified Paragraph 12 of the Working Procedures in Appendix 3, as contained in
TN/DS/9.
81 See modified Paragraph 8 of the Working Procedures in Appendix 3, as contained in
TN/DS/9. The current Paragraph 10 of the Working Procedures would be deleted.
82 See the modified Article 15.1, as contained in TN/DS/9.
83 On current third party participation in appellate proceedings, see McCall Smith (2003),
pp 84ff.
182
Negotiating the Review of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding
Members which have not participated as third parties during the panel
stage would get an opportunity to notify their substantial interest within
10 days after the date of the notice of appeal. Third parties would have
an opportunity to be heard and to make written submissions to the
Appellate Body. Their submissions would also be circulated to the parties
to the dispute.84 In this respect, it is worth noting that the Appellate
Body itself had modified its working procedures in September 2002 to
give third parties the possibility to attend oral hearings even if they did
not make a written submission prior to the hearing, as the old rule
required. This old rule had been designed to give parties to a dispute
the ability to review third party arguments in advance and prepare for
their questions, but it was abused in a half dozen cases to deny entry to
Appellate Body hearings to countries which had reserved their third
party rights but did not file written submissions. The issue surfaced in
the Sardines case in context to the amicus issue (see Section 7.3 on amicus
curiae briefs).85
Finally, third party rights are also strengthened in the implementation
stage through enhanced notification requirements for mutually agreed
trade or other compensation in response to the Australian proposal (see
Section 6.4.5).
In an overall evaluation, the draft would substantially expand third party
rights in the panel stage and during appellate review. First, the
modifications would respond to the concerns and to the experience of
members who found themselves shut out from the multilateral
proceedings in several instances. Secondly, it would integrate the practice
already developed by panels and the Appellate Body (with regard to
‘enhanced’ third party rights) into the DSU. Thirdly, it responds to fears
among members that NGOs could get better access to the DSU procedure
than members as a consequence of the rulings on the amicus issue. In
accordance with the negotiatory and bilateral nature of consultations,
the expansion of third party rights in the consultation stage is, however,
less substantial. This holds particularly if one considers that the
notification requirements for mutually agreed solutions could be
spurned by new rules on the lapse of consultation requests. Negotiators
are obviously aware of the fact that transparency at an early stage of the
84 See the modified Article 17.4, as contained in TN/DS/9.
85 The new Working Procedures are contained in WT/AB/WP/7. See ‘WTO Appellate Body
Braces for Criticism for Easing Rules on Third Party Participation’, in WTO Reporter, 10
October 2002; ‘WTO Appellate Body Chair Offers to Discuss Appellate Review Rules’, in
WTO Reporter, 23 October 2002; and ‘Appellate Body to Clarify Working Procedures on
Role of Third Parties’, in Inside US Trade, 15 November 2002.
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proceeding could make bilateral settlements increasingly difficult. Given
the systemic implications of third party rights for the multilateral trading
system, they are only prima facie a technical issue. It is to some extent
surprising that they have not been the topic of more intense scholarly
research.
7.5 Special and Differential Treatment
Development issues are supposed to play a major role in the current
‘Doha Development Agenda’, and they have also been a key topic in the
current negotiations on the DSU. An intense discussion has taken place
on why developing countries are still less frequent users of dispute
settlement procedures than industrialised countries, and on what could
be done to improve their participation.86 Proposals on special and
differential treatment of developing countries (S&D) have therefore
played a prominent role in DSU negotiations.
7.5.1 S&D in Consultations
With regard to consultations, the Least Developed Countries (LDCs)
Group proposes the introduction of a provision according to which the
possibility of holding consultations in the capitals of LDC members
should be explored in cases involving LDCs.87 This should help them
overcome problems that arise from their ‘extreme human resource
constraint’ and from the fact that they are often underrepresented or
not represented at all in Geneva. The issue was accounted for in the
Balás draft.88
Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Honduras, India, Indonesia,
Jamaica, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Zimbabwe want
further to strengthen some S&D provisions that are already included in
the DSU. They wish to make Article 4.10 mandatory by replacing ‘should’
by ‘shall’ in a provision which calls upon disputing parties to give special
attention to developing-country members’ particular concerns and
86 On developing countries in WTO dispute settlement, see Jackson (2002), pp 111ff,
Petersmann (2002a), pp 20–22, Roessler (2002), Delich (2002), Hudec (2002a), Olivares
(2001), Footer (2001), Gabilondo (2001), Lacarté-Muro and Gappah (2000), Hoekman and
Mavroidis (2000) and Horn and Mavroidis (1999) with a focus on enforcement. For a
general overview of developing countries’ experience with dispute settlement mechanisms
in international trade, see Kufuor (1997) and Kuruvila (1997).
87 See TN/DS/W/17, para 3 (LDC Group) and TN/DS/W/37, no I (LDC Group).
88 See the modified Article 4.10, as contained in TN/DS/9.
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interests during consultations.89 This proposal, which had already been
included in the Suzuki text, was also supported by the EC.90 Balás equally
integrated it into his draft.91
Furthermore, the same countries suggest that the additional time-frames
which are available under Article 12.10 for consultations and the panel
process shall be made more operational by giving developing country
defendants an additional 30 days for consultations.92 Balás considered
this issue by creating a new Article 4.10bis on consultations with
developing country defendants. These would be entitled to ask the
chairman of the DSB for an extension of the consultations which the
latter would decide, after consulting with the parties.93
Jamaica proposes a general strengthening of consultative processes (ie
consultations pursuant to Article 4, good offices, conciliation, mediation)
because better use of these would make the participation of developing
countries in WTO dispute settlement more likely.94 A proposal by
Paraguay to make the procedures of Article 5 (good offices, conciliation
and mediation) mandatory in cases involving developing countries goes
in a similar direction,95 as does a proposal by Jordan.96 However, these
issues were not specifically accounted for in the Balás draft.
7.5.2 S&D in the Panel and Appellate Review Stages
The African Group, the LDC Group and Jordan submitted proposals
regarding the composition of panels, with an aim of ensuring a more
balanced geographical representation, and improving the rights of
developing countries to request representatives of such countries as
89 See TN/DS/W/19, no III, paragraph on Article 4.10 (Cuba, Honduras, India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Zimbabwe) and TN/DS/W/47, paragraph on
Article 4.10 (India, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Honduras, Jamaica and Malaysia).
On a related proposal made by India in the Special Session of the Committee on Trade
and Development, see ‘India Proposes Differential Treatment in DSU, SPS Agreements’,
in Inside US Trade, 19 April 2002.
90 See TN/DS/W/1, Attachment, no 3 (EC).
91 See the modified Article 4.10 as contained in TN/DS/9.
92 See TN/DS/W/19, no III, paragraph on Article 12.10 (Cuba, Honduras, India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Zimbabwe) and TN/DS/W/47, paragraph on
Article 12.10 (India, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Honduras, Jamaica and Malaysia).
93 A part of the text is bracketed, reflecting disagreement on whether ‘(a) guideline for the
Chairman of the DSB shall be that such extension should normally not exceed 15 days...’,
see Article 4.10bis as contained in TN/DS/9.
94 See TN/DS/W/21, no 1 (Jamaica).
95 See TN/DS/W/16 (Paraguay); see also Petersmann (2002b), p 132.
96 See TN/DS/W/43, no II (Jordan).
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panellists in cases involving them.97 These requests were partly
considered in the Balás text (see Section 6.2.1 on panel composition).
The African Group generally questions automaticity and sequencing
from a developing country perspective. Specifically, the African Group
wants to include in panels’ terms of reference an obligation to evaluate
the development implications of findings, a proposal also made by the
LDC Group98 and Jamaica.99 Moreover, according to the African Group,
the DSB should be required to take into account reports on the
development implications of findings and recommendations which
international organisations such as the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) would prepare.100 The LDC Group
suggests that panels should be required to take into account all relevant
provisions for differential and more favourable treatment in cases
involving developing or least-developed countries, regardless of whether
or not the parties have raised these provisions.101
While the Balás text keeps to the principle that S&D provisions should
specifically be raised by developing countries in the proceedings, it seeks
nevertheless to add precision to Art. 12.11. Developing countries wishing
to avail themselves of S&D provisions shall raise arguments relating
thereto as early as possible. If the other party is an industrialised country,
the latter would also be required to address such arguments in its
submissions. Finally, the panel report shall explicitly take into account
the consideration given to any S&D provisions that have been raised.102
Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Honduras, India, Indonesia,
Jamaica, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Zimbabwe suggest
that the additional time-frames which are available under Art. 12.10 to
developing countries during the panel process shall be made more
operational by giving developing country defendants an additional two
weeks for the preparation of their submissions.103 India, as one of the
co-sponsors, had once asked for an additional three weeks to prepare
and present its first written submission to the panel in the QR case but
97 See TN/DS/W/15, no 11 (African Group); TN/DS/W/37, no III (LDC Group); TN/DS/W/
43, no V (Jordan), and TN/DS/W/53 (Jordan).
98 See TN/DS/W/37, no II (LDC Group).
99 Proposal with regard to Article 21.8 DSU; see TN/DS/W/21, no 6 (Jamaica).
100 See TN/DS/W/15, no 7 (African Group).
101 See TN/DS/W/37, no IV (LDC Group).
102 See modified Article 12.11, as contained in TN/DS/9.
103 See TN/DS/W/19, no III, paragraph on Article 12.10 (Cuba, Honduras, India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Zimbabwe) and TN/DS/W/47, paragraph on
Article 12.10 (India, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Honduras, Jamaica and Malaysia).
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was granted only 10 days.104 Balás took this issue up by suggesting a
(bracketed) modification of Art. 12.10 DSU according to which panels
would have to afford developing country defendants additional time to
prepare their submissions, normally not less than 15 additional days
for their first submission and 10 additional days for their second
submission.105
7.5.3 S&D in the Implementation Stage
Article 21.2 contains a specific provision on S&D during the
implementation stage. According to this provision, ‘particular attention
should be paid to matters affecting the interests of developing country
Members with respect to measures which have been subject to dispute
settlement’. As even the panel has stated in applying the provision in
the Indonesia – Autos case, ‘the language of this provision is rather general
and does not provide a great deal of guidance’. It was only invoked in a
few cases. In the Indonesia – Autos case, the arbitrator (who had to decide
on the length of the reasonable period of time (RPT) for implementation)
added another six months to the period normally required for the
domestic rule-making process, conceding that Indonesia was ‘a
developing country ... in a dire economic and financial situation’.106 The
same logic was also applied in the arbitration in Argentina – Bovine
Hides.107 Moreover, it appears that the provision informed implicitly the
decision of the arbitrator in Chile – Alcoholic Beverages.108 Whereas these
cases affected developing countries as defendants, some developing
countries also invoked the provision in the arbitration on the RPT in the
Byrd Amendment case where the US is a defendant. The arbitrator,
however, stated that he had ‘some difficulty in seeing how the fact that
several Complaining Parties are developing country members should
have an effect on the determination of the shortest period possible within
the legal system of the United States to implement.’109 The compliance
panel in EC – Bed Linen also rejected Indian allegations about a violation
104 See the panel report in India – Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile
and Industrial Products (WT/DS90/R), paras 5.8–5.10.
105 See the modified Article 12.10, as contained in TN/DS/9.
106 See the Award of the Arbitrator, para 24, in Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the
Automobile Industry; Recourse to Arbitration under DSU Article 21.3(c) (WT/DS54/15, WT/
DS55/14, WT/DS59/13 and WT/DS64/12); see also Roessler (2002).
107 See the Award of the Arbitrator, paras 50–51, in Argentina – Measures Affecting the Export
of Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished Leather; Recourse to Arbitration under DSU Article
21.3(c) (WT/DS155/10).
108 See the Award of the Arbitrator, paras 41–45 in Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (WT/
DS87/15 and WT/DS110/14).
109 See the Award of the Arbitrator, para 81, in United States – Continued Dumping and
Subsidy Offset Act of 2000; Recourse to Arbitration under DSU Article 21.3(c) (WT/DS217/14,
WT/DS234/22).
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of the provision by the EC through the specific actions it took in this
anti-dumping case. The panel had found that the ‘hortatory’ word
‘should’ does not mean ‘shall’ and that nothing was therefore in that
provision which would explicitly require a member to take any particular
action.110
The vague wording of Article 21.2 DSU and the jurisprudence on this
Article likely prompted Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Egypt,
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka,
Tanzania and Zimbabwe to suggest that the provision should be made
more operational. To this purpose, it is proposed that the reasonable
period of time (RPT) for implementation of disputes which involve
industrial countries as complainants and developing countries as
defendants should normally not be less than fifteen months. It should
be extended to at least two years (or beyond) if statutory changes were
required or if a ‘long held practice/policy’ such as a quantitative
restriction (QR) or a balance of payment measure (BOP) was involved.111
QRs and BOPs have played an important role in the trade policy of India,
one of the co-sponsors. Moreover, the time frame for the compliance
panel process in such cases should be extended to 120 days. Also,
developing countries should not have to present a status report on
implementation at every meeting but only at every second meeting. By
contrast, developing countries demand that in cases where the
developing country is a complainant and the developed country is a
defendant, the RPT should not exceed 15 months, that the 90-day limit
for compliance panel procedures should be strictly observed, and that
mutually acceptable compensation should be offered in case of delays
by the developed country to offset the trade loss to the developing
country.112
The Balás text considered some of these requests: It would make Art.
21.2 DSU mandatory by replacing ‘should’ with ‘shall’.113 Furthermore,
developing countries would have to present their status reports only at
every second meeting of the DSB.114 With regard to the length of the
110 See the compliance panel report, paras 6.262–6.271 in European Communities – Anti-
Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India; Recourse to Article 21.5 of the
DSU by India.
111 See TN/DS/W/19, proposal on Article 21.2, lit (b)(i) (Cuba, Honduras, India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Zimbabwe).
112 See TN/DS/W/19, no III, paragraph on Article 21.2 (Cuba, Honduras, India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Zimbabwe) and TN/DS/W/47 (India, Cuba,
Dominican Republic, Egypt, Honduras, Jamaica and Malaysia).
113 See the modified Article 21.2, as contained in TN/DS/9. This proposal, which had already
been included in the Suzuki text (WT/MIN(99)/8), is also supported by the EC See TN/
DS/W/1, Attachment, no 18 (EC).
114 See the proposed text marked with an asterisk at the end of Article 21.6(b), as contained
in TN/DS/9.
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RPT, Balás did not propose to introduce any new numbers into the DSU.
He added, however, a programmatic provision which would apply to
developing country defendants. Accordingly: ‘the arbitrator shall take
due account of any particular problems which may affect the time within
which that Member can implement the DSB recommendations and
rulings.’ Additionally, the provision would call upon the arbitrator to
give due consideration to the special situation faced by LDC
defendants.115 The concrete effect of this provision is difficult to see today,
given its programmatic character.
Other issues brought forward by developing countries include a call for
monetary compensation to be paid continually until a trade measure is
withdrawn,116 and for collective retaliation.117 Ecuador also proposed to
improve the SCOO for developing countries. As part of its proposal on
implementation, Ecuador suggests that developing countries
complainants should be allowed to take into account the impact of a
trade restrictive measure on their economy when calculating the level
of retaliation, and not just the level of nullification or impairment. This
could be done, for instance, by multiplying the amount authorised by
the DSB by a factor of at least two.118 Cuba, the Dominican Republic,
Egypt, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri
Lanka, Tanzania and Zimbabwe want to grant developing countries the
freedom to suspend concessions vis-à-vis non-complying industrial
countries in sectors of their choice.119 However, none of these proposals
found entry into the Balás text.
7.5.4 Legal Costs and Secretariat Assistance
The monetary cost of an active participation in dispute settlement and
the level of support which the secretariat should provide to developing
countries have often been raised by developing countries in the
discussions. According to Roessler (2002), the cost of legal advice
provided by law firms is prohibitive for many developing countries,
and special and differential treatment in the field of WTO dispute
settlement should therefore primarily take the form of privileged access
to legal expertise. The need to expand the resources available to
115 See the modified Article 21.3, as contained in TN/DS/9.
116 See TN/DS/W/15, no 5 (African Group). See also Section 6.4.5 of this study.
117 See TN/DS/W/15, no 6 (African Group). See also Section 6.4.7 of this study.
118 See TN/DS/W/9 (Ecuador).
119 See TN/DS/W/19 (Cuba, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka,
Tanzania and Zimbabwe), no I and TN/DS/W/47 (India, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt,
Honduras, Jamaica and Malaysia). See also Section 6.4.8 of this study.
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developing countries effectively to participate in the system has been
recognised.120
In this respect, the African Group calls for the establishment of a fund
which could be used by developing countries that wish to avail
themselves of the dispute settlement procedures. That fund would be
used to develop the institutional and human capacity of developing
countries for using WTO dispute settlement. It would complement the
already-existing Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL), an
international organisation which has been set up to provide legal
assistance to developing countries in WTO disputes.121
Further on, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Honduras, India,
Indonesia, Jamaica, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and
Zimbabwe suggest that litigation costs in disputes involving both
industrial and developing countries should be borne by the industrial
country if the developing country prevails in the dispute.122 Similar
proposals on legal costs have also been made separately by Jamaica123
and China.124 Specifically with regard to amicus briefs, Jordan seeks the
establishment of a fund which would support developing countries and
LDCs in the submission and handling of such briefs.125
The Balás text proposes a new Article 28 on litigation costs. However, it
is bracketed and its contents are rather vague. Its application would
require further decisions and a substantial amount of interpretation by
panels or the Appellate Body. According to the proposed article,
Members shall bear their own costs in procedures brought under the
DSU. However, panels or the Appellate Body may decide to award upon
request by the parties to a dispute an amount for litigation costs, taking
into account the specific circumstances of the case, the respective
120 See Davey (2000a), pp 17ff.
121 See TN/DS/W/15, no 3 (African Group). According to the African Group, the ACWL
‘should not be considered as panacea for all institutional and human capacity constraints
of developing countries’, as the latter’s terms of reference were allegedly equivocal in
certain instances and as it did not cover all developing countries. Jamaica argues with
regard to the ACWL that the cost of membership is still prohibitive for some developing
countries so that they cannot access its facilities; see TN/DS/W/21, no 2a (Jamaica). On
the ACWL and its activities, see ACWL (2002).
122 See TN/DS/W/19 (Cuba, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka,
Tanzania and Zimbabwe) and TN/DS/W/47 (India, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt,
Honduras, Jamaica and Malaysia).
123 See TN/DS/W/21, no 7 (Jamaica).
124 See TN/DS/W/29, no 1 (China), TN/DS/W/51, no 4 (China), TN/DS/W/51/Rev 1, no 4
(China) and TN/DS/W/57, no 2 (China).
125 See TN/DS/W/43, no XI (Jordan) and TN/DS/W/53.
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conditions of the parties concerned as well as special and differential
treatment to developing countries. The panel or the Appellate Body
decisions in this respect shall be guided by principles to be determined
in a decision by the DSB.126
With regard to legal assistance granted to developing country members
by the Secretariat, Jamaica calls for a strong expansion of such services.
The African Group also calls for fully-fledged assistance to developing
countries. It includes the provision of a pool of experts and lawyers for
the conduct of cases, the payment of fees and expenses entailed, the
compilation of all applicable law by the secretariat including past
decisions for use by the parties and the adjudicating bodies.127
Additionally, the LDC Group argues that the impartiality requirement
included in Article 27.2 on legal assistance to developing countries
unnecessarily constrains the legal experts and may prevent them from
offering the ‘full breadth of assistance’ as envisaged by the members.
Jamaica also argues that the services provided under Article 27.2 are
insufficient for developing countries that need the services of advisers
on a full time basis.128
The Balás text proposes only a slight modification of Article 27.2 DSU.
Accordingly, the Secretariat shall maintain a roster of qualified legal
experts from which an expert shall be made available to any developing
country member which so requests. However, the impartiality
requirement would not be relaxed.129
7.5.5 Other Matters Relating to S&D
The African Group also called for an easing of the requirements for third
party participation of developing countries in disputes (see Section 7.4
on third party rights).130 Moreover, periodic reviews of dispute settlement
should take place every five years and ensure that the dispute settlement
mechanism contributes to development objectives.131 None of these
objectives was taken into account in the Balás draft.
China suggests as a matter of S&D that industrial countries should not
bring more than two cases per calendar year against a particular
126 See new Article 28, as contained in TN/DS/9.
127 See TN/DS/W/15, no 8 (African Group).
128 See TN/DS/W/21, no 2(a) (Jamaica). See also Ragosta (2000).
129 See modified Article 27.2, as contained in TN/DS/9.
130 See TN/DS/W/15, no 9 (African Group).
131 See TN/DS/W/15, no 10 (African Group).
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developing country member.132 In addition, developing country
members’ participation in WTO dispute settlement should be enhanced
by the provision of technical assistance and capacity-building
programmes. Finally, China proposes that any tightened rules (for
instance regarding time-frames) on dispute settlement should not apply
to developing countries.133 As one might expect, the Balás text did not
integrate the Chinese proposal to limit the number of cases that could
be brought against any particular developing country. Such a proposal
could factually amount to exempting developing countries from
compliance with the WTO agreements, and any negotiated balance of
rights and obligations could thus be upset. As far as the Chinese
suggestion on time-frames is concerned, the Balás text indeed exempts
developing countries from some of the modifications suggested, such
as, for example, the proposed establishment of a panel at the first meeting
where the panel request appears on the DSB agenda.
7.6 Role of the Secretariat
Some proposals also deal with the role of the WTO Secretariat in disputes.
The LDC Group holds that the Secretariat provides a broad spectrum of
assistance to panels such as support on legal, historical and procedural
aspects of the case and secretarial and technical support under Article
27.1 DSU. The Group asserts that ‘(o)ften, such support is pernicious
and impacts heavily on the outcome of the case’.134 LDCs therefore want
such assistance, particularly the legal research, to be provided to the
parties so as to allow them to get a full picture as to how a decision was
reached.
A similar proposal is made jointly by Cuba, Honduras, India, Jamaica,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. They hold that:
‘(i)n certain disputes the Secretariat seemed to have provided negotiating
history, which does not have the approval of the members, to the panels
and the panels would no doubt have relied on these inputs.’ The co-
132 See TN/DS/W/29, no 1 and TN/DS/W/57, no 1 (China).
133 See TN/DS/W/29 (China), TN/DS/W/51, no 4 (China), TN/DS/W/51/Rev 1, no 4 (China)
and TN/DS/W/57, no 3 (China).
134 See also Hudec (1999), pp 34ff who acknowledges that: ’(w)hile most panel members
have insisted on exercising their own judgment at the end of the day, Secretariat legal
advisors have clearly exercised considerable influence.’ While he argues that the criticism
of those who argue that Secretariat officials have no mandate to perform this quasi
decision-making role is understandable, the warns against overstating the argument as,
in most cases, the Appellate Body has the final responsibility for the outcome, and that
Secretariat support will remain the only available source of legal expertise as long as
panel members are selected as they have been in the past (ie without making legal expertise
a mandatory requirement).
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sponsors therefore want to include a provision into the working
procedures that would require that : ‘(a)ny document, notes, information,
etc, submitted by the secretariat to the panel shall be given promptly to
the parties to the dispute, whose views on such documents, notes,
information etc, shall be taken into consideration by the panel.’135 Jordan
supports this proposal, too, and wants to include third parties in the
circle of those who receive the material prepared by the secretariat and
who may comment on it.136 Davey questions such propositions and
argues that disclosure requirements for Secretariat submissions to panels
would be unworkable as most of this interaction is verbal. Moreover, it
could lead to further disputes.137 The involvement of the Secretariat in
dispute settlement had already led to criticism in the Fuji-Kodak case in
1998, where Kodak charged the Secretariat of unfair intervention.138
7.7 Criticism of Adjudicating Bodies and Proposals to Regain
Political Control
One major proposal of systemic importance is the joint proposal by the
United States and Chile on ‘improving flexibility and member control
in WTO dispute settlement’. They argue that: ‘some limitations in the
current procedures may have resulted, in some cases, in an interpretative
approach or legal reasoning applied by WTO adjudicative bodies ... that
could have benefitted from additional member review.’ The co-sponsors
hold that ‘the reasoning and findings of reports may at times go beyond
what the parties consider to be necessary to resolve the dispute, or ...
may even be counterproductive to resolution of the dispute’ and that
mechanisms should therefore be introduced to ‘enhance the parties’
flexibility to resolve the dispute and members’ control over the adoption
process’.139
Specifically, they hold that: ‘panel and Appellate Body reasoning and
findings should not go beyond those aspects of the dispute that the
complainant and respondent parties consider necessary to resolve the
dispute.’ As examples for such ‘sensitive areas that could have benefited
from additional opportunity for member discussion and review’, they
135 See TN/DS/W/18, no V (Cuba, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka,
Tanzania and Zimbabwe). That issue has been a long-standing concern for India and has
also been raised on other occasions; see ‘India, Mexico Block Proposal to Release More
WTO Documents’, in International Trade Reporter, vol 16, no 7, 17 February 1999.
136 See TN/DS/W/43, no XIII (Jordan).
137 See Davey (2002), pp 30–31.
138 Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper (United States), (WT/
DS44); see ‘Kodak Charges WTO Secretariat With Unfair Intervention in Film Case’, in
Inside US Trade, 3 July 1998.
139 See TN/DS/W/28, nos 1–5 (US, Chile).
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cite ‘situations where the relevant WTO text does not address an issue,
leading to concerns over whether an adjudicative body might “fill the
gap” and consequently add to or diminish rights and obligations under
the relevant agreement instead of clarifying those rights and obligations’,
or ‘situations in which legal concepts outside the WTO texts have been
applied in a WTO dispute settlement proceeding, including asserted
principles of international law other than customary international law
rules of interpretation’ (eg state responsibility, proportionality).
To implement the proposal, several suggestions are made that have
already been discussed elsewhere in this study: the introduction of an
interim review at the appellate stage similar to that already known from
the panel stage,140 the suspension of panel or Appellate Body procedures
by mutual agreement,141 the deletion of findings by mutual agreement142
and partial adoption procedures.143 Moreover, a provision would be
introduced into Article 8.2 DSU according to which ‘expertise to examine
the matter at issue in the dispute’ should be integrated explicitly as a
selection criterion into the provision on the composition of panels.144
Finally, the co-sponsors wish to: ‘provide some form of additional
guidance to WTO adjudicative bodies concerning (i) the nature and scope
of the task presented to them (for example when the exercise of judicial
economy is most useful) and (ii) rules of interpretation of the WTO
agreements.’145
To summarise, the overarching goal is to strengthen political elements
in WTO dispute settlement, and to regain control over the adjudicating
process by reorienting it towards bilateral deals and making it less
automatic. Moreover, it is coupled with strong implicit (and, indeed,
close to explicit) criticism of panel members’ expertise and of the ability
of adjudicating bodies to carry out their tasks independently. The
proposal may thus be viewed as a ‘diplomatic translation’ of the strong
criticism that had been voiced in the US Congress on dispute settlement
140 See TN/DS/W/28, no 6a (US, Chile) and TN/DS/W/54, lit (a) (US, Chile); see also Section
6.3.4.
141 See TN/DS/W/28, no 6(d) (US, Chile) and TN/DS/W/52, lit (d), proposing changes to
Article 12.12 and Article 17.5 DSU (US, Chile); see also Sections 6.2.3 and 6.3.3.
142 See TN/DS/W/28, no 6(b) (US, Chile) and TN/DS/W/52, lit (b), proposing changes to
Article 12.7 and Article 17.13 DSU (US, Chile); see also Sections 6.2.5 and 6.3.6.
143 See TN/DS/W/28, no 6(c) (US, Chile) and TN/DS/W/52, lit (c), proposing changes to
Article 16.4 and Article 17.14 DSU (US, Chile); see also Sections 6.2.5 and 6.3.6.
144 See TN/DS/W/28, no 6(e) (US, Chile) and TN/DS/W/52, lit (e), proposing a change to
Article 8.2 DSU (US, Chile); see also Section 6.2.1.
145 See TN/DS/W28, no 6(f) (US, Chile) and TN/DS/W/52, lit (f). For a discussion of the
proposal, see Ehlermann (2003).
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in the time preceding this proposal (see Section 5.4 for details).
Specifically, Congress members complained that the WTO was
legislating instead of interpreting and that it allegedly did not apply
the negotiated standard of review that would leave sufficient deference
to US agencies that make determinations under US trade remedy laws
(anti-dumping, safeguards, countervailing duties). In seeking to weaken
the adjudicative elements of dispute settlement, the proposal represents
a reversal in the position that the US held during the Uruguay Round
on important points. At that time, the US had sought to make the
mechanism as automatic as possible in order to prevent defendants from
blocking decisions.146 Automaticity was demanded by the US in exchange
for restraint in the unilateral application of Section 301 (see Section
2.2.2.8).
Criticism of adjudicating bodies is, however, not limited to the US. The
African Group criticises panels and the Appellate Body for coming up
with ‘“surprises” in their interpretation and application of WTO
provisions, in some cases totally unexpected and unintended in the
negotiations of the provisions’. This has, in the view of the African Group,
affected the rights and obligations of members. The Group complains
about conflicts between agreements or provisions that ‘have been
conveniently interpreted away’ to the prejudice of developing countries
such as in the case of transition periods. It also mentions the
interpretation of the right to seek information under Article 13 (see amicus
curiae issue). In order to ‘address such excesses’, the African Group
therefore proposes, inter alia, that the General Council be regularly
briefed on the jurisprudence developed in dispute settlement. Parties to
a proceeding should have the right to refer questions of interpretation
to the General Council at any stage before the authorisation of retaliatory
measures.147 In its second proposal, the Group suggests a concrete
obligation for panels or the Appellate Body to refer questions on whether
146 On the allegations that the adjudicating bodies were ignoring the negotiated standard
of review and on the general criticism of the dispute settlement system, an intense debate
has emerged. On an overview on the standards of review issue, see Oesch (2003). On the
treatment of trade remedy measures by the adjudicating bodies, see also Cunningham
and Cribb (2003), Jackson and Benke (2003) (introducing the debate), Benke (2003), Stewart
and Dwyer (2001) and Bourgeois (1998). On these and several other aspects of the WTO
criticism, see Esserman and Howse (2003) (essentially supporting the WTO), Davey (2001),
Clough (2001), Jackson (2000a) and Magnus (2000). Particular criticism has been voiced
by Magnus, Joneja and Yocis (2003), Ragosta, Joneja and Zeldovich (2003), Wilson and
Starchuk (2003), Ragosta, Joneja and Zeldovich (no year specified). The US General
Accounting Office has also reviewed, in several instances, US participation in the WTO
and in dispute settlement. It generally found that there is no bias against the US in the
use of the system; see GAO (2003). See also GAO (2000), GAO (2000a) and GAO (2000b)
for further information on US experience under the DSU.
147 See TN/DS/W/15 (African Group).
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or not there is a conflict between provisions inside an agreement or
between agreements to the General Council for determination. The latter
should have recourse to the authority conferred under Article IX.2 of
the WTO agreement, which allows decisions to adopt an interpretation
to be taken by a three-fourths majority of the members.148
Jordan’s proposal equally deals with questions of interpretation. The
country suggests that the panels, Appellate Body and the DSB be granted
the power to seek advisory opinions from the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) on matters of international law. The advisory function of
the ICJ would therefore be extended to the WTO, as has been done with
other specialised bodies. Such advisory opinions should be considered
as instruments of interpretation which should be subject to adoption by
the Ministerial Conference or the General Council pursuant to Article
IX.2 WTO agreement. Jordan also supports the proposal made by the
African Group on this issue (see above) and recommends that it should
be included in a new Article 5bis on ‘Questions of Interpretation’.149
While the proposal which had been submitted by the African Group
and Jordan received less public attention than the US proposal, both
proposals – if seen in synopsis – reveal a substantial degree of unease of
both a developed trade power and a large number of developing
countries with the interpretations of panels and the Appellate Body. The
common thrust is the desire to regain (or at least considerably strengthen)
member control over the adjudicative bodies. Whereas the numerous
but less powerful African countries seek to enhance this control by giving
more authority to the General Council under (problematic) voting
procedures (where they would enjoy comfortable majorities), the US
prefers better control through the parties to a dispute. These bilateral
settings would give the US higher leverage for its negotiating power.
7.8 Time-Frames
The EC proposed a new Article 13.3 DSU which would allow parties to
extend any time period in the DSU by mutual agreement. This
amendment had already been suggested in the Suzuki text. The EC
would add a sentence requiring members to give special attention to
the particular problems and interests of developing country members.150
148 See TN/DS/W/42, no I (African Group).
149 See TN/DS/W/43, no XII (Jordan).
150 See TN/DS/W/1, Attachment, no 1 (EC).
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Australia made a suggestion with regard to time-frames under the
Safeguard agreement, suggesting a harmonisation with the time-frames
on subsidies. Whereas accelerated dispute settlement procedures are
available to challenge subsidies under the SCM Agreement, such
procedures are not available under the Safeguard Agreement, the
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, and the Agreement on Agriculture.
With regard to the Safeguard Agreement, Australia considers that this
is an anomaly, as safeguard actions have similar adverse trade effects as
prohibited and actionable subsidies and because they are by definition
time-limited. Australia therefore proposes expedited dispute settlement
procedures on all safeguard matters brought under the DSU.151 The
motivation for this proposal may be found in the experience that
Australia made in the US – Lamb Safeguard case152 where the proceedings
were initiated almost immediately after the safeguard came into force
but where withdrawal of the illegal measure could only be secured seven
months before the three-year safeguard was set to expire anyway.153 More
generally, China is also in favour of the establishment of specific
shortened time-frames for disputes concerning trade remedy measures.
These should, however, not apply in the case of developing country
defendants.154 The proposals were not integrated into the Balás text.
7.9 Measures Withdrawn
The African Group raises the problem of trade measures which are
withdrawn before the finalisation or even the commencement of DSU
proceedings. Particularly in the case of small developing country
economies, even short-timed export restrictions would inflict serious
injury. Nevertheless, the DSU has currently no remedies to address such
situations. Developing countries therefore suggest notification
requirements for measures withdrawn by members during consultations
with a subsequent recommendation by the DSB regarding compensation
of the injury suffered by the member. Measures withdrawn prior to a
DSU proceeding or even without such a proceeding should equally
entitle the injured party to compensation.155 This proposal, which has
some similarities to the Mexican proposal on retroactivity (see Section
151 See TN/DS/W/8, lit (a) (Australia), TN/DS/W/34, lit (a) (Australia), and TN/DS/W/49,
lit (a), proposing changes to Articles 1.2 and the inclusion of a new Article 8bis (Australia).
152 See United States – Safeguard Measure on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb from
New Zealand and Australia (WT/DS177) (New Zealand) and (WT/DS178) (Australia).
153 See ‘Australia, South Korea Outline Proposals for Revamping of WTO Dispute
Settlement’, in WTO Reporter, 19 July 2002.
154 See TN/DS/W/29, no 3 (China), and TN/DS/W/51 as well as TN/DS/W/51/Rev 1, no 4.2
(China).
155 See TN/DS/W/15, no 4 (African Group).
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6.4.11 on increased incentives for implementation), was not considered
in the Balás text.
7.10 Composition of Delegations
Jamaica wishes to introduce a new Article 3.13 DSU which would
establish that a WTO member has the right to determine the composition
of its delegation in dispute settlement proceedings. 156 This proposal has
to be seen against the background of the experience of the small banana-
growing Caribbean island of Saint Lucia. It wanted to include a private
attorney into its delegation but the panel objected, arguing that the
working procedures only allow members of government to attend panel
meetings.157 That finding, however, was overturned by the Appellate
Body which noted that representation by counsel of a government’s own
choice was a matter of particular significance, especially for developing
country members.158 The proposal was not integrated into the Balás text
– possibly because the clarity of this ruling has made any provision on
this issue redundant.
7.11 Measures Under Discretionary Laws
In addition to its proposal on the level of nullification or impairment
caused by measures taken under so-called ‘mandatory laws’ (See Section
6.4.4), Japan also suggests a change to the ‘theory of discretionary law’.
According to this theory, a law that permits a member to choose between
WTO-consistent and WTO-inconsistent measures is not WTO-
inconsistent as such, unless WTO-inconsistent measures are taken in its
application.159 Japan suggests that an exception to the theory of
discretionary law be made when repetition of an illegal measure under
a discretionary law is highly probable. If a member has intentionally
applied the same measure that was already found to be WTO-
inconsistent through a dispute settlement procedure, panels or the
Appellate Body ‘may find the discretionary law inconsistent’ and
‘recommend that necessary steps be taken to prevent ... the repetition of
WTO-inconsistent measures’. Measures taken under the discretionary
156 See TN/DS/W/44, no 1 (Jamaica). This suggestion is no longer included in Jamaica’s
second proposal; see TN/DS/W/44/Rev 1 (Jamaica).
157 See WT/DS27/R, paras 7.10–12; for a comment, see also Bronckers and Jackson (1999),
Ehrenhaft (1999), Vermulst, Mavroidis and Waer (1999), pp 4–5, Pearlman (1999) and
Martha (1997). See also Ragosta (2000) who deals with several aspects of private party
participation in dispute settlement.
158 See WT/DS27/AB/R, paras 5 and 10–12.
159 For a general overview of the discussion on mandatory versus discretionary laws, see
Bhuiyan (2002) and Sim (2003).
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law which are similar to measures already found WTO-inconsistent
should be presumed to be inconsistent, with the burden of proof being
shifted to the defendant.160 The proposal could be seen as directed
towards the United States with its record of violations that occurred
through actions taken under discretionary laws. Given the potential high-
politics implications of the proposal, it is barely surprising that it did
not find consideration in the consensus-oriented Balás text.
160 See TN/DS/W/22, no 2(b) (Japan) and TN/DS/W/32, Attachment, no 22 (Japan).
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8. ANALYSING THE DIFFICULTIES:
REASONS FOR THE FAILURE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT
Having reviewed the last six years of negotiations and the multitude of
proposals that have been submitted, one will identify six major stumbling
blocks and disincentives that have stood in the way of an agreement.
First, any amendment to the DSU requires consensus which is difficult
to achieve. Secondly, key decisions of the adjudicative bodies and
members’ experience with the system created controversial views on
specific aspects of the system that have become increasingly difficult to
bridge. Thirdly, the discussion reveals a more profound controversy
regarding the overall direction which the DSU should pursue, namely
whether it should continue its route towards more rule-orientation and
adjudication, or whether it should return to a more negotiatory,
diplomatic approach. Fourthly, and on a more systemic level, it is difficult
to reform a system that is in use while the review negotiations are taking
place. Fifthly, members appear to be unwilling to modify the DSU simply
for the sake of modifying it – in the light of a general sense of satisfaction
with the functioning of the current DSU and a fundamental concern
which is not to do any harm to the system through the review. Sixthly,
there appears to be some amount of a ‘DSU review in practice’. Although
no modifications to the text of the DSU have been made, members and
adjudicating bodies have managed to adapt the system to changing
practical needs. This flexibility has reduced the pressure towards a
reform. These six elements are subject to a more detailed discussion in
this chapter.
8.1 The Procedure for Amendments to the DSU
Traditionally, political decision-making in the consensus-oriented GATT/
WTO regime is a cumbersome process, and hurdles for amendments to
the texts are very high. The rules for such amendments are established
in Article X WTO Agreement. The particular systemic importance of the
DSU in the architecture of the multilateral trading system is reflected
by a specific provision on amendments to the DSU which is laid down
in Article X:8 WTO Agreement. It reads as follows:
Any Member of the WTO may initiate a
proposal to amend the provisions of the
Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annexes 2
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and 3 by submitting such proposal to the
Ministerial Conference. The decision to
approve amendments to the Multilateral Trade
Agreement in Annex 2 [ie the DSU; note by
the author] shall be made by consensus and
these amendments shall take effect for all
Members upon approval by the Ministerial
Conference. ...
In other words, any amendment of the DSU requires a consensus decision
and approval by the Ministerial Conference. To understand this
provision, it is helpful to recall the meaning of the term ‘consensus’ and
to contrast it with the concept of ‘unanimity’ which is not meant here.
Consensus in GATT parlance means that no member, present at the
meeting when the decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed
decision. Whereas the concept apparently grants veto powers, absent
parties (or those abstaining from voting) do not prevent such consensus.
Consensus thus gives members a tool which they can use to protect
their vital interests. If they do not wish to support an amendment but
do not have ‘strong feelings’ against it either, they may abstain from a
vote without thereby inhibiting consensus. However, even in such cases,
the consensus requirement gives members some leverage for bargaining
as they could still make their agreement to a modification conditional
upon approval of their own proposals in the same or in another
negotiating area.
Such bargaining opportunities in the DSU review negotiations under
the Doha mandate are, however, very limited. According to this mandate,
members were to come to a conclusion on the DSU review prior to the
overall deadline for the Doha Round negotiations. Whereas this attempt
of members to reap an ‘early harvest’, and the resulting partial insulation
of the DSU review from other negotiating areas may facilitate an issue-
oriented discussion which is not burdened by factually unnecessary but
politically motivated linkages, the political advantages of package deals
when it comes to agreeing on the issues discussed are being lost. Each
negotiator needs to see his own position, however controversial it may
be, reflected to some extent in a potential agreement on the DSU review
because there is no scope for bargaining across different negotiating
areas. This could lead to a more polarised discussion in which
compromise and an agreement are more difficult to achieve.
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8.2 Controversies on Major Specific Issues
As in other negotiating areas of the Doha Round, members partially
pursue negotiating objectives in the DSU review that appear to be
diametrically opposed to each other, or otherwise irreconcilable. Major
issue-specific controversies have shaped in particular the early stages
of the DSU review (ie the 1998–1999 stage). These controversies arose
between the US and the EC, and between industrialised and developing
countries. Whereas the debate has softened in most of these areas,
diverging approaches to these issues remain.
The transatlantic divide was particularly strong in the initial stage of
the DSU review (1998–1999). The US was mainly preoccupied with
strengthening the enforcement quality of the system, as it denounced
any idea of ‘sequencing’ between Article 21.5 and Article 22 DSU as
‘delay tactics’, and as it explored the possibility of carousel retaliation
to increase the impact of the suspension of concessions and other
obligations (SCOO) on the defendant. By contrast, the EC sought to avoid
the ‘teeth’ of the system and to delay the SCOO as it was struggling
with the implementation of the rulings in Bananas and Hormones, hence
its insistence on sequencing and on a prohibition of carousel retaliation.
Both positions were so far apart and apparently essential enough for
each party that there was no scope for an agreement that would have
enjoyed consensus between both partners in the early stages of the review
exercise. The change in the US position from offensive into defensive –
in particular after the lost FSC case and after the surge of complaints
against US trade remedy measures – made this topic lose some of its
acrimony.
The North-South divide regarded initially mainly questions related to
the openness of the dispute settlement system and options for
participation from civil society. Some industrialised countries, and the
US in particular, have been strongly in favour of more transparency in
order to appease increasingly critical domestic constituents and powerful
NGOs. By contrast, major emerging and developing countries including
Mexico, Malaysia, Egypt and India sharply opposed any opening of the
dispute settlement process and thus pursued diametrically opposed
negotiating objectives.
Whereas transparency and amicus briefs were clearly the most
controversial North-South issues during the initial stage of the review
exercise, the discussion evolved over time. Concerning amicus briefs,
the Appellate Body developed its own approach that allowed it to retain
a maximum of flexibility. It thus created accomplished facts despite harsh
criticism from developing countries. Northern countries now began to
204
Negotiating the Review of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding
signal that they could live with the practice developed by the Appellate
Body. Developing countries, however, will have realised that amicus
briefs have so far not had a decisive role in the adjudicative decision-
making. In this light, demands for action on the amicus issue increasingly
resemble bargaining chips that may, at a later stage, be traded against
concessions in more important areas.
With regard to external transparency and openness of the system,
however, the divisive approach seems to remain – at least prima facie.
Nevertheless, one is tempted to question the US insistence on increasing
external transparency in the light of more recent US calls for increased
Member control and flexibility of dispute settlement. Such negotiating
flexibility is at odds with transparency and public scrutiny.
The two major lines of controversy (US-EC, North-South) as outlined
above can explain to some extent why no consensus on the outcome of
the DSU review has been achieved in the past. In this light, attempts of
many small and medium-sized traders to move the review and to settle
at least on a mini-package of less controversial improvements in the
interest of the system, had no chance of realisation.
8.3 Controversies on the Fundamental Orientation of the DSU
In addition to issue-specific divergences, there is also a more profound
controversy regarding the overall direction the DSU should pursue.
Should the dispute settlement system continue its route towards more
rule-orientation and adjudication (as it did in the past 30 years), or should
it rather return to a more negotiatory and diplomatic – ie power-oriented
– approach?1
1 Rule-orientation and power-orientation as basic concepts for the settlement of international
trade disputes were initially introduced into the literature by Jackson (1978), pp 98ff.  He
described power oriented techniques as suggesting: ‘a diplomat asserting, subtly or otherwise,
the power of the nation he represents.  In general, such a diplomat prefers negotiation as a
method of settling matters, because he can bring to bear the power of his nation to win
advantage in particular negotiations ... Needless to say, often large countries tend to favour
this technique more than do small countries; the latter being more inclined to institutionalised
or “rule oriented” structures of international activity. A rule oriented approach, by way of
contrast, would suggest that a rule be formulated which makes broad policy sense for the
benefit of the world and the parties concerned, and then there should be an attempt to develop
institutions to insure the highest possible degree of adherence to that rule. In the case of
disputes between countries, a power oriented approach is often utilised in the negotiation, so
that the dispute, even if it involves a breach of a rule, may be settled more from the point of
view of who has the effective power, economic or otherwise, than from the point of view of
determining whether a rule has been breached. A rule oriented approach, on the other hand,
would also involve negotiation for a settlement, but in such a negotiation the negotiators
would be more inclined to resolve the dispute by reference to what they would expect an
international body would conclude about the action of the transgressor in relation to its
international obligations. ‘ For a short overview, see also Jackson (1997). For a  critical comment,
see Dunne III (2002).
205
8. Analysing the Difficulties: Reasons for the Failure to Reach an Agreement
For the purpose of this contribution, rule-orientation is understood as
the strong reliance on procedural and material rules for the settlement
of trade disputes, ideally involving independent third party
adjudication. By contrast, a power-oriented (or diplomacy-oriented)
dispute settlement procedure relies strongly on political negotiations
and therefore on the political power of the parties concerned. In such a
setting, the role of procedural and material rules for the settlement of
disputes is limited. The role and independence of third party
adjudication is also subject to narrow limits in a power-oriented setting.
Each of these two generic orientations is reflected in a substantial part
of the proposals.
8.3.1 Proposals Towards Strengthening Rule-Orientation
Some proposals would contribute directly or indirectly to more rule-
orientation. Major proposals include:
• Strengthened notification requirements for mutually acceptable
solutions and written reports on the outcome of consultations
(see Section 6.1.3): These proposals would make early
settlements more transparent. Such transparency, in turn,
would create both normative and political pressure for
solutions that are not too far apart from WTO rules and the
outcome of a potential litigation. They could therefore
strengthen the rule-oriented element in dispute settlement.
• Compliance reviews of mutually agreed solutions (see Section
6.1.4): Compliance reviews of mutually agreed solutions
could be a powerful instrument in making early settlements
a more attractive means of dispute settlement since their
results would become better enforceable. That could
increase their attractiveness for complainants and
strengthen the security and predictability of trading
conditions under such solutions.
• Reduced time-frames: Several proposals have been submitted
that aim at the explicit or implicit reduction of time-frames.
The ‘explicit’ category includes reduced time-frames for
consultations and for the determination of the RPT. The
‘implicit’ category includes the removal of the requirement
that panels are established only at the second meeting after
the request has appeared on the DSB agenda, or the
introduction of a provision that would mandate members
to submit their first written submission along with the panel
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request. The establishment of a fast-track panel procedure
follows similar directions. Such proposals will generally
deprive members of time and options that are available for
diplomatic settlements and for ‘controlled escalation’. In
reducing opportunities for political tactics and negotiations,
these proposals would inevitably strengthen the legal
elements in the procedure. In the light of experience which
suggests that consultations are often not held in a
meaningful way under the new DSU, and that they are
limited to one or two short meetings, time for consultations
does currently not appear as the primary constraint during
consultations or as the major problem in arriving at an early
settlement. However, the actual impact of such changes
should not be overrated. Time-frames in the DSU are
already relatively short. Delays often occur because existing
time-frames are not respected. Such delays cannot be
eliminated by reducing time-frames on paper.
• The creation of a professional permanent panel body (PPB; see
Section 6.2.1): One far-reaching proposal is the EC call for
a permanent panel body. Modelled after the existing
Appellate Body, the PPB would become some kind of a
‘Court of First Instance’ in the WTO dispute settlement
system. Members would lose their control of the
composition of panels. Considerations related to re-
appointment as a panellist would presumably have less
weight in a PPB, thereby increasing the independence of
panellists. Moreover, it is often argued that permanent
panellists would pursue a more legalistic approach to
dispute settlement than that pursued by government
officials on which the current system strongly relies. Finally,
the establishment of a PPB could further contribute to the
evolution of a consistent body of precedent law. Of course,
its actual impact would depend largely on the composition
of the PPB, eg on whether it would mainly be composed of
litigation-oriented lawyers or of government officials.
• Terms of appointment of the Appellate Body (see Section 6.3.1):
It has been proposed to appoint Appellate Body members
on a non-renewable six-year term. By thus removing any
considerations related to reappointment from Appellate
Body members’ minds, the proposal would strengthen the
independence of the Appellate Body members and their
ability to focus solely on legal considerations.
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• Sequencing and implementation (see Section 6.4): A major
portion of the proposals on the implementation stage are
dedicated to the elaboration of a solution to sequencing
and other open issues (such as the lifting of retaliatory
measures) in this ultimate stage of WTO dispute settlement.
In clarifying the DSU and suggesting a one-fits-all solution,
the need for bilateral negotiations on procedural
agreements is eliminated. This would clearly move dispute
settlement towards more rule-orientation. The same holds
for other proposals such as the strengthening of the
defendant’s reporting requirements in the implementation
stage, the obligation of the complainant to submit the list
of concessions it wishes to withdraw along with its request
for an authorisation to SCOO, notification requirements of
retaliatory measures taken and the extension of the scope
of compliance review procedures to arbitration awards.
• Prohibition of carousel retaliation (see Section 6.4.6): The
proposals for a prohibition of carousel retaliation would
have a somewhat ambiguous effect: On the one hand, it
would eliminate legal uncertainty with regard to retaliatory
measures. Market conditions for the defendant’s exporters
would, although being restricted through retaliatory
measures, remain predictable and agreed-on trade rules
would continue to apply for non-affected exporters. A
prohibition would also be in line with the requirement that
retaliation shall be equivalent to the level of nullification
or impairment. By thus reducing the potential cost of the
SCOO for the defendant, however, there would be less
pressure towards compliance.
• Strengthened enforcement: Several proposals to strengthen
compliance and the enforcement of material WTO law have
been submitted. Their basic rationale is to increase the cost
of a violation for defendants and thus the incentives for
prompt compliance. At the same time, they would ensure
that reciprocity is maintained and that the negotiated
balance of rights and obligations is protected. These
submissions include: proposals on collective retaliation;
freedom of cross-retaliation; retroactive determination and
application of nullification and impairment, including the
allocation of litigation expenses; mandatory (monetary)
compensation, including for measures withdrawn during
proceedings; and the negotiability of the right to suspend
concessions or other obligations. Other measures such as
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preventive measures, the suspension of a defendant’s right
to use the dispute settlement mechanism as a complainant
if it does not comply with adverse rulings, the fast-track
panel procedure, the method of calculating increased
amounts of nullification or impairment in the case of
‘mandatory laws’, and the proposed change to the doctrine
of ‘discretionary laws’ also follow a similar thrust. However,
these proposals may be more difficult to implement and
may unfold some adverse effects as well. All these proposals
have in common that they would restrict the ability of
members to reach policy goals by means of trade policy
interventions in contravention of WTO disciplines.
• Strengthened third party rights (see Section 7.4): Strengthened
third party rights increase internal transparency and may
raise the costs of negotiated settlements. Potentially affected
third parties will have better opportunities to oppose
bilateral deals between the main parties to a dispute if these
deals are at their expense, or if they treat them less
favourably than the original complainant. Improved third
party rights may also prevent negotiators from settlements
that are too far away from the WTO principles. As a result,
negotiating flexibility of the main parties is reduced, and
outcomes are likely to be closer to WTO rules than they are
today.
• Increased external transparency (see Section 7.1): Similar to
strengthened third party rights and strengthened
notification requirements, external transparency sheds light
on negotiations and therefore ‘disinfects’ bilateral deals
from negotiated elements that are not necessarily in line
with WTO provisions. The logic is that concessions and
package deals would become more difficult as adversely
affected interest groups would pressure their governments
to take a ‘hard stance’ and bring issues to adjudication
instead of settling on a compromise with ‘unnecessary
concessions’. Not surprisingly, empirical studies have found
that democracies find it particularly hard to settle if the
process is public, and scholars are issuing warnings against
the increase of transparency as it would preclude early
settlements (see Chapter 4). Transparency can thus be
associated with the move towards a more accountable,
rules-based system, whereas the current confidentiality
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requirements and lack of public transparency belong rather
to the domain of diplomatic negotiations.
To conclude, a large number of proposals would lead to more rule-
orientation in the multilateral trading system. However, a word of
caution must be said. While each of these proposals may increase the
impact of rules for the resolution of disputes, it cannot be excluded that
the implementation of these proposals could in the long run weaken the
system. For instance, increased transparency, improved notification
requirements and compliance reviews of mutually agreed solutions
appear, prima facie, to strengthen rule-orientation. However, the paper
trail which such consultations would leave could put governments under
considerable pressure. Complainants would presumably have fewer
incentives than today to settle early (see empirical findings in Chapter
4) as compromises would be well-documented and governments could
come under pressure domestically for not pursuing a ‘tougher line’ with
the defendant. Similarly, compliance reviews could deter defendants
from agreeing to early settlements as they would fear the threat of
enforcement.
As a result, political strains on the WTO dispute settlement system in
particular, and on the WTO as a whole, could increase if more cases
(including more difficult ones) were brought to litigation. Moreover,
powerful players that are interested in some negotiating flexibility could
be driven out of a too legalist system. If they turned to settling their
disputes outside the WTO, any strengthening of rule-orientation in the
DSU would be only a pyrrhic victory. The anti-legalist backlash, which
occurred in the 1960s (see Section 2.2.2.4) shows, that such dangers are
real.
8.3.2 Proposals Towards Strengthening Power-Orientation
• Automatic lapse or withdrawal of consultations/panel requests
(see Section 6.2.3): Proposals have been brought that
provide for the automatic lapse of consultations/panel
requests or for an easier withdrawal. Both instruments
would allow members to use consultation and panel
requests more vigorously as negotiatory instruments.
Notification requirements for mutually agreed solutions
could be spurned even more easily if consultation or panel
requests dissipated automatically. This would clearly
enhance the flexibility of disputing parties and reduce the
power of adjudicating bodies.
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• Calls for separate opinions by individual panel(ists)/Appellate
Body members (see Sections 6.2.6 and 6.3.1): Calls for panel
or Appellate Body members to hand down their opinions
separately would expose individual members of the
adjudicating bodies to undue pressure from governments
and might reduce their independence. It cannot be excluded
that such proposals would lead to more ‘political’ decisions.
• Flexibility during appellate review (see Sections 6.3.3 and 6.3.4):
Several proposals seek to introduce more flexibility and
member control at the appellate stage by allowing an
interim review and the suspension of the appellate
procedures. The appellate stage is currently the most rule-
oriented stage of the process, with cases undergoing review
by law experts and without any noteworthy Member
control over the procedure. It is therefore of little surprise
that this stage is targeted by those members who would
prefer to turn back the clock. The interim review or the
suspension of procedures would provide members with a
new, powerful political control instrument and with
increased possibilities for bilateral negotiations at a stage
which has so far remained largely outside their control.
• Deletion of findings from reports (see Sections 6.2.5 and 6.3.6):
The US-Chilean proposal to allow parties to delete findings
from panel and Appellate Body reports by mutual
agreement could fundamentally alter the nature of the DSU.
Its implementation could lead to situations where a weaker
party in a bilateral setting could come under considerable
pressure from a more powerful counterpart to consent to
such deletion. Moreover, the effects of such a provision on
the rights of third parties are rather detrimental, as their
interest in a ruling on a specific issue would be disregarded.
The proposal is also at odds with calls for more
transparency. The power of adjudicating bodies would be
curbed as they could be prevented from making findings
which could contribute to the further evolution of the
multilateral trading system. The rule of law in international
economic relations would therefore be weakened.
• Partial adoption procedures (see Sections 6.2.5 and 6.3.6): By
contrast to the deletion of findings, another suggestion of
the US-Chilean proposal, which is to allow the DSB to
decide by consensus not to adopt specific findings or the
basic rationale behind a finding in a report, seems less
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problematic. This proposal is basically in line with the
member-driven character of the organisation, and it could
remedy to some extent the imbalance between the legal and
the political elements in the WTO system. Furthermore, its
effect should not be overrated. As soon as the Appellate
Body makes a controversial finding, it is likely to be in the
interest of at least one member in an organisation of 148
states, and that member could still block a consensus not
to adopt a finding – and were it only to create a situation
which allows for bargaining on open issues with the party
interested in the deletion.
• Special and differential treatment for developing countries (see
Section 7.5): Several proposals have been made that would
introduce more flexibility for developing countries and
would ease the ‘burden’ of rule-orientation upon them. This
holds basically for most proposals on S&D, including the
mandatory provision on S&D during consultations
(although it remains so far unclear how it should be made
operational), the mandatory use of Article 5 procedures
(good offices, conciliation and mediation) in cases involving
developing countries, the mandatory study of development
implications of findings and recommendations, and the
mandatory consideration of S&D by panels. Proposals for
the implementation stage such as extension of the RPT to
two to three years have a similar direction. Finally, the
proposal by China according to which industrial countries
should not bring more than two cases per calendar year
against a particular developing country, would provide a
highly effective means for developing countries to shield
themselves against challenges to their trade policy
measures. It would basically release developing countries
from their obligation to comply, amounting to an invitation
to defy multilateral trade rules where it seems politically
appropriate.
• Various other proposals: Several other proposals would
increase the flexibility of members to negotiate during the
procedure and help gain more political control over the
mechanism. These include the EC proposal to give parties
to a dispute the possibility of extending any time frame in
the DSU by mutual agreement, proposals to oblige
adjudicating bodies to submit certain issues to the General
Council for interpretation, and the call by the US and Chile
for ‘additional guidance’ to be provided to adjudicating
bodies.
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8.3.3 Rule-Oriented Versus Power-Oriented Proposals: Summary
A classification of the proposals according to their fundamental
orientation shows that both the trend towards more rule-orientation and
towards more power-orientation and negotiation are represented in
current negotiations.
Table 8.1: ‘Power-Orientation’ Versus ‘Rule-orientation’ in the Doha
Round DSU Negotiations
Proposals strengthening  
‘rule-orientation’  
Proposals strengthening  
‘power-orientation’ 
• Strengthened notification 
requirements for mutually 
acceptable solutions and 
written reports on the 
outcome of consultations; 
• Compliance reviews of 
mutually agreed solutions; 
• Reduced time-frames; 
• Creation of a professional 
permanent panel body 
(PPB); 
• Terms of appointment of 
the Appellate Body; 
• Regulating sequencing and 
implementation; 
• Prohibition of carousel 
retaliation; 
• Strengthening enforcement 
and increasing the cost of 
non-compliance; 
• Strengthening third party 
rights;  
• Increasing external 
transparency. 
 
• Automatic lapse or withdrawal 
of consultations/panel 
requests; 
• Calls for separate opinions by 
individual panellists/Appellate 
Body members; 
• Flexibility during appellate 
review: interim review and the 
suspension of the appellate 
procedures;  
• Deletion of findings from 
reports;  
• Partial adoption procedures; 
• Additional measures of special 
and differential treatment of 
developing countries; 
• Extension of time-frames by 
agreement of the parties; 
• Obliging adjudicating bodies 
to submit certain issues to the 
General Council for 
interpretation;  
• Providing ‘additional 
guidance’ to adjudicating 
bodies. 
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As the historic account in Chapter 2 has shown, the trend in the evolution
of WTO dispute settlement has been towards more rule-orientation and
towards a reduction of political elements, with the important exception
of the anti-legalist period in the 1960s. Particularly since the Tokyo
Round, rule-orientation has gained ground, not least under pressure of
the United States which was always interested in a strong dispute
settlement system to open up foreign markets. In the light of the more
recent proposals, however, the future evolution seems less clear. A
considerable number of proposals from both the presumably most
important single member (ie the US) and a large number of developing
countries reveal a certain degree of scepticism towards the rules-based,
adjudication-oriented approach.
Whereas the newly-discovered US interest in flexibility and member
control could be interpreted as a direct reflection of the currently
defensive US position in dispute settlement, the reasons for the criticism
from developing countries are less obvious at first sight. Normally, we
would expect these mostly small and medium-sized economies to be
particularly interested in a largely rule-oriented approach to the
resolution of trade disputes as it shields them from undue pressure from
powerful industrial nations. It appears, however, that the system does
not work satisfactorily for developing countries.
A variety of reasons might explain their sense of dissatisfaction. First,
developing countries are disappointed with the final outcome of the
litigious process. As the Ecuadorian experience in the Bananas case has
bluntly illustrated, the SCOO as the enforcement device of last resort is
an ineffective instrument for small developing countries. Not only do
they lack retaliatory power because of insufficient market size, but they
also mainly harm their own development prospects by shutting out
imports which are needed for their economic development. Secondly,
participation in the increasingly rules-based system requires more fine-
tuned legal reasoning and therefore costly legal assistance. Both the
financial and human resources required to carry out litigation before
the WTO are apparently a serious impediment for poorer countries. And
thirdly, many developing countries face multiple political constraints
that may prevent them from bringing disputes against a developed
country. These may stem from linkages of multilateral trade policy with
other policy areas. For instance, a developing country that depends on
a developed country’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) scheme
or on its Official Development Assistance (ODA) programmes may
decide not to bring an otherwise substantiated complaint against the
latter.
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To sum it up, the divergences in specific proposals also reflect a more
fundamental controversy on the basic direction that the DSU should
take, i.e. on whether it should further evolve towards a rules-based
mechanism relying on legal process, or whether diplomacy and
negotiations should be emphasised more strongly again. These
fundamental divergences may be more difficult to bridge than the issue-
specific controversies.
8.4 Systemic Problems of Renegotiating a System in Use
It has been said above that the dispute settlement mechanism has a
‘constitutional’ character as it includes the basic rules under which
members settle disputes between each other which may arise under any
of the covered agreements. The systemic importance of the DSU is
reflected in the particular requirements for amendments to the DSU (see
Section 8.1.1 above) that go beyond the requirements for amendments
to other provisions.
According to Rawls, constitutional rules should always be agreed by
actors in the ‘original position’ and behind a ‘veil of ignorance’2 in order
to prevent self-serving choices. Transposed into the DSU review
discussion, this means that the best approach from a systemic perspective
would be if the discussions took place far away from any concrete dispute
brought to Geneva. In the reality of trade policy, however, such a ‘veil of
ignorance’ does obviously not exist. Members know their own and the
other parties’ vulnerable points fairly well after having applied the
mechanism to more than 300 disputes in the past 10 years. In order
properly to understand the DSU review and the slow, if any, progress it
has made, it is therefore clearly not sufficient to focus narrowly  on the
discussions held in the DSB, let alone in its special negotiating session.
Rather, the context should be considered as well.
This context may pose additional systemic difficulties in completing
the DSU review, arising on three levels in particular: ongoing material
disputes, specific procedural disputes and ongoing negotiations on
material WTO rules.
2 This is a constructivist technique developed by Rawls in his book ‘A Theory of Justice’
(1971) to show the underpinnings of what everyone could conceive as a just state. If
actors conceived themselves as potential constructors of a mythical just future society
but were ignorant of their racial, social, and economic position within that society, rational
actors would be in an ‘original position’ from which they would be able to take optimal
decisions on how a just society would look.
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Parallel material disputes: First and foremost, the context of the DSU review
consists of the ‘material’ disputes that are brought to the WTO on a
continued basis, and in particular of the politically more controversial
ones. It is here that several of the controversial issues in the debate have
emerged, and where individual country positions have been shaped
(eg sequencing and collective retaliation in Bananas, carousel retaliation
in Hormones, and amicus curiae in Shrimp-Turtle etc; see Chapter 5 for
details).
In addition to these past experiences, members’ expectations with regard
to looming disputes that may threaten to come up in the future will also
have an influence on the negotiating positions.
Parallel procedural disputes: A second layer of this context consists of
specific “procedural” disputes which focus on issues that, at the same
time, are subject to DSU review negotiations. Examples are US – Section
301, US – Certain EC Products, or US – Section 306, where the EC tried to
obtain rulings that would confirm its positions on sequencing or carousel
retaliation, respectively (see Chapter 5 for details).
As long as such disputes are going on and both parties see chances to
prevail, no party has an interest in prejudicing its position through a
prior settlement on these issues.
Parallel negotiations on material WTO rules and on the substance of
negotiations: In a third layer, ongoing discussions on the ‘material’ WTO
rules and on the ‘substance’ of negotiations play a crucial role in
governments’ approach to the DSU. An illustrative example is the current
‘two-part strategy’ of the US administration to avoid ‘bad rulings’, ie to
avoid more defeats in trade remedy cases. To this purpose, the US takes
an active part in both the negotiations on the ‘rules’ (such as anti-
dumping, safeguards, subsidies and countervailing measures) and on
the DSU.3
Moreover, the extent to which new areas such as investment or
competition could become subject to dispute settlement rules has a direct
bearing on members’ readiness to accept such new disciplines on the
3 See ‘Commerce Outlines Two-Part Strategy to Fight Bad Rulings’, in Inside US Trade, 3
January 2003; and ‘Shirzad Says US Will Focus on Market Distortions in Rules Paper’, in
Inside US Trade, 4 October 2002.
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one hand, and on their agenda with regard to a strengthening (or a
weakening) of the dispute settlement mechanism on the other.4
Clearly, it would not make much sense to contemplate and evaluate the
DSU review in isolation of developments on the three levels as outlined
in the preceding sections. The situation is further complicated by the
dynamic nature of these three levels: The entire context of the DSU review
is not static, but it evolves with each new (or merely expected)
development that modifies or threatens to modify positions taken on
the DSU review, thereby making negotiations even more difficult.
A nice illustration is a position paper prepared by the Union of Industrial
and Employers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE), the representative
business organisation of corporate Europe and a main stakeholder in
the system. On 1 October 1999, after two deadlines for the DSU had
already lapsed and with the Seattle Ministerial only two months away,
it issued a ‘Preliminary UNICE position on WTO Dispute Settlement’,
holding explicitly that ‘(t)hese views might be reviewed/complemented
as the discussions on this matter evolve at EC and WTO levels’.5
Negotiators seem to be aware of the particular difficulties that re-
negotiating a system in use does entail. In order to avoid further
complications through additional linkages, delegations were anxious
not to link the DSU review negotiations to other negotiations, as one
diplomat mentioned. Attempts by certain members to construe such
linkages between the DSU review and other negotiating areas during
the Doha-mandated negotiations were reportedly rejected by a large
majority of WTO members.
8.5 General Sense of Satisfaction with the Current DSU
Despite the criticism that is occasionally voiced about the DSU, there
seems to be a general sense of satisfaction with the system. As the
Consultative Board (2004, p 56) holds with regard to the lack of success
of the DSU review to date, ‘… an important underlying concern is, or
4 Indeed, such a debate has already begun in negotiations. With regard to investment,
see, for instance, ‘Proposals to Apply WTO Dispute System to Investment Pact Draw
Fire’, in Inside US Trade, 20 September 2002; with regard to competition, see, for instance,
‘Informal Competition Group Focuses on Dispute Settlement’, in Inside US Trade, 13 April
2001.
5 See UNICE (1999).
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should be, to not ‘do any harm’ to the existing system since it has so
many valuable attributes’.
Although there is some scope for improvements, there appears to be a
well-founded fear that the required modifications (which are mostly
technical) should not come at the expense of fundamental alterations of
the system that are demanded by some members. This holds in particular
for those changes to the DSU which would be motivated by particular
interests of single countries, and which would not necessarily be in the
overall interest of the system. In this context, it is understandable that
delegations prefer to ignore negotiating mandates and let the DSU
review negotiations drag on without a conclusion beyond fixed
deadlines.
8.6 Limited Progress: Elements of a ‘DSU Review in Practice’
The pressure towards a fast conclusion of the DSU review is further
reduced by the ‘DSU review in practice’ which has occurred in some
instances, as the following examples show.
First, the sequencing problem has been overcome by the conclusion of
bilateral agreements between disputing parties during the
implementation stage. These agreements allow members to overcome
the gaps and contradictions in the DSU text in a practical way. Whereas
there has not yet been a consensus to adapt the DSU text to this evolving
practice, members have adapted to the bilateral agreements and no
longer appear to consider the sequencing issue as a pressing concern.6
Secondly, with regard to amicus curiae briefs, the Appellate Body has de
facto developed a very pragmatic approach, despite initially strong
opposition from mostly developing countries. On the one hand, the
Appellate Body displays a general openness towards the acceptance of
amicus curiae briefs. On the other hand, it does not appear to accord
decisive weight to these submissions in its decisions – at least not
explicitly. This approach gives adjudicating bodies a maximum of
flexibility while it respects the concerns of members who are against
such briefs.7
6 See Section 6.4.3.
7 See Section 7.3.
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Thirdly, on a related matter, the Appellate Body has found a response to
the concerns of many members who held that the acceptance of amicus
curiae briefs gave NGOs an edge over members, as the latter had to cope
with restrictive requirements on third country participation. It relaxed
these requirements by adopting new working procedures in late 2002
which extended the possibility of third parties to attend oral hearings.8
Similarly, the Appellate Body only recently adopted new working
procedures requiring more precision in notices of appeal, thus catering
for a long standing concern of some members who had called for
increased precision in notices of appeal but were unable to reach such a
modification through the DSU review negotiations.9
As a further example, the establishment of an Advisory Centre on World
Trade Law (ACWL) has remedied some of the resource constraints that
developing countries face when litigating in the more sophisticated legal
settings of the new dispute settlement system. By providing legal
assistance to such countries, the centre serves to a certain degree as a
substitute for other institutions such as a special fund or the
reimbursement of litigation costs that have been called for by some
developing countries during the DSU review negotiations.10
As these examples show, members and adjudicating bodies have
managed to adapt the dispute settlement system to changing
circumstances without changing one single provision of the DSU.
Dispute settlement practice has thus brought some amount of DSU
reform, without facing the problems of political renegotiations of the
DSU text.
8 See Section 7.4.
9 See Section 6.3.2.
10 See Section 7.5.4.
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Having analysed the stumbling blocks in the DSU negotiations, this
chapter derives some policy recommendations in order to move the DSU
review forward and it evaluates the chances of an agreement.
9.1 Policy Recommendations: How to Advance the DSU Review
9.1.1 Trimmed Ambitions and a Focus on Technical Improvements
The controversies on specific issues and in particular the more
fundamental conflict between rule-oriented and power-oriented
proposals indicate the difficulties associated with the DSU review. In
an attempt to include only those proposals into the compromise draft
on which consensus seemed to be feasible, the Balás compromise text
already left out many major issues such as, for instance, the permanent
panel body, increased external transparency and the partial adoption
procedure.
Given these controversies along with the consensus requirement for any
amendment to the DSU, it is difficult to perceive how a review that
stretches beyond rather technical improvements (some of which are
already established DSU practice) should materialise. Given the fact that
the DSU works generally well, any effort to move the DSU review should
be limited to the less controversial aspects. Of course, this could make it
difficult for more ambitious players who would have to return to their
capitals with nothing in their hands. This is, however, a difficulty
inherent to the ‘early harvest’ idea which isolates the DSU review from
remaining negotiations and which will be dealt with in Section 9.1.5.
9.1.2 Improved Integration of Developing Countries
Roughly three-quarters of the WTO’s 148 member states are developing
and least developed countries. Despite their importance in terms of
membership, developing countries have not been frequent participants
in dispute settlement cases. Empirical studies even suggest that the new
DSU could make it harder for developing countries to participate in
dispute settlement (see Section 4.2.3).
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If this large majority of members is to be truly integrated into the
mechanism, and if they are to support any DSU reform effort (which, it
should be remembered, can only be arrived at by consensus), taking
developing country interests into consideration is of particular
importance. The major problems of developing countries, many of which
do not even have a mission of their own in Geneva, are the human and
financial resource constraints. Such resources are a precondition to high-
levelled litigation. The improved legal quality of the dispute settlement
reports under the new DSU has often been hailed as a major contribution
of the Uruguay Round and as a sign of the DSU’s increasing rule-
orientation. At the same time, however, this evolution has increased the
requirements with regard to the quality of legal reasoning. Developing
countries often do not have sufficient means to participate in these
elaborate proceedings.
Similar to legal aid which is available in national legal systems to persons
without adequate resources, developed countries and the WTO should
be ready to support developing countries. The establishment of an
Advisory Center on World Trade Law (ACWL) is an important step in
this direction. Further ways to contribute to the resources of developing
countries wishing to participate in dispute settlement proceedings could
be explored, including the establishment of a fund that developing
countries could tap in order to bring forth their complaints or to defend
their interests in a case filed against them. The terms of usage should,
however, be defined in a way that does not lead to abuse (such as the
filing of politically motivated ‘nuisance suits’ at the expense of other
countries).
An improved integration of developing countries into dispute settlement
practice is of key importance – both as a matter of fairness, and as an
instrument to secure their support for and sense of ownership in the
system.
9.1.3 Rebalancing Adjudication and Political Decision-making
9.1.3.1 Imbalance Between Adjudication and Political Decision-
making as a Problem
It has been said several times that the dispute settlement system has
gradually moved from barely codified practices relying heavily on
diplomatic negotiations to an increasingly codified litigation mechanism
with a relatively strong emphasis on the rule of law (see Chapter 2 for a
detailed account of this evolution).
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More recently, some observers have become concerned that the relative
success and well-functioning of the dispute settlement system with its
adjudicative bodies on the one hand, and the weakness of the consensus-
based political decision-making in the WTO on the other, is leading to a
serious imbalance. Automaticity and the allocation of full agenda control
with the complainant government have made WTO dispute settlement
become the forum of choice for governments to pursue their agenda,
including on sensitive issues. Judges have to decide the cases which are
brought before them, and they cannot refuse rulings just because they
are politically sensitive. The judge’s job becomes even more delicate,
where the political decision-making process is slow or practically
blocked, which is the case in the WTO.1 Although the WTO agreement
includes rules for the adoption of interpretations or the amendment of
the agreements which would enable members to exercise some control,
the high hurdles that are built into these rules deprive them de facto of
the possibility of correcting rulings.
The consequence of such ‘wrong cases’ are heavily-criticised rulings and
allegations that panel or Appellate Body reports add to or diminish the
rights or obligations of members, or that these organs exceed their
authority. Although such criticism – which has partly translated into
some of the proposals discussed in this study2 – appears to be largely
unfounded,3 it is a symptom of increasing tensions in the system. The
fundamental divergence between rule-oriented and power-oriented
proposals is one aspect of the problem which should be remedied in
order to move the DSU review.
Two generic options are available to remedy the current situation of
imbalance and to bring legal and political decision-making back into
tune again. One option is to pull the teeth of the adjudicating mechanism
and to make dispute settlement again subject to increased political
control. The second option is to enhance the political decision-making
process and thus make it more effective. Whereas most observers would
likely favour the second option, the matter is not so straightforward.
9.1.3.2 Option 1: Weakening the Adjudication System
Barfield (2001), a key proponent for more political control of WTO
dispute settlement,4 suggests that the WTO should adopt a less rigid,
1 See Ehlermann (2002).
2 See Section 7.7.
3 See, for instance, the reports by GAO.
4 See Barfield (2002) and Barfield (2001). An earlier contribution to the discussion is Bello
(1996).
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more flexible dispute settlement system. He also suggests that in order
to achieve continued democratic legitimacy, the WTO should remain a
government-to-government organisation in which governments take
decisions to the WTO after having reconciled the conflicting interests in
the domestic political process. With regard to dispute settlement, his
recommendations explicitly follow the goal of moving the WTO dispute
settlement system partially back into the direction of the original
diplomatic model for dispute settlement, and away from the judicial
model introduced by DSU.
His proposals for ‘constitutional reform’ have four elements. First, he
recommends the introduction of a ‘safety valve’. In the case of highly-
politicised disputes that threaten to damage the WTO, or where there
are no established legislative rules or where treaty language masks
disagreement between members, the Director-General or a special
standing committee of the DSB would step in and direct the disputing
members to settle their differences through bilateral negotiations,
mediation, or arbitration by an outside party. Secondly, he suggests the
reintroduction of a blocking mechanism, allowing one-third of DSB
members representing one-fourth of trade between WTO members to
block the adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report which, as a
consequence, would not become binding WTO law. Thirdly, he suggests
abolishing retaliation as a remedy and replacing it by monetary fines or
trade compensation. Fourthly, he recommends that the US continues to
deny direct effect to WTO provisions. In addition, he proposes improving
transparency, a restrictive stance towards amicus briefs, a greater diversity
of panellists beyond trade experts, public hearings, and more dialogue
with ‘outside interest groups’, as well as the establishment of an ‘Eminent
Persons Group’ similar to the Leutwiler Group in the 1980s.5
Domestically, he calls for increased congressional oversight, through a
bipartisan commission and a joint committee, as a means of increasing
the democratic accountability and legitimacy of the WTO.
5 One will note that such a group – the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai
Panitchpakdi – has, in the meantime, been established. In its report entitled ‘The Future
of the WTO’, however, the Consultative Board (2004, p 80) does not recommend to re-
politicise WTO dispute settlement. Rather to the contrary, it argues that: ‘… any measures
or ideas for reform that would create a sort of “diplomatic veto” or the opportunity for
specific disputants to “nullify” or change aspects of the final adopted report should be
strongly resisted.’
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9.1.3.3 Option 2: Strengthening Political Decision-making at the
WTO
Other authors, however, vehemently oppose any effort to weaken the
adjudicating system and argue in favour of focusing reform efforts on
improved political decision-making.6
Traditionally, both in the former GATT and now in the WTO, political
decision-making has been a cumbersome process. The practice in GATT
was to avoid voting, and that preference has also found entry into the
WTO agreement where Article IX on decision-making explicitly states
in its first sentence that ‘(t)he WTO shall continue the practice of decision-
making by consensus followed under GATT 1947’. Where consensus
cannot be reached, Article IX:1 WTO agreement provides for ordinary
decisions that the majority of votes cast is sufficient. The authority for
decisions rests with the Ministerial Conference or the General Council.
In both bodies, each member has one vote.
The Ministerial Conference and the General Council also have the
exclusive authority for the adoption of interpretations. The adoption of
interpretations requires an affirmative vote of a three-fourths majority
of all WTO members (ie not only of members present) according to
Article IX:2 WTO agreement. Furthermore, the Ministerial Conference
has the right to waive an obligation imposed on a member by the
agreements – a technique which has been used in the past to
accommodate political realities to some extent. According to Article IX:3
WTO agreement, such waivers, unless granted by consensus, require a
three-fourths majority of all the members.
For amendments to the text, Article X GATT prescribes a rather complex
and cumbersome procedure: The authority for amendments rests with
the Ministerial Conference. Usually, acceptance of an amendment shall
be decided by consensus within 90 days after the proposal has been
tabled. If consensus is reached, the proposed amendment is submitted
to Members for acceptance. Members shall then deposit an instrument
of acceptance with the WTO within the period of acceptance specified
by the Ministerial Conference. If no consensus is reached, the Ministerial
Conference shall decide by a two-thirds majority of the members on
whether to submit the amendment to the members for acceptance. In
practice, interpretations of an agreement and amendments occur only
6 See Ehlermann (2003) (including the comment by McRae (2003)), Ehlermann (2002), p
635ff, Ehlermann (2002a), Jackson (2002), p 111, Steger (2002a) and Cottier and Takenoshita
(2003).
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rarely. No single amendment to an agreement has been decided since
the conclusion of the Uruguay Round.
Reform suggestions to strengthen political decision-making in the WTO
have already been made. Schott and Watal (2000) propose the
establishment of a small, informal steering committee with roughly 20
seats, distributed according to both the value of foreign trade and the
goal of achieving global geographic representation. While each of the
larger traders would have one seat, smaller nations would pool their
resources and each of these groups of countries would be represented
by one country. Actually, this approach would be similar to the
composition of the boards governing the IMF and the World Bank.7 Such
a structure would still allow the continuation of decision-making by
consensus, as the proponents explicitly abstain from suggesting
proportional or weighted voting. The main strength of the proposal lies
accordingly in facilitating the preparation of decisions and the search
for a consensus.
Focusing more narrowly on the problem of ‘legislative response’ to
decisions by adjudicating bodies, Cottier and Takenoshita (2003) base
their suggestions on the diagnosis that both the amendment and the
interpretation of provisions in the multilateral trade agreements are
virtually impossible. Members whose interpretation prevailed in a panel
or Appellate Body proceeding will usually not agree to an interpretation
of the losing party. Therefore, consensus is illusory, and a three-fourths
majority (if voting ever happens) is extremely difficult to achieve.
Similarly, attempts to amend the agreement will likely fail, unless the
negotiations take place in a wider context (eg in a trade round) where
the points at issue can be traded. This, however, is a lengthy process.
The authors wish to facilitate the conditions for legislative response,
not least in order to liberate the Appellate Body from the extreme judicial
restraint and to allow it to make ‘forward-looking, purposing
interpretations and clarifications (...)’. They argue that: ‘(i)deally, the
fragmented and often incomplete law of the WTO would rather call for
a larger scope of interpretation in order to achieve full coherence with
the system. Yet, the lack of possibilities of legislative response and thus
a true dialogue between the judicial and the political branches of the
WTO renders this politically difficult.’ 8 In order to counter the problems,
the authors suggest a transition towards voting. However, current
membership structures would not allow voting along the lines of formula
‘one state = one vote’ as the 24 industrial member countries,
7 See Schott and Watal (2000).
8 See Cottier and Takenoshita (2003), pp 175ff.
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corresponding to 79 per cent of GDP, would only have 16.8 per cent of
the votes. According to the authors, this explains why decision-making
remains reserved to consensus as voting could drive developed countries
out of the WTO. Based on a calculation of voting weights and related
power assessments, the authors propose a weighted voting model that
uses trade shares, GDP, market openness, population variables and/or
basic votes.
The efforts to loosen the consensus requirements are understandable in
the light of the immobility of the political decision-making process.
However, we do not think that a transition to voting which would remove
the de-facto veto position of important Members such as the US or the
EC is a realistic way forward for the WTO. Sovereignty concerns and
political reality considerations appear to be the key motivation behind
the consensus practice. It stems from the insight that even the strongest
majority vote would not succeed in forcing an issue upon major
members, because ‘they will simply not accept direction of their foreign
trade policies by majority votes of international organizations’, as Hudec
notes: ‘GATT consensus decision making is often contrasted to majority
voting in United Nations organizations, particularly the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which is in many
ways the UN twin of GATT. The records of UNCTAD are replete with
resolutions voted 100–10. Such acts do have a role in establishing a long-
term normative framework for policy, but no one ever pretends they
can accomplish actual policy changes.’9
9.1.3.4 An Economic Perspective:
Taking Globalisation into Account
When evaluating the two generic options, we should take a step back
and consider the economic context of the WTO dispute settlement
system.
For the time being and in extrapolating past experience, we may assume
that the process of globalisation and the international fragmentation of
sourcing, production, marketing and distribution will continue in
coming decades, as nations wish to reap the benefits of international
specialisation and economies of scale. First, economic fundamentals such
as patterns of comparative advantage, differential factor endowments,
or economies of scale will drive globalisation forward. Both small and
large firms will continue to rely on international markets. Producers of
9 See Hudec (1993), p 8.
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goods for mass markets will further the concentration of production
due to cost considerations, and even smaller producers of specialised
niche products will need a global market in order to serve their narrow
segments and in order to recover the increasing costs of technological
research and development.
Secondly, technological fundamentals such as ever-improving
information and communications technology as well as productivity
gains in transportation technology – along with decreasing costs – will
likely continue to drive this globalisation process forward and foster
international transactions. Thirdly, regulatory activity in the past decades
has so far been conducive to the process of globalisation. Not only does
it include the WTO level, but it includes an increasing number of
comprehensive bilateral or regional trade agreements, and instruments
in non-trade areas on various levels (eg bilateral investment treaties,
double taxation agreements, unilateral easing of capital controls etc).
Fourthly, more sophisticated forms of international economic activity
than classical goods trade (which is still the focus of the current WTO
system) will assume increasing importance. These include trade in
services (including electronic commerce), licensing agreements
(highlighting the importance of intellectual property rights) and foreign
direct investment (establishment of subsidiaries, mergers and
acquisitions). These activities may require improved rules, as is the case
in services and intellectual property protection, or the establishment of
new rules, for instance on investment and competition.
Fifthly, new important markets are emerging in the world economy:
Traders such as China, India and Brazil are growing in importance. The
current ‘triad’ or ‘quad’ structure (US, the EC, Japan and Canada) of
world economic relations is likely to be replaced by a more multipolar
structure. Unless all these economic relations were covered by
preferential trade agreements (their number has recently increased
sharply10), the WTO rules will continue to play an important role for
providing predictability to traders and investors.
In sum, there will likely be more international transactions and more
economic interdependence in the future, presumably in a more multi-
polar setting. By and large, this evolution is at odds with attempts to
correct the imbalance between effective adjudication and ineffective
10 See the Consultative Board (2004, Chapter II) for a critical comment on the ‘spaghetti
bowl’ of trade preferences.
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political decision-making by reducing the predictability of market access
conditions through a re-politicisation of international trade rules and
the dispute settlement system.
9.1.3.5 Correcting the Imbalance: An Incremental Strategy
To conclude, correcting the current imbalance between the effective
adjudication system and the ineffective political decision-making system
is both an important and a difficult issue. If this imbalance remains
without correction, an alienation of members from the adjudicative
system is possible, ultimately leading to a situation of ‘anti-legalism’
similar to the one already experienced in the 1960s. Such alienation
should be avoided, given the weak legal options for enforcement of
public international law on the one hand and the importance of ‘soft
factors’ for the system (reputation costs, allegiance to the system, and
normative pressures; see Chapters 2 and 4 for details) on the other.
None of the two generic options discussed to remedy the situation –
weakening adjudication or strengthening political decision-making –
holds great promise. Weakening adjudication is not an attractive option
as members would have to forego the achievements which the new DSU
brought for a rules-based international trading system. It would also be
at odds with globalisation and its increasing reliance on international
transactions.
Alternatively, improving political decision-making is a difficult task.
Any attempt to make political decision-making at the WTO more
effective would necessarily imply that the sacred consensus principle
would have to be replaced by some form of majority voting which could
drive important members out of the system. Sovereignty concerns similar
to those that are currently voiced against allegedly overreaching dispute
settlement could ultimately be raised against undesired outcomes of
voting procedures as they could force results upon countries which the
latter cannot or do not want to accept. While it is correct that the WTO
could be (and actually is) ‘hamstrung by inaction derived from its
“consensus” culture’11, it has at least managed to keep powerful players
interested in the system.
For the time being, only incremental steps by a variety of actors do
therefore seem to be feasible and desirable to remedy the situation. Such
a gradual approach could include the following elements:
11 See Jackson (2000), p 383.
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• Members, particularly the larger ones, should assume their
systemic responsibility by exercising restraint in bringing
politically sensitive cases to adjudication.
• Adjudicating bodies might prefer to continue their current
approach to dispute settlement, based on judicial restraint
and the avoidance of ‘sweeping statements’ which might
provoke strong political reactions from members without
yielding any benefit to the overall stability of the system.
• Selective political elements could be built into the dispute
settlement procedure without altering the basic architecture
of the DSU. One option could be to allow the DSB to decide
by consensus not to adopt specific findings or the basic
rationale behind a finding in a report.
• Work should be intensified to explore alternative political
decision-making mechanisms. In the recent report of the
Consultative Board (2004, Chapters VII–IX), some
interesting proposals have been made in this respect.
9.1.4 Inclusion of Transition Periods
As has been pointed out in Section 8.4 above, negotiations on dispute
settlement are also being made more difficult by the fact that they
basically deal with a system currently in use, where any proposal is
inevitably judged in the light of current and expected disputes. The use
of generous transition periods in a prospective agreement could,
however, mitigate some of the problems.
• Long transition periods would ensure that none of the more
contentious modifications would apply to any case (or
follow-up case) that is currently undergoing litigation. For
instance, rules on transition periods could not only define
specific dates of entry into force for each modification that
is suggested, but they could also provide an exclusion for
all complaints filed after that date under matters that are
already being processed by the system (eg compliance
reviews etc). In short, the rationale should be that none of
the new rules would apply to any currently known or
expected dispute. Moreover, members should have
sufficient time to file new disputes before the new rules
would come into effect.
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• Transition periods could also lower the inhibition threshold
to agree on new rules as the costs of a potentially adverse
amendment could be discounted. It is often stated that
political actors follow short-term orientations in line with
electoral cycles. Accordingly, they have high discount rates.
The establishment of transition periods is therefore a
popular means to help negotiators agree on rules which
might entail some political cost in the future. The same
technique could be used in the DSU reform process.
Surprisingly, whereas transition periods were an issue in the 1998/1999
DSU review discussions, they do not appear to play a dominant role in
the discussions under the Doha mandate. Similarly, they have not been
integrated into the Balás text.12 Their explicit consideration might help
negotiators reach an agreement.
9.1.5 Abandoning the Idea of an ‘Early Harvest’
In all DSU review efforts since 1998, including under the Doha mandate,
the DSU review was conceived as a separate undertaking in isolation of
a larger round. As has been pointed out in Section 8.1 above, this
approach has certain advantages but it also has disadvantages when it
comes to striking a deal. Moreover, the relationship between the DSU
review negotiations and material disputes, procedural disputes, on-
going negotiations and the unpredictability of new developments
(particularly new disputes) stands in the way of an agreement, as has
been pointed out in Section 8.4 above.
Both findings raise the question whether it might not be better to integrate
the DSU review negotiations into a broader negotiating framework. One
may argue, of course, that the idea of an early harvest on the DSU (as
mandated by the Doha Ministerial Declaration) could have been fostered
by the experience in the Uruguay Round, where members were indeed
able to agree on improvements to the dispute settlement mechanism
prior to the conclusion of the entire Round (see Section 2.2.2.7). Today,
however, the situation differs in at least two regards:
• Unlike in the Uruguay Round, there is currently no unifying
force behind members such as the threat of more aggressive
US Section 301 procedures which made members agree to
the new procedures at the time.
12 The issue of transition provisions was raised in a press report, ‘WTO Members Fail on
DSU Deal, Further Negotiations After Cancun’, in Inside US Trade, 30 May 2003.
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• Members are less like-minded on the direction which the
DSU should pursue. Moreover, the heterogeneity of the
WTO community has further increased since the early
1990s, due to the admission of many new members.
• Today’s DSU presumably carries a higher burden of
conflict-laden cases compared to its predecessor under the
GATT, because ‘wrong cases’ are no longer filtered under
the ‘quasi-automatic’ proceedings as they had been under
the old rules which had allowed blocking.
Integrating the DSU review into a broader package might also have a
positive impact on the outcome of negotiations: Negotiators, particularly
the more ambitious ones, will be better able to settle on less far-reaching
changes to the DSU if they can justify their compromises domestically
with advantages obtained in other areas and agreements. By contrast, if
the DSU negotiations continue in isolation, some parties (in particular
the US but also the EC and certain developing countries) could feel
obliged to insist on more ‘radical’ changes that could be detrimental to
the DSU. While the current strategy of the negotiators to avoid linkages
with other negotiating topics is justifiable on the factual level, the political
nexus between the DSU negotiations and negotiations in other areas
should not be overlooked. In the terms of negotiations technique, the
negotiations would change from a distributive towards a more
integrative approach.13
Nevertheless, a final word of caution must be said. Striking package
deals is not an easy task either. It may complicate negotiations, and if
the ambitions that are brought into the package are too broad (such as
was the case with the Singapore issues in Cancún), it does not facilitate
the task either. Speaking about a ‘broader package’ does therefore not
necessarily mean that it should contain a multitude of issues such as
investment or competition. A ‘traditional’ negotiating round with
agricultural and non-agricultural market access as well as improved
commitments on services could suffice.14
9.2 Outlook: The Chances of an Agreement
Before we conclude this study, let us consider the chances of an
agreement on the DSU review.
13 For an overview on negotiating approaches and techniques, see Saner (1997).
14 The contributions of Hauser (2003) and Hauser (2002) advocate a small package of
negotiations.
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In Chapter 8, we have identified some major reasons for the failure to
conclude the DSU review so far. Some policy recommendations have
been derived from this analysis in the preceding Section 9.1. Against
this background, the outlook for a conclusion of the DSU review is
determined by: (i) whether and how the parameters analysed in Chapter
8 will change; and (ii) whether and how the recommendations set out in
the preceding Section 9.1 can be implemented.
With regard to the stumbling blocks on the way to a successful conclusion
of the DSU review negotiations, not much will likely change in the near
future. The consensus requirement (see Section 8.1) for any change to
the DSU is here to stay. As a conciliation of the different positions on
controversial issues and, in particular, on the fundamental orientation
of the DSU will not be easily achieved, any fast conclusion of the DSU
review outside a larger negotiating package (where deals and the
exchange of concessions are possible across different negotiating areas)
does not appear to be feasible. This impression is reinforced by the
general feeling of satisfaction with the functioning of the DSU (despite
its flaws) and a lack of sense of urgency with regard to the conclusion of
the negotiations. The latter is also due to the progress which has been
achieved on practical issues through elements of the ‘DSU review in
practice’.
The ideal setting for a conclusion of the DSU review negotiations
increasingly appears to be the conclusion of the Doha Round (or any
other major negotiating round). The conclusion of such a round could
also include a political settlement of controversial trade disputes between
major trade powers, in particular the many trade disputes between the
US and the EC. As some of these disputes are very delicate, a political
settlement would also take pressure off the dispute settlement
mechanism and reduce the imbalance between legal and political
decision-making at the WTO. Even though the outcome of such a political
package deal would not necessarily be fully in line with material
provisions of WTO law, it could be beneficial to the overall stability of
the WTO system. A further advantage of concluding the DSU review
negotiations in the context of a larger trade deal is that a considerable
portion of the uncertainty which is inherent to the context of the DSU
review negotiations (see Section 8.4) would be removed.
To conclude, the outlook for a conclusion of the DSU review seems to be
linked to the chances to successfully conclude the Doha Round.
Realistically, such a conclusion would have to occur prior to the expiry
of the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) of US President Bush, ie before
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1 July 2007. An evaluation of the chances for the conclusion of the Doha
Round would be outside the scope of this study. Nevertheless, the very
limited progress that has been achieved in these negotiations so far does
not hold much promise. Similarly, the diversion of negotiating resources
and attention away from the multilateral scene to regional trade
agreements is working against the Doha Round as well. The Hong Kong
Ministerial Conference, planned for late 2005, and the likely continuation
of the negotiations into the year 2006 will bring more clarity on these
issues.
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The Dispute Settlement Understanding that entered into force in 1995
has undergone several review efforts since 1998. The most substantial
effort so far has been undertaken under the Doha mandate in 2002 and
2003. Proposals on virtually all provisions of the DSU have been received,
including suggestions on each stage of the process and on most
horizontal issues. So far, all attempts to review and reform the system
have failed as members were unable to reach consensus on a package of
modifications.
While the evolving dispute settlement practice under the DSU has
revealed a certain number of flaws in the system, the mechanism has
generally worked well. Despite a recent slowdown in dispute settlement
activity, Members have used the DSU intensely, and the DSB still appears
to be the WTO’s most active body with the most efficient decision-making
process. Despite this generally positive assessment, the imbalance
between the relatively effective quasi-judicial decision-making in dispute
settlement and the largely ineffective political decision-making between
negotiating rounds has recently become a major concern.
As this study has shown, several factors are responsible for members’
inability to conclude the DSU review. Among these is the consensus
requirement for any amendment to the DSU which sets high hurdles
that are difficult to overcome. In addition, members are in disagreement
on several crucial issues and on the more fundamental orientation of
the system, i.e. whether it should develop towards more rule-orientation
or whether the clock should be turned back towards more power-
orientation. Moreover, there are the systemic hurdles of renegotiating a
system in use. Whereas amendments to the text are therefore difficult to
achieve, the sense of urgency to conclude the negotiations has been quite
low: There is a general feeling of satisfaction with the DSU, and there is
a concern that a poorly-founded set of modifications to the DSU could
do harm to the system while bringing only modest benefits. Moreover,
some practical reforms could be achieved without amending the DSU
text. This ‘DSU review in practice’ which includes practical actions both
by Members and by the adjudicating bodies, has brought some progress
in areas such as sequencing, amicus curiae briefs, third party rights, the
clarity of the notice of appeal, and legal assistance to developing
countries. Such elements of evolving practice are likely candidates for
inclusion into a new or modified DSU text at a later date.
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Regarding the outlook for the DSU review negotiations, an agreement
appears to be feasible as long as several conditions are fulfilled. First,
members may want to focus on a technical package that avoids, for the
time being, any of the more controversial issues, particularly those
implying fundamental choices towards either more rule-orientation or
more power-orientation. Secondly, the concerns of the large majority of
developing country Members should be better taken into account. In
particular, their access to the expensive judicialised dispute settlement
mechanism should be further improved in order to secure their support
for the system. Thirdly, and on a more fundamental level, the current
imbalance between the strong adjudication mechanism on the one hand
and the weak political decision-making mechanisms on the other needs
to be remedied in order to reduce tensions in the system. From an
economic point of view, a major repoliticisation of dispute settlement
that would reduce the predictability of the multilateral trading system
is not an attractive solution. Rather, various incremental steps from the
different actors involved could help to remedy the situation. Fourthly,
the explicit integration of transition periods into any amendment could
increase its acceptance. Finally, the inclusion of the DSU review into the
larger Doha Round negotiation package might ease cross-agreement
compromise and enhance the acceptability of a DSU review deal that
does not contain the more ambitious proposals. Embedding the DSU
review into a package deal would be particularly beneficial if that deal
also included a settlement of major current trade disputes.
Whereas the chances of coming to an agreement in the short run (ie
before the conclusion of the Doha Round) are rather dim, an agreement
on the DSU could still be feasible in the context of the conclusion of the
Doha Round which should occur before the expiry of the US President’s
Trade Promotion Authority on 1 July 2007.
A failure to conclude the DSU review exercise would probably not pose
a major threat to the DSU and to the WTO system as a whole. On the
one hand, there appears to be a general sense of satisfaction with the
functioning of the system – despite the flaws that have been identified.
As dispute settlement practice has thus brought some amount of DSU
reform without facing the problems of political renegotiations of the
DSU text, the system seems to build once more on its historic strength,
which is to evolve with a certain degree of flexibility and in a pragmatic
spirit, and to deal with new issues as they arise. Such adaptations clearly
make a completion of the DSU review less urgent.
Part IV
ANNEX
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11. TABULAR OVERVIEW OF COUNTRY PROPOSALS
UNDER THE DOHA-MANDATED DSU REVIEW
Notes:
• ‘Doc No’ designates the document number that was given to the
proposal and under which the text can be retrieved in the WTO’s
document dissemination facility (http://docsonline.wto.org/
gen_home.asp?language=1&_=1). Documents not included in this
overview (eg TN/DS/W/4) do not constitute negotiating propos-
als but are limited to information on the agenda of meetings.
• ‘Type’ designates whether a proposal is mainly conceptual (C) or
textual (T) in nature.
• ‘Issues Covered’ refers to the issues that are covered in a proposal:
C = Consultations; P = panel stage; A = appellate review; I = imple-
mentation; Tr = transparency; AC = Amicus Curiae briefs; 3P = Third
party rights; SD = special and differential treatment of developing
countries; Ot = other issues. Brackets indicate instances where the
effect of a proposal on a stage/horizontal issue is rather indirect.
• ‘Concrete Proposals’ gives an overview of the contents of a pro-
posal. The numbering of issues follows the original numbering in
the respective documents so as to facilitate readers’ access to spe-
cific issues.
• ‘Discussed in’ refers to the minutes of the meeting where the pro-
posals were discussed.
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13. OFFICIAL WTO DOCUMENTS
Note: The sections and entries in this chapter are sorted alphabetically by
Document Number, except for a few single documents regrouped in Section
13.10.
13.1 Special (Negotiating) Session of the DSB (Doha Round Only)
Minutes of Meetings
TN/DS/M/1; Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body – Minutes
of Meeting; Held in the Centre William Rappard on 16 April 2002; 12
June 2002
TN/DS/M/2; Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body – Minutes
of Meeting; Held in the Centre William Rappard on 21 May 2002; 3 July
2002
TN/DS/M/3; Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body – Minutes
of Meeting; Held in the Centre William Rappard on 15 July 2002; 9
September 2002
TN/DS/M/4; Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body – Minutes
of Meeting; Held in the Centre William Rappard on 10 September 2002;
6 November 2002
TN/DS/M/5; Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body – Minutes
of Meeting; Held in the Centre William Rappard on 14 October 2002; 27
February 2003
TN/DS/M/6; Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body – Minutes
of Meeting; Held in the Centre William Rappard on 13–15 November
2002; 31 March 2003
TN/DS/M/7; Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body – Minutes
of Meeting; Held in the Centre William Rappard on 16–18 December
2002; 26 June 2003
TN/DS/M/7/Corr 1; Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body –
Minutes of Meeting; Held in the Centre William Rappard on 16–18
December 2002; Corrigendum; 23 July 2003
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TN/DS/M/8; Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body – Minutes
of Meeting; Held in the Centre William Rappard on 28 –30 January 2003;
30 June 2003
TN/DS/M/9; Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body – Minutes
of Meeting; Held in the Centre William Rappard on 17–18 February 2003;
1 July 2003
TN/DS/M/10; Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body – Minutes
of Meeting; Held in the Centre William Rappard on 10–11 March 2003;
14 August 2003
13.2 Special (Negotiating) Session of the DSB (Doha Round Only)
Country Proposals
Note: Documents not included in this section (eg TN/DS/W/4) do not constitute
negotiating proposals but contain information on the agenda. For an overview
of the contents of each proposal, please refer to Chapter 11.
TN/DS/W/1; Contribution of the European Communities and its Member
States to the Improvement of the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding; Communication from the European Communities; 13
March 2002
TN/DS/W/2; Proposal to Review Article 17.1 of the Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes;
Communication from Thailand; 20 March 2002
TN/DS/W/3; Proposal to Review Article 22.7 of the Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes;
Communication from the Philippines and Thailand; 21 March 2002
TN/DS/W/5; India’s Questions to the European Communities and its
Member States on their Proposal Relating to Improvements of the DSU;
Communication from India; 7 May 2002
TN/DS/W/7; The European Communities’ Replies to India’s Questions;
Communication from the European Communities; 30 May 2002
TN/DS/W/8; Negotiations on Improvements and Clarifications of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding; Communication from Australia; 8
July 2002
TN/DS/W/9; Contribution of Ecuador to the Improvement of the Dispute
Settlement Understanding of the WTO; Communication from Ecuador;
8 July 2002
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TN/DS/W/11; Contribution of the Republic of Korea to the Improvement
of the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO; Communication
from the Republic of Korea; 11 July 2002
TN/DS/W/12; Proposal by Costa Rica – Third Party Rights;
Communication from Costa Rica; 24 July 2002
TN/DS/W/12/Rev.1; Proposal by Costa Rica – Third Party Rights;
Communication from Costa Rica; Revision; 6 March 2003
TN/DS/W/13; Contribution of the United States to the Improvement of
the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO Related to
Transparency; Communication from the United States; 22 August 2002
TN/DS/W/15; Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding;
Proposal by the African Group; 25 September 2002
TN/DS/W/16; Negotiations on Improvements and Clarifications of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding; Communication from Paraguay; 25
September 2002
TN/DS/W/17; Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding;
Proposal by the LDC Group; 9 October 2002
TN/DS/W/18; Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding;
Proposals on DSU by Cuba, Honduras, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri
Lanka, Tanzania and Zimbabwe; 7 October 2002
TN/DS/W/18/Add 1; Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement
Understanding; Proposals on DSU by Cuba, Honduras, India, Malaysia,
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Zimbabwe; Addendum [addition of
Jamaica to the list of sponsors]; 9 October 2002
TN/DS/W/19; Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding;
Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries; Proposals
on DSU by Cuba, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri
Lanka, Tanzania and Zimbabwe; 9 October 2002
TN/DS/W/21; Contribution by Jamaica to the Doha Mandated Review
of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU); Communication from
Jamaica; 10 October 2002
TN/DS/W/22; Negotiations on Improvements and Clarifications of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding; Proposal by Japan; 28 October 2002
TN/DS/W/23; Negotiations on Improvements and Clarifications of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding; Proposal by Mexico; 4 November
2002
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TN/DS/W/25; Contribution by the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan,
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu to the Doha Mandated Review of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU); Communication from the
Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu; 27
November 2002
TN/DS/W/26; Negotiations on Improvements and Clarifications of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding; Proposal by Ecuador; 26 November
2002
TN/DS/W/28; Negotiations on Improvements and Clarifications of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding on Improving Flexibility and
Member Control in WTO Dispute Settlement; Contribution by Chile and
the United States; 23 December 2002
TN/DS/W/29; Improving the Special and Differential Provisions in the
Dispute Settlement Understanding; Communication from China; 22
January 2003
TN/DS/W/30; Proposal to Review Article 17.1 of the Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes;
Communication from Thailand; 22 January 2003
TN/DS/W/31; Contribution to Clarify and Improve the Dispute
Settlement Understanding: Panel System; Communication from
Thailand; 22 January 2003
TN/DS/W/32; Amendment of the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes; Proposal by Japan;
22 January 2003
TN/DS/W/33; Negotiations on Improvements and Clarifications of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding; Proposal by Ecuador; 23 January
2003
TN/DS/W/34; Negotiations on Improvements and Clarifications of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding; Communication from Australia; 22
January 2003
TN/DS/W/35; Contribution of the Republic of Korea to the Improvement
of the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO; Communication
from the Republic of Korea; 22 January 2003
TN/DS/W/36; Contribution by the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan,
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu to the Doha Mandated Review of the
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Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU); Communication from the
Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu; 22
January 2003
TN/DS/W/37; Text for LDC Proposal on Dispute Settlement
Understanding Negotiations; Communication from Haiti [on behalf of
the LDC Group]; 22 January 2003
TN/DS/W/38; Contribution of the European Communities and its
Member States to the Improvement and Clarification of the WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding; Communication from the European
Communities; 23 January 2003
TN/DS/W/40; Amendments to the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes – Proposed Text by
Mexico; Communication from Mexico; 27 January 2003
TN/DS/W/41; Contribution of Canada to the Improvement of the WTO
Dispute Settlement Understanding; Communication from Canada; 24
January 2003
TN/DS/W/42; Text for the African Group Proposals on Dispute
Settlement Understanding Negotiations; Communication from Kenya;
24 January 2003
TN/DS/W/43; Jordan’s Contributions Towards the Improvement and
Clarification of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding;
Communication from Jordan; 28 January 2003
TN/DS/W/44; Contribution by Jamaica to the Doha Mandated Review
of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU); Communication from
Jamaica; 11 February 2003
TN/DS/W/44/Rev 1; Contribution by Jamaica to the Doha Mandated
Review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU);
Communication from Jamaica; Revision; 14 February 2003
TN/DS/W/45; Contribution of Brazil to the Improvement of the WTO
Dispute Settlement Understanding; Communication from Brazil; 11
February 2003
TN/DS/W/45/Rev 1; Contribution of Brazil to the Improvement of the
WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding; Communication from Brazil;
Revision; 4 March 2003
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TN/DS/W/46; Further Contribution of the United States to the
Improvement of the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO
Related to Transparency; Communication from the United States; 11
February 2003
TN/DS/W/47; Disupte Settlement Understanding Proposals: Legal Text;
Communication from India on behalf of Cuba, Dominican Republic,
Egypt, Honduras, Jamaica and Malaysia; 11 February 2003
TN/DS/W/49; Negotiations on Improvements and Clarifications of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding; Communication from Australia; 17
February 2003
TN/DS/W/51; Specific Amendments to the Dispute Settlement
Understanding – Drafting Inputs from China; Communication from
China; 5 March 2003
TN/DS/W/51/Rev 1; Specific Amendments to the Dispute Settlement
Understanding ? Drafting Inputs from China; Communication from
China; 13 March 2003
TN/DS/W/52; Negotiations on Improvements and Clarifications of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding on Improving Flexibility and
Member Control in WTO Dispute Settlement; Textual Contribution by
Chile and the United States; 14 March 2003
TN/DS/W/53; Jordan’s Further Contribution Towards the Improvement
and Clarification of the Dispute Settlement Understanding;
Communication from Jordan; 21 March 2003
TN/DS/W/56; Jordan’s Further Contribution Towards the Improvement
and Clarification of the Dispute Settlement Understanding;
Communication from Jordan; 19 May 2003
TN/DS/W/57; Responses to Questions on the Specific Input of China;
Communication from China; 19 May 2003
TN/DS/W/60; Contribution from Thailand (related to Article 17 of the
DSU); 8 December 2003
TN/DS/W/61; Contribution from Indonesia and Thailand; 12 December
2003
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13.3 Special (Negotiating) Session of the DSB (Doha Round Only)
Reports
TN/DS/1; First Formal Meeting of the Special Session of the DSB; Report
by the Chairman to the Trade Negotiations Committee; 23 April 2002
TN/DS/2; Second Formal Meeting of the Special Session of the Dispute
Settlement Body; Report by the Chairman to the Trade Negotiations
Committee; 9 July 2002
TN/DS/3; Third and Fourth Formal Meetings of the Special Session of
the Dispute Settlement Body; Report by the Chairman to the Trade
Negotiations Committee; 2 October 2002
TN/DS/4; Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body; Report by the
Chairman, Ambassador Petér Balás, to the Trade Negotiations
Committee; 28 November 2002
TN/DS/5; Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body; Report by the
Chairman, Ambassador Petér Balás, to the Trade Negotiations
Committee; 4 February 2003
TN/DS/6; Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body; Report by the
Chairman, Ambassador Petér Balás, to the Trade Negotiations
Committee; 3 March 2003
TN/DS/7; Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body; Report by the
Chairman, Ambassador Petér Balás, to the Trade Negotiations
Committee; 2 April 2003
TN/DS/8; Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body; Report by the
Chairman, Ambassador Petér Balás, to the Trade Negotiations
Committee; 7 May 2003
TN/DS/9; Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body; Report by the
Chairman, Ambassador Petér Balás, to the Trade Negotiations
Committee; 6 June 2003
TN/DS/10; Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body; Report by
the Chairman, Ambassador David Spencer, to the Trade Negotiations
Committee; 21 June 2004
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13.4 Dispute Settlement Cases
Overview
WT/DS/OV/18; Update of WTO Dispute Settlement Cases – New
Developments Since Last Update (from 24 November 2003 until 19
December 2003); 23 December 2003
Individual Cases
The disputes referred to in this study are listed below. Specific documents
pertaining to the listed cases (eg panel report or Appellate Body report) are not
listed separately.
WT/DS2; United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline [Venezuela] (see also WT/DS4)
WT/DS4; United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline [Brazil] (see also WT/DS2)
WT/DS18; Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon
[Canada]
WT/DS27; European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas (Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico,
United States)
WT/DS26; European Communities – Measures Affecting Livestock and
Meat (Hormones) [United States] (see also WT/DS48)
WT/DS31; Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals [United
States]
WT/DS44; Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and
Paper [United States]
WT/DS48; European Communities – Measures Affecting Livestock and
Meat (Hormones) [Canada] (see also WT/DS26)
WT/DS50; India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products [United States] (see also WT/DS79)
WT/DS54; Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile
Industry [European Communities] (see also WT/DS55, WT/DS59, WT/
DS64)
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WT/DS55; Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile
Industry [Japan] (see also WT/DS54, WT/DS59, WT/DS64)
WT/DS58; United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products [India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand]
WT/DS59; Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile
Industry [United States] (see also WT/DS54, WT/DS55, WT/DS64)
WT/DS64; Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile
Industry [Japan] (see also WT/DS54, WT/DS55, WT/DS59)
WT/DS70; Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft
[Brazil]
WT/DS79; India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products [European Communities] (see also WT/DS50)
WT/DS87; Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages [European
Communities] (see also WT/DS110)
WT/DS90; India – Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural,
Textile and Industrial Products [United States] (see also WT/DS91, WT/
DS92, WT/DS93, WT/DS94, WT/DS96)
WT/DS91; India – Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural,
Textile and Industrial Products [Australia] (see also WT/DS90, WT/DS92,
WT/DS93, WT/DS94, WT/DS96)
WT/DS92; India – Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural,
Textile and Industrial Products [Canada] (see also WT/DS90, WT/DS91,
WT/DS93, WT/DS94, WT/DS96)
WT/DS93; India – Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural,
Textile and Industrial Products [New Zealand] (see also WT/DS90, WT/
DS91, WT/DS92, WT/DS94, WT/DS96)
WT/DS94; India – Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural,
Textile and Industrial Products [Switzerland] (see also WT/DS90, WT/
DS91, WT/DS92, WT/DS93, WT/DS96)
WT/DS96; India – Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural,
Textile and Industrial Products [European Communities] (see also WT/
DS90, WT/DS91, WT/DS92, WT/DS93, WT/DS94)
WT/DS99; United States – Anti-dumping Duty on Dynamic Random
Access Memory Semi-conductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above
from Korea [Korea]
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WT/DS103; Canada – Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and
the Exportation of Dairy Products [United States] (see WT/DS113)
WT/DS108; United States – Tax Treatment for ‘Foreign Sales
Corporations’ [European Communities]
WT/DS110; Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages [United States] (see
also WT/DS87)
WT/DS113; Canada – Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and
the Exportation of Dairy Products [New Zealand] (see WT/DS103)
WT/DS122; Thailand – Anti-dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and
Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel H-Beams from Poland [Poland]
WT/DS126; Australia – Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters
of Automotive Leather [United States]
WT/DS135; European Communities – Measures Affecting the Prohibition
of Asbestos and Asbestos Products [Canada]
WT/DS136; United States – Anti-dumping Act of 1916 (I) [European
Communities] (see also WT/DS162)
WT/DS138; United States – Imposition of Countervailing Duties on
Certain Hot-rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating
in the United Kingdom [European Communities]
WT/DS152; United States – Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974
[Europea: Communities]
WT/DS155; Argentina – Measures on the Export of Bovine Hides and
the Import of Finished Leather [European Communities]
WT/DS160; United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act
[European Communities]
WT/DS162; United States – Anti-dumping Act of 1916 (II) [Japan] (see
also WT/DS136)
WT/DS165; United States – Import Measures on Certain Products from
the European Communities [European Communities]
WT/DS177; United States – Safeguard Measure on Imports of Fresh,
Chilled or Frozen Lamb from New Zealand [New Zealand] (see WT/
DS178)
WT/DS178; United States – Safeguard Measure on Imports of Lamb Meat
from Australia [Australia] (see WT/DS177)
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WT/DS200; United States – Section 306 of the Trade Act of 1974 and
Amendments Thereto [European Communities]
WT/DS204; Mexico – Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services
[United States]
WT/DS207; Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures relating
to Certain Agricultural Products [Argentina]
WT/DS217; United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act
of 2000 [Australia, Brazil, Chile, European Communities, India,
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Thailand] (see also WT/DS234)
WT/DS231; European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines
[Peru]
WT/DS234; United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act
of 2000 [Canada, Mexico] (see also WT/DS217)
WT/DS247; United States – Provisional Anti-dumping Measure on
Imports of Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada [Canada] (see also
WT/DS257)
WT/DS248; United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports
of Certain Steel Products [European Communities] (see also WT/DS249,
WT/DS251, WT/DS252, WT/DS253, WT/DS254, WT/DS258, WT/DS259)
WT/DS249; United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports
of Certain Steel Products [Japan] (see also WT/DS248, WT/DS251, WT/
DS252, WT/DS253, WT/DS254, WT/DS258, WT/DS259)
WT/DS250; United States – Equalising Excise Tax Imposed by Florida
on Processed Orange and Grapefruit Products [Brazil]
WT/DS251; United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports
of Certain Steel Products [Korea] (see also WT/DS248, WT/DS249, WT/
DS 252, WT/DS253, WT/DS254, WT/DS258, WT/DS259)
WT/DS252; United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports
of Certain Steel Products [China] (see also WT/DS248, WT/DS249, WT/
DS251, WT/DS253, WT/DS254, WT/DS258, WT/DS259)
WT/DS253; United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports
of Certain Steel Products [Switzerland] (see also WT/DS248, WT/DS249,
WT/DS251, WT/DS252, WT/DS254, WT/DS258, WT/DS259)
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WT/DS254; United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports
of Certain Steel Products [Norway] (see also WT/DS248, WT/DS249, WT/
DS251, WT/DS252, WT/DS253, WT/DS258, WT/DS259)
WT/DS257; United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination
with respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada [Canada] (see
also WT/DS247)
WT/DS258; United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports
of Certain Steel Products [New Zealand] (see also WT/DS248, WT/DS249,
WT/DS251, WT/DS252, WT/DS253, WT/DS254, WT/DS259)
WT/DS259; United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports
of Certain Steel Products [Brazil] (see also WT/DS248, WT/DS249, WT/
DS251, WT/DS252, WT/DS253, WT/DS254, WT/DS258)
WT/DS264; United States – Final Dumping Determination on Softwood
Lumber from Canada [Canada]
WT/DS277; United States – Investigation of the International Trade
Commission in Softwood Lumber from Canada [Canada]
WT/DS285; United States – Measures Affecting Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services [Antigua, Barbuda]
WT/DS291; European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval
and Marketing of Biotech Products [United States] (see also WT/DS292,
WT/DS293)
WT/DS292; European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval
and Marketing of Biotech Products [Canada] (see also WT/DS291, WT/
DS293)
WT/DS293; European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval
and Marketing of Biotech Products [Argentina] (see also WT/DS291, WT/
DS292)
WT/DS294; United States – Laws, Regulations and Methodology for
Calculating Dumping Margins (‘Zeroing’) [EC]
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13.5 Dispute Settlement Body – Minutes of Meetings
WT/DSB/M/15; Dispute Settlement Body – Minutes of Meeting; Held in
the Centre William Rappard on 24 April 1996; 15 May 1996
WT/DSB/M/16; Dispute Settlement Body – Minutes of Meeting; Held in
the Centre William Rappard on 8 May 1996; 4 June 1996
WT/DSB/M/39; Dispute Settlement Body – Minutes of Meeting; Held in
the Centre William Rappard on 18 November 1997; 7 January 1998
WT/DSB/M/42; Dispute Settlement Body – Minutes of Meeting; Held in
the Centre William Rappard on 13 February 1998; 16 March 1998
WT/DSB/M/43; Dispute Settlement Body – Minutes of Meeting; Held in
the Centre William Rappard on 13 March 1998; 8 April 1998
WT/DSB/M/44; Dispute Settlement Body – Minutes of Meeting; Held in
the Centre William Rappard on 25 March 1998; 4 May 1998
WT/DSB/M/45; Dispute Settlement Body – Minutes of Meeting; Held in
the Centre William Rappard on 22 April 1998; 10 June 1998
WT/DSB/M/46; Dispute Settlement Body – Minutes of Meeting; Held in
the Centre William Rappard on 22 June 1998; 6 August 1998
WT/DSB/M/47; Dispute Settlement Body – Minutes of Meeting; Held in
the Centre William Rappard on 23 July 1998; 18 September 1998
WT/DSB/M/48; Dispute Settlement Body – Minutes of Meeting; Held in
the Centre William Rappard on 22 September 1998; 20 October 1998
WT/DSB/M/50; Dispute Settlement Body – Minutes of Meeting; Held in
the Centre William Rappard on 6 November 1998; 14 December 1998
WT/DSB/M/52; Dispute Settlement Body – Minutes of Meeting; Held in
the Centre William Rappard on 8 December 1998; 3 February 1999
WT/DSB/M/67; Dispute Settlement Body – Minutes of Meeting; Held in
the Centre William Rappard on 20 August 1999; 30 September 1999
WT/DSB/M/68; Dispute Settlement Body – Minutes of Meeting; Held in
the Centre William Rappard on 22 and 24 September 1999; 20 October
1999
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WT/DSB/M/70; Dispute Settlement Body – Minutes of Meeting; Held in
the Centre William Rappard on 27 October and 3 November 1999; 15
December 1999
WT/DSB/M/72; Dispute Settlement Body – Minutes of Meeting; Held in
the Centre William Rappard on 9 December 1999; 11 January 2000
13.6 Dispute Settlement Body – Others
WT/DSB/RC/1; Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes; 11 December 1996
WT/DSB/W/74; Dispute Settlement Body; Procedures for the Review of
the Dispute Settlement Understanding; 26 February 1998
13.7 General Council – Minutes of Meetings
WT/GC/M/26; General Council – Minutes of Meeting; Held in the Centre
William Rappard on 19 February 1998; 16 March 1998
WT/GC/M/28; General Council – Minutes of Meeting; Held in the Centre
William Rappard on 24 April 1998; 8 May 1998
WT/GC/M/29; General Council – Minutes of Meeting; Held in the Centre
William Rappard on 15, 16 and 22 July 1998; 30 September 1998
WT/GC/M/31; General Council – Minutes of Meeting; Held in the Centre
William Rappard on 14, 16 and 23 October 1998; 9 November 1998
WT/GC/M/32; General Council – Minutes of Meeting; Held in the Centre
William Rappard on 9-11 and 18 December 1998; 9 February 1999
WT/GC/M/35; General Council – Minutes of Meeting; Held in the Centre
William Rappard on 15 and 16 February 1999; 30 March 1999
WT/GC/M/48; General Council – Minutes of Meeting; Held in the Centre
William Rappard on 6 October 1999; 27 October 1999
WT/GC/M/50; General Council – Minutes of Meeting; Held in the Centre
William Rappard on 3 and 4 November 1998; 16 November 1999
WT/GC/M/58; General Council – Minutes of Meeting; Held in the Centre
William Rappard on 10 October 2000; 8 November 2000
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WT/GC/M/60; General Council – Minutes of Meeting; Held in the Centre
William Rappard on 22 November 2000; 23 January 2001
WT/GC/M/61; General Council – Minutes of Meeting; Held in the Centre
William Rappard on 7, 8, 11 and 15 December 2000; 7 February 2001
WT/GC/M/63; General Council – Minutes of Meeting; Held in the Centre
William Rappard on 8 and 9 February 2001; 2 March 2001
WT/GC/M/65; General Council – Minutes of Meeting; Held in the Centre
William Rappard on 8 and 9 May 2001; 18 June 2001
WT/GC/M/66; General Council – Minutes of Meeting; Held in the Centre
William Rappard on 18 and 19 July 2001; 10 August 2001
WT/GC/M/69; General Council – Minutes of Meeting; Held in the Centre
William Rappard on 10 October 2001; 26 October 2001
WT/GC/M/71; General Council – Minutes of Meeting; Held in the Centre
William Rappard on 31 October and 1 November 2001; 13 December
2001
WT/GC/M/74; General Council – Minutes of Meeting; Held in the Centre
William Rappard on 13 –14 May 2002; 1 July 2002
13.8 General Council – Working Papers
WT/GC/W/77; Transparency and Derestriction; Communication from
the United States; 9 February 1998
WT/GC/W/88; Transparency in WTO Work – Procedures for the
Circulation and Derestriction of WTO Documents; Proposal by the
United States; 14 July 1998
WT/GC/W/92; Improving the Transparency of WTO Operations;
Communication from the European Communities; 14 July 1998
WT/GC/W/98; Transparency and Derestriction; Communication from
Canada; 22 September 1998
WT/GC/W/106; Transparency in WTO Work; Procedures for the
Circulation and Derestriction of WTO Documents; Revised Proposals
by the United States and Canada; 13 October 1998
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WT/GC/W/109; Special and Differential Treatment for Developing
Countries in the Multilateral Trading System; Communication from
Egypt; 5 November 1998 (see also WT/COMTD/W/49)
WT/GC/W/117; Review of Procedures for the Circulation and
Derestriction of WTO Documents; Note by the Secretariat on Proposals
made by delegations; 27 November 1998
WT/GC/W/133; Request for an Authoritative Interpretation Pursuant to
Article IX:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing The World Trade
Organisation; Communication from the European Communities; 25
January 1999
WT/GC/W/143; Request for an Authoritative Interpretation Pursuant to
Article IX:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organisation; Communication from the European Communities; 5
February 1999
WT/GC/W/144; Procedures for Amendment and Interpretation of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding; Response to European Communities’
Request for an Authoritative Interpretation of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding Pursuant to Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement;
Communication from the United States; 5 February 1999
WT/GC/W/410; Proposal to Amend Certain Provisions of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes (DSU) Pursuant to Article X of the Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Submission by Canada,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway,
Peru, Switzerland and Venezuela for Examination and Further
Consideration by the General Council; 29 September 2000 (and WT/GC/
W/410/Add.1 of 31 October 2000 [Chile added to the Group of Sponsors],
WT/GC/W/410/Add.2 of 15 January 2001 [Bolivia added to the Group
of Sponsors], WT/GC/W/410/Add 3 of 20 February 2001 [Uruguay added
to the Group of Sponsors]
WT/GC/W/410/Rev.1; Proposal to Amend Certain Provisions of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes (DSU) Pursuant to Article X of the Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Submission by Canada,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway,
Peru, Switzerland and Venezuela for Examination and Further
Consideration by the General Council; Revision; 26 October 2001
WT/GC/W/410/Rev.1/Corr.1; Proposal to Amend Certain Provisions of
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes (DSU) Pursuant to Article X of the Marrakesh Agreement
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Establishing the World Trade Organization, Submission by Canada,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway,
Peru, Switzerland and Venezuela for Examination and Further
Consideration by the General Council; Corrigendum; 1 November 2001
13.9 Ministerial Conference
WT/MIN(99)/8; Proposed Amendment of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding; Communication from Canada, Costa Rica, Czech
Republic, Ecuador, the European Communities and its member States,
Hungary, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Slovenia,
Switzerland, Thailand and Venezuela; 22 November 1999
WT/MIN(99)/8/Corr 1; Proposed Amendment of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding; Communication from Canada, Costa Rica, Czech
Republic, Ecuador, the European Communities and its Member States,
Hungary, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Slovenia,
Switzerland, Thailand and Venezuela; 23 November 1999
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1; Ministerial Declaration – Adopted on 14 November
2001; 20 November 2001
WT/MIN(01)/W/2; Proposal to Review the Dispute Settlement
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes; Communication from Thailand; 9 October 2001
WT/MIN(01)/W/3; Proposal to Amend the Dispute Settlement
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes; Communication from the Philippines and Thailand; 9 October
2001
WT/MIN(01)/W/4; Decision to Amend the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes; Communication from
the Philippines and Thailand; 29 October 2001
WT/MIN(01)/W/6; Amendment of Certain Provisions of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes; Submission by Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Switzerland,
Uruguay and Venezuela; 1 November 2001
13.10 Other Documents
MTN.GNG/NG13/1; Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement; Meeting
of 6 April 1987; Note by the Secretariat; 10 April 1987
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TN/C/M/1; Trade Negotiations Committee – Minutes of Meeting; Held
in the Centre William Rappard on 28 January and 1 February 2002; 14
February 2002
WT/AB/WP/5; Working Procedures for Appellate Review; 4 January 2005
WT/AB/WP/7; Working Procedures for Appellate Review; 1 May 2003
(re-issued on 4 January 2005 as WT/AB/WP/4 for technical reasons
explained in WT/AB/WP/W/9)
WT/AB/WP/8; Proposed Amendments to the Working Procedures for
Appellate Review; 8 April 2004 (reissued on 4 January 2005 as WT/AB/
WP/4 for technical reasons explained in WT/AB/WP/W/8)
WT/AB/WP/W/9; Working Procedures for Appellate Review –
Communication from the Appellate Body; 7 October 2004
WT/COMTD/W/49; Special and Differential Treatment for Developing
Countries in the Multilateral Trading System; Communication from
Egypt; 5 November 1998 (see also WT/GC/W/109)
WT/L/160/Rev.1; Procedures for the Circulation and Derestriction of
WTO Documents; Decision Adopted by the General Council on 18 July
1996; Revision; 26 July 1998
WT/L/452; General Council; Procedures for the Circulation and
Derestriction of WTO Documents; Decision of 14 May 2002; 16 May 2002
WT/L/579; Doha Work Programme; Decision Adopted by the General
Council on 1 August 2004; 2 August 2004
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International Trade Reporter, vol 15, no 13, 1 April 1998
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International Trade Reporter, vol 15, no 17, 29 April 1998
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US Has “Very Active” Trade Agenda, Official Asserts; in: International
Trade Reporter, vol 15, no 20, 20 May 1998
USTR Seeks Comments on WTO Dispute Procedures; in: International
Trade Reporter, vol 15, no 22, 3 June 1998
WTO Off to Slow Start on Review of Dispute Settlement Mechanism; in:
Inside US Trade, 12 June 1998
Comments on WTO DSU Review Seek Transparency, Private Party Role;
in: Inside US Trade, 3 July 1998
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in: Inside US Trade, 3 July 1998
Steel Companies Call for Reinforcement of WTO Dumping Review
Rules; in: Inside US Trade, 10 July 1998
US Proposal Calls on WTO to Release Dispute Panel Papers; in:
International Trade Reporter, vol 15, no 28, 15 July 1998
WTO Chief Outlines Plans for Increased Transparency; in: International
Trade Reporter, vol 15, no 29, 22 July 1998
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Inside US Trade, 24 July 1998
Ruggiero Places Onus for Additional Transparency on WTO Members;
in: Inside US Trade, 24 July 1998
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Settling Disputes; in: International Trade Reporter, vol 15, no 29, 29 July
1998
US, EU Banana Dispute May Become Test Case for WTO Rules; in: Inside
US Trade, 14 August 1998
Canada Says no to USTR Request for Industry Observers at WTO Talks;
in: International Trade Reporter, vol 15, no 35, 9 September 1998
Attorney Urges Private Party Participation to Protect Commercial
Interest at WTO; in: International Trade Reporter, vol 15, no 37, 23
September 1998
US Transparency Goals Seen Unlikely Focus of 1998 Review; in:
International Trade Reporter, vol 15, no 37, 23 September 1998
Talks on WTO Dispute Settlement Review Delayed Until Later in
October; in: International Trade Reporter, vol 15, no 39, 7 October 1998
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Administration Withstands Gingrich, Lott Pressure on EU Retaliation;
in: Inside US Trade, 9 October 1998
WTO Appeals Body Faults Implementation of Shrimp-Turtle Law; in:
International Trade Reporter, vol 15, no 40, 14 October 1998
EU Outlines its Proposal for Reforming Dispute System; in: International
Trade Reporter, vol 15, no 41, 21 October 1998
US Submits Revised Proposal on WTO “Timely” Transparency; in:
International Trade Reporter, vol 15, no 41, 21 October 1998
US, EU Clash Over Planned Retaliation for EU Banana Policy; in: Inside
US Trade, 23 October 1998
WTO Begins Contentious Talks on Reform of Dispute Resolution Rules;
Delays Expected; in: International Trade Reporter, vol 15, no 42, 28 October
1998
EU Outlines Proposals for Changes to WTO Dispute Settlement System;
in: Inside US Trade, 30 October 1998
Experts Complain WTO Dispute Settlement is Slow, Ill-defined, and
Often Unsuccessful; in: International Trade Reporter, vol 15, no 43, 4
November 1998
US Calls on WTO Members to Open Dispute Mechanism to Public; in:
Inside US Trade, 6 November 1998
US Recommends Prompt Compliance, Transparency to Reform WTO
Process; in: International Trade Reporter, vol 15, no 44, 11 November 1998
Complainants in WTO Shrimp Case Slam Appellate Body at DSB; in:
Inside US Trade, 13 November 1998
Four Nations Submit Proposals to Reform WTO Dispute Settlement
Process; in: International Trade Reporter, vol 15, no 47, 2 December 1998
Dispute Settlement Review Will Continue into Next Year; in: International
Trade Reporter, vol 15, no 48, 9 December 1998
Members of the WTO Vote to Delay Review of the DSU Until Next Year;
in: Inside US Trade, 18 December 1998
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1999
USTR Will Seek to Clarify WTO Rules on Dispute Settlement at
Ministerial Meeting; in: International Trade Reporter, vol 16, no 4, 27
January 1999
India, Mexico Block Proposal to Release More WTO Documents; in:
International Trade Reporter, vol 16, no 7, 17 February 1999
Canada Urges WTO to Adopt “Refinements” to Dispute Rules; in:
International Trade Reporter, vol 16, no 7, 17 February 1999
WTO General Council Passes on Clarifying WTO Dispute Rules; in: Inside
US Trade, 19 February 1999
Next WTO Negotiating Round Must Clarify Dispute Settlement,
Canadian Official Says; in: International Trade Reporter, vol 16, no 14, 7
April 1999
Canada Proposes Change for Dispute Rules in Draft Submitted to WTO
Settlement Body; in: International Trade Reporter, vol 16, no 21, 26 May
1999
Canada Floats Language to Clarify WTO Dispute Settlement Provisions;
in: Inside US Trade, 28 May 1999
ESI Calls on US to Broaden its Objectives for New Trade Talks to Include
WTO Reform; in: International Trade Reporter, vol 16, no 22, 2 June 1999
US Isolated on Sequencing Issues at WTO Dispute Reform Negotiations;
in: International Trade Reporter, vol 16, no 28, 14 July 1999
WTO Fails to Meet Deadline for Completing DSU Review; in:
International Trade Reporter, vol 16, no 31, 4 August 1999
WTO Members Deadlocked on DSU Review After Missing July Deadline;
in: Inside US Trade, 6 August 1999
Environmental Group Urges Reform of WTO Dispute Settlement
Process; in: International Trade Reporter, vol 16, no 33, 18 August 1999
Review of Dispute System in Limbo as Members Fail to Extend Mandate;
in: International Trade Reporter, vol 16, no 38, 29 September 1999
Proponents, Opponents of DSU Review Fail to Break Stalemate in WTO;
in: Inside US Trade, 8 October 1999
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North-South Stalemate Continues in Talks on Reform of WTO Dispute
Process Rules; in: International Trade Reporter, vol 16, no 40, 13 October
1999
DSU Review Draft Falls Short of US Demands for Transparency; in: Inside
US Trade, 22 October 1999
Official Says WTO Members Still Disagree on Reform of Dispute
Resolution Procedure; in: International Trade Reporter, vol 16, no 43, 3
November 1999
Barshefsky Says WTO May Endorse DSU Changes Short of US Demands;
in: Inside US Trade; 5 November 1999
Draft DSU Text Languishes as Countries Oppose Formal Consideration;
in: Inside US Trade, 5 November 1999
EU Demands on Retaliation Delay Progress on DSU Draft Review in
WTO; in: Inside US Trade, 12 November 1999
Revised Dispute Reform Text Presented to WTO Members; Differences
Remain; in: International Trade Reporter, vol 16, no 46, 24 November 1999
US, WTO Members Split Over How to Change DSU at Seattle; in: Inside
US Trade, 26 November 1999
Seattle Ministerial and Beyond: A Long, Winding Road for the WTO; in:
International Trade Reporter, vol 16, no 47, 1 December 1999
Trade Officials Say Accord is Near on WTO Dispute Settlement Reform;
in: International Trade Reporter, vol 16, no 47, 1 December 1999
Negotiators Try to Hammer Out Agreement on DSU Review; in: Inside
US Trade, 3 December 1999
DSU Review Faces Substantive, Procedural Challenges After Seattle; in:
Inside US Trade, 24 December 1999
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DSB Adopts Report on Leather Subsidies Despite Australia Protest; in:
Inside US Trade, 18 February 2000
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Inside US Trade, 18 February 2000
US Blocks WTO Compliance Review with Reversal on DSU Rules; in:
Inside US Trade, 24 March 2000
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Trade Lawyer Links More Negotiation to More Effective WTO Dispute
Resolution; in: WTO Reporter, 3 April 2000
EU May Challenge United States in WTO on Carousel Approach to Trade
Sanctions; in: International Trade Reporter, vol 17, no 19, 11 May 2000
WTO’s Moore Hails Trade Body’s System to Settle Dispute as 200th Case
Nears; in: WTO Reporter, 6 June 2000
Key WTO Members Score Appellate Body for Decision to Accept Amicus
Briefs; in: WTO Reporter, 8 June 2000
WTO Members Fight Appellate Body on British Steel over NGO Briefs;
in: Inside US Trade, 9 June 2000
USTR Puts Public Comments on “Carousel” Sanctions in Hundreds; in:
WTO Reporter, 21 June 2000
Rep. Cardin Revives Dole Plan to Create Panel to Review WTO Rulings
Against US; in: WTO Reporter, 23 June 2000
Text’s Footnotes on Carousel Retaliation Seen Likely to Sink Dispute
Settlement; in: WTO Reporter, 21 July 2000
Sen. Baucus Warns of Attacks on US Trade Laws in WTO Proceedings;
in: WTO Reporter, 21 July 2000
WTO Panel Sides With US Interpretation of Dispute Settlement Rules;
in: Inside US Trade, 28 July 2000
WTO Members Make Unfriendly Noises On “Friends of the Court”
Dispute Briefs; in: WTO Reporter, 9 August 2000
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Lamy Says; in: WTO Reporter, 3 November 2000
WTO Should Formalise Process for NGO Participation in Disputes; in:
WTO Reporter, 7 November 2000
WTO Appellate Body Sets Out Procedures for Amicus Briefs in Asbestos
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Inside US Trade, 19 April 2002
315
14. Press Reports
India Proposes Differential Treatment in DSU, SPS Agreements; in: Inside
US Trade, 19 April 2002
WTO Members Discuss DSU Changes Based on EU Proposal; in: Inside
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Baucus Urged to Back Proposal Calling for NAFTA Chapter 19 Reform;
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WTO Reporter, 6 May 2003
DSU Chairman to Table Draft Showing Possible Areas of Consensus; in:
Inside US Trade, 16 May 2003
Chairman Offers Compromise Text for WTO Dispute Settlement Review;
in: WTO Reporter, 19 May 2003
US, EU Pan WTO Chair Text on Dispute Settlement Reform; in: WTO
Reporter, 21 May 2003 [also published as US, EU Pan WTO Chair’s Draft
Text on Reform of Dispute Settlement Rules; in: International Trade
Reporter, vol 20, no 22, 29 May 2003]
Countries Clash Over DSU Chairman’s Proposal for Small Deal; in: Inside
US Trade, 23 May 2003
European Court Adviser Backs Firm’s Claim Against Illegal EU Ban on
US Hormone Beef; in: International Trade Reporter, vol 20, no 22, 29 May
2003
WTO Dispute Reform Talks Miss Deadline; Parties Plan to Keep Trying,
but Set no Date; in: WTO Reporter, 29 May 2003
WTO Members Fail on DSU Deal, Further Negotiations After Cancun;
in: Inside US Trade, 30 May 2003
DSU Consultations Focus on Extending Time, Sidestepping Mandate;
in: Inside US Trade, 11 July 2003
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New Deadline Set for DSU Negotiations, in: BRIDGES Weekly Trade News
Digest, vol 7, no 27, 28 July 2003
General Council Endorses New Deadline for Changing DSU Rules; in:
Inside US Trade, 1 August 2003
Members Unprepared to Engage in DSU Review; in: BRIDGES Weekly
Trade News Digest, vol 7, no 35, 23 October 2003.
Formal DSU Talks Stall, WTO Considers US Appellate Body Appointees;
in: Inside US Trade, 24 October 2003
DSB: EC-US Disputes Top Agenda; in: BRIDGES Weekly Trade News
Digest, vol 7, no 38, 13 November 2003
Mexican Study Cites Non-compliance as Top Problem in WTO Dispute
System; in: WTO Reporter, 14 November 2003
DSU Review: Members React to Mexican Study; in: BRIDGES Weekly
Trade News Digest, vol 7, no 40, 26 November 2003
Mexican Analysis Does Little to Dislodge Impasse in WTO on DSU Talks;
in: Inside US Trade, 28 November 2003
Commerce Official Downplays Chance of Self-Initiated Steel Case; in:
Inside US Trade, 12 December 2003
2004
WTO DSU Chair lays out new timetable for meeting May deadline; in:
Inside US Trade, 2 January 2004
Dispute Settlement: Lumber, Byrd Amendment and DSU Review; in:
BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, vol 8, no 1, 14 January 2004
DSU Review Off to Slow Start; in: BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest,
vol 8, no 3, 28 January 2004
WTO Chairpersons for 2004"; WTO Press Release no 371, 11 February
2004; http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres04_e/pr371_e.htm
WTO Agrees to New Chairs for Doha Round, Puts Off Decision on
Ministerial; in: Inside US Trade, 13 February 2004.
DSU Review: May 2004 Deadlines Slipping Out of Reach; in: BRIDGES
Weekly Trade News Digest, vol 28, no 8, 4 March 2004
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Chairman’s Call for Informal DSU Talks Produces Little Action’; in: Inside
Trade, 9 April 2004.
Package Deal to Salvage DSU Negotiations?; in: BRIDGES Weekly Trade
News Digest, vol 8, no 16, 4 May 2004; and
“Magnificent Seven” Offer Compromise as Clock Ticks Down to
Deadline in May; in: WTO Reporter, 4 May 2004
Deliberations on Package Deal for DSU Review Ongoing; in: BRIDGES
Weekly Trade News Digest, vol 8, no 17, 13 May 2004
Chair to Propose Indefinite Continuation of Dispute Reform; in: WTO
Reporter, 25 May 2004
Proponents Unveil Proposal for Limited Reform of WTO Dispute
Settlement Rules; in: International Trade Reporter, vol 21, no 22, 27 May
2004
Chairman Seeks Third Extension of WTO DSU Talks, but no Deadline;
in: Inside Trade, 28 May 2004
DSU Update: DSU Review Deadline Extended; Appellate Body
Developments; in: BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, vol 8, no 19, 2
June 2004
Fewer WTO Cases Filed So Far in 2004, Legal Affairs Director Wilson
Says; in: International Trade Reporter, vol 21, no 34, 19 August 2004
DSU Review: Members Discuss May Proposal, Dispute Settlement Data;
in: BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, vol 8, no 36, 27 October 2004
WTO Report Cites Sharp Decline in New Trade Dispute Cases for 2004;
in: International Trade Reporter, vol 21, no 43, 28 October 2004
Dispute Settlement Review Focuses on ‘Package Deal’; in: BRIDGES
Weekly Trade News Digest, vol 8, no 41, 1 December 2004
2005
DSU Update: Sugar, Gambling, EC Customs Procedures, Revised
Appellate Review Rules; in: BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, vol 9,
no 1, 20 January 2005
Trade Heavyweights US and EU Go to the Mat over Bilateral Disputes;
in: International Trade Reporter, vol 22, no 3, 20 January 2005
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Informal Papers Submitted During the 1998/1999 DSU Review
(Selection according to availability)
Review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding – Discussion Paper
from the European Communities; Job no 5602; DSU/7
Review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding – Discussion Paper
by India (undated)
Proposal by Guatemala Regarding the Review of the Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes; 26 October
1998
Preliminary Views of the United States Regarding Review of the DSU;
29 October 1998
Comments on The Review of The Dispute Settlement Mechanism; Non-
Paper by Venezuela; 24 February 1998
Comments on The Review of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism; Non-
Paper by Hungary; 18 September 1998
Issues Relevant to the DSU Review – Informal Suggestions by Korea;
Job no 3224 DSU/3
Review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding; Non-Paper Argentina;
27 October 1998
The Review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding – Informal
suggestions with respect to the issues to be considered for evaluation
and review by the Government of Japan; 29 May 1998; 3150 DSU/2
Informal Papers Submitted During the 2002/2003 Review
Diagnosis of the Problems Affecting the Dispute Settlement Mechanism;
Some Ideas by Mexico; undated file (November 2003)
Letters and Policy Papers
Letter by USTR Michael Kantor to Bob Dole, Senate Minority Leader,
dated 23 November 1994; reprinted in: Inside US Trade, 25 November
1994
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Right to Counsel: American Bar Association Section of International Law
and Practice – Recommendation and Report – Private Counsel in WTO
Dispute Settlement Proceedings; reprinted in: Journal of International
Economic Law, vol 2 (1999), no 1, pp 164– 81
Right to Counsel: The CCBE Resolution; in: Journal of International
Economic Law, vol 2 (1999), no 1, pp 182-184
Letter by Robert E. Lighthizer (Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
LLP, New York) and Alan WM. Wolff (Dewey Ballantine LLP) to Ms
Gloria Blue, Office of the USTR, dated 10 July 2000; http://
www.dbtrade.com/publications/blue_letter.pdf (downloaded on 10
August 2003)
AgTrade Coalition Policy Paper on Dispute Settlement Understanding
Reform, reprinted in Inside US Trade, 17 May 2002
Letter by Senator Max Baucus to USTR Robert B. Zoellick on DSU
Changes; dated 15 April 2002; reprinted in: Inside US Trade, 15 April
2002
Letter by Senator Max Baucus to Secretary Donald Evans and USTR
Robert B. Zoellick on DSU negotiations; dated 4 September 2002;
reprinted in: Inside US Trade, 6 September 2002
Frequently used internet resources
Dispute Settlement Commentary (DSC); http://www.worldtradelaw.net
GATT/WTO Analytical Index; http://www.wto.org
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Balás: 23; 27; 111f; 116f; 122; 127;
128f (~ text regarding =>
consultation requests); 130 (~
text regarding the process of
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regarding => notification
requirements for => mutually
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regarding => panel
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the => interim review); 139 (~
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=> nullification or
impairment); 156 (~ text on the
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treatment of => developing
countries with regard to =>
time-frames during the =>
panel stage); 187f (~ text on =>
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countries during the =>
implementation stage); 189 (~
text on => litigation costs); 190
(~ text on => legal assistance);
191 (~ text on other matters
relating to => special and
differential treatment of =>
developing countries); 196 (~
text on => time frames); 196f
(~ text on => measures
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Bananas (case): 24; 74; 79; 86; 95;
97; 99ff; 106f; 123; 150; 157;
159; 161; 162; 176f; 203; 213;
215;
bandwagon effects: 86;
basic rationale: => rationale;
Baucus: 114f;
Bed Linen (case): 186f;
bilateral investment treaties: 226;
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view to a => mutually agreed
solution); 148 (~ on the =>
reasonable period of time for
=> implementation); 207 (~ on
procedural agreements with
regard to => sequencing); 210;
222 (settlement of disputes
through ~); => also
consultations; => also
mutually agreed solutions;
bilateral trade agreements: =>
trade agreements;
blockage / blocking: 22; 55; 79; 87;
194; 211; 222; 230;
BOP: => balance of payments
measures;
Bovine hides (case): 186;
British steel (case): 108;
Bryn: 103f;
business confidential information:
=> confidential information;
Byrd Amendment (case): 114f; 186;
Cancún: 118f; 230; => also
Ministerial Conference(s);
capacity building: 178f (=> third
party rights as ~); 189; 191;
capital controls: 226;
carousel retaliation: 101f; 104f;
105-109; 111; 112; 118; 123;
159-161; 203; 207; 212; 215;
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chicken war: 48ff;
civil society: 104; 169; 203; => also
transparency; => also amicus
curiae briefs;
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proposals): 212;
clothing: => Agreement on Textiles
and Clothing;
collective retaliation: 49; 104; 161;
188; 207; 215; 242; 243; 249;
collegiality: 67 (role of ~ for the
work of the => Appellate
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142f (in the => Appellate
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comparative advantage: 33; 225;
compensation: 22; 49; 55; 68f; 83;
112; 153; 154f; 156; 156-159 (~
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concessions or other
obligations); 164; 179f (=>
third party rights in bilateral
~ arrangements); 182; 187; 188
(monetary ~); 196 (~ for =>
measures withdrawn); 207;
222; 238; 240; 241; 242; 243;
244; 246; 247; 249; 252;
competition: 33; 215; 226; 230;
competitiveness: 80; 156f;
compliance: 22; 37; 39; 49; 53; 55
(non-~); 68f (~ panel; non-~);
74 (non-~); 79f; 82f (incentives
for ~ and reputation costs of
non-~); 88f; 95-98; 99ff; 110 (~
panels); 113 (incentives
towards earlier ~); 119 (non-
~); 120f; 123; 132f (~ review of
=> mutually agreed
solutions); 146 (application of
the => remand procedure on
~ panel reports); 150-155
(introduction of a ~ panel
procedure); 157 (non-~); 159;
162; 163 (~ review regarding
the => termination of the =>
suspension of concessions or
other obligations); 205 (~
reviews of => mutually
agreed solutions); 207; 209 (~
reviews of => mutually
agreed solutions); 212; 228;
238; 239; 241; 245; 252;
composition of Appellate Body: =>
Appellate Body;
composition of delegations: 197;
244; 250;
composition of panels: => panel
composition;
conceptual proposals: 112f; 116;
237; => also Part IV of the book;
conciliation: 54; 70; 129; 184; 211;
242; 244; 250;
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conclusions: 233f;
Conference: 40f (=> ITO); => also
Ministerial Conference(s); =>
also United Nations
Conference on Trade and
Development;
confidential information: 27; 169ff;
171f; 178; 242; 248; 250; 251;
confidential(-ity): 61 (~ of =>
consultations); 64 (~ of parties’
submissions to the => panel;
of panel deliberations); 66 (~
of parties’ submissions to the
=> Appellate Body; of =>
Appellate Body
deliberations); 88 (~ nature of
the pre-panel stage); 127 (~ of
=> consultations); 132 (~ of =>
consultations); 167ff; 208f; =>
also transparency;
consensus: 22; 28; 54; 55; 62
(reverse ~); 65; 67f; 71 (reverse
~); 81 (~-based => political
decision-making); 102; 136;
139; 142 (~ in the => Appellate
Body); 147; 152; 201f (~
requirement for amendments
to the => Dispute Settlement
Understanding); 210f; 219 (~
requirement for amendments
to the => Dispute Settlement
Understanding); 200; 221 (~-
based => political decision-
making); 223ff (~ in =>
political decision-making);
227f; 231 (~ requirement for
changes to the DSU); 233; 252;
=> also reverse consensus;
constitutional: 28 (~ character of
the => DSU); 34ff (~ systems);
214 (~ character of the =>
DSU); 222 (~ reform of the =>
DSU);
constitutionalisation: 24; 78;
consultation(s): 21; 26; 40 (Havana
Charter); 43 (Art. XXII GATT);
61ff; 71; 127-133 (proposals on
~ in the => DSU review); 152
(proposals to hold ~ prior to
the request for a =>
compliance panel procedure);
177 (=> third party rights
during ~); 183f (=> special and
differential treatment during
~); 210 (=> special and
differential treatment during
~); => also consultation
requests;
consultation request(s): 61; 74
(number of ~); 112
(withdrawal of ~); 128f
(proposals on ~ in the => DSU
review, including withdrawal
of ~); 209 (lapse / withdrawal
of ~); 212 (lapse / withdrawal
of ~);
Consultative Board: 216; 228; =>
also Eminent Persons’ Group;
=> also Leutwiler Group;
CONTRACTING PARTIES: 43ff;
control: => political control;
controversies: 27; 201; 203f (~ on
major specific issues); 204-214
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(~ on the fundamental
orientation of the => Dispute
Settlement Understanding);
215; 219;
counter-complaints: 86;
countervailing measures: =>
Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures;
criticism (of WTO dispute
settlement / of panels / of the
Appellate Body): 80f; 96; 108;
113f; 136; 168f; 192-195; 203;
213; 216; 221;
cross-retaliation: 69; 153; 154; 161f
(freedom of ~ for =>
developing countries); 188
(freedom of ~ for =>
developing countries); 207;
data: => statistics;
David Spencer: => Spencer;
Dayton Craig Amendment: 115;
deadline(s) (for the => DSU review
negotiations): 23; 93; 99; 102ff;
112; 117; 118-122; 125; 202;
216; 217;
decision-making: => political
decision-making;
deference: 80; 114; 194; => also
standard of review;
delegations: => composition of
delegations;
deletion: 115 (~ of portions of a =>
panel or => Appellate Body
report); 117 (~ of portions of a
=> panel or => Appellate Body
report); 139 (~ of findings in
=> panel reports); 147 (~ of
findings in => Appellate Body
reports); 193; 210 (~ of
findings from => panel
reports and => Appellate
Body reports); 212;
democractic legitimacy: =>
legitimacy;
de-restriction (of reports): 168;
determination of the reasonable
period of time for
implementation: =>
reasonable period of time for
implementation;
determination of the sector(s)
subject to the => suspension of
concessions or other
obligations: => cross-
retaliation;
developing countries: 28; 48; 56; 75;
86; 98; 100; 113; 119ff; 129; 130;
133 (presence of ~ on panels;
=> also panel composition);
135 (presence of ~ on =>
panels; => also panel
composition); 149 (=>
reasonable period of time for
=> implementation in cases
involving ~); 157 (difficulties
of ~ to use the => suspension
of concessions or other
obligations); 161; 175
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(establishment of a => fund
for ~ to deal with => amicus
curiae briefs); 178f (treatment
of ~ with regard to => third
party rights); 183-191 (=>
special and differential
treatment of ~); 213; 219f
(improved integration of ~);
=> also special and differential
treatment (of developing
countries);
differential treatment: => special
and differential treatment;
Dillon Round: 48;
diplomatic: 21; 26; 28; 38 (~
protection); 47 (use of law as
a ~ instrument); 50 (~
approach to => dispute
settlement); 56; 70f; 148 (calls
for more ~ => dispute
settlement); 201; 204; 220; 222;
direct effect: 38; 222;
Director General: 51; 63 (recourse
to the ~ for => panel
composition); 133ff (recourse
to the ~ for => panel
composition); 149
(appointment of an =>
arbitrator by the ~); 222;
discretionary law(s): 96; 156; 197f;
208; 244; 247; => also
mandatory laws;
dispute escalation: 24; 87;
dispute initiation: 24; 26; 59ff; 71;
86f;
dispute outcome: 24; 88f;
dispute settlement (only selected
references): 21f; 59-72;
Dispute Settlement Body (only
selected references): 22; 55; 61
(footnote 11);
Dispute Settlement
Understanding (only selected
references): 21f; 38; 55; 59-72;
dissenting opinions: => opinions;
distribution: 34f (~ of gains and
losses);
distributive (negotiating)
approach: 230;
division (of the Appellate Body):
65;
Doha (only selected references): 23;
93; 105-111 (limbo between
Seattle and ~); 111-122
(negotiations under the ~
mandate); 127-198 (proposals
under the ~ mandate); => also
Ministerial Conference(s);
Doha work programme: => July
package;
Dole: 108;
double taxation agreements: 226;
DSB: => Dispute Settlement Body;
DSU: => Dispute Settlement
Understanding; => also
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dispute settlement; => also
DSU review; => also DSU
review in practice;
DSU review (only selected
references): 13; 21; 22f; 93-125
(~ negotiations); 127-198
(proposals in the ~); 199-234
(problems and perspectives of
the ~); 237-253 (tabular
overview of the proposals
under the ~); => also DSU
Review in practice;
DSU review in practice: 201; 217f;
231; 233f;
dual standard: 34ff ;
Dunkel: 52;
early harvest: 202; 219; 229f;
early leakage: => leakage;
early settlement: 82; 85; 87; 88; 132;
205f; 208f; => also mutually
agreed solutions; => also
consultations;
economic analysis of the courts: =>
law and economics;
economic interdependence: 226;
economic rationale: => rationale;
economics / economists: 24; 81ff;
economies of scale: 225;
electronic commerce: 226;
Eminent Persons’ Group: 222; =>
also Leutwiler Group; => also
Consultative Board;
empirical findings / literature /
research: 24; 26; 84-89; 133;
208; 219;
enforcement: 26; 33f; 37ff; 49f; 52
(~ problems); 82; 84 (limits of
~); 132; 157; 161; 207f
(strengthened ~); 212
(strengthened ~); 227;
enhanced third party rights: 177;
179; 182; 244; => also third
party rights;
enlargement (of the Appellate
Body): => Appellate Body;
“en route”: => goods “en route”;
equivalence (of the level of =>
suspension of concessions or
other obligations with the
level of => nullification or
impairment): => suspension
of concessions or other
obligations; => nullification or
impairment; => also
arbitration
escalation: => dispute escalation;
establishment of panels: => panel
establishment;
ETI: => Extraterritorial Income
Exclusion Act;
Executive Board: 40f;
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exemption for goods “en route”:
=> goods “en route”;
ex-officio prosecution: =>
prosecution;
expedited dispute settlement
procedure: 180; 196;
extension(s) (of deadlines): =>
deadline(s);
Extraterritorial Income Exclusion
Act: 107; => also Foreign Sales
Corporations (case);
factor(s): 33 (~ allocation); 34
(production ~ of import-
competing industries; ~ price
rigidity; ~ remuneration); 225
(~ endowment);
fast track: => Trade Promotion
Authority;
fast track panel procedure: 140
(proposal for the introduction
of a ~); 206; 208; 251;
financial compensation: =>
compensation;
fines: => compensation;
flexibility: 49 (traditional ~ of =>
GATT law); 61 (trade policy
~); 84 (trade policy ~); 115 (~
in => dispute settlement); 131
(~ in => dispute settlement);
134; 138 (~ in the => panel
procedure); 139 (~ in the =>
adoption procedure); 143f (US
/ Chilean ~ proposal on the =>
suspension of appellate
review); 144f (US / Chilean ~
proposal on the introduction
of an => interim review stage
for => appellate review); 169
(~ with regard to =>
transparency); 192-195; 201 (~
in adapting the DSU through
the => DSU review in
practice); 203 (~ in the
handling of => amicus curiae
briefs); 204; 208f; 209; 210; 211;
212; 213; 217 (~ of adjudicating
bodies in the handling of =>
amicus curiae briefs); 234; 246;
248; 252;
foreign direct investment: 226;
foreign policy: 34; 61;
Foreign Sales Corporations (case):
74; 80; 100f; 106ff; 114; 118;
123; 150; 203;
free trade: 33; 35; 50;
friend of the court briefs: =>
amicus curiae briefs;
FSC: => Foreign Sales
Corporations (case);
Fuji-Kodak (case): 95; 192;
full time panelists: => permanent
panel body;
fund: 175 (establishment of a ~ for
=> developing countries to
deal with => amicus curiae
briefs); 189 (establishment of
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a ~ to be used by =>
developing countries); 218 (=>
Advisory Centre for WTO
Law as substitute for a ~); 220;
242; 249; 250; 253;
fundamental orientation; => rule-
orientation and power-
orientation;
Gambling Services (case): 78;
game theory: 24; 82;
Gasoline (case): 96; 169;
GATS: => General Agreement
Trade in Services;
GATT: => General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade;
General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (only selected
references): 21f; 36; 42-57; 73-
90;
General Agreement on Trade in
Services: 77f;
General Council (only selected
references): 61 (footnote no 11);
98; 102; 118; 119; 122; 141; 194;
211; 212; 223;
general provisions (of the DSU):
71;
generic options (to remedy the =>
imbalance between =>
adjudication and => political
decision-making): 221-228;
genetically modified products: =>
GMO
Geneva (Ministerial Conference):
94; => also Ministerial
Conference(s);
globalisation: 225ff;
GMO (case): 118;
good offices: 54; 70; 129; 184; 211;
242; 244; 250;
goods “en route”: 162; 238; 239;
247;
government procurement: =>
Agreement on Government
procurement;
GPA: => Agreement on
Government Procurement;
Havana Charter: 26; 39-42;
hearing(s): 63 (=> panel ~); 66 (=>
Appellate Body ~); 96f (=>
public access to ~); 168-170 (=>
public access to ~); 182 (giving
=> third parties the possibility
to attend ~); 218 (denial of
access of => third parties to =>
Appellate Body ~); 222 (public
~); 239;
historical evolution: 39-57;
Hong Kong (Ministerial
Conference): 232; => also
Ministerial Conference(s);
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horizontal issues / proposals /
topics: 23; 26f; 123; 127; 167-
198; 233; 237;
Hormones / Hormone Beef (case):
74; 79f; 95; 97; 101; 107; 118;
123; 159; 163f; 177; 203; 215;
house-keeping: 117; 128f;
ICJ: => International Court of
Justice;
ICSID: => International Centre for
Settlement of Investment
Disputes;
imbalance (between =>
adjudication and => political
decision-making): 81; 211;
220-228; 231; 233f;
IMF: => International Monetary
Fund;
impairment: => nullification or
impairment;
impartiality requirement: 190;
implementation (only selected
references): 22; 26; 54
(surveillance of ~); 67-69 (the
~ stage in WTO => dispute
settlement); 79f (~ problems);
95 (~ problems); 97 (~
problems); 99ff (~ problems);
117; 128 (~ of => mutually
agreed solutions); 132f (~ of
=> mutually agreed
solutions); 148-165 (proposals
for the ~ stage); 177ff (=> third
party rights during the ~
stage); 186-188 (proposals for
=> special and differential
treatment of => developing
countries during the ~ stage);
207; 212; => also compliance;
239; 240; 241; 244; 245; 246;
248; 249;
Improvements: => The 1989
Improvements;
incentives: 37 (~ for policymakers);
82 (~ in the litigation process;
~ for compliance); 113 (~ for
earlier => compliance); 127 (~
in the => consultations
process); 132 (~ in =>
compliance reviews of =>
mutually agreed solutions);
154 (increased ~ for =>
compliance); 164f (increased ~
for => implementation); 207 (~
for prompt => compliance);
209 (~ for => early settlement);
income classification: 76 (of
complainants / respondents in
WTO Dispute Settlement);
incremental strategy (to correct the
=> imbalance between =>
adjudication and => political
decision-making): 227f;
information: => right to seek
information or => confidential
information
information technology: 226;
initiation: => dispute initiation;
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integrative (negotiating)
approach: 230;
intellectual property rights: 54; 77;
226; => also Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights;
interim (review / report): 55
(introduction of ~ review at
the panel stage during the
Uruguay Round); 63 (~
report); 64f (~ report); 71; 101;
116 (~ report); 137 (~ report);
138f (proposals in the => DSU
review on the ~ for the =>
panel stage); 144f (proposals
in the => DSU review on the
introduction of an ~ for the =>
appellate review stage); 179;
181 (~ report); 193 (proposals
in the => DSU review on the
introduction of an ~ for the =>
appellate review stage); 210;
212;
International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes: 39;
International Court of Justice: 41;
195; 250;
International Monetary Fund: 224;
International Trade Organisation:
39ff; 43; 56f;
international transactions: 226;
227;
interpretation: 22; 38; 71f; 100;
193ff; 211; 212; 221; 223f; 242;
250;
investment: 215; 226;
investment measures: =>
Agreement on Trade-Related
Investment Measures;
IPR: => intellectual property rights
or => Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights;
ITO: => International Trade
Organisation;
judicial restraint: 106; 224; 228;
July Package: 122;
Kåre Bryn: => Bryn;
Kennedy Round: 48;
Lamb Safeguard (case): 196;
lapse: 64 (~ of panel’s authority);
128f (~ of => consultation
requests); 131 (~ of =>
consultation requests); 182;
209 (automatic ~ of =>
consultation requests); 212 (~
of => consultation requests);
239;
law and economics: 82;
lawyers’ fees: => litigation
expenses;
LDCs: => least-developed
countries;
leakage: 168;
337
16. Index
least-developed countries: 55; 75;
87; 113; 135 (representation of
~ on => panels); 178ff (~ with
regard to => third party
rights); 219; => also
developing countries;
legal assistance: 189f; 213; 218; 233;
=> also legal costs; => also
Advisory Centre on WTO
Law;
legal costs: 164; 188ff; 207; 244; 252;
253;
legal literature: 24; 78-81;
legal office: 51;
legislative response: 224;
legitimacy: 133 (~ of the => panel
process); 167f; 222
(democratic ~ of the => WTO);
length of the reasonable period of
time for implementation: =>
reasonable period of time;
Leutwiler Group: 52; 222; => also
Eminent Persons’ Group; =>
also Consultative Board;
level (of nullification or
impairment): => nullification
or impairment; => also
arbitration;
level (of suspension of concessions
or other obligations): =>
suspension of concessions or
other obligations; => also
arbitration;
licensing agreements: 226;
linkage(s): 28; 108; 202; 213; 216;
230;
litigation expenses / costs: => legal
costs;
Magazines (case): 95; 100;
majority: 46 (~ conclusions in =>
GATT working parties); 67 (~
votes in => Appellate Body
reports); 141 (~ decisions in =>
panel reports); 143 (~
decisions in => Appellate
Body reports); 195; 223ff; 227
(~ voting); 249; 250;
mandatory law(s): 96; 155f; 197f;
208; 244; => also discretionary
laws;
market access: 35ff; 39; 54 (~ for US
exports); 158; 227; 230;
material disputes: 214ff; 229;
Max Baucus: => Baucus;
measures withdrawn: 196f; 207;
242;
mediation: 49; 54; 70; 129; 184; 211;
222; 242; 244; 250;
member control: => political
control;
Mexican study: 119;
MFN: => most-favoured nation
(principle / treatment);
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mid-term improvements: => The
1989 Improvements;
Ministerial Conference(s): 23; 93
(Seattle ~, Doha ~); 94 (Geneva
~); 110 (Doha ~); 118 (Cancún
~); 195; 202; 223; 232 (Hong
Kong ~);
Ministerial Decision: 22; 93; 105 (~
on the Application and
Review of the =>
Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes);
Ministerial Declaration(s): ´ 23 (=>
Doha ~); 53 (=> Punta del Este
~); 93 (=> Doha ~); 111 (=>
Doha ~); 229 (=> Doha ~);
Ministerial Meeting: 53 (Punta del
Este ~); => also Ministerial
Conference;
monetary compensation: =>
compensation;
most-favoured nation (principle /
treatment): 36; 45; 177; 241;
multiple complainants: 54; 64; 140
(proposals in the => DSU
review on cases with ~); 248;
Music Licensing (case): 108; 180;
mutually acceptable (trade or
other) compensation: =>
compensation;
mutually acceptable / agreed
solution(s): 42; 51; 61f; 64; 71f;
112 (monitoring of ~); 128
(implementation of ~; => also
implementation); 129 (=>
notification of ~); 130ff (=>
notification of ~); 132f (=>
implementation of ~); 152 (~
for the => implementation of
=> DSB recommendations
and rulings); 168; 176 (=>
notification of ~); 182
(notification of ~); 205 (=>
notification requirements for
~; => compliance reviews of
~); 209 (=> notification
requirements for ~; =>
compliance reviews of ~); 212
(=> notification requirements
of ~; => compliance reviews of
~); 238; 239; 245; 251; => also
notification; => also
compliance review(s) of
mutually agreed solutions;
national treatment: 36;
NCPI: => New Commercial Policy
Instrument;
negotiability of the => suspension
of concessions or other
obligations: 165; 207; 245;
negotiating history: 41 (~ of the =>
Havana Charter); 174 (~ of the
=> Uruguay Round); 191; 244;
negotiating/-ons (only selected
references): 25 (~ proposals; ~
process); 93-125 (DSU Review
~); 214ff (on-going WTO ~);
229;
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New Commercial Policy
Instrument: 60; => also Trade
Barriers Regulation;
NGOs: => Non-Governmental
Organisations;
non-compliance: => compliance;
non-discrimination: 36;
N o n - G o v e r n m e n t a l
Organisations: 96; 98; 108; 169;
175f; 182; 203; 218;
Non-Tariff Measure Codes: 50f;
non-violation: 48f; 55;
normative pressure(s): 47; 56; 83;
227;
North-South divide / controversy
between industrialised and
developing countries: 123;
203f; => also transatlantic
divide;
notice of appeal: 66; 121; 143
(proposals in the => DSU
review on the ~ ); 182; 233; 243;
248;
notification: 54; 62 (~ requirement
for mutually agreed
solutions); 61 (~ requirement
for consultation requests); 71;
129 (~ requirement for
mutually agreed solutions);
130ff (~ requirement for
mutually agreed solutions);
151f (~ requirement of
measures taken for =>
implementation); 159 (~
requirement of =>
compensation arrangements);
176 (~ requirement for =>
mutually agreed solutions);
178 (~ of => third party
interest); 182 (~ requirements
for => mutually agreed
solutions and => third party
rights); 196f (~ requirements
for => measures withdrawn);
205 (~ requirements for =>
mutually acceptable
solutions); 207 (~
requirements for =>
retaliatory measures); 208 (~
requirements); 209 (~
requirements for => mutually
agreed solutions); 212; 243;
NTM: => Non Tariff Measure
Codes;
nullification or impairment: 40; 42;
43f; 48f (=> non-violation; =>
Uruguayan Recourse); 57; 61f;
69 (equivalency of the =>
suspension of concessions or
other obligations with the
level of ~); 71; 90; 111
(determination of the level of
~); 112 (arbitration on the level
of ~); 131; 151 (arbitration on
the equivalence of the level of
=> suspension of concessions
or other obligations with the
level of ~); 153ff
(determination of the level of
~) ; 155f (level of ~); 161 (level
of ~ with regard to =>
collective retaliation); 163
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(recomputation of the level of
~); 164 (early determination
and application of ~ / =>
retroactive determination and
application of ~); 187; 197f
(level of ~ caused by measures
taken under => discretionary
laws); 207f; 240; 241; 244; 245;
246; 247; 248;
number of Appellate Body
members: => Appellate Body;
obligations: => rights and
obligations or suspension of
concessions or other
obligations;
Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988:
=> Section 301;
openness (of WTO dispute
settlement): 168f; 203f; 217;
225; => also transparency;
opinion(s): 41 (~ of the =>
International Court of Justice
in => ITO dispute settlement);
64 (~ of panelists); 66 (~ of =>
Appellate Body members);
141 (calls for separate written
~ in => panel reports); 142f
(allowing dissenting ~ in =>
Appellate Body reports; calls
for separate written ~ in =>
Appellate Body reports); 195
(advisory ~ from the =>
International Court of Justice);
210 (calls for separate
(written) ~ in => panel reports
and => Appellate Body
reports); 212 (calls for
separate ~ in => panel reports
and => Appellate Body
reports); 249; 250;
orientation: => rule-orientation or
power-orientation;
other compensation: =>
compensation;
outcome: => dispute outcome;
outlook (for the DSU review):
230ff;
panel/-s (only selected references): 22;
26; 46f; 54 (~ procedures); 62f;
133-141 (proposals in the =>
DSU review on the ~ stage);
145ff (=> remand ~
procedure); 167ff (=>
transparency in ~
procedures); 172 (handling of
=> confidential information
by ~); 172ff (handling of =>
amicus curiae briefs by ~);
177ff (=> third party rights
during the ~ stage); => also
panel composition; => also
panel establishment; => also
panel hearings; => also panel
reports; => also panel requests;
=> also panelists;
panel composition: 51; 54; 55; 63;
97; 133-136 (proposals in the
=> DSU review on ~); 184f (=>
special and differential
treatment of => developing
countries in ~); 193; 206; 243;
246; 253; => also panelists; =>
also permanent panel body;
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panel establishment: 51; 54; 62; 71;
79; 119; 136; 140 (=> multiple
complainants); 152 (with
regard to => compliance
panels); 191;
panel hearings: => hearings
panelist(s): 62; 119 (appointment of
~ from => developing
countries); 135 (qualification
of ~); => also panel
composition;
panel report(s) (only selected
references): 22; 65; 74 (number
of ~); 139 (proposals in the =>
DSU review on the =>
adoption of ~); 146 (=>
remand ~);
panel requests: 62; 112
(withdrawal of ~); 128; 136;
137f (proposals on the
withdrawal of ~ in the => DSU
review); 191; 209 (withdrawal
of ~); 212 (withdrawal of ~);
partial adoption: 117; 139
(proposal for a ~ of => panel
reports); 147f (proposal for a
~ of => Appellate Body
reports); 193; 210f; 212; 219;
246; 252; => also adoption;
Patents (case): 98;
payoffs: 82f;
per diem: 135 (~ of panelists); 248;
permanent panel body; full time
panelists; PPB: 96; 104; 112;
117; 133ff (proposals in the =>
DSU review for a ~); 140; 147;
206; 212; 219; 238; 239; 240;
248; => also panel
composition;
perspectives (of the DSU review):
=> outlook (for the DSU
review);
Peter Balás => Balás;
phytosanitary measures: =>
Agreement on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures;
policy recommendations: 13; 25;
28; 219-230;
political control / control: 81; 115f
(member ~ in => dispute
settlement); 139 (member ~
over the => adoption process);
148; 192-195 (proposals to
regain ~); 204; 206; 210f; 213;
221f; 246; 252;
political decision-making: 28; 81;
90; 201; 220-228 (imbalance
between => adjudication and
~); 231; 233f;
political economy: 21; 24; 26; 33ff;
42; 82ff;
political science / scientists: 23f;
81ff;
political will: 38; 56; 79; 90;
positive feedback effect: 86;
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positive solution: 72; 129; => also
mutually acceptable solution;
power-orientation: 26; 204f; 209-
214; 219; 221; 231; 233f; => also
rule-orientation;
PPA: => Protocol of Provisional
Application;
PPB: => permanent panel body;
practice: => DSU review in
practice;
predictability: 71; 80 (adverse
effect of the => suspension of
concessions or other
obligations on the ~ of trade
conditions); 157 (adverse
effect of the => suspension of
concessions or other
obligations on the ~ of trade
conditions); 205 (increased ~
of trade conditions due to =>
compliance reviews of =>
mutually agreed solutions);
226f; 234;
preferential trade agreements: =>
trade agreements
preventive measures: 165; 208; 245;
private parties: 39; 60;
problems (of the => DSU review):
201-218;
procedural disputes: 214ff; 229;
production factor(s): => factor(s)
professional panellists: =>
permanent panel body;
proposals: => stage-specific
proposals; => horizontal
proposals; => textual
proposals; => conceptual
proposals;
prosecution / “ex officio”
prosecution: 39; 49; 71;
protectionism / protectionist
measures: 21; 35; 52; 87; 95;
Protocol of Provisional
Application: 42f;
provisional measures: 120;
public access: 168-171; => also
transparency;
public observers: 169; => also
transparency;
Punta del Este: 53;
QR: => quantitative restrictions;
qualification: 135f (~ of =>
panellists);
quantitative restrictions: 36; 42
(prohibition of ~); 98 (~ case);
185 (~ case); 187;
quasi-automatic(ity): =>
automatic(ity);
rationale: 26 (economic ~ of =>
trade agreements); 33ff
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(economic ~ of => trade
agreements; ~ of the => WTO
system); 42; 57 (~ of =>
reciprocity); 139 (~ behind a
finding); 147 (~ behind a
finding); 228 (~ behind a
finding); 252;
reasonable period of time (for
implementation): 22; 68f; 98
(longer ~ for => developing
countries); 99f (end of the ~ for
=> implementation in the =>
Bananas case); 104; 148f
(proposals on the
determination of the ~ for =>
implementation); 149f
(proposals on the length of the
~ for => implementation);
151f; 157; 186ff (=> special and
differential treatment with
regard to the ~); 205; 211;
reciprocity: 21; 35f; 37f; 42; 48; 56;
71f; 84; 89f; 155; 207;
recomputation of the level of
nullification or impairment:
=> nullification or
impairment;
recourse to Art. 21.5: =>
compliance (panel);
regional seats (in the Appellate
Body): => Appellate Body;
regional trade agreements: =>
trade agreements;
remand: 66; 80; 96; 112; 117; 120f;
145ff (proposal in the => DSU
review for the introduction of
~ authority for the =>
Appellate Body); 238; 239;
248; 250; 253;
re-negotiating /re-negotiation(s):
49 (of Art. XXIII => GATT); 84;
214ff (~ a system in use); 218;
233f;
rent-seeking: 80; 157;
reputation costs: 82f; 227;
research: => legal literature; or =>
economics / economists; or =>
political science; or =>
empirical literature; or =>
theoretical literature;
restraint: 35 (constitutional ~); 228
(in bringing cases to =>
adjudication); => also judicial
restraint;
retaliation / retaliatory measures:
=> suspension of concessions
or other obligations;
retroactivity: 113; 164; 196; 207;
245; 248;
reverse consensus: => consensus;
review: => standards of review; or
=> DSU review; or => WTO
dispute settlement review
commission;
rights and obligations: 21; 42; 56;
65; 67; 71f; 84; 90; 180; 191;
193f; 207; 221;
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right to seek information: 64; 172-
176; 194; 242; 249; => also
amicus curiae briefs;
roster (of panelists): 52; 63; 134f;
149; 246; 248;
rotation: => carousel retaliation;
RPT: => reasonable period of time;
rules of conduct: 63 (~ for
panelists); 65 (~ for Appellate
Body Members);
rule-orientation: 26; 28; 53; 71; 201;
204-209; 211; 212-214; 219; 221;
231; 233f; => also power-
orientation;
Safeguard Agreement: =>
Agreement on Safeguards;
Salmon (case): 108;
sanctions: => suspension of
concessions or other
obligations;
sanitary measures: => Agreement
on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures;
Sardines (case): 176; 182;
satisfaction: 25; 28; 94; 123; 201; 216
(general sense of ~ with the
DSU); 231; 233f;
scale: => economies of scale;
scholars: => research;
SCM: => Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing
Measures;
SCOO: => suspension of
concessions or other
obligations;
S&D: => special and differential
treatment;
Seattle: 23; 46; 49; 51; 63; 94; 99-105;
105ff (limbo between ~ and =>
Doha); 108; 123; 216; => also
Ministerial Conference(s);
Secretariat: 47; 51; 94; 135; 142; 169;
188-190 (~ Assistance); 191f
(Role of the ~); 243; 244; 249;
250;
Section 301: 52; 54; 55; 60f; 69; 89;
95; 100; 117; 144; 194; 215; 229;
sector(s) subject to the =>
suspension of concessions or
other obligations: => cross-
retaliation;
selection of panellists: => panel
composition;
separate written opinions: =>
opinions;
sequencing problem: 68f; 100f;
106f; 112f; 117f; 120f; 123; 150-
155 (proposals to resolve the
~); 203; 207; 212; 215; 217; 233;
=> also compliance panel;
services: => trade in services;
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Shrimp-Turtle (case): 96ff; 143; 169;
172f; 215;
Singapore issues: 230;
single package approach: 56;
small countries: 80; 157; 204
(footnote 1);
softwood lumber (case): 113ff;
sovereignty: 56f; 169; 225; 227;
Special 301: 54; => also Section 301;
special and differential treatment
(of developing countries): 26f;
98; 130; 136 (~ regarding =>
panel establishment rules);
149 (~ regarding the length of
the => reasonable period of
time for implementation);
183-191; 211; 212; => also
developing countries;
specialisation: 225f;
Spencer: 120;
SPS: => Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures;
stage-specific proposals: 123; 127-
165;
standard of review: 96; 108; 114;
194; => also deference;
standing (in WTO dispute
settlement): 39; 60; 176;
standing panel body: =>
permanent panel body;
state of play: 128f (~ of disputes);
statistics / data: 24; 26; 73ff (~ on
the use of WTO => dispute
settlement); 84; 94; 119; 148 (~
on the time required for the
determination of the =>
reasonable period of time for
implementation);
status report(s): 68; 151; 187;
Steel (safeguard) (case): 113f; 119;
submissions (only selected
references): 27 (~ to the => DSU
review); 63f (~ to the panel);
65f (~ to the => Appellate
Body); 169f (making ~ public);
172-155 (=> amicus ~); 177-182
(=> third party ~); 238; 239;
240; 242; 243; 244; 245; 247;
248; 251;
subsidies: => Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures;
substantial (trade) interest: 61; 64;
65; 177-180; 182; 250; 252; =>
also third party rights;
Super 301: 54; => also Section 301;
suspension of appellate review:
143; 193; 210; 212; => also
appellate review;
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suspension of concessions or other
obligations / retaliation: 22; 41
(ITO); 55; 68f; 71; 80; 97; 107;
112; 118; 120f (removal of ~);
132; 150ff; 156-159 (=>
compensation versus ~); 159-
161 (=> carousel retaliation);
161 (=> collective retaliation);
161f (freedom of => cross-
retaliation for => developing
countries); 162 (exemption of
“goods en route” from the ~);
163f (termination of the ~);
164; 165 (negotiability of the
~); 203; 207f; 213; 222;
suspension of panel procedure: 64;
71; 137f (proposal on the ~);
193 (proposal on the ~);
suspension of the application of
challenged trade measures:
165;
Suzuki / Suzuki text: 103f; 109; 111;
129; 130; 136; 138; 170
(footnote 20); 187 (footnote
113); 195; 238; 239;
systemic difficulties / problems: 28;
214; 233;
TBR: => Trade Barriers Regulation;
TBT: => Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade;
technical advice: 64; 174; => also
right to seek information;
technical assistance: 49; 54; 191;
244;
technical barriers to trade: =>
Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade;
technical improvements: 28; 219;
Telecommunications (case): 78;
termination of the suspension of
concessions or other
obligations: 163f; 207; 238;
239; 245; => also suspension of
concessions or other
obligations;
terms of appointment of the
Appellate Body: => Appellate
Body;
terms of reference: 54; 63 (footnote
29); 106; 146; 152 (~ for =>
compliance panels); 185; 247;
249;
textiles: => Agreement on Textiles
and Clothing;
textual proposals: 112; 116; => also
Part IV of the Book;
theoretical literature: 24; 33; 81-84;
89;
The 1989 Improvements: 52ff; 86f;
third countries: => third party
(rights);
third party adjudication: 46; 56; 70;
205
third party prosecution: =>
prosecution;
347
16. Index
third party rights (only selected
references): 26f; 48; 54; 55; 61 (~
in consultations); 64 (~ during
the panel stage); 65 (~ during
appellate review); 71; 103f;
108f (refusal of US to grant ~
in the case on => carousel
retaliation); 113; 117; 120f; 129;
131; 139; 140; 148; 157 (impact
of the => suspension of
concessions or other
obligations on third
countries); 159 (~ with regard
to => compensation
arrangements); 169f (~ with
regard to => transparency);
175f (relationship of ~ to =>
amicus curiae briefs); 176-183;
190 (easing of the
requirements for =>
participation of => developing
countries); 192; 208; 210; 212;
218; 233; 243;
time frames (only selected
references): 22; 54 (~ for
consultations and panels); 79;
97; 100f; 103; 117; 129
(proposal for a reduction of
the ~ for => consultations);
136f (~ for the => panel
procedure / for => panel
establishment); 144 (~ for =>
appellate review); 148f (~ for
the determination of the =>
reasonable period of time for
=> implementation); 154 (~ in
the determination of the level
of => nullification or
impairment); 184 (additional
~ for => developing countries
during => consultations as a
measure of => special and
differential treatment); 185
(additional ~ for =>
developing countries during
the => panel stage as a
measure of => special and
differential treatment); 195f;
205f (reduced ~); 211; 212
(reduced ~ / extension of ~);
time lines: => time frames;
time savings: => time frames;
Tokyo Round: 50f; 56; 213;
TPA: => Trade Promotion
Authority;
Trade Act of 1974: => Section 301;
trade agreements: 21; 33-36 (=>
rationale of international ~);
37ff (enforcement of
obligations under the
multilateral ~); 83f; 86
(preferential ~); 114; 226
(bilateral or regional ~); 232;
trade in services: 77; 226;
Trade Barriers Regulation: 60;
trade compensation: =>
compensation;
trade liberalisation: 21; 33ff; 37; 81;
Trade Negotiations Committee: 54;
122;
Trade Promotion Authority: 114f;
231; 234;
348
Negotiating the Review of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding
Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights:
=> Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights;
Trade-Related Investment
Measures: => Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment
Measures;
trade remedy (cases / laws /
measures): 80; 108; 114f; 123f;
194; 196; 203; 215; 246;
trade restrictions: 21; 34ff; 80; 82;
157;
transatlantic disputes: 48; 88; 107ff;
118f; 231; => also Foreign Sales
Corporations (case); => also
Bananas (case); => also
Hormones (case); => also
transatlantic divide;
transatlantic divide: 123; 203f; =>
also transatlantic disputes; =>
also North-South divide;
transition periods / transitory
provisions: 28; 108; 110; 194;
224f; 228f; 234;
transparency: 27; 96ff; 100; 102;
108; 113; 116; 118; 120f; 123;
129; 131; 132; 167-171; 176; 182
(~ and => third party rights);
203f; 208; 210; 212; 219; 238;
240; 242; 245; 248;
transportation technology: 226;
TRIMS: => Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures;
TRIPS: => Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights;
Tuna rulings: 169;
two-part strategy: 215;
unanimity: 202; => also consensus;
UNCTAD: => United Nations
Conference on Trade and
Development;
Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes: =>
Dispute Settlement
Understanding;
Understanding Regarding
Notification, Consultation,
Dispute Settlement and
Surveillance: 51;
UNDP: => United Nations
Development Programme;
unemployment: 34;
unilateral: 33 (~ liberalisation); 37
(~ punishment; ~ action); 38 (~
granting of => direct effect); 41
(~ action); 48 (~ retaliation); 52;
54 (aggressive ~ism); 55; 69 (~
determinations of => non-
compliance); 71 (prohibition
of ~ action); 95 (~ => Section
301 policies); 100; 106; 160 (~
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modifications of the list of
concessions; => also carousel
retaliation); 194 (~ application
of => Section 301); 248; => also
Section 301;
United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development: 185;
225; 242;
United Nations Development
Programme: 185; 242;
unsolicited information /
unsolicited reports: 97f; 172-
175; => also amicus curiae
briefs;
Uruguayan Recourse: 48ff; 90;
Uruguay Round: 21f; 26; 52-55; 56;
85; 86; 164; 174; 194; 220; 224;
229;
use / users of WTO => dispute
settlement: 73-78;
veil of ignorance: 214;
voting: 195; 223ff; 227;
waiver(s): 159; 164; 223;
weighted voting model: 225; =>
also voting;
welfare theory: 35;
withdrawal of consultation
requests: => consultation
requests;
withdrawal of panel requests: =>
panel requests;
working party: 46; 54 (working
party procedures);
Working Procedures: 47; 66 (~ for
appellate review); 121; 140
(proposed rule on the contents
of => panel reports; proposed
introduction of standard
panel ~); 143 (~ for =>
appellate review); 170
(amendment of the ~ to allow
for more => transparency);
177; 181f (~ on => third party
rights); 192; 197; 218; 238; 239;
241; 245; 247; 248; 250; 252;
World Bank: 224;
World Trade Organisation (only
selected references): 21; 36f; 56;
59; 220-228 (correcting the =>
imbalance between =>
adjudication and => political
decision-making at the ~);
written opinions: => opinions;
written submissions: =>
submissions;
WTO: => World Trade
Organisation;
WTO Agreement (only selected
references): 21; 59; 201; 220-225;
WTO dispute settlement review
commission: 108; 115;
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